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To ifje Skevoes of tfje Adriatic. <PV 



The last year of the European war will be reg- 
istered in History — when History is written 
with the object of serving Truth, and Truth only, 
ent it is written merely to pander to the 
idiced cravings of our Allies — as the 
4 ory of the Italian Navy. It can truly be 

asseriea chat never before have the hearts and 
the minds of our seamen, closely welded toge- 
ther, constituted a more nobly-tempered weapon; 
a weapon of more rapid and sure action; a very 
weapon of precision intended to attain military 
victories as well as moral victories; than during 
the year which wafted on Illyrian winds, from 
Durazzo to Buccari, the names of the heroes who, 
in Trieste Harbour, in that of Pola (which was 
several times violated), and at Premuda, struck 
the finishing blow to the naval power of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. Deeds of the greatest 
daring were carried out in the deepest silence ; the 
greatest results were obtained by means of the 
most unforeseen combats. A handful of men, as 



5 - 



many as could be contained in an almost invisible 
boat were enough to reduce destinies in subjection 
to their power. On moonless nights these men, 
led by an infallible eyesight, sustained by an in- 
flexible will, becoming disembodied ghosts, mere 
shadows, mere images, were able to pass through 
mazes sown with mines, break through barriers 
of steel and carry with them confusion and death 
into the deep lairs where the monsters of the ene- 
my fleet lay hidden; and one of their number, 
Luigi Rizzo, the David of the Adriatic, at last, 
on a May dawn, in the open sea under the won- 
dering skies, and like a hero of the legends of old, 
threw with his sling the deadly missiles and felled 
the monsters which had incautiously emerged 
from their dark lairs with the intent of blasting 
out Italy's sea defences. For they were Boroevics 
vanguards, the vanguards of the chief who was 
at that moment preparing to fulminate Italy from 
the uplands and on the Piave. Truly a marvel- 
lous historical basis for the poetry of centuries to 
come. At that moment, the cause of the Entente 
seemed as good as lost. The English armies were 
already with their back to their sea. Ludendorfs 
guns were pointed on Paris, which, in apprehen- 
sion of the imminent invasion, had already re- 
moved her Penates to Avignon. The souls of the 
people of England and France were cast down in 
trepidation and anxiety, as had been those of the 
Christians on the eve of the year One Thousand. 
The Italian victory at Premuda at one stroke, 



_- 6 



cleared the horizon of the terror which darkened 
it and completely changed the course of events. 
The naval power of Austria-Hungary once over- 
thrown, and Lissa avenged, Italy forthwith pro- 
ceeded to beat down the Dual Empire's military 
power also, on the Piave; thus reducing by one 
half the strength of Germany; the half represented 
by the forces of her faithful Ally: so thai the 
Entente, after four years of a struggle which 
seemed desperate, could finally overcome her 
formidable foe as never before she could hope to 
do, until Italy had overthrown Austria-Hungary 
on land and sea. 

Yet, Italy's victory was her crime. 

That which was immediately acknowledged by 
the Generals and the Statesmen of the Central 
Empires : by Boroevic and Ludendorf, by Czer- 
nin and Broc\dorfi-Rantzau, namely, that Italy s 
victory had determined their defeat, neither Fran- 
ce nor England by means of the preordinated 
propaganda of their Governments, nor America 
(indeed the Americans arrived here too late to 
examine and judge affairs in a direct manner, 
disinterestedly, with their minds clear of prejudice 
and their soul clear of jealousies), neither France 
nor England, I say, would ever admit or acknow- 
ledge. They did their utmost, on the contrary, to 
underrate our victories and to lessen the import- 
ance which they bore on the results of the war. 
The suppression or the mutilation of our War 
Bulletins, including the historic one issued by Ge- 

— 7 — 



neral Diaz on the 21s*. of October 1918, clearly 
show the tendency which was followed by the 
Allies during the armistice and became further 
accentuated at the Peace Congress. 

How has it been possible that two great Powers, 
which wish to be considered amongst the most 
civilized and most liberal minded in the world, 
have thought fit to pursue, immediately after Ger- 
many's defeat, the same conduct towards Italy, 
their Ally, as the small Balkan nations pursued, 
towards one another, after Turkey's first defeat ? 

The writings on the subject of our policy and 
of the policy of the Allies, which I have collected 
in this volume and which first came to light dur- 
ing the war, and precisely from the day of the 
fall of Mount Lowcen, will, I trust, illustrate 
the reasons and the causes of the Allies' conduct 
towards us; reasons and causes which I have 
culled in the heat of the daily conflicts. 

During the war, France and England remained 
firm in their old traditional mentality, which was 
made up of diffidence and hostility towards Italy; 
and Italy remained firm in her old, traditional 
prudery and pusillanimity in the face of the Allies, 
as, in the past she had remained in the face of 
her peace Allies; for, mental cowardice is the 
predominant characteristic of Italian Statesmen. 

Besides, the war was felt and considered, by 
the Powers of the former Entente merely as an 
isolated episode, at the termination of which each 
of them would resume her old relations with 



8 — 



Austria, more or less defeated and reduced in 
power, with Greece, with Serbia or with Yugo- 
slavia in order to continue the raising of obstacles 
against the expansion of Italy — Italy the intruder, 
Italy the troublesome — in the eastern Mediter- 
ranean, as well as to prevent her from penetrating 
into the Balkan Peninsula and into Asia. And 
Italy, on her side, did not possess the necessary 
moral force to unhinge the mentality of those two 
Powers; and, beyond the usual generalities, so 
full of hypocrisy and so devoid of essence, about 
the brotherhood of the peoples united for the 
glory of Democracy, oblige them to consider the 
war under the aspect of a real and true revolution 
of minds and interests in international relations. 
In any case, she did not find the elementary 
audacity nor the elementary sagacity to prevent, 
by means of special actions of warfare undertak- 
en of her own accord, the by no means occult 
designs of her Allies; and to act in a way as to 
cause apprehension by those actions; or, at all 
events, to place her Allies in the presence of ac- 
complished facts on the day of reckoning. When- 
ce it has happened that no sooner were arms laid 
down than she found herself at the Paris Congress 
with clean but empty hands, by the side of her 
war Allies, which, the war once ended, have not 
considered themselves any longer as Allies, and 
have ta^en no further trouble to recognize or to 
guarantee the Treaties concluded during the war. 
Which one of the two, the representative of Great 



Britain, or the representative of France has been 
the most forgetful - let us call him so - at the Paris 
Congress ? We will not waste time in seeding to 
discover to whom the lead in the race belongs. 
Both one and the other have acted in conformity 
with their respective individual and national cha- 
racter: Lloyd George has acted with the serene 
nonchalance of the trader who, having already 
done his stroke of business, endeavours to reap 
all the profit for himself, and to leave to his part- 
ner, if anything, the remembrance of the honour 
reaped in the effort made in collaboration. Cle- 
menceau has acted with frisky Gallic insolence 
which, according to Macchiavelli, in days of good 
fortune does not acknowledge the benefits recei- 
ved and the help solicited in times of ill-fortune. 
The less wise of the two, Clemenceau, with so 
much French glory around him, was wrong in 
attempting to humble the glory of Italy, which is, 
like that of his own country, made up of tears 
and of blood. He, having in his hands the future 
of a country li\e France, which is exposed to all 
perils, and in need of all possible help, ought not 
to have alienated for ever the soul of the Italian 
people, that soul which was entirely his! 

In any case, both Lloyd George and Clemen- 
ceau, with the object of diverting, for their own 
particular ends, Mr. Wilsons sight from the rents 
which they were tearing in his Fourteen Points, 
gave him a free hand against innocent and ill- 
defended Italy; so that, in company with the Yu- 

— 10 — 



goslavs and the American bankers who are sub- 
sidizing Yugoslavia, he might amuse himself by 
composing on Istria and Dalmatia his games of 
puzzles which they had forbidden him to compose 
on their own geographical maps; and that he 
might likewise amuse himself by fishing out of 
the Adriatic that famous principle of his of the 
Freedom of the Sea which, even before the open- 
ing of the Congress they had so blithely caused 
him to lose at the bottom of both Oceans. Even 
the most solemn mythologies are apt to end in the 
« Bantering of the gods » . 

What solution will be arrived at, to-morrow, 
at the Paris Congress, on our questions, if it will 
be arrived at, or if a solution is in any way pos- 
sible ? 

My firm belief is that the Paris Congress will 
be unable to solve in a serious and lasting manner 
either our own questions or the other European 
questions which it is called upon to solve, on ac- 
count of the moral, intellectual and political de- 
rangement which permeates it; and, likewise, on 
account of the equivocal ends it wishes to reach 
through that derangement in contempt of the per- 
manent and fundamental interest of the nations; 
and furthermore, in order to attain the triumph 
of momentary and particular interests appertain- 
ing to more or less accredited financial groups; 
or perhaps even for the sake of the experiments 
on ideology which Mr. Wilson thinks himself 

— 11 - 



authorized in making on the scarred bodies of the 
nations of Europe. 

Democracies are founded upon the concept of 
responsibility of individuals exercising power, and 
these individuals can exercise this power only 
in so far as their action is liable to be submitted 
to judgement and approved and disapproved of, 
or even annulled together with their function by 
the prescribed judges, that is, by the so-called 
representatives of the peoples' sovereignty. 

Now, Mr. Wilson, in his function as President 
of the United States is intangible : no control, or 
only a useless control can be exercised over his 
actions, as the judgement would not entail any 
penalties; and he could never be sentenced to loss 
of power on account of any error or injustice he 
were to commit at the Paris Congress, because he 
is inevitably destined to remain President of the 
United States until the end of his term of office. 
And if, to this condition of irresponsibility enjoy- 
ed by him, we add the fact that as President of 
the United States he is at liberty to employ the 
immense financial, industrial and food resources 
of his great country, and, by their means, to exer- 
cise a pressure on the will of the representatives 
of the European nations and especially of those 
who are the least wealthy and, consequently, the 
more easily influenced, it is easy to understand 
what strange and hitherto unheard-of form of ty- 
ranny he has come to exercise in Europe in the 
name of the most liberal-minded people of the 

- 12 -, 



world. In exercising this tyranny he represents his 
own personality and « a thought of his hrain » , 
hut he represents neitheir the spirit nor the inter- 
ests of the American Nation. And, through no 
fault of ours and through no desire on our part, 
we find ourselves dragged into a conflict with the 
people of America, whereas it is only Mr. Wil- 
son who is in conflict with us and in conflict with 
the history and the geography of our most an- 
cient country, which he does not know, and which 
he is neither in a position to \now, nor to under- 
stand. 

Yet, what is to he done? Unfortunately we 
ard all moving in absurdity. And, from absurdity 
only chaos can emerge, and not the state of order 
and of peace which the world is anxiously await- 
ing. 

Therefore, we cannot, on our own account, con- 
ceive any hopes in the Paris Congress. And we 
must consider our former Allies as enemies. 

I dedicate this book to our Heroes of the 
Adriatic. 

Let them \eep a vigilant guard over our rights 
and our honour! Let them heep our enemies, and 
especially our A Hies at a distance from both shores 
of that sea! And, above all, let them be the win- 
ners of the diplomatic battle which our political 
men have been incapable of fighting, and which 
they have so miserably compromised. 

Italy, by now, has faith in nought else but their 
valour, in which the loftiest wisdom resides. 

V. MORELLO. 



y 



LA DAME AUX CAMELIAS. 



We all remember the delightful scene between 
Marguerite and Armand, which closes the first 
act: 

(( You are moved, Armand; your accent is sin- 
cere; you are convinced of what you are saying... 
Your emotion, your sincerity deserve a reward... 
Take this flower ». (She gives him a camelia). 

(( What am I to do with this flower ? » 

(( You will return it to me » . 

« When ? » 

« When it is faded ». 

« And how long will that take ? » 

(( Oh, the length of time it takes a flower to 
fade... The length of an evening or of a morn- 
ing » . 

(( Ah, Marguerite, how happy I am ! » 

(( Well, tell me once more that you love me ». 

« Yes, I love you ! » 

« And now, go ». 

((I go». (s'eloignant a reculons, say the stage 
instructions). 

And so, in the same manner as Armand, the 
good Denys Cochin has left Greece, with a ca- 
melia in his hand. But he has not had time to see 



15 



his flower fade. The wind, during the journey, 
has blown the leaves away. 

It is really pathetic to see what sweet sentiment- 
ality prevails in the war diplomacy of our Allies. 
The house is burning, treason is at our heels, the 
submarines are in the /Egean. Yet our French 
friends cannot find anything better wherewith to 
extinguish the conflagration, to stifle the treason, 
to destroy the submarines, than to send a lover 
of Athens along the streets of that city to shout: 
(( Zeto Greece ! » and to get maudlin over the cry 
that re-echoes, of: « Zeto Gallia! » Oh, m amour! 

We are at war, we are struggling in the fiercest 
war that the history of mankind records ; yet that 
lover loses thirty days in huzzas and salaams in 
a country which has already all gone over, arms 
and baggage, to the enemy: in a country which 
not an hour ago, but for fully a year has been 
bound to the enemy by a graceful pact — grace- 
ful, was it not ? for it was made in defiance of 
an old-standing treaty of fidelity with Servia — 
and, instead of choosing and using weapons, be 
they merely legal ones, to obtain a divorce, care 
is taken to select the most pleasing expressions 
to compose toasts with, and verses for future 
Alexandrine anthologies 7 Courtesy prevented us, 
some days ago, from commenting upon as they 
deserved, the interviews granted by M. Denys 
Cochin, all mingled with honey and ambrosia in 
honour of Greece; but fearing, and not unjusti- 
fiably, alas, by what has taken place up to now, 
that the decisions which the French Government 
will have to take together with the other Allies 
in view of the new replies that King Constantine's 
Government is sure to make, may bear the same 
stamp as those romantic interviews, we are in 
duty bound to make our protests in anticipation. 

- 16 — 



No, Gentlemen, war is not conduct eel that way; 
the Mediterranean is not held thus: and all will 
be lost. You must decide to issue from the pre- 
judice in which you have wrapped yourselves up 
since the beginning of the war, like the women 
of the Middle Ages in the belt of chastity, whilst 
their husbands overran the East: you must issue 
forth from the prejudice that your marriage with 
Greece is indissoluble. You must conceive your 
future differently from what you had designed and 
prearranged it to be before the German competitor 
fell upon the coveted prey. Believe me, no new 
song can be composed out of old sentiments, nor 
new politics out of old ideas. Cut away you must, 
and cut ruthlessly into the raw and living flesh. 
If you do not make a clean cut of it, to-morrow 
gangrene will set in. As an Italian writer, I do 
not want gangrene to set in also in Italy. Let us 
avoid infection. 

I know not what the Government will do and 
say on the subject of Greece: and I am not sup- 
posed to know. But I have read that the French 
Press, with some apprehension, has reproduced 
the threat — made under the form of courteous 
advice — by the officers of the Greek army to 
those of the Entente, to fall back on Salonika 
before the Austro-Germans descend from the Ser- 
vian mountain passes. I have read that the English 
Press, with no less anxiety, reproduces the other 
threat, also under the form of courteous advice, 
of taking away the Salonika railway and port 
from the operations of the Allies. And lastly, I 
have read that in the House of Commons, Lord 
Robert Cecil replying to a question on the subject, 
has been obliged to say that « he was sorry that 
he could not give a reassuring answer and could 
not state that an understanding had been arrived 



17 — 



at between th® Quadruple Alliance and the Greek 
Government » . 

When, then, will this understanding be arrived 
at, if up to now it has not been ? And until when 
will the Greek Government drag the Entente 
along the ill-chosen road of its intentions ? At 
every halting-place of the Austro -German-Bul- 
garian army on its way towards the Greek 
boundary line King Constantine's Government 
becomes renitent or renegade. What are the 
Powers of the Entente waiting for } That the last 
link of the Balkan chain be welded on Greek ter- 
ritory, and that thet Austro -Germano-Bulgarian 
chain be rivetted on their ankles ? Evidently 
declarations of a mellifluous character coming 
from the Ministers of Gorgias will not be 
wanting in these days. But declarations are 
made up of words, and war does not brook 
words. Signer Sonnino, in his speech of the day 
before yesterday said with candid precision that 
the Balkan peoples have allowed themselves to 
be dominated and have determined their action 
by their own particular appetites and resentments 
rather than by the high ideal reasons of their 
existence or by right. What shall be said of 
Greece, then, which, to those two elements adds 
another: fear, in a negative sense; and a fourth 
in a positive sense : the promise made by Germa- 
ny as reward for her line of conduct ? In the 
conduct of Greece are in action two elements 
more than are to be found in the conduct of the 
other comrades of the Balkan Gain... 

And are there people who believe that new 
and old elements can be won over by a camelia ? 

Oh, now more than ever is the time come to 
call: Nanin, courez chercher le medecin! 



— 18 



ANTWERP MOUNT LOWCEN. 



We have placed ourselves, as citizens, under 
the strictest discipline, which imposes upon us 
the most complete, the most absolute renunciation 
of all personal ideas and of all personal senti- 
ments for the cause of the fatherland. But, as 
writers, we have not given up our mission as 
observers and critics of all the actions and events 
which, directly or indirectly, bear upon the po- 
litics of the war. Discipline does not exclude 
criticism ; on the contrary, criticism serves to 
strengthen discipline and to render it more intel- 
ligent and more scrupulous. We can abstain 
from gathering news and from commenting on 
facts which, at a given moment, might offer to 
the enemy some useful elements of information 
or of judgement. But we cannot refrain from 
examining and discussing events which belong 
to the domain of history: which are, rather, his- 
tory itself. Discussion is always useful to clear 
up and explain the motives of action and to avoid, 
at all events, misunderstandings and errors in the 
future. 

Last November, Winston Churchill appeared 
in the House of Commons to explain the reasons 

— 19 — 



of his resignation from the office of First Lord 
of the Admiralty. Public opinion had charged 
him with two grave responsibilities: that of the 
fall of Antwerp and that of the Dardanelles Ex- 
pedition. On the first charge he excused and de- 
fended himself stating that having been informed 
too late, he was barely in time to send to the 
relief of Antwerp the Naval Reserves, which 
were very poor in quality and very little trained. 
On the second charge he said that having been 
unable to obtain from the War Office the 40.000 
men demanded by the Admiralty for a combined 
action on land and sea on the Gallipoli Peninsula, 
he was constrained to limit himself to a sea action 
only. In consequence of that speech England was 
at last informed that on two most serious issues 
of the war she had been wanting in men for her 
military operations. And, it may be said that 
from that point the conscription propaganda gain- 
ed its first victory. 

With all due reserve, I believe that with regard 
to the situation on the Adriatic the fall of Mount 
Lowcen has the same importance that the fall 
of Antwerp had in the situation of Northern Eu- 
rope!. This opinion, to judge from Press comments, 
is accepted by many writers on military matters 
both in Italy and in the allied nations. It would 
be interesting' to know, from the point of view of 
the politics of the war, whether the Italian Govern- 
ment be of the same opinion. 

Winston Churchill, in the speech above refer- 
red to, stated that on the first announcement of 
the decision of the Belgian Government to eva- 
cuate Antwerp and give up the defence of that 
place he offered, in the Cabinet, to go in person 
to Antwerp for the purpose of inducing the Bel- 
gian Government to continue in the resistance. 



20 



He went, in fact, and suceeded in his intent. But, 
owing to the scarcity of means he could not 
equally succeed in bringing over the necessary 
help. As to Mount Lowcen, I ask: Was there a 
want of judgement or a lack of means on the part 
of the Italian Government ? Did the Italian Go- 
vernment believe that it was unnecessary or inop- 
portune to assist Montenegro in holding the posi- 
tions on Mount Lowcen, or were the Italian for- 
ces insufficient for the undertaking ? 

In the event of the second supposition being 
true, we cannot express an opinion for want of 
positive evidence. But if the first supposition were 
true, namely, if it were a question of the policy 
which underlay the direction of the war, I, for 
my part, would feel that I was seriously failing in 
my duty towards the public if I did not condemn 
that policy. 

The recollection of our war in Lybia is a recent 
one. 

At an early stage we could have struck down 
Turkey by land and sea and have thus rapidly 
decided the fortunes of the war. But we allowed 
the Turkish Fleet, which we had at the mercy 
of our guns, to escape whilst it was returning 
home through the Dardanelles from the ports of 
Asia Minor ; and we allowed ourselves to be per- 
suaded to turn back from Prevesa, whilst the gun 
fire of the Duke of the Abruzzi was commencing 
to do « wonders)). We lost, in that manner, a 
year and half of precious time and a milliard and 
half of money in the sands in striving to build up 
an edifice which is still wanting of foundations. 
We had then to yield to the wishes of Germany 
in respect of the Turkish Fleet, and to those of 
Austria in respect of Prevesa. But now, if we 
are not actually at war with Germany, we cer- 

— 21 — 



tainly are with Austria. And are we, with our 
own hands, to bind ourselves in this war with the 
same chains that Germany and Austria together 
placed round us in the previous war "> 

Even not wishing to extend our operations 
beyond the limits rendered possible by our for- 
ces in the East, we cannot consider any point on 
the opposite shore of the Adriatic as being beyond 
the pale of our war — which at the very least is 
essentially an Adriatic war. To restrict our action 
to the Alpine boundaries would be, not for the 
European war alone but for our own war, the 
grossest of errors. 

The « Niggardly Company » cannot be the ideal 
model of a nation. It was at most the model of 
a bygone Italian Ministry which was neither fort- 
unate nor long-lived. 

In last evening's « Tribuna » it was said that 
(( the territorial conquests of the enemy do not 
constitute in themselves a decisive factor » — and 
up to this point I may agree — but it was added : 
(( It would certainly pay Austria very much better 
not to occupy Mount Lowcen, and not to have her 
currency depreciated by 4 1 per cent and her bonds 
by 50 and 60 per cent » — and here I cannot 
agree. If the commercial war were the equivalent 
of the military war, evidently one of the two 
would be unnecessary. Nor let it be said that one 
could not exist without the other. The fact is, 
that no military war has ever terminated in Stock 
Exchange Reports. And if we calculate the fall 
in the value of bonds as liabilities, we must also 
calculate conquests as assets. Now, I do not be- 
lieve it to be a sound war policy not to take mea- 
sures to prevent everywhere and at all times the 
conquests of the enemy: especially if these be 
gained on our very threshold. 

— 22 — 



All ideas, all arguments and even all events 
should be discussed publicly, so as to test, during 
the discussion, their soundness and validity. 

The Italian People has such sound nerves and 
heart, is so firm and tenacious of purpose, so dar- 
ing and resolute in action, that it can well listen 
to our discussions — and, better still, become 
their judge. 



- 23 



SOME TRUTHS. 



We have an unbounded belief in the final vic- 
tory of the Quadruple Alliance; but, notwith- 
standing all that, we are not inclined to excuse 
its deficiencies or justify its errors. 

The deficiencies must be displayed in broad 
daylight and must not be excused, that is, hushed 
up ; and the errors must be discussed and must 
not be justified, that is, attenuated. We are at 
war: mental reservations and begging the ques- 
tion are not admissible in war. 

At every success of the Central Powers we hear, 
with irritating monotony, this perpetual refrain: 
— (( But the question will be settled at the end of 
the war, after the victory of the Quadruple Allian- 
ce » — or this other : — « But the question will 
be decided on another field ». — Propositions, 
these, which contain a large portion of truth, but 
cannot contain the whole truth. Undoubtedly, all 
the questions will be resolved at the end ; but we 
must not allow the enemy to compromise them 
all by his successes. Undoubtedly, the war will 
be won more in the West than in the East. But 
no harm would be done if it were won both in 
the East and in the West, and wherever fighting 

- 24 — 



is going on. In any case, would it not be better 
to make an effort to win all over ? 

After the last Montenegrin comedy and the 
consequent surprise of the public, the Press of the 
Quadruple Alliance is now striving to demon- 
strate that, since the beginning of the war the con- 
duct of the Cettigne people was equivocal and 
that it could not fail, in the end, to fall on the 
side on which it was leaning. But is this a justifi- 
cation ? Is it not rather an accusation against the 
Quadruple Alliance } Given such people and such 
suspicions, the Allies' diplomacy cannot put for- 
ward any excuse for its failure, having had ample 
time to take precautions. That was the time, of 
all times, to do at Cettigne what had been done 
at Salonika: to take possession of it, plant oursel- 
ves there firmly, organize — whether the Pefero- 
vichs liked it or not — the defences against the 
invader, if not before at least immediately after 
the defeat of the Servians, that is, when there 
was no further doubt as to the nature of Austria's 
designs. Instead of that, we have stood idle in 
the most fatalistic manner, watching the supplies 
furnished by Italy rot on the quays of St. John 
of Medua, and awaiting the ripening of events 
on Mount Lowcen. No: even if all were agreed 
in upholding and demonstrating the contrary, I 
should never desist from proclaiming that the 
diplomacy of the Allies can put forward neither 
excuses nor extenuating circumstances for the 
failure in Montenegro. This diplomacy does not 
possess, nor has it shown itself to possess, either 
the mind or the means necessary to conceive and 
put into execution a serious war programme, a 
serious programme of power and command. The 
diplomacy of the Allies does not possess the 
revolutionary spirit which is absolutely essential 



25 



in the great crises of history : its soul is not eager 
for renovations and upheavals; one would say, 
rather, that it is afraid to see ideas and things 
displaced from the point in which it found them 
and where it was accustomed to admire them 
until yesterday. It issues forth to meet the bar- 
barous, troublous, turbulent action of Germany 
with a minuet step and to the music of the oca- 
rina. In her war of invasion Germany employs 
all means, especially the factor Man: the Allies 
ignore Man. Through man, by means of reason- 
ing, persuasion, corruption, Germany endeavours 
to conquer Governments and States before she 
launches forth her armies. The Allies, the miserly 
Allies, are afraid or hesitate to open their hearts 
or their purses even to the Balkan peoples, whose 
maxim : « The f riiend is valued for what he 
gives and the enemy for what he takes away 
from you », is well-known. In such a manner they 
have allowed the people of Montenegro to slip 
through their fingers ! And they have permitted 
them to do, in an inverse sense with Mount Low- 
cen, what they did in April 1913 with Scutari. 
Do you remember the taking x>f Scutari, at that 
time ? At first it seemed, after a long siege, a 
glorious conquest ; and it turned out to be nothing 
more than a stupid comedy instead ; precisely like 
yesterday's surrender of Mount Lowcen. 

After this last misadventure of Montenegro, 
the Press of the Allies, finally apprehensive as 
it seems, is crying out unanimously from London, 
Paris and Rome : « Unity of consultation and of 
decision is necessary)). This may be attained, 
although after all that has takem place it appears 
to me that it will come too late. But, rather than 
unity of consultation, a transformation of mind and 
conscience is indispensable, a transformation of 

— 26 — 



the soul from which counsel generally emanates. 
The diplomacy of the Allies possesses a sluggish 
soul: an animula, rather than a soul, vagula and 
blandula; and it needs, instead, the formation of 
a proud and unprejudiced soul: a revolutionary 
soul in the truest and highest sense of the word; 
a soul new and innovatory, for there is no greater 
revolution than this European war, and it is im- 
possible to govern this immense war by means 
of the unaggressive and moderate ideas which 
prevail in times of ordinary administration. 

As to Italy, there is no one, I believe, in our 
country who is not convinced of the necessity of 
our war. The more Austria unfolds and carries 
out her Balkan programme, the more this neces- 
sity reveals itself in an evident and imposing man- 
ner. Austria's descent on Servia, on Montene- 
gro and on Albania could not have or have any 
other final goal than the definite and complete 
vassalage of Italy in the Adriatic. 

But is Austria to be allowed to accomplish this 
programme in its entirety and in all its details 
during the war, even if it has to be overturned 
afterwards, like so many other things, at the end 
of the war ? Or, rather, would it not be better to 
prevent her from carrying it out, now, day by 
day, whilst the war is raging and we are all in- 
volved in it ? 

The problem seems to me to be of a certain 
gravity. 

Neither I, nor you, readers, have the power 
to solve it. 

But to propound it, it is to be hoped, yes. 



— 27 — 



UPPER AND LOWER ADRIATIC. 



Was it well or ill to have failed to help Monte- 
negro — whether she wished it or not — in the 
defence against the Austrian advance ? Was there 
the possibility of bringing an efficient help in any 
case, at the proper time or at the last moment ? 
Whose was the responsibility for the failure to 
cooperate with Servia and Montenegro in good 
time or at the last hour ? All these questions are 
past by this time, and it would be useless and 
dangerous to protract a discussion upon thern. 
We are in time of war, and time cannot be wasted 
in discussing the past. Every hour that is lost in 
inquiries on an event that has already taken place, 
is lost for the preparation of a new event : it is 
lost, in fact, for action. Let us, then, pass on. 

The defeat of Montenegro creates a new situa- 
tion in the Lower Adriatic. Montenegro was the 
natural barrier to the Austrian penetration in 
Northern Albania. This barrier once fallen, Aus- 
tria can more easily and surely make a descent - 
in Albania, towards Durazzo and Elbassan, and 
join the Bulgarian forces proceeding from Ma- 
cedonia towards the Adriatic coast. What steps 
are to be taken to meet this new situation ? And 

— 28 — 



should this situation be taken into consideration 
and declared to be a cause of anxiety on our part 
before it be on the part of the Allies ? 

In his speech at Ancona, Signor Barzilai said 
that in the scale of political values the positions 
of the Lower Adriatic cannot have the same worth 
to-day that they had during the thirty years of the 
Triple Alliance, and that these positions are to 
be defended to-day by means of the conquest of 
the positions on the Upper Adriatic that garrison 
them. But, in Signor Barzilai's words there is, 
if I misake not, totum in fieri nihil in esse. For 
we do not yet possess the positions on the Upper 
Adriatic and Austria, who holds them, is on her 
way to conquer those of the Lower Adriatic too. 
Hence, with regard to us, the problem must be 
put upon a different basis from that upon which 
Signor Barzilai has placed it, namely: ((Is it in 
the interests of Italy — who has not yet in her 
power the positions of the Upper Adriatic — to 
allow Austria to conquer those of the Lower 
Adriatic also ? » 

I may be mistaken, but to put the problem is 
to solve it. 

Ay, solve it, also for another reason which I 
have stated in another article, in contradiction 
to a statement of the Trihuna, namely that the 
solution of all questions should not be postponed 
until the end of the war, but that efforts should 
also be made to solve some of them on the way. 
The integral conception of the final victory should 
not exclude efforts for partial successes. 

Now, to conclude on this vital point, I do not 
believe that it is sound war policy, whilst Tries- 
te, Istria, Dalmatia and the islands are still under 
the sway of Austria, to allow the shores of Mon- 
tenegro a® well as those of Albania also to fall 

— 29 - 



under Austrian power. It is not sound war policy 
to allow the aggrandizement and the enrichment 
of the enemy, in the hope of taking everything 
away from him all at once afterwards. The « poli- 
cy of the artichoke)), in the Italian tradition, 
means to strip the symbolical vegetable leaf by 
leaf: not to increase its size and cover it with 
new and fresher leaves whilst it is on the enemy's 
table. 

Should the principle of the depreciation of the 
Lower Adriatic — combined with the second 
principle of rendering the final accounts after the 
victory of the Allied armies, and co-ordinated 
with a third principle of the concentration of our 
effort on the one point where we are called upon 
to defend our frontier — prevail, one could arrive 
even at the conclusion that the evacuation of 
Valona is desirable; taking into consideration, 
according to the statement made by Signer Bar- 
zilai. that we have organized the Valona expedi- 
tion for the purpose of assisting the Servians dur- 
ins: their retreat; and this once accomplished: 
(( Italy's conduct will be based on the conception 
of a common struggle as far as that conception 
can be usefully pursued and attained » . But will 
it be possible to arrive as far as the evacuation 
of Valona ? I trust that no one will dare place 
himself, on the road of formal loeric, from deduct- 
ion to deduction, on the declivity that leads to 
such consequences. Italy, who is giving blood 
and monev with a generosity and a calmness of 
mind worthy of the hicrh sense of her historic res- 
ponsibilities, would have no argument of satis- 
faction from the abandonment of a position of 
hers, held by her before entering the field. 

I dare not push my indiscretion in the discus- 
sion of war matters beyond the limit of my rea- 



30 



son able competence. But, without being a clever 
mathematician, one can, in critical moments, try 
to count on one's fingers to see whether two plus 
two really make four, or not more and not less. 
Now, I notice that Austria, after having seen that 
she could not meet Italy on the side of the Alps, 
has endeavoured and is endeavouring to meet her 
on the side of the Adriatic — be it even the Lower 
Adriatic. And noticing this, I cannot understand 
why Italy, on her side, has not attempted to go 
round the opposite way and seek Austria on that 
road. Some days ago, I read an erudite article 
in the Corner e della Sera written by a most learn- 
ed writer who evidently is well versed in the 
question and is familiar with the localities be- 
longing to the sphere of offensive and defensive 
operations in the territories that are now overrun 
by Austria ; an article written to demonstrate the 
terrible difficulties of the enterprise on the part 
of Italy — and not, from what I can gather, on 
the part of Austria. But all the arguments in 
favour of a not doing » will not persuade me that, 
at bottom, war is the art or science of a not do- 
ing » . Especially as arguments in favour of « not 
doing )) can be found and can always be found ; 
although to my way of thinking, they should not 
be sought for in war time. 

In any case, if even in war time our cautions 
bourgeois spirit does not allow the eulogy of the 
cothurnus, I do not think useful and opportune 
the glorification — and consequent substitution 
of — the domestic slipper. 

Now, if I mistake not, the policy of our war 
in the Lower Adriatic is coddling itself in that 
foot-wear more than is necessary. 

And, out of doors one walks very uncomfort- 
ably in slippers. 

— 31 — 



THE GERMANS AND THE ADRIATIC. 



The article of the German Post which was 
reprinted in its almost entirety by the Tribuna 
last evening, deserves immediate and peremptory 
refutation rather than comment. It is rooted in 
falsehood ; and as a fit reply it is necessary to cut 
it down at the roots. 

(( What does Italy claim in the Adriatic ? She 
cannot claim greater rights than are due to her in 
proportion to her real power, which is not su- 
perior to that of Austria or of Greece. — Her real 
and proper field of action is not the Adriatic, 
but the Mediterranean : her rivals are not Austria 
and Greece, but France and England : it was a 
mistake, for which she will suffer hereafter, to 
have chosen Austria as her rival and enemy 
rather than France and England. — Now that 
Servia is defeated and Montenegro fallen, she 
must be content to see Austria increase her pos- 
sessions on the Adriatic to the same extent to 
which she refused to allow Servia to increase 
hers. Italy has started from a false premise. The 
consequence could not be other than the victory 
of Austria, who had started from a true premise » . 
— Such is — in its essential points — the article 



32 



of the Post, which resumes the ideas and princi^ 
pies of the German political world. Its confutation 
will not be difficult. 

It is pleasant to observe and to note, in the 
first place, the exquisitely delicate sense of legal 
right which our ex-Allies show whenever they 
discuss a question of Italian affairs or interests. 
One would think they were so greatly imbued with 
the supreme reasons of law as to pronounce sen- 
tences (as you know, sententia is derived from 
sentio) in Latin mood and with Latin conscience; 
instead of judging (ordaliare, to judge — In Ger- 
man urtheilen, if I remember right) in German 
mood and with German conscience. But they 
need not disturb themselves ! We know exactly 
what value to put upon this delicate sense of le- 
gality of theirs, in so far as it is applied to our 
affairs. It is tantamount to the proverbial saying: 
«Get out of there, I want to take your place)). 
Germany has always preferred that Austria 
should be on the Adriatic, and even Greece, so 
long as Italy were not there; or, at most, that 
she should be on the opposite shore. Her sense 
of legality is well-known. So also is the goodness 
of her heart. 

A statement of fact which must not horrify the 
defenders of the Realpoliti\ is that Germany has 
never had the opportunity of doing a good turn 
to any one; not even indirectly, not even in an 
oblique manner. Russia, even though it was to 
erect a rampart against Turkey and Austria, has 
created ex nihilo, Bulgaria, and no one can deny 
that in 1848 she fought whole-heartedly and gra- 
tuitously in Hungary for Austria. France, after 
the Revolution, has shed much blood in Europe, 
for her military reputation and for her ideals. 
Even England, at a certain period, gave away 

— 33 — 



some islands to Greece. But Germany, not even 
by mistake, not even through absent-mindedness 
has ever given a handful of beans to any one. 
I do not say she was wrong: I simply state a fact. 
It is perfectly true that from 1870 onwards, she 
has always pointed out many roads to those who 
were willing to follow them : roads which served 
to rid her of importunate people. Thus, she point- 
ed out the road to the East to Austria after Sa- 
dowa ; she pointed out the road to Tunis to France 
after Sedan, and when the hour had struck, she 
pointed out the way of the Mediterranean to 
Italy, instead of that of the Adriatic. So with 
Greece; she pointed out the way of the Adriatic, 
instead of that in which Greece would have met 
Bulgaria and Turkey, So with Rumenia: instead 
of the way to Transilvania she pointed out the 
way where that country would have come face 
to face with Russia. Ah, yes ; when the European 
war broke out and Italy had declared her neutrali- 
ty, Germany very politely came to see us to per- 
suade us of the interest we had of turning west- 
ward, of taking the places of France and England 
in the Mediterranean, rather than of Austria in 
the Adriatic. Only she quite forgot to elicit our 
intentions on this interest of ours and to prepare 
with us, in advance, the plan for carrying it out, 
on the eve of the war, before her Fleet locked 
itself up in Kiel; and reserved her intention of 
displaying the new horizon to our eyes when she 
imagined she could divide us internally by means 
of a new improvised programme which would 
supply new and improvised inspirations. Noit 
only; but Germany never showed that she felt 
this tender care on behalf of our Mediterranean 
interests during our Lybian war, when she was 
all ablaze against us, because we were disturbing 

_ 34 — 



Turkey's Mediterranean position; or when we 
concluded the recurrent Mediterranean agreements 
with France and Russia. As to Italy, Germany 
was quite forgetful of the existence of the Medi- 
terranean until Italy had shown that she was not 
willing to sacrifice her rights on the Adriatic in 
favour of Austria. And the thought never struck 
her that the Adriatic is also a portion of the Me- 
diterranean, and that a nation like Italy, being 
essentially Mediterranean, needs be strong in the 
Gulf of Venice; and that the stronger she is in 
the Mediterranean, the stronger will her position 
be in the Adriatic portion of that sea. 

Let us therefore put all bad jokes aside, at 
least in war time ! And if the German papers 
have really a mind to have some fun, let them 
amuse themselves in some other way. Our racket 
is busy in other games. 

But what we should never allow, even in joke, 
in our colleagues beyond the Rhine, is to falsify 
history on Austria's account, for the purpose of 
feeding rancour and diffidence against Italy 
among the dispersed Servians. If not respect to 
historical truth — it is true that Treitschke, their 
divine Master, says that historical truth is a stu- 
pidity unworthy of a healthy, full-blooded and 
martial race, and only fit for anaemic and contem- 
plative ones — respect, at least, for misfortune 
should restrain them from showing themselves 
cruel with deceit and falsehood against the Ser- 
vians, whom they now force to go wandering 
around Europe. To say, to-day, to these home- 
less fugitives, after having defeated them: « It 
was Italy's wish and Italy's interest that defeat 
should overtake you )) , is going far beyond the 
limits of irony. It is to be hoped that they are 
more considerate with their Belgian proteges. 

— 35 — 



The part assumed by Austria and Germany 
between the first and the second Balkan war is 
within the memory of even the most humble of 
the Adriatic fishermen; when, defeated by the 
Allies, Turkey's fate seemed to be settled for 
ever in the Balkans for the Central Powers. Kider- 
len's last interview on the Balkan question, on 
the eve of his sudden, death, is well known: 
(( Henceforth we must drag Bulgaria into our 
game, and have care to create and encourage 
interests that will bind her to us » . And Aus- 
tria's action — after the capture of Scutari, 
against Montenegro, and after the victories of the 
first Balkan war against Servia to prevent the 
latter from obtaining an opening on the sea under 
threat of war — is also well known. To avoid 
war, Italy — and that was her mistake, and not 
the only one of that time, a mistake which not i 
even the new condition in which the Lybian cam- 
paign had left her is sufficient to excuse — was 
constrained to follow Austria, who was claiming 
compensations even for the expenses that she 
said she had been obliged to sustain for her mo- j( 
bilization during the Balkan war, and to assist |l 
in the adjustment of the Lower Adriatic by means |£ 
of the aerial creation of the Kingdom of Albania, 
which was destined to become, in Austria's inten- 
tion, the excuse for the future rupture with the 
Ally. All this is known. And all this being i 
known, because it is but of yesterday, is it not I 
supremely ridiculous to attempt to-day to lay | 
Austria's action to Italy's charge and call Italy p 
responsible for the situation created by Austria 
in the Lower Adriatic in her blind hatred against 
Servia ? 

Italy, at that time, committed one fault: that 
of not opposing herself to Austria's manoeuvres 



36 



and of showing herself in the view of the Balkan 
peoples, on the same stage as Austria. But it is 
useless to make retrospective criticisms now. At 
present, it is only useful and necessary to place 
the facts again in their true position, which the 
German newspapers are trying to turn upside 
down and misrepresent. 

« Austria has won » , continues the Post, « and 
Italy will be unable to boast of having obtained 
by the war that which she was not willing to 
obtain by peaceful agreement ». 

A correction is necessary: Austria has van- 
quished Montenegro after having vanquished Ser- 
via in company with Germany and Bulgaria ; and 
no one denies the glorious feat. But, well or ill- 
inspired, Italy has not fought by the side of Mon- 
tenegro and, on the other hand, has not counselled 
Servia in her action. In any case, would Servia 
have accepted Italy's advice } And, at any rate, 
may not Servia 's distrust of Italy have been the 
result of Austria's action in 1913 ? If an Austrian 
victory must be vaunted, let the victory gained in 
peace time, in 1913, be mentioned. Austria won, 
then, truly,, against her enemy, Servia, and 
against her own Ally, Italy, at the same time: 
she won in time of peace and thanks to the Al- 
liance. Now, things are quite changed. 

But, if I err not, the war is still going on, and 
has not come to an unexpected termination with 
the compromise of the Monenegrin General Be- 
ck, nor with that of his assistant, the Montenegrin 
Major, Lovepar. 



37 - 



STILL TO SUBSTRACT: 
TURKEY AND GREECE. 



The Battle of Verdun continues to rage vio- 
lently, after fifteen days of incessant fire, and it 
is as yet impossible, therefore, to count the dead 
and wounded that are lying on the field. Mean- 
while, it will be well to speak of the victims, 
ascertained beyond all doubt, that Germany has 
made up to now around her. These victims are 
not Belgium and Servia — Belgium and Servia 
will rise again, and until they do, civilized Europe 
will not be in peace — but Turkey and Greece. 
Every day that passes, and every calculation that 
can be made on the events of the day that has 
flown, demonstrate how and in what measure the 
great warlike Empire and the small Kingdom of 
the Levant — arcades ambo — and rivals to 
each other — have been brought low by Ger- 
many's protection. The one under the heel of 
Granduke Wladimir; the other under the arm 
of General Sarrail. The only difference between 
Turkey and Greece is this: that in the end Tur- 
key, at least, will be able to say she has lost every- 
thing save honour. Greece, instead, will have 
to be content with a handful of beans which will 

- 38 — 



compensate her for the fleeting dream of By- 
zantium. 

It seems impossible to imagine — being the 
case of an empire on the basis of harems — that 
Turkey should have become Germany's Foolish 
Virgin. Giving way to the fascination of an ad- 
venturer like Enver Pacha — not a vulgar one 
by any means, as many believe — after so many 
years of sloth and fanaticsm, Turkey lived her 
day of ambition and pride, and dreamed the most 
inordinate dreams of glory and greatness that she 
had ever dreamed from the Siege of Vienna to 
this day. Germany, in accord with the adventurer, 
had kept up these dreams and, worse still, had 
infused through them in the Turkish soul a thirst 
for conquest. Why, then, not re-capture all the 
dominions of Mediterranean Africa } Why not 
sweep away, not only from the Mediterranean 
Africa, but also from all the inlets of the East, 
the enemies and competitors of Germany ? And , 
encouraged and stimulated by heir Berlin protect- 
ors, and dragged along and terrorized by her 
autochthonous adventurer, she gave herself up 
to the wildest incursions by land and sea, trustful 
that in Germany's name she would have routed 
the monsters and subdued the Christian dogs. 
(It can hardly be doubted that the Turkish men- 
tality is somewhat diffused among other peoples 
of Europe). Truly, after a year and half of incur- 
sions, the Army of the Prophet is nought but a 
vain name, with a von der Goltz at its head, and 
a Liman von Sanders at the tail. But the English, 
who were to have been thrown out beyond the 
Suez Canal and beyond the Persian Gulf, out of 
Egypt and out of Mesopotamia, are still on the 
Nile and at Kut-el-Amara. And the Russians, 
who were to have been cut up on the Caucasus, 

— 39 — 



have reached beyond Erzerum and are returning 
to the ancient delightful legends of Bitlis and 
Trebizond. Asiatic Turkey is melting away under 
the footsteps of the Cossacks of the Don. And of 
all this great gesta Macometti per Germanos there 
remains nothing, in Turkey's balance-sheet 
save the transfer of territories to Bulgaria, to indu- 
ce her to enter into war against Servia. More 
gloriously and, let us say the truth, more stupidly, 
than this, Turkey could not have ended. She came 
into European history armed with the scimitar; 
now she leaves it to the sound of a jeer. Really, 
were it but for her disinterestedness, she deserved 
a better fate ! 

Greece, however, was seized by means of a 
different artifice: with her own artifice: 

(50 lines censored). 

It is clear that the defeat of the Entente in the 
Balkan policy and the disappearance of the King- 
dom of Servia is principally and specially due to 
the conduct of Greece. Had not Bulgaria received 
a perfect assurance directly from Greece, and 
through Greece from Germany, that she could 
act without fear of surprises, she would not have 
moved so easily ; on the contrary, she would not 
have moved at all against Servia. And as the 
Balkan defeat has inflicted serious damage on the 
Entente, it is natural that, sooner or later, Greece 
will have to be called upon to pay them. But I 
have not understood, nor can I succeed in under- 
standing, the generosity of the Italian Govern- 
ment towards Greece, after Servia's defeat which 
has evidently exercised a not indifferent action 
upon the affairs of our war, by means of the 
greater pressure brought to bear by the Austrian 

— 40 — 



army on Montenegro and on the Southern Adria- 
tic. In force of that millionth part of judgement 
on the development of the war to which, as an 
Italian, I have a right (will Signer Sonnino be 
so courteous as to pay attention), I declare the 
Italian Government culpable of not having turned 
against Greece for the damages which have ac- 
crued to us in consequence of the Servian defeat 
and of the irruption of the Austrians towards 
Albania. The Italian Government has wished to 
act and has acted with too much delicacy towards 
Greece, who has shown that she understands and 
appreciates, in the way we all know, such deli- 
cacy ! 

In any case, and apart from the digression 
relating to Italy, it is by no means unprofitable 
to take into consideration the victims which Ger- 
many has made and the losses she has had to 
sustain during the course of the war. Until yester- 
day there were entered in the liabilities column 
only her African and Asiatic colonies. But to-day 
we must also add her colonies in Europe : Turkey 
and Greece. 

For the cash account only ; for nothing else. 



41 — 



THE JOURNEY TO PARIS. 



Two days hence, Sign or Salandra and Baron 
Sonnino will be starting for Paris to return the 
French Government's visit. They will also be 
the bearers of the greetings of the Italian people 
to the heroic army which has been fighting its 
great battle for four weeks; and, together with 
those greetings, the wishes for a speedy victory. 

This is not the time for festivity and gladness. 
All national and international manifestations are 
covered up with the violet cloth of Passion Week 
ceremonies. Whilst Statesmen meet in council 
or at dinner, the flames are rising high on the 
horizon, and in that fire the sacrifice of two ge- 
nerations is being consummated. « Ah, vous 
voila bien place » said the King of France to 
Marshal Tress an, on the day of the Battle of 
Fontenoy. And the courtier replied : « Sire, I 
am certain that to-day will be a feast-day for Your 
Majesty's House and for the nation)). But those 
were other times ; and other wars ! Which stand 
to the present war as the musket stands to the 
305 gun. A sea of mourning surrounds the ter- 
ritory of European nations to-day, which grows 
wider as the carnage spreads in the effort to reach 

— 42 — 



the haven of peace. None but necessary words 
can be or should be spoken. The superfluous is 
put off until the day following victory, which 
everyone, by this time, after two fierce years of 
scientific cruelties, wishes near. The chemical 
laboratories of the German Universities must sure- 
ly have exhausted all the experiments initiated 
during their forty-five years of war preparations. 

The journey of the Italian Ministers to Paris 
coincides with the various Allied Congresses 
which are to discuss all the questions concerning 
the conduct of the war; such as the financial 
question, that of munitions and of armaments, 
which, it is to be hoped, will all be finally co- 
ordinated and resolved. We shall never tire of 
recommending the three important questions of 
freights, exchange and coal, which represent the 
nervous plexus so essential to our existence. We 
have entered in the great war by the side of the 
Allies, not under the pressure of a German threat 
or offence, but of our own free election, to claim 
from Austria those rights which are justly due 
to us, and for the protection and the exaltation 
of the rights of European civilization against the 
ferocious aggression perpetrated by the two Cen- 
tral Empires. And no one can deny or refuse to 
acknowledge the moral value of our attitude and 
the material weight of our action. Hence the duty 
on the part of the Allies to respond to our gene- 
rosity with equity and not to create in our econo- 
mic existence conditions that may not be pro- 
pitious to our resistance during the war. It is in 
the interest of all that Italy should not issue 
exhausted from the struggle in which she is en- 
gaged, and in which her action is by no means 
without profit for her Allies. 

Time wears out not only ideas, but also and 

- 43 - 



perhaps in a greater measure, our sentiments; 
and it is not to be wondered at that actions which 
yesterday aroused enthusiasm should be looked 
upon with mere indifference to-day. We, oursel- 
ves, in our character of artists more than of politi- 
cians — like Vico, for Machiavelli is but a vanity 
of our name and of our culture — are apt, in the 
variety and mutability of our impressions, to 
under-estimate our work day by day arid not to 
take into account yesterday's deed in to-morrow's 
calculation. We are re-born every day, and pre- 
sent ourselves naked at the font, asking inces- 
santly for fresh water of new baptism. I trust that 
the Italian Statesmen at the Paris Congresses will 
be able to demonstrate the just value of all that 
Italy has accomplished, from the declaration of 
neutrality to the declaration of war, and will 
know how to draw and get others to draw, the 
necessary consequences for our future. Italy needs 
to lay on the scale together with her weapons also 
her spirit and her mind. For the spirit and the 
mind which at the moment of supreme danger 
affirmed the rights and the defence of European 
civilization deserve some honour and some con- 
sideration. 

The Italian Statesmen will find, after two years 
of war, a France different to that which the 
enemy had believed to place under his heel after 
the Caillaux case. 

Never, perhaps, has France been so lofty and 
so noble as she 1 appears now in the sight of 
nations ; not even during the storm of the Revolu- 
tion, or during the glory of the Napoleonic era. 
Sorrow has refined, if that were possible, all her 
heroic qualities, and to the purification of the 
heart it has added that of thought. A severe 
Spartan wrinkle lines the shining forehead! of 

— 44 — 



Joan of Arc. And thus France fights, on land and 
in the skies; and acquires fresh vigour from her 
dead and fresh consciousness of life from the 
enemy's strength. War, which, in 1870 had dis- 
solved and disbanded her, has to-day regenerated 
her, caused her to gather her strength anew and 
bound her as in steel coat-of -mail ; and has given 
her back the unity, the gravity and the austerity 
which party politics had deprived her of, or had, 
at least, weakened in her. 

Italy, too, has strengthened and completed her 
personality in the war; and together with inde- 
pendence has regained the conscience she had 
lost and the confidence in her genius and her 
destiny which she had never troubled to> cultivate. 

Jealous of each other no longer, to-day, but 
mindful of their fate, the two Latin nations, 
trustful, by now, of one another, will be able to 
say to each other the essential words which will 
most serve their interests for the present and for 
the future. 

There is no room for rhetoric when there are 
armies in the field which are writing history with 
their blood. 



— 45 - 



BEYOND DEMOCRACY. 



On the basis of a book by M. Hermann Fer- 
nau, Signer Labriola erects, in this morning's 
(( Messaggero » , a small triumphal arch in honour 
of French Democracy for the Verdun resistance, 
and in honour of Democracy in general foir the 
resistance shown throughout the European War. 
Let us leave books alone: they contain so many 
strange ideas and statements concerning the war 
that not even Cardinal d'Este would have been 
astonished any more at them ! But with all due 
respect to those persons who uphold the method 
of breaking through open doors, I do not believe 
that History could easily pass under that trium- 
phal arch without first having her feet or her 
head cut off. Supposing we rid ourselves once 
for all of old constructions and old nomencla- 
tures ? And, in the face of this terrible phenomen- 
on, unexpected and unforeseen by Democracy, 
which is called the European War, supposing, I 
say, we judged with our minds cleared of recol- 
lections and of doctrinal and party prejudices ? 
We should, without doubt, render truth a greater 
service, and we should all gain greater credit 
and greater confidence from the public which, 

— 46 — 



by this time knows and instinctively understands 
what value to place on words and ideas which, 
at last, it has had the opportunity of experiment- 
ing and has found useless, or nearly so, for its 
defence and protection. 

Democracy can boast of numerous and great 
merits in the history of modern civilization, but 
it would be difficult to weave garlands round her 
brow with the iron and the laurel of the war 
which is to-day fought on all the baittlefieldls of 
Europe. Till the eve of the war, she denied even 
the hypothesis and the possibility of war; and 
when the war broke out she found herself, and 
caused the nations under her domain to find 
themselves, unprepared in a moral and military 
sense to meet the enemy's aggression. And if 
to-day, after two years, those nations, that is, 
France, England and Italy, commence at last to 
organize their defences, this is not due to the 
French Radical-Socialist Government, nor to the 
English Radical Government, nor to the chaotic 
parliamentary democracy of Italy, but to> the pri- 
mitive instincts of self-preservation and of defence 
which have risen up and have taken the reins 
which guide the races of mankind, and have 
hurled down all the particular principles of parties 
and of classes. Democracy has accepted and has 
fought the war for the simple reason that at the 
moment when it broke out she found herself at 
the head of affairs, and only she could 1 assume 
the responsibilities and the conduct of the strug- 
gle. But like the queen bee which dissolves and 
disappears on the very instant of fecundation, 
so Democracy has dissolved and disappeared in 
the very act of the war : she, that had been forced 
to recognize the fact which she had ever excluded 
from her foresight ; forced to accept the fact which 

- 47 — 



she had always denied in her doctrine; the fact 
of the war. Think of it: the speeches delivered 
by the English Radicals — commencing with 
Lloyd George's — those English Radicals who 
called for nothing less than the dismissal of old 
Lord Roberts, for his propaganda in favour of 
conscription, contain nought but a perpetual mea 
culpa. Remember: between June and July 1914, 
that is, on the eve of the war and after the French 
general elections, the only Government which 
could be set up in France was that of the Radi- 
cal-Socialist Party which had fought against the 
Three Years* Conscription Law; and M. Viviani 
on two occasions had to prepare a formula which 
should reconcile the pacifist aspiration of the 
Radical-Socialist Party with the respect — - tem- 
porary, at least — of the approved Law. What 
is to be said of Italy ? It is useless to remind our- 
selves of our own stupidity. « One cannot be a 
prophet », that is the usual, much abused, excuse. 
But then, no claim for glorification should be 
put forward after having shown so little perspi- 
cacity, foresight and preparation in the policy of 
the State. The dominant Democracy of Western 
Europe, entirely engrossed, and with the best 
of intentions, in the cultivation of the little orchard 
of her individualism, of her parliamentarism, of 
her pacifism, has never found the time or the way 
to be informed of what was seething in the mind 
of the imperialism of the German peoples, nor of 
what was being moulded in the Krupp and Skoda 
workshops: worse still, all engrossed in reading 
her books over and over again, and in perusing 
her speeches a century old, she never found the 
leisure to read and think over, and much less 
take in real earnest, the books that were pub- 
lished, and 'the speeches that were made in 

- 48 - 



Germany, in which the dream of Teutonic im- 
perialism was so neatly delineated, so pompously 
coloured, so prodly accoutred with everything; 
oh, yes, everything but metaphors ! The Demo- 
cracy of Western Europe did not believe in war, 
did not think of war, laughed at everyone who, 
from time to time, attempted to wrest her from 
the Elysium of her phantasies, in order to push 
her a little more closely against the thorns of 
international reality. And now, in the end, she 
would lay claim to the glory of the war ? 

Now, I do not say that Democracy should pos- 
sess the same ideals as those of the Empires of 
the Hohenzollems and of the Hapsburgs. But I 
do say that if the void which the war has effected 
in her principles is now openly known, she must, 
at the very least declare the imperfection and the 
deficiency of her doctrine. After all, it should 
serve to govern human society which lives in 
alternation between peace and war; and, confes- 
sing the deficiency, Democracy should endeavour 
to cover it and complete it with a new order of 
ideas which will assure the existence and the 
defence of hur^an kind. Until this happens, let 
us postpone the building of triumphal arches. 
These appertain only to those who triumph over 
themselves, before they triumph over their 
enemies. 

Democracy, as it was understood and practised 
up to the eve of the war, has exhausted her fun- 
ction in European civilization. She that, during 
a century of splendid struggles had succeeded in 
constructing the political basis of the new so- 
ciety which was born out of the fire and the 
blood of the French Revolution, no longer pos- 
sesses the mind and the energy necessary to build 
up the loom and the tower which serve to weave 

- 49 — 



and to defend the new existence of the peoples 
who will emerge, mutilated or smoked out, from 
the hell of this war. 

Prepare then, oh, ye Apostles, oh, ye Practi- 
tioners of lost ideas, to resign your soul and your 
gospel into the hands of the new combatants. 
Together with the geographical map of Europe 
will be changed, after the war, also the chart of 
the value of souls. And the new generations which 
are in the field will themselves undertake the task 
of tracing the lines of this chart. 

It would be ridiculous to prophesy: but it is 
not at all ridiculous to assert that it is not possible 
that the world of to-morrow can be governed by 
the same doctrines and by the same men who 
were powerless to preserve it from the whirlwind 
which is now overturning all things. 

It is not possible that war, which consumes so 
much human life, so much labour, so much social 
wealth, should not also consume the words and 
the ideas which lit the flame or which could not 
prevent the lighting of it. 

A great war — and no war has been greater 
than this one — is a crisis: but it is likewise an 
experience. Experience of individualism, party 
government — that is, government by a few men 
and by an only idea or by an only interest — we 
know by this time what al] these things mean 
and where they may lead to. Further, still further 
must the ship go ! 

The war has been fought in spite of Demo- 
cracy. 

The new society, born of the war, will be 
organized beyond Democracy. 

Jupiter, doubt it not, has strong knees. 



50 — 



RESPECTABLE DIPLOMACY. 



It has been announced on the one hand, and 
has not been contradicted on the other, that Gree- 
ce has annexed Epirus, and has also subdivided 
it into departments, provinces, boroughs, coun- 
ties, according to the nomenclature most accept- 
able to the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance. 
Were this fact true, I should be the first to pay 
my best compliments to M. Skouludis' Govern- 
ment. To lay hold of something is always the 
best thing that can be done, especially in war 
time; and it is not because ascetics make a prac- 
tice of renunciation as a virtue, that we must bla- 
me whosoever makes the most of time and space. 
In his recent speech in the Chamber of Deputies, 
Signor Sonnino said that Greece had given ample 
assurances that her occupation of Epirus would 
have been a temporary one. Precisely. Occupa- 
tion, temporary. Admission of Deputies to the 
Greek Chamber, temporary. Administrative di- 
visions, temporary. Of a permanent character 
I nothing is, or remains, save the Entente's cheer- 
fulnas®. 

No one can deny that Master Nicholas Ma- 
chiavelli was, in his time, a most melancholy 
person. The merry individuals who now shave 

— 51 — 



with Mr. Wilson's « Gillette » razor would, 
doubtless, be horrified to stand close to him, if 
they happened to meet him in Val di Pesa, in 
the Via di Sant 'Andrea in Percussina. Poor 
Master Nicholas ! Trodden on during life, and 
more so after his death ! What sadness would 
reign in his little heap of ashes, if these, with a 
sudden start were to feel once more the thrill of 
a political sensation! The barbarians most abo- 
minably counterfeit his doctrine, of which they 
do not succeed in under standing the sense; and 
those who call themselves civilized show a pious 
horror and terror of it. Who, in History, more 
civilized than the diplomats of the Quadruple Al- 
liance } They are truly the exponents of the loftiest 
culture and of the prof oundest sentimentality of the 
modern world. They represent the purest « prin- j 
ciples )) , and are the defenders of the purest | 
(( right » . So much do they represent and defend | 
that they are even afraid to pronounce the con- 
trary term in their speeches and in their Notes: 
the term « force ». To listen to them, or otherwise ! f 
to learn their word, one experiences the suave 
satisfaction of beholding a noble race of shep- jj 
herds (of peoples, of course), aspiring to the |* 
beatitude of Heaven, rather than to glory on \l 
earth; and preoccupied that their names and t 
those of their nations be written on the pages of f 
the little book of religious instruction entitled ; 
(( The Garden of the Soul » , rather than in the 
pages of History. Do not newspapers do them-| 
selves the honour of always placing the title off 
a moral story, such as; for example, « The Ene- 
my's Pride Humbled » , or : « The Philosophy of I 
Barbarism Confuted », on the report of a speechf 
delivered by Mr. Asquith or by Sir Edward 
Grey ? And after Signer Sonnino's recent speech! 

— 52 — 



I in the Chamber of Deputies, did not the Tribuna 
j entitle its article commenting upon it : « An Hon- 
est Speech » ; and the Giornale d' Italia rising 
j from the Word to the Man : « Vir Probus » ? — 
I The moral question, politically speaking, domi- 
j nates over everything and in every one. And the 
j illustrious Western diplomats are happy to con- 
found their personal qualities of private gentle- 
|! men with those of public men : a confusion which 
' Master Nicholas decidedly opposed in his « Di- 
I s cor si », and Count Cavour, in his turn, declared 
was a thing he would not do, lest ill should befall 
his country. But so much time has passed, since 
then ! And, besides, is it not of importance, to- 
day, more than anything else, always to do the 
opposite to what is done by the enemy } 

The opposite, even to the extent of not using 
the weapons that one has in one's hands. 

It is true, for instance, that in 1863, three of 
the Powers who are now fighting against Ger- 
many, namely, France, Russia and England 
created, as is written in Article 3 of the Charter, 
the monarchical State of Greece, « under the 
sovereignty of the Prince of Denmark and the 
guarantee of the three Courts » . And it is also 
true that, at this present moment, the sovereignty 
of the Prince of Denmark is in a state — how 
shall we put it ? — of disaccord with the three 
protecting Powers, and in accord with the Power 
which is enemy to them, namely, Germany. But 
what matters it ? Laissez faire ! But not laissez 
passer! Do not even let the Allied army pass (for 
until the contrary is proved, the Servian army 
is still allied to that of Greece). And so, laissez 
faire the Government in Epirus, laissez faire the 
! German submarine providers on the coasts and on 
! the islands. What is needful is not to hold co- 



— 53 



lonies, but to save principles. And, as to princi- 
ples, no one will deny that the future Professors 
of International Law will collect enough in the 
different countries to form encyclopedias with. 
The various Offices of the Western States can 
already inscribe on their budgets the funds for 
the subscription to the work. 

I dare no longer expound my views with regard 
to Italy's policy in the Lower Adriatic and in the 
/Egean. Once that I attempted to do so, the Cen- 
sor, with his archangelic sword slashed the 
thread of my discourse to pieces. And as, in time 
of war, submission is not even a virtue, I, without 
the usual « laudabi liter » , beg to avoid the repeti- 
tion of the attempt. But from the dust of my hu- 
miliation, let me be allowed at least to say that 
Greece has acted most wisely in grabbing what 
the others have not seized, and what they allow 
her freely to grab. 

When I think of the end of the war, I cannot 
help thinking, at the same time of Michael An- 
gelo's (( Last Judgement ». The human genera- 
tions arise from the open tombs, to the sound 
of the last trump... But surely you do not wish 
me to give a description of the terrible painting 
in the Sixtine Chapel. You remember it well. 
There are depicted in it human hodies which have 
not yet reconstituted their skeletons. Others that 
are covered here and there with fragments of 
flesh. Others that are completely covered with 
flesh. Each of the resurgents brings with him what 
he can lay hold of — as will be done by the 
Powers of Europe one day at the supreme Mee- 
ting, at the supreme Congress, with the various 
pledges that they have succeded in seizing during 
the war. 

And, I ask, what will Italy bring? 



54 



A YEAR AFTER. 



Austria did not make up hear mind to attack 
us until a year had passed since our declaration 
of war. Having remained on the defensive for 
three hundred and sixty four days, she takes the 
offensive on the eve of the commemoration of the 
anniversary. We should be unjust if we did not 
recognize in this delay a compliment paid to our 
valour. The secular enemy, before entering the 
field has been busy in burnishing his armour and 
in sharpening his weapons well. He has prepared 
himself, and has given us time to prepare also. 
And, in order to give the struggle its true signi- 
ficance, he has sent, at the head of the armies 
the most inured to war that he possesses, the Heir 
to the Imperial Crown, the successor in rank of 
the Archduke who fell at Serajevo. From one 
Archduke to the other ! Austria always places 
her heirs, like signboards, on the boundaries of 
her proudest ambitions: in the Balkans as on the 
Alps. One signboard fell in the Balkans, amidst 
the blood of a political murder. It is our wish 
that the other may be driven back on the Alps, 
in defeat. 

— 55 — 



Let them cross the Alps again, 
And brothers again we'll be. 

But they must go back ! 

It is commanded by our historic law, which is 
also our moral law. 

I know not, and I do not care to know — it is, 
at best, a sectarian's curiosity — whether there 
are still two different opinions in Italy concern- 
ing our war, because I do not believe that the 
opinion of individuals exercise any function in 
the great crises of history, such as we are accus- 
tomed to see them exercise during Cabinet crises ; 
and I believe, rather, that the action of a nation 
in the great crises of history is determined by 
factors and motives absolutely superior and dif- 
ferent to those which determine — nor let this 
seem a paradox — the opinions of individuals. 
On the whole, the difference between one class 
of factors and motives and another is the same 
that exists between genius and culture. The opin- 
ions of individuals are the product of the special 
environment of political schools and doctrines; of 
class, caste or family interests, which represent 
only the smallest part of truth and reality: the 
changing and decrepit part of life. The collective 
action of a nation is determined by a permanent 
and unchangeable factor, which, in one word that 
comprehends and expresses all, can be called 
the genius of national history. There is the ge- 
nius of species, in love; the genius of race, in the 
forms of civilization ; the genius of national histo- 
ry, in wars. What matters if individuals do not 
succeed at first sight in discovering the reason of 
a national war, on account of the effort which 
their old mental habits have to undergo, and on 
account of the displacement of their interests ? 

— 56 — 



Do we know why we love a beautiful woman or 
a plain one ? Do we know what deep and occult 
force urges us on, in love, across the perturba- 
tion of all the senses and the exaltation of all our 
aesthetic faculties } When the philosopher finally 
tells us that it is the genius of the species which 
acts for us for the preservation of our being, we 
can even smile incredulously; but our smile and 
our attitude will not alter the law of Nature. The 
same obtains in the direction of national history. 
The genius of history works by itself. Do you 
seriously believe that the Italian People, in the 
days of May, last year, was seated at the writing 
desk calculating coldly, to decide upon and pro- 
claim the war ? It followed the unconscious im- 
pulse of its life, the genius of its history : instinct ; 
instinct which, in the end, has self -defence as a 
final purpose. This war, in fact, is nothing else 
but a war of elementary self-defence. Had we 
allowed — through negligence, or incapacity, or 
cowardice — the increase of Austria's -power 
behind our back and at our side, we would have 
signed our own sentence of death — by suffoca- 
tion. If Italy is to live, she cannot live unless she 
wards off the threat of a greater Austria. Who 
can seriously imagine an Italy free and sure of 
herself with an Austria enlarged by Servian, 
Montenegran and Albanian territory, and mis- 
tress not only of the Upper but also of the Lower 
Adriatic, and of the Balkans ? Put the question 
herself Italy never could have done; and, in fact, 
she never did. But, as Austria has put it herself, 
and for Austria, Germany has put it by means of 
the European war, Italy could not but accept 
its discussion, with those means with which one 
only discusses in war : with arms. 
We could not, like Greece, and for a fleeting 

- 57 - 



week of quiet living, destroy the essential reasons 
of our existence. And much less could we, by 
Germany's side, play the part which Austria and 
Turkey are playing in the European war. 

The Italian people has, in centuries gone by, 
suffered all the misfortunes of foreign domina- 
tion; but nobody could ever think that finally her 
definite mission could be that of the voluntary 
nigger slave, after the proclamation of her unity 
and independence in the civilized history of 
European peoples. A nigger slave of Germany, 
bent under the lash of Austria, for the aggran- 
dizement of the glory and fortune of the two 
mistresses, no, never! Therefore, there remained 
but one way of salvation : war. 

But, if the country was conscious of the sense 
of historical reality in wanting the war, has the 
Government the clear sense of its responsibilities 
in conducting it ? And does it understand to the 
fullest extent, its importance and meaning? 

This war that we are fighting is the most se- 
rious, and we can also say, the most revolution- 
airy of the wars which at the present moment 
the Powers of Europe are fighting: because it is 
a war which aims at displacing the axis of life 
of Central Europe and transferring to Italy the 
dominion which the Austrian Empire has held 
till yesterday in the Adriatic for its road to the 
East. With and by means of this war, Italy 
should strive to resume the ancient sceptre which 
Venice once wielded from the Isonzo to the 
/Egean Sea, and let fall from her hand after 
1454, by her narrow and improvident policy; 
a policy which allowed Mahomet II. and Turkey 
to take her place on land and sea, after having 
humbled her and destroyed her prestige from 
her. Italy should... But, who knows what the 

— 58 - 



Government really thinks and wants } We are 
standing before a mystery, in the icy zone of 
silence. 

But, now that the war has lit all her beacons 
on our Alps, we are more than ever bound by 
duty to loudly proclaim our right and to call for 
the greatest audacity in the offensive and the 
defensive. 

It is useless to discuss to-day, after a year, 
whether there were or there are still adversaries 
of the war in the country. To-da3^, neither the 
opinions of individuals nor the tendencies of part- 
ies count, nor are of any consequence; because 
it is not with these or those that the war is carried 
out and history is written ; and if Cavour or Bis- 
marck had listened to them, they would not have 
organized the one, the Crimean Expedition, and 
the other the war of '66. To-day it does not con- 
cern us to know whether all brains are agreed, 
but whether the Government's brain is sufficiently 
strong to contain and understand the problem of 
the war in all its extension, and to give to such 
a problem — in a military sense against the 
enemy, and in a diplomatic sense toward® the 
Allies — the necessary solution which is indis- 
pensable for the fortunes and the future of the 
nation. 

Meanwhile, let us send our greetings to our 
heroic soldiers who, at least, know how to sacri- 
fice for their country the sacred Springtime of their 
lives. 



59 



SEEKING NEW FRONTIERS. 



I had barely finished writing my article on 
Austrian peace, a fortnight ago, when General 
Gadorna's communique came to announce to Italy 
the advance of the Hereditary Archduke in the 
Tyrol. By instinct (what has remained to the 
willing Italian writer, in the vacuum which the 
Government creates around him, but instinct }), 
I had felt from the distant vibrations of the Vien- 
na and Budapesth Press, the storm that was gather- 
ing in the air, and I immediately counselled : « Do 
not fall into the net of peace discussions ! » The 
two thousand guns unexpectedly roaring on the 
peaks of the contested boundary have composed 
the last bars of my article. Now, whilst the battle 
continues to rage on our land, the German jour- 
nalists continue to speak of peace, whilst the 
Austro-Hungarian journalists, on their own ac- 
count, continue to disclose the aim of the advance 
in the Trentino, which is the search for a new 
boundary line which will assure the Monarchy 
against any possibility of Italian conquests for 
ever. And we, what shall we reply ? 

For the moment, let us put aside the German 
pacifist literature. Only fools — and 1 the Germans 

— 60 — 



must think that there aire still some left in the two 
worlds — can, without laughing, listen to Herr 
Harden talk of a referendum between the belli- 
gerent nations on the basis of reason and not on 
that of the sword's point, and on the dethronement 
of Prussian militarism; that same Herr Harden 
who, during the first months of the war would 
not acknowledge that in the dictionary of politics 
there could be found any other word but « for- 
ce » . (( What are you jabbering of reason and 
right for ! » he then wrote : « Is Germany strong 7 
Yes ? That is enough. Are the grand principles, 
so highly extolled, worth anything ? One principle 
only is of any account : force. All the rest is illu- 
sion and stupidity. Force: that is a word which 
sounds high and clear. Force: a fist, that is; that 
is everything ! » — Now the devil Harden turns 
monk. And scatters his ejaculations in his prose. 
But, after having made the customary exorcisms, 
it will be much more useful and serious for us 
to occupy ourselves more with the threats that 
the Austro-Hungarian writers are hurling at us, 
than with these ejaculations. After all, is there 
so much disaccord in the different thought of the 
partners of the two Empires } 

Whilst the German writers are attempting to 
hypnotize the spirit of Europe in general and that 
of Italy in particular with the song of peace, the 
German and Austro-Hungarian armies are rend- 
ering their strokes doubly violent. The spirit of 
France does not allow itself to be hypnotized, 
but remains awake and on the alert under protect- 
ive weapons. Will the Italian spirit let itself fall 
into unconsciousness ? I hope not. Because a 
moment of oblivion would mean ruin. It is neces- 
sary, oh Italians of every class and of every legion, 
that you dispense with sleep for some time, if 

— 61 — 



you do not want the enemy to kill the reason of 
your existence for ever. 

The Germans are in accord with the Austrians 
in the programme against Italy; and the German 
newspapers , even before the action of the Austro- 
Hungarian armies have revealed the common 
aim, namely: « to obtain to the South of the Alps 
a boundary which will assure the Danubian Mo- 
narchy from any eventual surprise in the future » . 
Misunderstandings are no longer possible. And 
neither, on our side, must illusions, weaknesses, 
hesitations, errors be possible: errors which are, 
for the greater part, the effect of uncertain con- 
sciences and of tortuous volitions. At last, the 
enemy is in front of us: he is there, present and 
erect, not distant and wavering any more. Have 
you now the cognizance and the experience of 
him ? Well, now, it is not allowed to lie, not even 
to one's self. The Past, with all its stupidity, is 
abolished. Now, there is nothing but war. And 
war be it ! 

Easy - going and merry people are always de- 
testable; yielding and sweet -insipid people like- 
wise : they are all the more' detestable in time 
of war. 

In time of war there is need for crude, and bitter 
men, with intense heart and sound mind; men 
who carry a sword in their brain as well as in 
their fist; a sword that is resisting and thrusts 
straight, that does not bend or twist at every 
breath and at every shock; and which does not 
rust in negligence or indifference. 

The Italian People, for its part possesses a 
mind and a heart which can cope with the war 
that its sons are fighting on the field. But have 
those that lead it the same mind and heart ? 

One of the hidden reasons of the Austrian of- 

— 62 — 



fensive in the Trent ino — a moral, rather than 
a military reason — was precisely this: to upset 
the mind of the Italian People and to throw it 
into panic. But the Italian People has shown 
that it was hardly aware of that offensive. Al- 
ways backward — this time by more than a 
week — Austria has thought and perhaps still 
thinks that the Italian People of to-day is the 
same people of the Abyssinian War ; and in any 
case, that the Italian parliamentary men are the 
same as those of the Abyssinian War, who, on 
reading bad news transmitted by the Stefani 
Agency rubbed their hands in glee to spite Grispi. 
But to-day the Italian People has renewed its 
backbone. And, after all, does Austria really 
think that she is forgotten by us, or that she is as 
indifferent to us as was Abyssinia in her time ? 

The Italian People is to-day standing erect at 
its post. It is to-day and will be to-morrow the 
greatest guarantee of the war. Let the generals 
and the ministers of the Austrian Empire reflect 
on it. 

And, let them reflect also, once for all, that 
our internal competitions, whatever they are or 
may be, will never cause the Italian People to 
swerve from the road which it has mapped out 
and determined upon for itself. From that road 
there is no turning back ! And if the armies of 
the Archduke on starting had merely that political 
aim in view, they may as well collect their artil- 
lery and transport it else where. 

But they have also a military purpose: that of 
the conquest of new boundaries. 

Well, on this point, it will be necessary that 
they discuss a little with our young national army. 



63 



BEYOND THE NAMES OF MEN 
AND THE VANITY OF PARTIES. 



I do not understand the numerical calculations 
and the metaphysical discussions that are being 
agitated round the shadow of the Cabinet. If 
arithmetic is not an opinion, there is no calcula- 
tion in the world that will make a minority become 
a majority. And if opinion is loyally declared, 
there is no metaphysical discussion that can make 
the believer appear an atheist or the observant 
of religious practices appear a sceptic. Facts 
must be accepted as they are; they should not 
be deformed or transformed according to our 
interest or our passion. Saturday's crisis was the 
work of the interventionists, discontented and 
apprehensive of the weak action of the Govern- 
ment in the conduct of the war ; and it is not pos- 
sible to throw discredit upon it, as the work of 
the neutralists, or as a retaliation) for the May 
days. One can be a friend of the Cabinet, but one 
must be, above all, a friend of truth. And the 
truth is that the vote against the Cabinet meant a 
vote for a more vigorous war. The promoters of 
the crisis may have been wrong or right in judg- 
ing the policy of the Government: this is to be 

_ 64 — 



demonstrated. But there is no necessity to de- 
monstrate that they intended and claimed to 
assert the necessity of stronger sinews in the 
conduct of the war. And, furthermore, one ren- 
ders a very bad service to the country by making 
the Allies and the enemies believe that the war 
energy of Italy has fallen with Signer Salandra's 
Cabinet. No. Let us proclaim it loudly and for- 
cibly so that all may hear and understand: the 
crisis has taken place because the war energy is 
more ardent and powerful in the nation than in 
Signor Salandra's Cabinet. This is the Message 
which must be sent to comfort and exalt the 
armies of the Isonzo and of the Trentino. This 
is the Message that must cause the smile to die 
in the heart and on the lips of our eternal detract- 
ors of Vienna and Berlin. 

To-day's misfortune cannot and must not cause 
the high merits of Signor Salandra's Cabinet to 
be forgotten. But if each day brings its own toil, 
it also brings its "own responsibility; and yester- 
day's actions and words cannot be judged by the 
remembrance of the actions and words of to-day. 
Time, like crowds, has no memory and it is well 
that it has not; otherwise life would remain 
crystallized in one instant and in one attitude. 
Each of us, in his special circle, is but an instru- 
ment of the thought and the action of the human 
family of which we constitute a part : to-day use- 
ful and glorious; to-morrow worn out and de- 
pressed. Signor Salandra's Cabinet was a useful 
instrument in the transitional period, between 
peace and war, when it was a question of prepar- 
ing and carrying the nation from one bank to the 
other of its historical conscience. But the qualities 
which had been of service at the first moment, 
should not .and could not be of service at the 

— 65 — 



second moment. War is a great adventure, the 
greatest adventure in a nation's life, and requires 
unprejudiced temperaments to carry it through. 
Signor Salandra's temperament has remained the | 
ponderous one which has always been that of a 
man of the Centre Party, whilst the genius of P 
war resides entirely in extreme tension. In the I 
Centre Party one can only be surrounded and f 
stifled either by embraces or by intrigues. 

To-day, it is useless to criticise this laborious j 
political year. In the brief intervals of transition 
between one Ministry and another, the passions 
are so ablaze that no calm word can avail in 
persuading the defeated of yesterday ; neither can 
it satisfy to-morrow's aspirants* But if I were cal- 
led upon to give advice based on yesterday's 
experience to the aspirants of to-morrow, I would 
say to them : a Whoever you are that are called 
to succeed, be you new or old men, men of me- 
dium or tall stature, strive with all your might to 
create a Government based on a real majority 
and not on a fictitious unanimity. The effort to 
secure a fictitious unanimity was the cause of the 
constitutional weakness of Signor Salandra's Go- f 
vernment and of its action. » j' 

For good or for ill, the parliamentary system 
is founded upon the basis of majorities, not upon 
una(nimjity ; on the basis of majorities which 
presupposes the more restricted one of minorities ; ' j 
and not the basis of unanimity which annuls or F; 
excludes, or considers as factious that of mino- Jl 
rities. 

In the loftiest and most serious questions, it is H 
a prejudice to pretend unanimity instead of a I'll 
majority ; just as one would say : evening dress !| 
for gala performances and dinner jacket for or- j] 
dinary ones. I think that on every question, great ! j 



66 






or small, there is room for two opinions. The 
suppression, by imposition on one side, or owing 
to convenience by the other, of one of the two 
opinions is productive of disorder, confusion and 
falsehood. And, for a long time we have been 
standing on falsehood. 

In one of his speeches in the Chamber of De- 
puties last December, Signor Coilajanni, with 
respect to the harmony which was persistently 
spoken of by his colleagues of all sides of the 
House, said: « If we are in harmony, come and 
see us in the corridors, where we are all like cats 
and dogs. » Why, therefore oblige these cats and 
dogs to coo in the Chamber like a nest of turtle- 
doves ? And who can be deceived by these sud- 
den changes of fleece and voice } 

To return to a state of order, that is, to sincerity 
— from which they have all emerged in the 
Chamber — is the best service that can be rend- 
ered to the nation, and the best homage that can 
be rendered to the soldiers who are bleeding on 
the battlefield, and who fight well and valorously 
only because they light in their qualit}' of elemen- 
tary mass : Italians for Italy, not political animals 
for their party, their faction, their personal am- 
bition of the present and what is worse, of the 
future. 

Let it be said: whoever, by reason of the war 
should attempt to prepare an electoral future for 
himself or for his adherents, is guilty of high 
treason towards the army which is fighting for 
the country ; and towards the nation which claims 
to be defended herself, and not that the fortunes 
of this or that ambition, of this or that party should 
be defended instead. 

To-day Italy must be loved and served for her 
own sake: whoever does not feel in himself the 

- 67 - 



strength to do this, let him resign from governing 
and busy himself in other ways ; or let him leave 
the country. 

To-day, Italy is an end in herself, and is no 
longer a means of furthering the fortunes of po- 
litical adventurers. And an end in itself must 
also be the war, and not the means wherewith 
to bring about the resurrection of the old Right 
or of the old Left. The war, which engrosses all the 
forces of the nation, cannot be conducted in view 
of any design of internal or parliamentary policy. 
The electoral body will see to these small mat- 
ters; but the army has not and cannot have any- 
thing in common with the electoral body. Let a 
war Cabinet be formed, therefore, to obtain 
victory, and let it go forward, like the knights of 
the good old times, for the honour of our towers 
and of our castles, of our mountains and our sea. 

The strongest, the most pure, the noblest, to 
work ! Those who will have been foremost in 
defending the Marches shall be created Marquis. 
And he who will have led the nation to victory 
shall be Duke. 

The Power in Italy to-day is to be acquired on 
Victory " s shield . 



- 68 



THE CAPTAINS OF THE ANABASIS 
AND THE MINISTERS OF THE ENTENTE. 



After the death of Cyrus, then, the King of 
the Persians sent an ambassador to the supreme 
Commander of the Grecian armies to demand a 
surrender of arms. Clearchus — such was the 
name of the supreme Commander — called to- 
gether a council of captains and placed them in 
communication with the ambassador and with his 
dilemma : Either arms or war. And, as the Greek 
captains were all excellent spokesmen, they found 
no great difficulty in confounding the ambassador 
with their reasoning. — « Why does the King 
ask us for our arms } But how can we fight for 
him unarmed ? Perhaps that he may massacre us 
better ? How can we lend ourselves to such a 
game and deprive ourselves of the only means 
we possess to repel an aggression ? In either case 
we could not give up our arms, which are the 
reason of our existence, whether we have to fight 
with them for him or have to fight for ourselves » . 

And the reasoning so confused the ambassador 
of the Persians, that he asked for a delay in order 
to report. 

But, between those Greek captains and that 
ambassador was not mooted at that time, the 

_ 69 — 



other case which is being mooted now, as it 
appears, between King Constantine and his Sku- 
ludis on one side and the ambassadors of the 
Entente on the other. Either to fight with him or 
to fight for us — they were two cases sufficiently 
embarrassing for the not too open mind of the 
Persian ambassador, whose brain was not accust- 
omed to logic-fence. But to fight against him, for 
others : here are two new cases, not at all embar- 
rassing for the ambassadors of the Entente. King 
Constantine and his Skuludis have not posed 
them themselves; they have fixed their attention 
on the two primitive cases of the captain© of the 
Anabasis. But their conduct denouncels them. 
They are an improvement on the narrative of 
Xenophon. But the ambassadors of the Entente, 
too, are an improvement on that of the King of 
Persia ; and useless talk is of no avail in averting 
a disarmament. This time, the Greeks, or Grae- 
culi, whichever they may be, must deliver up 
their arms; and with their arms their ensigns. 

The whole of the conduct of Greece in the 
Balkan conflict connected with the great Euro- 
pean war is treason: first towards her Ally, Ser- 
via; secondly towards it he protecting Powetrs, 
which are also the guarantors of her existence. 
Treason, not as a vain saying and not as a simple 
rhetorical expression, but real and effective, ac- 
cording to a well-determined and precise design, 
and with a constant method of execution. The for- 
mula of neutrality was nothing more than a for- 
mula of deceit to lull to sleep the artless idealists 
of France and England. And we know by what 
we have seen how easily these last were disposed 
to fall into catalepsy under Minerva's olive-tree 
owing to a long-standing abuse of the narcotic 
of Hellenism. Neutralism was the mask. Neutral- 



70 



ism — and King Constantine dismissed Venizelos 
who upheld that Greece should be faithful to the 
Treaty with Servia. Neutralism — and the Gu- 
naris Cabinet, commanded by King Constantine 's 
will which stood in lieu of a majority in the 
Chamber, attributed to the Treaty with Servia the 
interpretation most convenient to Austria and 
Germany. Neutralism — and the Chamber created 
by Venizelos was dissolved, in order to create by 
means of corruption and violence another Cham- 
ber, which should ratify the King's will, repre- 
sented by the Skuludis Cabinet, and which should 
annul even the remembrance of the bygone will 
of the nation, represented by Venizelos. Neu- 
tralism — and, silently, the Greek army evacuates 
Kavalla and the Rupel fort, to make room for 
the hereditary enemies, the Bulgarians, so that 
they might, under more favour able condition, 
fight against the armies of the Allies. If there be 
no method in this treason disguised as neutralism , 
it cannot be said that the word « method » have 
any meaning, not even in Germany or in German 
dictionaries. The forbearance shown by France 
and England towards this method of Greece, was 
certainly one of the most characteristic pheno- 
mena of that old-style doctrinairism and senti- 
mentalism in vogue between 1830 and 1848, 
which has now weakened the nerves and the 
diplomacy of the Allies to such an extent as to 
cause the duration of the war to be protracted 
for some years. But recrimination is useless, now. 
To-day, we must insist that, once on the right 
path, the diplomacy of the Entente may remain 
in it and go to the end without exposing itself, 
for the third or fourth time, to become the laugh- 
ing-stock of the professors of legerdemain of the 
Piraeus. What is the Entente still waiting for? 

— 71 - 



Its proposals are circumvented, like that of par- 
tial disarmament, which has given M. Skuludis 
the opportunity of sending the old men to their 
homes and calling up the young ones instead. 
And its Ministers are insulted in their residences. 
And the Admirals of its ships are compiles in 
the open streets. And, what is still worse, Kaval- 
la is surrendered to the Bulgarians in order that it 
may serve as a naval base for the submarines 
that Germany wishes to have near Salonica, so 
as to isolate Sarrail's army on the eve of action, 
and close it up and suffocate it between the 
trenches and the sea. The time for speeches is 
past. It is time to act seriously, and to decline all 
discussions on arguments upon which King Con- 
stantine's ingenuity and irony have been so gra- 
cefully exercised. 

And when I say the Entente, I mean Italy also. 
Up to now, Italy has been absent during the ne- 
gotiations with Greece, and this absence — let 
the new Cabinet understand it well — disconcerts 
and saddens the Italians much more, I venture to 
say, than the Austrian offensive in the Trentino 
has done. The Austrian offensive can be seen 
and can be fought. But absence, like nothingness, 
is outside the logic and the sentiment of the war. 

An Italian policy of abstention in Greek affairs 
could have been understood — for my part, I 
have never undestood it, nor justified, nor ad- 
mitted it — before the Entente's decision to pass 
from the field of ideas to that of action. It was 
perhaps necessary not to create embarrassments 
at the back of Sarrail's army in preparation at 
Salonica; and Italy's black demon might have 
excited rather than pacified the Eumenides of 
Epirus. But to-day that the Entente has resolved 
to act, there can be no more consideration, nor 

— 72 — 



delicacy, nor apprehension to check Italy. To- 
day, Italy must resume her place amongst the 
Powers of the Entente, not only in the action 
against Greece, but in all the Balkan policy, and 
make up for lost time. 
Time, only ? 



- 73 _ 



THE MARCH TO VICTORY. 



Up to yesterday, the Austrians were in the 
habit of saying that the Italian soldiers know how 
to die, but not how to win. From to-day, they 
will learn that the Italian soldiers know how to 
win too. They know how to win, because they 
know how to die. Better still, because they know 
how to suffer. General Nogi, the organizer of the 
Japanese victories, said that the winning army 
is that which knows how to suffer one quarter 
of an hour longer than the enemy. Oh, as to suf- 
fering, our soldiers have been suffering for a 
whole year, nay, for fourteen months; calmly, 
patiently, with their feet in mud and blood, with 
their foreheads in the double storm of Alpine 
ice and of the fire of the Skoda guns, amidst the 
corpses of their comrades fallen in the trenches 
or on the bristling contested rocks. And, here at 
last, after so much suffering they issue happy and 
smiling, new from the long night, like the light 
on the first day of Creation. Let us greet them, 
with high cries of love, as one greets the light at 
day-break. 

These soldiers are Italy. 

They were not stimulated or aroused to action 
on entering the field by the words with which 
the Emperor of Germany usually stimulates or 

— 74 — 



exalts his recruits in the court of Potsdam. No 
one has told them : « From this day onwards, you 
are sacred because you carry the ensigns of your 
Lord » . 

In their simplicity, they would have laughed 
at such a melodramatic investiture. But in the 
hour of peril, the Great Mother knocked at the 
doors: — « Up, boys, to the rescue!)) — And 
the doors all opened; and from the dwellings, 
from the schools, from the workshops — forgetful 
of old dissensions and of recent rancour, as with 
hearts touched by the sound of the first voice 
heard in the cradle — the boys inssued forth with 
radiant eyes, with palpitating souls, as in a sud- 
den outburst of Spring — to go whither ? Oh, 
no one need point out the way to them, or tell 
them the enemy's name. By instinct they knew 
the way, already traced by the legionaries of Ro- 
me and afterwards strewn with the crosses of 
their fathers' graves : the road of the glories and 
the tortures of the new Italic race — the last, 
that of Battisti — and on that known road they 
started on their march with limbs sound and 
stouter hearts ! This time, for life or death ! Start- 
ing from Rome after so many centuries, the sol- 
diers of Italy understood that the order could be 
but one : to reach the goal and to force the enemy 
to bow, at last, to the law of Rome. And march- 
ing onwards they obey this order. 

We follow them, step by step, like their very 
shadow, along the bloodstained road: we see 
them from afar, divide and reunite, bend and 
be upright again, fall and rise; never faltering, 
never stopping, never weary; and we count 
them, or rather we endeavour to count them every 
day as during a fever, the pulsations of the veins 
or the heart-beats are counted ; and we call them 

— 75 — 



by name as in the storm the stars of Heaven are 
called. Where are they ? Here they are, to-dlay 
all on high in Trieste's sky. Ail ? Those who are 
missing will form, in our memory the new con- 
stellation of the great history of Italy. 

This war which we provoked not, but accepted 
just as Necessity imposed it upon us, has finally 
revealed the Italians to their own selves and also 
to friends and enemies. Withdrawn from the 
asphyxiating atmosphere of the political marsh, 
and transported to the pure one of the fight for 
the Ideal, their soul has opened as a flower on the 
thorn, all gentleness and valour, all virtue and 
heroism. They are all great. The humble peas- 
ant prepares our victory in the midst of the fire, 
with the same hands and the same smile with 
which he prepared yesterday in the earth the ferti- 
lity of the harvests. The labourer defends with 
his iron muscles the positions won from the enemy 
with the same pride as he yesterday defended his 
rights in his labour organizations. And the artisan, 
bent night and day over all the works of the war, 
models his death for the salvation of his father- 
land as he modelled yesterday bent over his 
bench, the work for the poor maintenance of his 
family. When the oak has such sturdy roots and 
souls so powerful in its roots, it can defy cent- 
uries and storms. There, in the roots resides the 
eternal force: it is the eternal substance of life. 
We are but the fading lustre of the bark of the 
tree, which the first sunshine or the first winds 
will peel off. How, then, shall we honour these 
marvellous factors of the fatherland's future great- 
ness ? We can but bow before them and learn 
from them the deep-seated virtues of the race, 
the virtues which ennoble a nation and render it 
worthy of history. 

— 76 — 



Does not all this army issue forth suddenly 
armed from the deep-seated virtues of the race ? 

It seemed born but of yesterday — in a coun- 
try which has never made of war an industry for 
herself or for others — and because it was born 
yesterday, it was exposed to the enemy's com- 
miseration and derision. But did the army of 
Italy require to be trained in the barracks, and 
to learn a theory in the books of the Herren Pro- 
fessors, for the search of the national boundaries } 
It was long since prepared in the sorrow and the 
sadness of the fatherland, and only awaited the 
opportunity to put itself in battle array. Its forma- 
tion was organic, like the life itself of the nation : 
not mechanical, as a doctrinaire and political arti- 
fice. And organically it proceeds to-day and de- 
velops itself in struggle and in victory. 
Hearts and flags on high ! 

In Germany, during the Middle Ages, only the 
Margraves, the guardians of the Marches, had 
the capacity of becoming Emperors. But are not 
all the soldiers of our army Margraves to-day ? 
They who have no other duty and are proud of 
nothing else save that of reconquering the front- 
ier of Italy — and holding it — holding it as 
long as the name of Italy lasts , and the Alps and 
the sea, there, under the Quarnaro, last ? But 
they do not aspire to-day — like their great Corsi- 
can brother, who preceded them on the Isonzo, 
to become Emperors. 

These divine boys depose the eagles of their 
youth, with all their heart's blood, and the hopes 
of their lives at Italy's feet, at the feet of the old 
and new Italy. And one thing only they desire : 
that their sacrifice may be fruitful of glory in the 
present and in the future. 

May their will be accomplished ! 

— 77 — 



THE DISTURBING BLUFF. 



The victories of the Bismarckian era, and the 
consequent establishment of the German Empire 
had created 1 , in Europe, an artificial, abnormal 
and incoherent state of things, bearing no rela- 
tion to reality either politically or economically: 
a state of things which the temporary conditions 
of the various countries constrained them to ac- 
cept or to submit to, but which the first shock 
would inevitably disintegrate and destroy. One 
only great country was there, armed and produc- 
ing arms, against all the others unarmed or nearly 
so, and worse still, incapable of arming by them- 
selves. One only great country was there, the 
wholesale and retail provider to friendly and 
enemy markets, amongst all the others, sluggish 
and each day more impotent in their inertia, and 
contented with selling their souls to the devil in 
order to purchase a little repose and a little 
cowardice. One only great country was there, the 
promoter of coalitions, groupings, diplomatic and 
dynastic combinations, in its own exclusive in- 
terest; amongst all the others around it, which 
were obliged to limit or to co-ordinate their action 
conformably with the German interest, predbmin- 

_ 78 — 



ant and preponderating. A typical example of 
this effort which tended to limitation and co-or- 
dination, is offered by England, which during the 
past ten years sought for, studied and proposed 
all the possible formulas of proportionality in 
naval armaments, and for a reply was told that 
the question of naval and terrestrial armaments 
does not depend on the will of the men in power, 
but on the dynamic force and on the plastic force 
of nations. And these two forces of the German 
people, imperfectly understood and imperfectly 
estimated by the others, exercised their fancy in 
all the fields of speculation, without showing or 
allowing the absent-minded to catch a glimpse 
of the ultimate aim of their tension. Could there 
have existed a more artificial and more abnormal 
combination than that of the Triple Alliance 7 
Italy was constrained to accept it, and even hold 
it in honour during the thirty long years of the 
formation of her economic framework and of her 
specific political conscience; without ceasing, 
however, to discuss its incompatibility with her 
essential interests ; in the same manner as Ger- 
many and Austria, on their own account, never 
ceased to labour in every direction for the aggrand- 
izement of their own power, to the detriment 
and in derision of their Ally. And, as it was with 
Italy, were not the other combinations with Tur- 
key and Greece artificial and abnormal also 7 The 
war diverted every one from the tortuous paths 
in which they had wandered, and replaced all 
in the straight road. Great and small countries, 
which up to the eve of the war had lived in the 
illusion and the dream of having attained the 
supreme state of welfare, took up once more the 
hard' battle of life, as if they were destitute of all 
and obliged to build up their homes and labour 



79 



for their children's existence. The unarmed armed 
themselves. The peaceful and the pacifists became 
warlike. The oblivious regained at one stroke the 
memory of ancient virtues. The weak displayed 
the will to recuperate their strength in order to 
fight side by side with other combatants. All 
those who possessed the capacities and Jthe power 
of life, entered into the field to defend their liberty 
and their future. In a period historically brief 
Europe saw the States that were living under the 
menace, regain the equilibrium of force to face 
the State which during the forty years of silent 
preparation had succeeded in breaking up that 
equilibrium and in weighing down in her favour 
under the weight of her sword the whole balance 
of human happiness. 

Yet, in the great upheaval, or rather in the 
great revolution, one human agglomeration only 
did not feel the pulsation of its heart and of its 
brain accelerate; one thing only did not move 
and never demonstrated the will to move: the 
agglomerated individual and the thing that still 
call themselves Greece. 

Now, at last, after so much experience, our 
illustrious French colleagues are asking themsel- 
ves whether there exists a Greek people in Gree- 
ce. We replied to this question a long time since. 
We can, now, without undue pride, note that 
amongst thinking people there is no further var- 
iance or disagreement on the question. 

One of the most serious causes of the disturb- 
ance of the diplomacy of Europe since the out- 
burst of the war has been, in fact, Greece, more 
than Turkey itself : Greece, which, being nothing, 
was to be all for her own and Germany's conve- 
nience, and for the convenience of France and 
England: Greece, this vain name without sub- 

— 80 — 



stance, to which each in turn strove to give some 
contents which might serve in the game of their 
own particular combinations and their own part- 
icular retaliations. Who was the cause of the 
contrasts between France and Italy during the 
Lybian War and after, and during the Balkan 
War ? Greece, and the ambiguity which she 
representend — entirely for the benefit of Ger- 
many. It is useless to-day to recall to mind the 
polemics of the past, which are, in any case, 
within everybody's memory. 

The Powers of the Entente, and most of all 
France, had arrayed themselves against Italy in 
the /Egean, because they were convinced — and 
Germany in the background kept such suspicions 
alive — that Italy's attitude was to prepare in 
the /Egean the way to the Mediterranean for 
Germany. Hence the setting up of Greece as a 
counter altar to Italy, which they regarded as the 
authorized representative of the Central Powers 
in the Mediterranean; those Empires which, at 
one and the same time, supplied the Turkish 
army with arms and officers to fight the Italian 
army in Lybia, and furnished Greece with their 
diplomacy in order to obtain Kavalla for her in 
the Treaty of Bucharest. Italy, therefore, owing 
to their duplicity and to this equivocal game, was 
useful to Germany, who held her aloof from 
France and England, and was useful to Greece 
upon which, openly, and in spite of Germany's 
Ally, they poured out their favours. And who 
knows to what consequences such a game would 
have driven us, if the war had not come to upset 
the dice of the Priests in the Belle Helene, and to 
cause the Iliad to end in comic opera. 

But now that the operetta has ended, it is well 
that, not for the sake of Italy and France only, 

— 81 — 



but for European life, for its honesty and serious- 
ness, this wretched affair of Hellenism in the 
Mediterranean should likewise come to an end 
once and for all. 

Hellenism does not answer any interest or any 
necessity of European life. A fatuous creation of 
political romanticism — literary, at first — the 
romanticism of the exaltation of the weak and 
the rehabilitation of the fallen ; then a diplomatic 
creation of the European States in contention with 
one another for Turkey's succession, it has finally 
revealed itself, at the war's trial, in its true cha- 
racter, and for what it cannot help being; a dis- 
turbing bluff on the nations and on the actions 
of States which are really worthy of existence, 
because they are really creators of civilization and 
factors of history. 

Italy, too, before her reconstruction, was a 
literary expression, rather than an actual power. 
But after her reconstruction she felt the duty of 
creating an autonomous life for herself and of 
co-operating with all her might to the increase 
and to the irradiation of civilization throughout 
the modern world. 

But what is, at present, the intellectual, po- 
litical and moral contribution of Greece to the 
modern world? 

Even a small country can have her importance 
in civilization, if science and the fine arts give 
her faith and ennoble her: Belgium is an exam- 
ple. But what does Greece represent to-day in 
the fine arts and in science ? And, what, at least, 
in the moral world ? 

What she represents in the moral world, let 
Streit and King Constantine tell to Servia, to 
which they were bound by a pact of honour which 
was not maintained ; and let them also tell France 

_ 82 - 



and England, to which they should have been 
bound by gratitude, and which they repay, in>- 
stead, with espionnage in favour of their enemy, 
and with treason. 

In the struggle of modern times, there is no 
more room for literary memories: it its sufficient 
if these remain sacred' in the venerable Books of 
antiquity: there is room for manly energies, for 
labour that produces wealth, for action that pro- 
duces welfare, for intelligence which produces 
light on the ways of humanity. 

For the idle, the sweaters and 1 the parasites, 
the bunch of dried grapes. 



83 



FACTS NOTED. 



The policy of the Entente in the various parts 
of trie Balkans continues to yield its fruits of 
((ashes and venom », with unchanging intensity, 
which shows the unalterable intensity of its germ. 
It certainly does not think of astonishing history, 
as in Boccaccio's tale, the heart of the Lady Dia- 
nora was astonished by an unexpected blooming 
of Spring in a winter garden. It is faithful to its 
rigid season and to its rigid chastity. It is always 
the same. And does not change with the changing 
of events. Cato, in the act of suicide, had the 
same sincerity and coherence. 

I have never believed, nor do I now believe, 
that the best way to co-operate in an enterprise 
is to acquiesce in the errors of its promoters. And 
it is for this reason that, for a year past, day by 
day, within the limits of my province, I have con- 
tinued to note and to comment in the most expli- 
cit form and in the clearest and most intelligible 
manner the errors of the Allies in the Balkans: 
errors of conception and execution — deriving 
partly from an archaic tendency to accomodation 
in absolute contrast with the war*s fundamental 
law, which calls instead for an overturning of 

— 84 — 



ancient situations and of ancient positions — and 
partly from the persistent incapacity to understand 
the enemy's determination and strength and 
to oppose to them an equal determination and an 
equal strength in the struggle which is raging. 
There is always in the sword of the Allies, as in 
their mind, a prejudice or an idea which, in the 
process of fusion, weakens the temper and ren- 
ders it brittle and unresisting to shocks. It hap- 
pened thus in the negotiations previous to the 
Austro-Bulgaro-German expedition against Ser- 
via; the same happened in the negotiations with 
Greece; and, lastly, it is the same in the present 
Roumanian campaign. In the most difficult mo- 
ments, the sense of relation — apart from all 
the rest — has been wanting in the Allies : that 
special sense which serves to bring thought into 
line with reality and to conciliate the particular 
interest of one party with that of the others. In the 
march across the Balkans, it is fatal that the Al- 
lies should always bar their own roads and should 
stop the clocks of all stations. Thus acting, they 
lose the notion of time and space; and usually 
lose a campaign also ; and, what is worse, together 
with the campaign, a whole year of war. Which 
is not the year of Fabius Maximus. 

After the experience of the Servian defeat, the 
Allies should have changed their system and 
should, at any rate, have summed up the poli- 
tical and military factors in the new Balkan strug- 
gle with a greater circumspection. They have, 
instead, pitifully wasted a whole year in negotiat- 
ing with Greece, and have not began to show 
themselves firm with King Gonstanitine's Govern- 
ments until these had surrendered, one by one, 
ail the boundary forts to Bulgaria, and with the 
forts, the guns, the munitions, the supplies and 

_ 85 - 



even the pack-horses ! Arid they have not threat- 
ened! to march against Bulgaria until she had 
widened heir territory as fair as the fortified posi- 
tions of Greece, and had organized an armoured 
hinterland of defence between her camp and that 
of General Sarrail. And in the meantime, whilst, 
owing to unexpected difficulties, the Salonika 
army remained more than ever barricaded in its 
trenches, Roumania, which appeared to have se- 
lected the most unfavourable conditions to effect 
her entry, threw herself into the fray, not only 
without the assistance of the Salonika army from 
the South, and that of Broussiloff from the North, 
but with the vague confidence — artfully kept 
alive — that the Bulgarians would have surrend- 
ered their arms to the Russians, who were not 
present, and could not, in any case, have taken 
delivery of them ; and with this vague confidence 
(worse still if it twas a formal promise), she was 
left to herself in Transylvania, and was followed, 
as was natural, by the Builgaro-Turkish -German 
army in the Dobrouja. The war bulletins tell us 
the rest: the fall of Constanza yesterday, that of 
Predeal to-day. 

On the eve of the war against Servia, the al- 
liance between Bulgaria and Turkey was not 
believed in ; not even after the Treaty for the 
transfer of the territory on the Enos line. And 
Greece's treason was not believed in, even after 
the cession of the forts and the surrender of the 
regiments, on the eve of the new war. Which 
of these was the grosser error, the first or the 
second 1 ? Or again, the mistake of having believed 
in the Greek parliamentary revolution, or that of 
having believed in a sentimental surrender of Bul- 
garia to Russia? But, between one sett of errors 
and the other, one thing is certain and unquestion- 

- 86 - 



able; the carelessness in estimating the moral 
and 1 material forces of the enemy. Yet, this time, 
it was clear, it was evident and more than ever 
to have been intuitively anticipated, that it was 
here that the enemy would have gathered! all 
his strength together to strike his great blow; 
that there, at the meeting-place of his most faith- 
ful Allies — the Hungarians on the one side 
and) the Bulgarians on the other — which was 
also the main point of the roads to the East and 
the field on which future harvests were to be 
gathered Germany would have engaged all the 
honour of her Supreme Command and all the 
fury of her arms. But the campaign appealed as 
smooth as a Press one. And, whilst Maekemsen 
and Falkenheyn aire to-day carrying on war in 
the grand 1 style, the Entente is listening to the 
word of Venizelos announcing the suspension 
of the ultimatum to Bulgaria ! It is sad. But it is so. 

Who is responsible for all! this? 

French and English writers are in the habit of 
assigning the responsibility of the war education 
of the Germans to Treitschke and von Bern- 
hardi, and to the other historians and philo- 
sophers of force, who effectively moulded a 
generation fit for war. By analogy it should be 
said that the responsibility of this uncertain po- 
licy is to be found in the habit of the Entente's 
mind,, which for so many long years has been 
turned towards the chaste thoughts of peace. 
However that may be, there is no doubt that, 
with the exception of the armies in the field, 
which are gloriously fighting, there has always 
been, in the Entente's war policy something fan- 
tastic and involved, which does not succeed in 
assuming a definite and concrete form. Residues 
of old! ideas that the tempest has not completely 



87 



dispersed are still roaming uncertain in the air. 
Old doctrinaire conceptions which not even the 
roar of the guns has succeeded in putting to silen- 
ce or rendering impotent, dominate in the recol- 
lections and the passions. Peace will be what it 
will be. But the mind of the war must be equal 
to the weapons with which the war is fought. 
Otherwise, why use them ? 

Still to-day, in the Entente, the arms are arms 
of war; but the mind between war and peace. 
(( And it is not yet black and the white fades » . — 
or vice versa. 

For us Italians the question of the conception 
of the war of the Allies in the Balkans is not a 
theoretical one; it is an essential question of the 
first, of the most absolute importance. And we 
are in duty bound to demand that the are of er- 
rors be for ever closed. 



88 ~ 



OLD WORDS AND OLD IDEAS. 



The two speeches, that of von Bethmann- 
Hollweg and of Asquith, demonstrate once more 
that ideas, which in the abstract appear the 
finest and safest for the governing of men, reveal 
themselves, in the end, the most false and deceit- 
ful when put to the test of action. Both the Chan- 
cellor of the German Empire and the British 
Premier, on the eve of the war, possessed their 
own ideas, which were those of their party, of 
their caste or of their class. But after two years 
of struggle, there appears nothing of those ideas, 
save some rare signs in their speeches, like the 
rare sparks in the ashes after a fire. What has 
become of the theories of the supremacy of force 
over right, and of the divinity of war on earth 
for the regeneration of mankind, which constitut- 
ed the leit-motif of the doctrines of the State and 
of the Empire in the grand orchestra of German 
science? Von Bethmann-Hollweg is seeking all 
kinds of cavilling to demonstrate that he has not 
wished for war; whilst his Lord, who has been 
proclaimed Lord of the War by the Super-Gen- 
erals of the Grand Staff, now runs after the 
Socialists of co-operative organizations to demon- 



89 



strate his passionate love for that very people 
which he has sent to butchery in his own name. 
— And what has become of the pacifism and the 
humanitarianism of Asquith and of his followers, 
floating supinely, like Delaroche's Martyr, with 
a halo round the forehead', on the dark waves of 
destiny ? During the ordeal, the terrible and 
devilish dream of German supremacy must have 
found out that it is not an easy matter to turn 
Europe into a desert, as it its done in a series 
of lectures and volumes on the privileged race 
and on its right to dominate. And the other 
dream — the pious metaphysical dream of Hu- 
manity triumphant over nationalities ; of the 
State unarmed, or armed only for parade — 
must have also found out that the sun has pe- 
netrated into the fog which had lulled it to sleep, 
and has dispersed the mist-wreaths in the flaming 
air. In any case, if not the Statesmen who are 
officially engaged in politics, the public of all 
the nations engaged 1 in the war must have real- 
ized by now the failure of the ideas which, from 
one side and from the other, had assured 1 it of hap- 
piness for the present and for the future. All the 
stupidities have by now been said; and all the 
experiments made. At present there is nothing 
left to do but to commence all over again, if 
we seriously wish to give some small security to 
European civilization, and to give to the various 
national co-operative bodies living in European 
civilization, a sound law, and not a changeable 
one, according to changes in parties, in doctrines 
or in interests. And we must return to reality, 
above all to reality out of which we have all been 
living for many years; until yesterday, until the 
great war in which we are all entangled, came 
to seize us by the forelock or by the feet to hurl 

— 90 - 



us into the fire to show us that even fire exists, 
and that our own will, or our imbecility is not 
sufficient to draw us away from the fire which 
burns up equally its worshippers and its despisers. 

I do not know, with regard to the responsi- 
bilities of the war — which the Chancellor of the 
Empire now wants to discharge upon some one 
else's shoulders — I do not know whether the 
blame is due to the strong and well-armed State 
which wanted war, or to the weak ones which 
had excluded war from their calculationis on 
historical probabilities, and therefore rendered the 
task of the aggressor easier, as the women of light 
morals render easy the task of the professional 
seducer. « Comme les nations liberates, ses voisines 
ei amies, la France a vu combien Y accroissement 
indefini des depenses milUaires rendait difficile 
le noble ideal de civilization quelle poursuit » — 
wrote in his Report on the War Budget that M. 
Massiny who, as Minister of War in 1914, has 
been able to see the error of his good intentions 
with his own eyes. Now, who remembers the 
Past? 

There are, however, many traces of the Past in 
the British Premier's speech, with many residues 
of the old mentality of the Little Englander, 
which, in these grave moments ought to be des- 
troyed together with all the recollections of those 
inert sentimentalisms which resolve and conclude 
nothing, and leave everything and 1 everybody 
in statu quo ante, plus one tear and minus a 
defence — such as the declarations in favour of 
Armenians, of (the Yugo-Slavs, of Hellenism. 
We must give Germany her dtue, and render 
justice to her policy, or, rather, to her action in 
the East before and during the war, against the 
accusations and the complaints of her adversaries. 

— 91 — 



When Germany takes a country in hand, she does 
her utmost to enhance her value and to give her 
the heart, the mind and the arms which are es- 
sential to her for the struggle of life. Germany 
is a soul-inspiring power and a formidable di- 
rectress of the little and the weak, which she 
enrols in her ranks; she is a reviver of energies, 
even if it be in her own interest — but who can 
pretend that the Roi de Prusse should work for 
the benefit of others? The other Powers, instead, 
either disdain or fail to seek action, and believe 
they have accomplished their interests by sending 
around the Messages of their principles and the 
sighs of their sentimentality. The French Revolu- 
tion used to send around her Sansculottes. 

Now, England, France and Italy which are 
three noble States living, it may be said, in an 
ultra-subtle and refined atmosphere of principles, 
must acquire that sixth sense of political reality 
which Germany has developed to such a high 
degree, and which they, notwithstanding the 
varied legends of their militarism, of their posi- 
tivism and of their Machiavellianism, have not 
attempted to acquire and to exercise, not even 
after the teachings that the war has imparted to 
them. One feels, one understands that in the 
conception and in the action of these three il- 
lustrious Powers there is something which disturbs 
the precision of movements, which upsets the 
process of direction, which interrupts the current 
along the conducting wires. Are they old ideas, 
not entirely discredited ? Old interests, not decid- 
ed to change? Old plans, not yet decided to be 
dissolved and to vanish ? I know not. But I should 
like to know. Because I should not wish any 
misunderstandings to exist between people who 
are fighting together at the same hour, on the 

— 92 — 



same field. Certain it is (and it is necessary that 
someone at least should tell what may be the 
cause for apprehension in many), that, as Italy 
has entirely emerged from the Triple Alliance, 
it does not seem as if the Allies have, in their 
turn emerged from their ancient combinations; 
it seems, on the contrary, that they continue to 
drag their old chains ri vetted to their ankles, thus 
rendering their walk painful and their action 
uncertain. And whilst Germany is lightening more 
and more the load of her vessel, casting over- 
board, during the voyage, many of her old ideas 
and her old aims and errors, the Entente is car- 
rying her ballast intact, and does not seem in- 
clined to free herself either of an idea, or of an 
aspiration, or of a recollection, or of a personage, 
which may be undesirable. Yet the war should 
have strengthened the muscles of the heart, and 
have caused the blood in the brains to be more 
active, so as to render the one more apt to sup- 
port the weight of sentiments which form them- 
selves on each flaming day; and the other more 
rapid in transmitting the ideas which each day 
are being renewed in the flames. Who can say 
that the aims of the war are the same to-day as 
they were at the beginning } And not for the Al- 
lies only, but for the Central Empires, and above 
all for Germany ? How many new aims have not 
been added to those of the defence of small na- 
tions on the part of the Allies, and to that of 
Mittel-Europa on the part of Germany ! And 
then, has not the war created the great, new fact, 
between the States; the great economic fact, 
unforeseen and not to be foreseen when, in Au- 
gust 1914 the armies entered the field ? And what 
changes might not this new economic fact bring 
in international politics? What new orientation 

— 93 — 



in thought and custom } What new modes and 
forms of wealth ? Will gold suffice as a measure 
of wealth 7 Or will another element be necessary ? 

I am not even an amateur in political economy 
and in financial science: I am simply incompe- 
tent : or rather, an innocent. 

But my innocence causes me to feel that Sta- 
tesmen should not speak any more, to-day, of the 
war with the same words and with the same ideas 
as in times gone by. 

And, therefore, both the speeches, that of the 
German Chancellor and that of the English Pre- 
mier, appear to me out-of-date. 






- 94 



THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH. 



It is no longer the case — for me, to say the 
truth, it has never been — to extenuate the actual 
situation of the Entente, or to cover it with a 
merciful veil. Even if newspapers were silent and 
the bulletins lied, the facts would speak for 
themselves with so forcible an eloquence, that it 
would not be possible for the public to remain 
deaf and indifferent to their voice. And the facts 
tell us that the measure of error® is by now over 
full. Can fortune ripen amongst error® ? 

The English newspapers are beginning to show 
themselves more than stern, aggressive, against 
the Asquith Cabinet, and are calling for a greater 
vigour and a greater energy in the conduct of the 
war. The French papers, struggling between their 
untiring phi Jo -Hellenism and' their deference to- 
ward® Russia, are striving to pluck up courage 
and to instil courage into others, by describing 
the situation of Roumenia as « serious but not 
desperate » ; and that of Greece as « improving » , 
at every act of resistance on the part of King 
Constanitine's Government, and at every declara- 
tion of war made to the enemy Powers by M. 
Venizelos* Cabinet. Meanwhile Germany and 

- 95 — 



Austria are annexing Poland, are conquering Rou- 
menia and are silently working on the Bagdad 
Railway; and very likely that part of LadislavofF s 
speech in the Sobranje, in which he announced a 
forthcoming event which will fill the soul of the 
Allies with joy — the Allies of Germany, of cour- 
se — referred to the inauguration of some new 
station on that line. And, at the same time, a 
new and greater expedition in the grand style 
on all the Italian battle front, from the Carso to 
the Trentino, is announced on all sides. When 7 

Under these conditions, silence regarding the 
errors of friends and Allies would be more bla- 
meworthy towards our country than silence re- 
garding our own errors. This is not the time for 
illusions or distractions. It is the time for action. 
And, in time of action it is necessary that the 
solidarity in a group of Allies should have, as 
basis, the duty of responsibility for some, and the 
right of vigilance for others. Has the Italian 
Government ever exercised this vigilance or is 
it exercising it now, with a full conscience and 
with entire authority ? Or does it allow things to 
take their chance and pass on, contenting itself 
with making some acute remarks, or giving some 
precise information in order not to wound the 
susceptibility of the Allies 7 

Let us say, clearly and loudly, so that everyone 
may hear and take the necessary steps : on many 
events, on many questions, on many problems 
of the war, we in Italy have a different view 
and a different political sense — and consequent- 
ly we make a different estimate and give a dif- 
ferent judgement — from those which the other 
Allied nations have and give. Idem sentire de 
republica was, with the Romans, a fundamental 
rule of good citizenship. Idem sentire of the ques- 

— 96 — 



tions of the war should be the fundamental rule 
of good alliance between the Allies. Now, dur- 
ing these two years of collaboration we have not 
succeeded in identifying our points of view with 
those of our Allies on the questions regarding 
the Balkan Peninsula and the East. And the 
diversity of ideas and sentiments has resulted in 
inactivities and incoherences which even in time 
of peace would be considered damaging, and in 
time of war are simply disastrous. Now, it is well 
that those who compose the Governments of the 
Entente should learn and understand this: that 
in case of a defeat of the Entente in the Balkans, 
Italy amongst all the other Allies would be the 
most exposed to disillusionment (let us call it 
so, for the moment), and therefore Italy should 
have the greatest weight and the greatest authori- 
ty in the councils on the Balkan policy. To dis- 
regard this would mean to disregard the very 
aims of our war. 

During the laborious period of our neutrality, 
when souls and minds were still uncertain of the 
decisions to be taken, the writer of this article, 
opposing all the arguments in favour of the so- 
called democratic war and of the so-caleld demo- 
cratic principles, sustained that the only and 
unique motives of Italy's war were to be sought 
for in her interests, which required that she 
should have absolute security in the Adriatic, 
and, therefore, that Austria should not be abso- 
lutely preponderant in the Balkans. 

But, alas, the conduct of the Balkan war has 
always remained in the hands of the dreamers 
of France, England and Russia alike. And the 
results have been, and continue to be, those which 
could and should have been expected, and which 
we are constrained to record, and lament over, 
day by day. 

- 97 — 



Not only, but in a war like this one, which 
threatens to end in a peace which will act as a 
balance, into the scales of which the Powers will 
cast the weight of the pledges they have seized, the 
idealists of the Entente have been afraid to secure 
for themselves those pledges which, at the proper 
moment, might serve to neutralize the value of 
those secured by the enemy. After Servia's de- 
feat, caused by Greece's treason, it was impera- 
tive to secure — in homage to Dante's law of 
counterpoise — pledges from the mouth of the 
Otranto Channel to Cape Sunio and to all the 
/Egean. But the chaste virginity of our friends 
trembles and blushes at the thought of an unjust 
marriage, and always runs after Venizelos to 
get the wedding celebrated in a legal form. Ger- 
many, therefore, has an easy game of it in 
seconding and defending, before the Court of 
the civilized world, the case of bigamy of her 
brother-in-law King Constantine against the En- 
tente, which is now wallowing in blood. 

No, let us repeat it once more, with elements 
like these one can write a pochade, not a tragedy. 

Tragedy, that is, war, which, after all, is not 
a common phenomenon in the life of nations, 
demands a philosophy, a policy and means dif- 
ferent to those which are adopted at election 
meetings and in parliament houses. A war based 
on principles is not less ridiculous and useless 
than a war en dentelles. Principles are excellent 
factors of internal policy for the claiming of rights 
and positions between the social classes, living 
between the wall and the moat. But beyond the 
wall and the moat, when the reasons of right rely 
totally and uniquely on the strength of arms and 
munitions; and when the conquest of lands and 
seas is the direct or indirect way to obtain the 

— 98 — 



triumph of one's cause, to obtain the victory of 
the aims for which one is fighting and dying, the 
conduct of the Allies is simply inconceivable. 
In such cases one should declare one's own in- 
competency for war, and turn to pacifism. 

In the life and death struggle, to make war 
without arms and without artillery, as in Roume- 
nia ; to engage in diplomacy with a bandiage over 
the eyes and a convulsion in the heart as in 
Greece, is neither serious nor dignified. Especial- 
ly when the enemy has a hard fist and a harder 
heart, and is named Germany. 

It would be more than ingenuousness to think 
that the general public awaits our remarks to 
form an exact idea of the situation. The alert 
and ironical sense of the Italians, which is the 
natural complement of the historical sense, de- 
veloped through centuries of sad experience, im- 
mediately sees and grasps the elements of reality 
before even the mind of the writers or of politi- 
cians — always embroiled or perverted by pre- 
judice of doctrine or by party interests — can 
decide to bring them and represent them in the 
field of discussion. I will not repeat the defini- 
tion which the Italian spirit of irony has, long 
ago formulated on the Entente's diplomacy in 
the Balkans, and which it now repeats with ever 
increasing scientific conviction; but, as it would 
be dangerous and ignominious for writers and 
politicians to feign an image of reality different 
to the actual one, and which the public is ac- 
quainted with, I will proceed to speak of that 
masterpiece of the Entente's diplomacy in the 
Balkans: the Greece of Venizelos. 

Who is responsible in a particular manner for 
this masterpiece ? France or England ? Or, per- 
haps also Russia, or all three together? If we 

— 99 — 



glance at the French and English newspapers, 
illustrated, up to yesterday, with the portrait of 
Venizelos, framed in garlands of oak and laurel ; 
if we remember the polemics which our col- 
leagues of the French Press have sustained 
against us, and the declarations made by English 
Ministers in reply to questions put by Members 
of Parliament, there is no doubt whatever that 
the Homer of this Iliad must be contested for 
between the two shores of the English Channel. 
If, also, some rhapsodies have been added to the 
poem by Greek bankers, roaming between Pa- 
ris and London, it will be the task of the German 
philological science to make researches upon 
them and to illustrate them in the future. 

One of the characteristics of the Entente's di- 
plomacy is the indifference it feels towards the 
Present, and its apprehensions for the Past and 
for the Future. For instance, if you ask M. Pasic 
what he hopes for the future, he will reply: All 
the Past, plus this and that thing. — If you ask 
M. Berthelot if he believe that at the end of the 
war some part of the East might appertain to 
others, he will reply: In Asia Minor, there is 
only room for France. — All, imagine and want 
the Future with the unchanged and unchangeable 
Past, naturally, augmented. Now, it is not dif- 
ficult to understand that with such a great im- 
mobility of Past and such infinity of Future, the 
conscience and the notion of the Present is apt- 
to gelt lost. Let also Venizelos be taken for Philip 
of Macedon, who must conquer and hold the East 
on behalf of this or that Power of the Entente. 
But we Italians have some cause and some right 
to declare and to denounce the want of serious- 
ness of all these proceedings. 



100 



No: we cannot continue to assist at these pro- 
ceedings with indifference. 

We must not only have the certitude that the 
old errors will not be renewed, but we must also 
be assured that the dispositions of soul and mind 
from which these errors were derived, will be 
profoundly changed and uprooted. 



- 101 - 



DEDICATED TO COUNT LUTZOW. 



Monsieur le Comte, I have read with much 
pleasure your article on peace in the Neue Freie 
Presse; I have read it with the same pleasure 
with which, more than once, in this Rome which 
you loved, or at least, loved to live in, it has 
been my lot to listen to your witty conversation 
on so many other subjects of art and politics. 
But, if the voice of the living reaches the me- 
lancholy shades in the world beyond, I do not 
know whether your August Lord and Master, 
recently carried off from the happiness of the 
peoples of the Monarchy, will have been able 
to read your article with a like pleasure. Do you 
remember the scene enacted between Louis XVI. 
and the Mayor of Paris on that famous 17th of 
July, in which the descendant of the Capets was 
dragged from Versailles to Paris by the boister- 
ous populace ? Offering him the keys_of the City, 
the Mayor said : « These are the same keys which 
were presented to Henri IV. Thajt King had 
conquered his people. To-day the people has 
reconquered its King » . At which audacious 
speech, Louis, turning to Prince de Beauvau who 
was standing beside him, asked in an angry tone : 

— 102 — 



(( Must I continue to listen ? » And I do not believe 
that the grand-nephew of Marie Antoinette would 
formulate any other interrogation, were hei to 
learn your theory of low and high and your con- 
demmnation of the mediaeval conception of the 
supremacy of Governments over peoples. 

Ah, you are turning revolutionist, Monsieur 
le Comte: revolutionist in theory and practice, 
revolutionist in the means and the end: you, an 
Austrian diplomat, a twig of Prince Metternich's 
tree ! The matter is one to be denounced to the 
King's Prosecutor — pardon, the Emperor's. 

. Is it worth while being Councillor of the Aus- 
trian Empire, of the only Christian Empire in 
Europe ordained on the basis of Divine Right, 
against which the scythe and the axe of the 
Revolution was most directly busy, to end by 
thinking like the very last of the Cordeliers } 

When the Duke of Brunswick, in his quality 
of chief of the Allied armies, launched his Mani- 
festo which should have been the signal of the 
intervention, or rather, of the war of the States 
of Europe against the Revolution, the revolution- 
ists of the Paris Clubs replied immediately by a 
counter-Manifesto which was destined to incite 
the Belgian, Dutch, German and Austrian pa- 
triots to rouse their countries tp revolt against 
their respective tyrants. — « The tyrants are 
marching against us. We will rouse the peoples 
to revolt against them ». — Old stories, as you 
see, Monsieur le Comte, old style and old method 
of struggle. And it is very strange that you and 
your German friends should endeavour to set 
them up again after having worked for a whole 
century to discredit and annihilate them. Have 
you, then, nothing more original to offer us ? Yet 
you ought well to understand that we Latins, are 



103 



somewhat acquainted with and instructed on the 
Revolution. 

And also in German Pedagogy. 

But, between the principles of the French Re- 
volution and those of German Pedagogy, we 
likewise know that there exists this not impercept- 
ible difference : that the first were professed and 
practised in good faith; whilst the others, instead, 
are by their very authors and partisans propa- 
gated in... will you kindly supply the equivalent 
for bad 1 faith ? The Paris Jacobins seriously be- 
lieved they were rendering a service to humanity 
by inciting the patriots of the Central States — 
we should call them Empires, now — to revolt 
against tyrants. But who, to-day, from the most 
sorrowful dwellings to the most dangerous tren- 
ches, would grant them the least credit for their 
generous intentions ? Even the most ingenuous of 
our neutralists, the most forgetful of our pacifists 
knows and remembers the fierce doctrines, the 
teachings which spring from the very bowels of 
the history of the German and Austrian races. 
« If every act of violence is an act of good war » , 
says one of the foremost Holy Fathers of the 
German Science of War — old Clausewitz — a it 
must be added that it is to be completed by an 
act of cunning and hypocrisy. When the struggle 
is engaged against a coalition, the means must 
be found wherewith to divide our adversaries and 
annihilate them separately and successively, para- 
lysing some with fear, and striking down others 
with force » . Ability and violence. Moral and 
material means. Things, at bottom, not unkown 
to all the rest of humanity and, consequently by 
no means extraordinary and astonishing. Extra- 
ordinary and astonishing is only this : that a man 
of your experience, Count Liitzow, should believe 

— 104 - 



that they must produce a great effect on the mind 
of the enemies, considering that you have the 
ingenuousness to confess that it cannot be denied 
that, this time, the peace proposals are: « a cle- 
ver move on the part of the Central Empires, the 
effects of which will be seen in the future ». Ah, 
is it then a question of a clever move and nothing 
more } Ex ore tuo, therefore, Germany's generosi- 
ty, Austria's chivalry, Bulgaria's humanity and 
Turkey's mercifulness are, taken all together, 
nothing more than a clever move for the purpose 
of disseminating the germs of discord and dis- 
union, in the same manner as plague and cholera 
germs are disseminated by means of sugar-plums 
thrown down from aeroplanes. And was it be- 
cause you have thought that we were not suffi- 
ciently intelligent to understand all this, that you, 
Count Liitzow, have hastened to give us its au- 
thentic interpretation ? 

It is an unskilful move, Monsieur le Comte, 
and one which causes you to derail, and precipi- 
tates you along the line, obstructing the way. If 
you really desire to be useful to yourselves, you, 
Central Empires, you must not deviate from your 
own line; you must not even touch other peo- 
ple's lines. Humanitarian principles, merciful and 
pietist sentiments, generous and chivalrous actions 
are dismal things that must be left to the fools 
of the Entente. « The greatest honour for Ger- 
mans » — says Harden — « is that of not belong- 
ing to the crowd of peaceful and pacifist peoples ; 
it is that of professing no other religion but the 
religion of force... Germany is not fighting and 
does not want to fight for the liberty of otheT 
peoples. She is simply fighting for her own right, 
that is, for her dominion over other peoples which 
are inferior to her » . — Here is the real German 

— 105 - 



line; and real German language. And, I add 
on my own account, also a straightforward lan- 
guage; because it answers to the sentiment and 
to the doctrine; and corresponds with the action 
of the Government and of the people of the Em- 
pire. But a language of peace, no: that one is 
false or falsetto, and convinces and exalts no one. 
Should the necesisty of evidence have ever been 
felt, we should express our thanks to you, Mon- 
sieur le Comte, for having supplied us gratuitous- 
ly with your own precious evidence. 

Precious, also, for another reason which refers 
in a more direct manner to Austria, to the well- 
beloved State which you once represented in our 
country, and which you still serve. 

But when and where did Austria ever make 
use of free principles and institutions for other 
aims than dark and oblique ones ? In her hands 
diamonds turn to coal once more. She made use 
of universal suffrage for the purpose of dividing 
the social classes and creating, internally, several 
foci of civil war, which should divert the va- 
rious nationalities from their struggle against the 
Empire. And, in the same manner, she would 
now make use of peace for the purpose of creat- 
ing in enemy countries other foci of civil war, 
which should divert the peoples from their acti- 
vity in their national wars. She exports to beyond 
her own circle Taafe's old formula: ((In order 
that Austria may be happy, it is necessary that 
no one be satisfied ». But, to make Austria happy 
is not Italy's task. 

No civil war in Italy, then, for Austria's benefit. 

If you have so solemnly put on the stage the 
comedy of peace, in order to deceive the actors 
and the spectators of the war in our countries, 
the deceit can but fall back and will only fall 



106 



back upon your own mask. And if you have, by 
means of a clever move or, better still, by means 
of a clever feint, aimed at the head better to strike 
the heart or the groin, let it not displease you to 
learn that in the case of fencing, at least, the 
Italian sword possesses still a school for parry 
and thrust. 

You, Monsieur le Comte, who, owing to your 
long residence in Italy know as much about our 
country as it is given to an Austrian possessing a 
subtle mind to know, are well aware that here 
in Italy no one loves war for war's sake ; that no 
one makes or thinks of making of war a perma- 
nent institution of national history; and that all 
have accepted this war as a duty, the harshest 
of duties which the salvation of the country has 
imposed upon us — and that is exercised and 
accomplished as a duty; nobly and worthily, 
with the faith and hope that the fatherland may 
emerge from sorrow and from bloodshed reno- 
vated and secure in the future. But you, and the 
others in Vienna must also learn that after so 
many centuries of servitude, the Italians, in their 
reconquered liberty and independence, will not 
brook one thing; the interference — however 
cloaked by cajolery or by threats — of strangers 
in the delimination and the determination of their 
political action. Is it understood ? 

Vain and pitiful illusion is therefore that of the 
Central Empires to believe that proposals of peace 
thus thrown to the winds, can suffice to upset 
the feeble brains and the timorous souls of the 
Italians, and to divert them from their labour, 
which is their duty. These feeble brains and these 
timorous souls know by now what value to set 
on the goodness and the generosity of strangers, 
especially when they are enemies, and do not run 

- 107 — 



so eagerly after crumbs, like the pigeons in the 
Piazza of St. Mark's in Venice, after the crumbs 
that are thrown out to them by travellers at sunset. 

As long as the Central Empires continue to 
speak of peace with the intent to destroy the na- 
tional war spirit at the frontiers, and to create the 
spirit of civil war in the interior, they will obtain 
one only resuslt: the opposite one, that is, the 
strengthening of the warlike spirit both at the 
frontiers and at home. 

Because there is no country in the worlql, and 
Italy least of all, that once the game of the enemy 
is exposed will render herself a voluntary victim 
of it, and will weaken her moral and military de- 
fences, to run the risk of being stupidly surprised 
and crushed, with a « thank you ! » on the lips 
and a poppy-head between her fingers. 

Many kind regards. 



108 - 



THINGS TRANSATLANTIC. 



Evidently the President of the United States, 
Mr. Wilson, must have thought that he was doing 
a very serious thing in sending that Note to the 
belligerent Powers of Europe. But, if it were not 
difficult, once upon a time, to note, according to 
the stern philosopher, that truth on one side of the 
Pyrenees was mendacity on the other, much less 
difficult is it now to note that a serious thing on 
the other side of the Atlantic is not equally se- 
rious on this. We, alas, (and it is we who are 
wrong, we on this side, so much older and worn 
out by the years), do not laugh, nor weep in the 
same manner and for the same emotions and im- 
pressions as those for which the Americans laugh 
or weep. Of time we have not the same notion, 
nor have we of business and politics the same 
idea. How then could we have the same notion 
and the same idea of seriousness and facetious- 
ness? 

Mr. Wilson, for instance, for two years and 
half past has failed to observe that there is a war 
going on in Europe, or that there is, in Europe, 
a humanity composed of flesh not American. He 
had to mind and to assure his election. And until 

— 109 — 



his election had obtained a merited success 
(triumph would be a too classical word, and 
would cause the people over there to laugh), the 
European war did not attract his attention, oc- 
cupied as his mind was in other matters, any- 
more than a boxing match between a yellow man 
and a nigger would have done. And if a German 
submarine sank, during those two years and half 
a Lusitania or so, full of women and children, 
and, in any case, of unarmed and harmless trav- 
ellers, he immediately fixed his pince-nez (oh, 
sans rire) on his nose to see whether there was 
a little American flesh in the wreck ; and if there 
was — it did not matter whether in large or small 
quantities — he immediately raised his respectful 
protest towards, not against, Germany. And all 
Europe was floating on the waves at every new 
feat of the German submarines, to discover that 
small amount of American flesh which should 
serve to affect the electoral entrails of the Presi- 
dent, and, having discovered it, to place it under 
his eyes in the hope that, from time to time the 
protest might assume a more serious and decisi- 
ve form. But Mr. Wilson, who had the German- 
Americans besides the American -Americans on 
his electoral lists, always kept the literature of his 
Notes at the level of the patriotism of these last 
and of the nationalism of the first; and so pro- 
ceeded to the poll. Now, the polling booth once 
closed, he occupied his electoral leisure in examin- 
ing the question of the European war for the 
better future of humanity — European or Ame- 
rican ? 

Truly, it must be admitted at once, that, great 
democrat and pacifist though he be, he never 
succeeds in imagining humanity from the Euro- 
pean point of view, a la Rousseau or a la Tolstoi ; 

— 110 — 



but always from the American and' exclusively 
American point of view, as a well-organized busi- 
ness Firm of American interests. In fact, so that 
there should be no misunderstandings, he begins 
by declaring that he speaks in his quality of « re- 
presentative of a neutral nation whose interests 
have been very seriously damaged by the war » . 

— I told you (did I not }) that we, on this side, 
have not the same idea and conception of gravity 
and facetiousness, as the people on the other 
side of the Atlantic, nor are our affections stirred 
for the same reasons ! We, on this side, have 
always believed, and continue to believe, that 
our war has been, let us put it in vulgar parlance, 
a lucky lottery ticket for American interests. And, 
instead, here is Mr. Wilson who comes to tell us 
that it has been a disaster; and in order to pre- 
vent the spreading of this disaster he — having 
first settled his election or, rather, his re-election 

— applies to the belligerents to claim, once more, 
an indemnity? We believed, we simple people, 
that over there, on the other side of the Atlantic, 
they were getting rich and were happy and con- 
tented, whereas on this side we were shedding 
blood, and dying and starving. But, on the con- 
trary, it seems, according to Mr. Wilson, that 
things are vastly different. How, then, to agree ? 
We do not, see, with blue or brown eyes, the 
same sight. We do not speak, with different 
words the same language. We all, in Europe, 
have our houses in flames, our families in tears, 
and our business all upset. Yet this illustrious 
gentleman comes along to tell us that, owing to 
all these misfortunes of ours, he feels the « mani- 
fest necessity of determining how best to protect 
his interests, if the war is to continue ». He speaks 
for himself, for neutrals, and for the lot of these 

- Ill - 



last, as if the belligerents were in duty bound to 
give him an account, not of their bereavements 
and their miseries, but of the greater profits that, 
in consequence of these bereavements and mi- 
series, he has been unable to realize. In truth, Mr. 
Wilson is most original in coming to ask our 
armies in the trenches for a New Year Present 
also. 

But, after all, we must not take all of Mr. Wil- 
son's originalities literally. 

This one, of the protection of the interests of 
neutrals, visible in itself on both sides of the 
Atlantic, is nothing more than a membership 
card, or let us say, a share exhibited by Mr. Wil- 
son in order to take part in the Meeting of Share- 
holders of the War, like those which are shown 
by solicitors representing this or that group of 
shareholders, intervening to defend this or that 
argument at the yearly Meeting of Shareholders 
of industrial concerns or of banks. 

He, in fact, takes care to forestall the not 
difficult objections, and appears as if he were 
apologizing for sending his Note around at this 
particular moment, « because it is possible that 
it may now appear that it has been hastened by 
the recent overtures made by the Central Powers)). 
— There is no necesity to employ, with the illus- 
trious President of the United States, those 18th. 
Century niceties of language which he despises 
and takes no notice of. It is enough to acknow- 
ledge the receipt of his unasked for excuses. And 
to pass on. 

Let us assert facts without circumlocutions or 
foolish hypocrisy. Force only truly attracts and 
excites adherence and sympathy. Since the be- 
ginning of the war and since the fortune of war 
of German armies has imposed itself, here and 



112 



there, more by meanns of destruction than by 
actual conquest, all the Powers so-called moral 
have approached Germany. Pity (they say) is a 
beautiful human sentiment ; and justice also (they 
proclaim), is a necessary and indispensable social 
conception. But I have never found out that in 
favour of pity and justice, men and States do 
more than speak fine words and open subscrip- 
tions and organize lotteries ; and I have always 
noticed, instead, that only in favour of Force in 
all its incarnations, they are able to accomplish 
real and true actions which have essentially poli- 
tical and definite significance and results. When 
did the Papacy, Socialism, a democratic Republic 
like the United States ever feel disposed to speak 
high in favour of Belgium, for instance; as they 
act, high and low, with regard to Germany ? 
When they have been unable to do any thing 
else, they have always endeavoured to avoid dis- 
cussions on the causes of the war, so as not to 
trace Germany's responsibilities. And I, who have 
ever striven to eliminate from my modest prose 
all the small sentiments of individual mind, in 
order to exalt sentiments which are useful for the 
production of Energy; I do not note this to 
draw from it reasons of accusation against either 
the Papacy, Socialism or the Republic of the 
United States, but simply to confound the weak 
men of our demoralized democracies, who have 
believed and still believe that they can establish 
their power and offer it as a basis of States, on 
the soft devices of individual mind sentiments, 
which, in moments of crisis are quite useless, or 
serve, at most, to draw derision upon those who 
hold them in honour. 

Here comes now, in his turn, Mr. Wilson, Pro- 
fessor Wilson, the purest and best accredited 

— 113 — 



representative of American Democracy, to per- 
form in favour of Germany, or rather, in favour 
of Germany's Force, an action which, during 
these two and half years he has never performed 
or thought iit expedient to perform in favour of 
the victims of that Force, on land or sea, be they 
innocent men or combatants. Andi he performs 
this action whilst ingenuous individuals were 
expecting at any moment a really serious Note 
against Germany about the irritating submarine 
war. They were expecting it, yes ! Because there 
does not exist a more irreducible mentality than 
that of democratic Europe, which believes arid 
never doubts that politics is the art of favouring 
the weak and uplifting the oppressed. 

Good Mr. Wilson demonstrates, however, that 
politics is the art of favouring the strong. 

Is it therefore necessary, at present, to discuss 
the contents of a Note which has none } 

Whoever will take the trouble to read it, will 
easily find out that this Note contains only vague 
and uncertain phrases, which do not even succeed 
in getting crystallized into formulas; and that it 
tends, in the end, to place itself between the 
(( yes » of the Central Empires and the « no » 
of the Entente, in order to propose some tests, 
so that notice may be taken of it : tests for the pre- 
sent and for the future, in view of the building of 
the new Palace at La Hague, which shall serve 
to eliminate ((rival alliances » which, with their 
want of equilibrium, render future wars possible. 
AH things, you see, wanting in practical sense 
and without ideal value. All things which are 
always said without seriousness and without con- 
fidence, to beguile the public, and not to express 
a true and proper code of existence for human 
society. 

- 114 - 



It would be difficult to find in diplomatic liter- 
ature a document which is more inconsistent than 
this one in its central part or which goes further 
astray from history and from doctrine. It is per- 
fectly true that its importance does not reside in 
the words that compose it, but in the very fact 
of its existence and in the action it performs or 
would perform, side by side of von Bethmann- 
Hollweg's proposals. All the rest is mere preach- 
ing. 

One final remark : 

Like all the best democrats in power, Mr. Wil- 
son has always shown himself inspired in his 
action by motives of personal interest, or of party 
interest, which is the same thing; and by the 
special conditions of internal policy obtaining in 
his country, made up of national financial ele- 
ments, and international moral ones, not all of 
which are clear to us, and many of which escape 
from our cognizance and from our examination. 

Now, I ask: What value can and will have in 
European questions of peace and war, the inter- 
vention of a man who possesses not the most 
remote conception of European questions; and 
projects into these, if anything, nought but the 
shadow of his personal interest, or the interest 
of his party or that of the internal policy of the 
financial Republic under his care 7 

I know not whether to pose the problem is to 
solve it. 



— 115 



A REPLY TO LUTZOW. 



The following article from the pen of Count 
Liitzow has been published by the Neue Freie 
Presse : 

« The considerations and observations referring 
to the steps ta\en in favour of Peace by the Cen- 
tral Powers, which I published is the Neue Freie 
Presse on the \6th. of last month, have attracted 
in Italy more attention than I ever anticipated. 
Not to speali of other newspapers, the Rome Tri- 
buna has dedicated a leading article to them. 
This gives food for thought, as naturally, this 
attention cannot be attribued to my person. All 
the observations, criticisms and objections that 
I have here before me, have, as a starting-point 
and as target the following words of my article : 
(( Our initiative is addressed more to the peoples 
than to the Governments, and in the Powers of 
the Alliance, peace will be concluded from low 
to high, rather than from high to low ». These I 
words do not appear to have been far from the \ 
truth, otherwise in Rome they would not have f 
had recourse to so much journalistic artillery to 
demolish them. 

— 116 — 



(( In Rome, diplomats and journalists are in 
much more active and continual intercourse with 
each other than, for instance, with us. And, 
amongst my critics, I find a writer of fame, who 
signs his articles in the Tribuna with the pseud- 
onym of « Rastignac », whom I have met number- 
less times in Roman salons: he is truly a man 
full of talent and wit. He reproaches me — in the 
most urbane and courteous form, of course — 
with having by the aforesaid remark, deviated 
from the lines of the Austro-Hungarian diplo- 
macy; and states that in Vienna, still to-day, as 
in Metiernich's time, it is traditional to ignore po- 
pular sentiments; and that, to Viennese minds, 
my way of thinking is more that of a\ Jacobin 
than of an ex-representative of the Ballplatz. 

« In Rome, then, evidently predominates to-day 
the same disastrous error which caused such a 
great mischief : that of purposely ignoring all that 
has ta\en place in the Monarchy during the last 
fifty years. They live there almost automatically 
of souvenirs of a long-past epoch; at the men- 
tion of the word « Austrian, they think only of 
Metternich and Haynau; their eyes are shut on 
the changes that have been effected by the Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Convention, by the adoption of 
Universal Suffrage, by general conscription and 
by various other institutions. And, if such is the 
case with the elite of intellectuals, in what abyss 
of ignorance must the popular classes still find 
themselves ? 

« The Tribuna, with a persistence which stri- 
kes the eye, lays stress on a statement to the ef- 
fect that the steps taken in favour of peace by 
the Central Powers, will not succeed in deceiving 
the timid and the pusillanimous in Italy and in 
arousing them to civil war. Oh ? Does not a well- 

- 117 - 



known French proverb say: Qui s'excuse, s*ac- 
cuse ! ? 

« Likewise, no one who possesses an impartial 
mind will read without bewilderment the follow- 
ing lines by Rastignac, which invite me, and with 
me all the others in Vienna, to understand that, 
after so many centuries of servitude, the Italians, 
in their reacquired liberty and independence, will 
support anything rather than the interference 
of foreigners in their political deliberations, how- 
ever much this interference may be accompanied 
by blandishments or by threats. (Ah! Rastignac, 
/ am re-translating your Italian from the 
German!). 

a Hear! Hear! the reader will voluntarily ex- 
claim. The Tribuna must possess a very failing 
memory if it has already forgotten what a colos- 
sal diplomatic apparatus had to be put in motion, 
during the Spring of 1915, to induce Italy to de- 
clare war. No means were left untried: threats 
and promises alternating every day; and by what 
arguments the street mob was mobilized to bring 
a pressure to bear on the Government and on the 
undecided, is a mystery to no one. I do not wish 
to repeat here the harsh word expressed by a high 
personage of the Entente, with reference to the 
means that were employed to win Italy over to the 
Allied group..., but let no one come forward to 
speak of inaccessibility and prudery in connexion 
with any kind of influence exercised by foreigners. 

a Naturally, in Rastignac 's article the well- 
known argument of German aspirations to world 
dominion is not wanting. Germany is fighting for 
what she considers her just right, that is, for do- 
minion over other peoples inferior to her. This 
quotation is said to have been drawn from one 
of Maximilian Harden s writings. As an exponent 

- 118 - 



of German foreign policy, we only recognize the 
Chancellor of the Empire, in whose extremely 
moderate and conciliatory statements one can hear 
an entirely different tone. 

a Meanwhile, Wilson s Note, animated as it 
is, by a spirit of true objectiveness and by a pure 
love of humanity, must have cleared up matters 
somewhat and have dissipated some illusions 
even in Rome. Not even the most blind fanatic 
can ever have suspected Wilson of being capable 
of taking part in favour of he Powers of the Quad- 
ruple Alliance; perhaps his simple though most 
efficacious words may have succeeded in dispel- 
ling certain illusions even in Rome, and — to 
employ the expression of a neutral writer — to 
show things in their proper light to « a people 
which was drawn into error » . 

I will reply to Count Lutzow in the essential 
arguments. 

To my remark (deduced, anyhow, from the 
words of the Neue Freie Presse) that, effectively, 
Austria with her « able move » of peace had no 
other aim in view but that of arousing dissensions 
and discord in Italy, Count Lutzow, deviating 
somewhat from the argument, replies: that the 
judgements passed on Austria in Italy are based 
on the resentments of the past, and not on the 
exact knowledge of the present ; which constitutes, 
according to him, a « fatal error » between the 
two countries. And, really fatal would the error 
be, if it existed. But for the honour of our intel- 
lectual seriousness, we must demonstrate that 
it does not exist. 

There are few in Italy, and they are by no 
means to be found amongst those who influence 
public opinion, who think and judge of Austria 

— 1 19 ^ — 



in the same way as the generations which were 
born and grew up under Austrian domination. 
In Italy, the historical sense is highly developed. 
And we should think we were committing one of 
the grossests political solecisms, if we were to 
find ourselves judging a country, friend or enemy, 
with the sentiments or the resentments of last 
century, rather than with the ideas of the present 
times. History is a complex vicissitude of always 
new conflicts of interest, and it would be sense- 
less to fix and crystallize the relation of two peo- 
ples or two States in the permanent form of a re- 
membrance or of a passion. We, only know the 
Austria of the Triple Alliance, and that is enough 
for us. Does not Count Liitzow, too, remember 
the Austria of the Triple Alliance, always rest- 
less and implacable against the Italian name, 
both in her internal policy and her foreign one ? 
And always ready to fight against the Italian 
name with her own weapons, besides those of 
Turks or Slavs ? And not in vain do I also say 
her internal policy. Because notwithstanding that 
constitutionalism, oh, so metaphorical! to which 
Count Liitzow alludes, it was also during the 
regime of the Triple Alliance that the Italians 
of the unredeemed territories experienced none 
but old reactionary and police systems, and could 
never succeed in obtaining the recognition of their 
rights, though these were guaranteed to them by 
Paragraph 19 of the Constitution, either for the 
autonomous government of the Trent ino, or for 
the Italian schools in Dalmatia, or for the Trieste 
University. As to all the other glories of modern 
Austria, which Count Liitzow extols, glories 
which would make of Austria a model State, 
different to that of Metternich and Haynau, I, for 
my part, would have nothing to say on the subject, 

- 120 - 



because Austria's internal constitution does not 
come within the radius of my discussion on the 
war. But, as Count Ltitzow speaks about them, 
would it not be discourteous not to take up his 
words ? Ay, the Convention with Austria-Hunga- 
ry. — But this is an event of an economic nature 
which affects Hungary only and not the other peo- 
ples of the Empire. Universal Suffrage. — But this 
is only an instrument in the hands of the Vienna 
Government, to bring the various nationalisms 
feared by Austria into conflict with the Socialist 
elements which she has no reason to fear. And, 
also, as regards Universal Suffrage, does not 
Count Liitzow remember that there is always, 
ready to cut its claws, the famous Paragraph 4, 
which empowers the Government to pass laws 
without the consent of Parliament, providing 
that, after they have been already in execution, 
the approval of Parliament be asked for } 

But, I repeat, these are not things that concern 
us, and concern the subjects of the Monarchy 
only, amongst whom we Italians are not included. 

What concerns us is, rather, Count Lutzo T #' s 
judgement on Italy and on the motives of Italy's 
determination in the European war. 

The idea of submission is so identified with the 
idea of Italian policy, in the mind of our ex- Allies 
of Vienna, that not even the fact of the war it- 
self, the war that is being fought, can succeed 
in uprooting it. 

Already attempts have been made, from the 
very first moment, to create a vile legend which 
should serve to discredit and underrate the Italian 
war, both morally and idealistically. And, I do 
not know with what circumspection Count Liit- 
zow now tries to take up and to delineate this 
legend once more in order to demonstrate the per- 

_ 121 - 



petual influence of foreigners in Italian politics. 
Now, at this moment, I do not wish to reawa- 
ken all the passions which are connected with 
the remembrances of the May days; and I must 
not do so, especially as the unity which appeared 
in danger of being broken, has been reconstituted 
in the minds of the Italians; and especially as 
those remembrances must be considered useless 
by now, and even more useless the passions con- 
nected with historic moments which are for ever 
decided and past. But, apart from our internal 
conflicts, which only we can appraise at their 
exact importance and at their just value., I do 
not think it is for political men and writers belong- 
ing to the Central Empires, and particularly those 
of Austria, to insist upon the diplomatic campaign 
of the Spring of 1915, which was engaged for the 
purpose of inducing Italy to enter into the struggle 
or to keep her away from it. « Threats and pro- 
mises » were made, undoubtedly; but Count 
Liitzow knows by whom; and Count Tisza, too, 
authentically commenting the diplomatic Books, 
told without any possibility of misunderstandings 
and of mental reservations, to what end they 
were directed. But it is to Italy's honour that she 
took her deliberations on her own account, not- 
withstanding the threats and notwithstanding the 
promises : it is to Italy's honour that she did not 
put her past and her future up to auction, and 
that she decided by herself, to make her own 
history by the sweat of her brow and the blood 
of her veins. Bismarck had already taught us what 
value to set on Austria's promises, long before 
Tisza had declared to us what results would have 
accrued from them. « We, have allowed ourselves 
to be ensnared by Austria » — wrote Bismarck 
from St. Petersburg, after the battle of Magenta 

- 122 ™ 



— (( we have allowed ourselves to be fooled by 
the feigned Viennese artleissness. And all that 
for nothing. Not even for the smallest mess of 
pottage )). Austria, this time, promised the mess of 
pottage to us; but with which hand, and with 
what intention ? And it is strange that a man of 
good taste, a diplomat of subtle intellect, like 
Count Liitzow, should speak of it once more. No: 
the Italian people was not a drawn into error » 
in the May days ; it was, on the contrary, drawn 
away from the error into which the promises, 
and, after these had failed, the threats, attempted 
to make it fall; never, rather, did it show itself 
more illuminated, more conscious, more free and 
more sure of itself in deciding its own destinies 
than during the May days. 

Besides, the conduct of the whole nation during 
the war and the valour of the army in the field, 
are there to belie all hostile legends, and to show, 
in all its efficacy, the historic truth which revealed 
itself unexpectedly, to us and to others during the 
flaming Spring of 1915. 

Now, it is war. 

But the Central Powers wish — or would like 
to wish — to dictate peace as victors. 

I ask Count Liitzow : as victors also over Italy ? 

And if, in regard to Italy, the Central Powers 
cannot speak separately, as they can in regard to 
the other Powers, what would their attempt at 
peace be reduced to, if not to interrupt the march, 
to weaken the effort and to annul the work that 
Italy has up to now accomplished ? 

(( Even the most blind fanatic cannot but be- 
lieve Wilson's words » — says Count Liitzow. 
And that may be so. But he adds : a And those 
simple, though efficacious words may have suc- 
ceeded in dispelling certain illusions even in Ro- 

— 123 — 



me ». And that is wrong. Will those words ever 
succeed! in destroying the facts ? 

And what man, what party, what social class, 
in Italy, could lightly accede to the design of the 
Central Powers, without annulling the facts, or 
mutilating them, in favour of the vanquished? 

Neither can the Italian war be arrested with 
yesterday's conquests ; nor can peace be discussed 
on the basis of those conquests. The mere attempt 
at discussion would be, at this moment, according 
to Talleyrand's famous formula : « une betise plus 
qu'un crime)). The struggle, therefore, must be 
continued until it has yielded all it can yield, for 
the satisfaction of our interests, and for the se- 
curity of our future. 

As Count Liitzow can see, it is a question of 
calculation, not one of rhetoric. And Italians have 
sufficiently good heads to know how to make a 
calculation in which the stakes axe their work of 
yesterday, and their blood of to-day or to-morrow. 

The question is not that of the hatred for the 
Austria of Metternich or of Haynau : it is a ques- 
tion of something better and more beautiful: the 
love towards Italy, and the defence of Italy in 
the life and death struggles which all the nations 
of Europe are fighting. 

Let Count Liitzow be persuaded; the Italians 
in this defence will all of them do their duty to 
the end, simply and calmly, as it is their ancient 
habit to do. 

And also unanimously. 



~ 124 



PEACE OR PREPAREDNESS ? 



I should like the Italian public to be well in- 
formed on many things and questions connected 
with America, before estimating and judging 
President Wilson's new and — why not } — most 
noble sermon on European peace. Ignorance of 
the intellectual and political factors which deter- 
mine the actions and speech of the men of the 
New World (a world really different from ours) 
may be the source of grave errors and still graver 
illusions, which it is well to avoid, especially 
when, to avoid them, a minimum amount of ef- 
fort is required in order to obtain information and 
enlightenment. 

In the first place, let us pose these two points 
of fact : Firstly : that Americans have not and can- 
not possibly have the same ideas or feelings in 
regard to European affairs, nor the same interests 
in them which we Europeans have. Secondly: 
that when Americans busy themselves with Eu- 
ropean affairs, they do so keeping their eyes fixed 
on the Pacific Ocean, which for them is what the 
Mediterranean basin is for us; and, therefore, 
there is no possibility of meeting and of agreeing 
between our points of view and theirs: because 

- 125 — 



if we say, for instance, Syria, the Straits, or Sa- 
lonika, they say Mexico, California, Philippines; 
and' an eventual meeting could only happen per- 
chance in China, via Russia for us, and via Japan 
for them. Now, on a background, on a horizon, 
on a line of navigation so different, how can it 
be possible to discuss, by means of the same 
words and the same ideas? I absolutely deny 
that the laws which determine the interests and 
the policy of the Pacific Ocean can serve to settle 
the interests and the policy of the Mediterranean 
Sea. 

So much so, that President Wilson's language, 
addressed to the peoples of the Pacific Ocean and 
bearing on the questions which concern them, is 
entirely different from his language addressed to 
the peoples of the Mediterranean Sea, and bear- 
ing on the questions which concern those regions. 

That President Wilson is, by scholastic tend- 
ency and by sentiment, a pacifist, there is not 
the slightest doubt. But that, notwithstanding his 
ideal pacifism, he should be constrained, in the 
practice of his government of the State (or, rather, 
the States) under his care, to give the greatest 
development to the War administration and to 
the War Budget, is still less doubtful. Remember 
his speech of June last, on the eve of the election 
campaign, addressed to the Cadets of the West 
Point Naval Academy, on the necessity of na- 
tional defence and on the preparation of this de- 
fence. Remember also — the deeds corresponding 
to the words — the programme of national de- 
fence which he has caused' Congress to accept 
and to vote, that is the maximum programme 
evolved up to now by the United States; for, on 
account of the Navy, Mr. Under Secretary Da- 
niel's Budget for '916 exceeds by 25 per cent that 



126 



of the British Admiralty. Remember, lastly, what 
the journal of the Washington Navy League said 
in commenting upon that programme and on ex- 
plaining it. That journal said, without any reti- 
cence, that (( even with all possible moral refine- 
ments, a nation has the absolute right to live 
her most complete intensity of life, to expand, to 
found colonies and to become wealthier, by the 
employment of every means, conquest by arms 
not excepted ». And as an expression of principle, 
it added also that « every expansion of that de- 
scription (conquest by arms), is an unalienable 
right; and, in the case of the United' States, a 
special duty » . How far is all this from the theory 
of the respect of small States and the abolition 
of factories of war material and of shipbuilding 
yards ! 

Put therefore this language — which, if it does 
not emanate directly from the Government, is 
certainly derived from Government actions, and 
if it does not represent the President's doctrinaire 
spirit, certainly represents jthe practical spirit of 
the political world which revolves round the Pre- 
sident — put this language, I say, together with 
the figures of the Daniel Budget, with the West 
Point speech and with the Notes on European 
peace, and you will see for yourselves what in- 
ferences to draw from it. One consequence, in the 
meanwhile, seems to me of an unquestionable 
logical efficiency: namely, that it would be the 
greatest imaginable stupidity to delude ourselves 
into supposing that in the other hemisphere, more 
than in ours, moral ideas without arms, and evan- 
gelical speeches without munition® can be of any 
value in carrying out a peace policy, or a policy 
of peace foT war, as might hastily be deduced 
from Wilson's Message. For logic, indeed, is not 
an opinion. 

— 127 — 



Let us reflect, in the mean time, that the Eu- 
ropean war has created a state of affairs in the 
Pacific which, in the end, might become uncom- 
fortable, owing to the President's own pacifist 
tendencies, and let us proceed further in our ar- 
gument. 

In consequence of the war, Japan, which has 
become Russia's great workshop, has gathered a 
wealth which she never possessed before, and 
which she silently and secretely, as is her custom, 
is employing in the construction of ships of war. 
Owing to this new wealth, and to its application 
to her military power, she is increasing her mort- 
gages on the Chinese markets, in such a manner 
as to exclude for the future any discussion upon 
the question of the open door with the United 
States; and, at the same time, she is widening 
her protection of China in such a manner as to 
exclude the intervention of any other Power, 
either Eastern or Western, in the political con- 
trol, and consequently in the commercial control 
also, of China. Even before President Wilson, 
in his Message to the Senate had announced the 
extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the small 
States of Europe implicated in the war, Japan 
had already proclaimed the extension of the same 
doctrine to Eastern Asia, and therefore also to 
the Philippines, in order to assert her right of 
control in China, and to keep the United States 
away for ever from any interference in the af- 
fairs of that country. It is useless, now, to plunge 
into all the questions which make up the problem 
of the future struggle between Japan and the 
United States in China. It is sufficient to hint at 
them to demonstrate what relation there may be 
between the European waT of to-day and a pro- 
bable war of to-morrow, and what conception or 

- 128 — 



what aim may be intended by a peace Message 
which has one wing on the Pacific and the other 
on the Mediterranean. To explain the enigma, 
one should substitute the word « humanity » with 
the word a Japan ». Besides, I always request my 
readers to consider the questions of peace and 
war from the point of view of interests which are 
the body of politics, and not from the point of 
view of humanitarian doctrine and of philosophy, 
which are but the cloak and the mask of interests. 
Ingenuousness is not and cannot be allowed in the 
struggle of life. 

Meminisse. 

It is not the first time that a President of the 
United States has entered the arena with the olive- 
branch in his hand and placed himself between 
two (to-dav thev are many) contending Powers. 
In September 1905, Roosevelt also, who was a 
votary of war, appeared arraved in a white stole 
and with an olive twig in his hand, between Rus- 
sia and Jaoan, to propitiate that peace of Ports- 
mouth without indemnitv for the victor, Japan; 
with the formula : « neither victor nor vanqui- 
shed ». whirh Mr. Wilson brings to-dav once more 
to the fore. But who can say whether Rooesevelt's 
twig did not then serve to repress, in the interest 
of the United States, the expansion and the great- 
ness of her rival Japan, more than arrest, in the 
name of humanity, the stream of blood that was 
being shed in Russia and Japan ? 

With all this, I do not mean to say that Pre- 
sident Wilson is not in complete good faith when 
he speaks of peace to Europe, or that he does not 
believe that he is exercising an evangelical epi- 
stolary mission by his action. 

And neither do I intend to assert that he does 

— 129 — 



not feel the greatest desire for the welfare of suf- 
fering humanity. 

Only, is his desire greater than ours? And, if 
it were so, why greater than ours ? 

We all want peace. 



130 - 



J 



ITALY AND THE ALLIES. 



The last events which have happened can be 
compared to a referendum on the basis of Uni- 
versal Suffrage — the suffrage of the civilized 
world — to judge Italy's intervention in the Eu- 
ropean war and in the Italian war. And Wilson's 
Message is the announcement of the referendum. 
Now, all are pressing on the field which Italy had 
chosen and marked out for the defence of right 
and of human liberty from the first day of the 
action of the Central Empires ; and all are bring- 
ing on to that field their parable and their sword. 
But, at that time, when the minds that were ga- 
thered round were in suspense and in suspicion, 
and it seemed as if to decide and to judge were 
almost an unconscious audacity, Italy serenely 
made up her mind and formulated her judge- 
ment : « This is a crime » — she said ; and aban- 
doned on the road the authors of it who had been 
her Allies of the day before. Belgium had been 
destroyed. France had been invaded. England did 
not yet possess an army, and not even a con- 
scription law wherewith to comoose it. From all 
the outlets of the symbolical Black Forest, the 
barbarian hordes were pouring forth in mad fury 

- 131 — 



on the civilization of Europe, like those of Attila 
against Rome. But, as hordes pass, and Rome 
remains (and even to-day, oh divine Lady of 
Eternity, April decks itself in beauty to throw 
its garlands at thy feet), it was in the name of 
Rome, which in centuries of yore had sustained 
the shock and the shame inflicted by them, that 
Italy stood up to resist the new and still more 
terrible barbarian exploits. What would have 
happened to us had our mind been less vigilant 
and our conscience less sound in resolve? We 
should have disappeared from the history of ci- 
vilization, and our name would have been ming- 
led in one common shame, and in one common 
humiliation, with those of Turks and Bulgarians. 
In the struggle, which is whollv the strugo-le of 
human civilization, between Force and Right, 
Rome has always represented Right, and the 
world only knows and recognizes her as the 
champion of Rirfit. The last remnants of the Fo- 
rum would have crumbled to dust if, in contra- 
diction to her essence and her nature, Rome had 
annulled her past and her future by mingling 
amongst the barbarians who represent Force and 
the religion of Force. And she was simplv equal 
to herself when she said and did that which all 
the civilized world is proud and exalted, to-day, 
to say and to do. In 1859, M. Thiers was afraid 
of Italy's resurrection, which he believed to be 
detrimental to France. This has been, forsooth, 
the effect of Italy's reappearance in the history 
of Europe ! To re-affirm and Te-establish the equi- 
librium of Right, which was denied and disturbed 
by the German races; and to save, at the first 
moment, France and the great ideas which she 
represents, and to give her the means to prepare, 

— 132 — 



together with the oher Allied Powers, the defen- 
ces and the victories to come. 

But if Italy has nobly fulfilled her historic mis- 
sion in this war; if she has placed, at an unex- 
pected moment, all the weight of her existence 
on the balance of European destiny; if she has 
staked all her fortune and heT peace, and has 
given and is giving the best blood of her sons 
for the triumph of the common cause, it is the 
duty, not only of our own political men, but of 
all the Allies together to prepare for her such 
conditions for her future adjustment and for the 
future development of her moral and material 
existence, as will assure her safety and her tran- 
quillity for a long sequence of years. 

I know not — and no one knows — what, up 
to now, has been concerted and concluded in the 
supreme assemblies of the Allies for the future 
adjustment and the future conditions of Italy's 
existence; but I know, and we all know that in 
the peace negotiations, if there will be a country 
which will be chosen as a target for the hatred 
and consequently for the hostility of the enemies, 
that country is Italy, the old Ally of Germany 
and Austria: Italy, which by her detachment 
from the Triple Alliance, upset and rendered im- 
possible the immediate execution of the enemy's 
war scheme, and therefore prevented the im- 
mediate victory over France and England. 

This special state of affairs must and cannot 
but create an enormous responsibility to be as- 
sumed by our Statesmen and by our Allies, to- 
wards our war and towards the fortunes of our 
country. The statements made by the Prime Mi- 
nister of the Danubian Monarchy, bearing on the 
latter *s irreconcilability with Italy, and on the 
uncompromising struggle for Trent and Trieste 

- 133 — 



and I stria, are but of yesterday; but the threats 
and the programme of eternal aversion from and 
eternal hatred against Italy, drawn up by Germ- 
any and Austria date from the earliest days of 
the war. Now, if our soldiers, to whom are ef- 
ficiently entrusted the honour and the glory of 
our arms, are occupied in the action in the open 
field, it is necessary that in the closed field of 
diplomacy, those who are responsible should take 
this special state of Italy's affairs into account, 
and should take the proper measures, without 
new mental reservations, ancient prejudices and 
ancient preconceptions. All the questions regard- 
ing our land and sea boundaries must be exhaust- 
ively solved; all our just aspirations in the East 
must be satisfied; all our spheres of influence 
must be defined and respected. Prince von Bil- 
low, during his interview with Bijorson on the 
eve of his mission to Italy, said that Italy's for- 
tunes were bound up with those of Germany; 
and, if at all, Germany's fall would mean Italy's 
fall too. Our Statesmen and our Allies must take 
steps to sever the connexion of Billow's double 
omen. Mors tua, but not Italy's. 

Because, on the whole, if a new order of things 
emerge, as it will inexorably emerge, from this 
great war, and if, in reality, the triumph of liber- 
ty and civilization arises out of so many sacrifices 
that have been made, and so much blood that 
has been shed, the symbol and the sign of the 
new order of things and of the triumph must be 
Italy. 

The new Europe will not effectively and se- 
curely exist, unless the new Italy finds herself in 
a different situation and in different conditions 
from those in which she found herself at the eve 
of the war. 

- 134 — 



Only a strong and powerful Italy ; only an Italy 
on the same level, in degree and in activity, with 
France and England on the Continent and in all 
the inlets of the Mediterranean, will be able to 
displace the terms and values of European po- 
litics. Should Italy, in consequence of her weak- 
ness or the restriction of her action and move- 
ments, be reduced to that policy of compromise 
and expedients to which she was reduced in the 
last thirty years, between insecure and distrustful 
alliances on the one side, which held her in sub- 
jection and in apprehension for her existence; 
and persistent rivalries and jealousies, which ren- 
dered her efforts at redemption useless, on the 
other, no group of Powers will succeed in obtain- 
ing stability and quietness. A poor and infirm 
Italy would cause Austria and Germany to beco- 
me stronger. Germany can only be weakened 
and Austria rendered powerless by a strong and 
powerful Italy. To haggle about the formation of 
a greater Italy would be the same as to haggle 
about the formation of a new Europe. It is well 
that this evident truth be well fixed upon and 
understood by European conscience. 

I speak loud, so that all may hear me. 

I know not whether in France and in England 
the old ideas about Austria prevalent during the 
Napoleonic era — the era of Napoleon III., of 
course — are still alive or have been attenuated or 
modified; and whether, even after Austria has 
become Germany's humble servant, it may be 
thought that she can be used as a lever against 
Germany. I hope, for the sake of the honour of 
our two Allies* s intelligence that it is not so; 
although I am aware that it is more difficult to 
eradicate an idea from that which for a literary 
convenience we are accustomed to call the public 



135 



opinion of a nation, than to cancel a law from a 
Code or a Treaty. In any case, until in the mind 
of the Powers which constitute the nucleus of 
European civilization, Austria has been replaced 
by Italy on all the Adriatic shores ; and until the 
name and the action of Italy have been perman- 
ently linked with those of France and England 
in the Eastern Mediterranean, the liberty and 
civilization of Europe cannot be said to have solid 
and secure bases. 

All this struggle for the ideal, all this war for 
the stability of the world's foundations, as Wil- 
son has said, all this tragedy in which the choi- 
cest flower of Europe's youth is disappearing 
would have neither sense nor aim if, in the end, 
the same organs, the same personalities, the same 
geographical expressions were to be set up again, 
which, up to yesterday represented the enemies 
of all liberties, refractory to all progress, instru- 
ments of every reaction, permanent association of 
barbarism and tyranny against small and large 
States within the scope of their influence, and 
which, during the progress of the war were al- 
ways fought as such. 

In one of those sittings of the Reichstag, during 
which German peace was announced amidst the 
thunder and lightning of German military glory, 
Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg presented his war 
map, which was, as it were, the constitutional 
chart of the new barbarian Europe. But to-day 
it is necessary that the Powers of the Entente, in 
unity with the Allies of all the Americas, should 
present their own chart, which will be the geo- 
graphical chart and the constitutional chart of 
new civilized Europe, all in one. A chart which 
will have its foundation upon this supreme law 
of vital organisms, namely, that the organ should 



136 



serve and correspond with its function.. What 
function of civilization or liberty can Austria ser- 
ve ? alien and hostile as she is to all national and 
human law ; she that acknowledges no other rea- 
sons but her own: that is, the abstract and wily 
reason of the State which she is ? 

In the new chart of Europe, there will only 
be room for such nations as have always wrought 
and fought, and are still ready to work and to 
fight for the world's lofty civilization and for its 
infinite progress. 

Let the civilized world, on this Birthday of Ro- 
me, accept the wish and the law which emanate 
from the tradition and the history of the Imperial 
City of Right. 



137 — 



THE WAR OF THE ALPS. 



This war does not admit of rhetoric. In all the 
forms of its organization and its developement, 
it is so severe and arduous an undertaking that 
the speech which were to attempt to deck it with 
the dried flowers of ancient poems and ancient 
songs would act as ingenuously and as uselessly 
as did the legendary child in wanting to hold 
the sea in the hollow of his hand. This terrible 
enterprise of science and will can have a litera- 
ture worthy of it, only in the precise statement 
of its actions. And the human values, by which 
it is measured, are derived from the perfection of 
moral effort corresponding to the physical and 
intellectual effort necessary for the struggle. 

Correspondents of foreign journals, and espe- 
cially the British ones, who follow our operations 
at the front, are sending to their papers news and 
opinions on our army which, besides the admi- 
ration for its courage, reveal a new valuation of 
the Italian mind and character in the formidable 
test of the war. And, a few days ago, on the eve 
of our advance, the great poet of British Imperial- 
ism, Rudyard Kipling, in his prose which is truly 
warlike, revealed to his readers his wonder for 

— 138 — 



what he had seen, for the new world, the new 
war, the new Italy he had discovered on the banks 
of the Isonzo and on the rocks of the Trentino. 
Here, then, is what is most important, namely, 
that, at the test, Italy and the Italians are and 
appear capable of dealing with the most difficult 
situations ; that Italy and the Italians are and ap- 
pear ripe for the greatest labours and enterprizes ; 
that they have in themselves the potentiality and 
the capability of reaching, on a par with other 
nations, the highest degrees of the task which 
Destiny has assigned to them. That an Italian, 
individually, should have the courage to defy an 
enemy even ten times better armed and trained 
in arms than himself, is not to be wondered at, 
nor can the fact excite any surprise; neither 
should his self-immolation and his sacrifice for 
an ideal cause excite any wonder or ^surprise : all 
the history of Italy is a history of self-immolation 
and of sacrifice. But the intensity of moral life, 
which consists in preparing, in organizing, in 
waiting without aprrehensions and without fears, 
between fatigue and perils, in working confidently 
one, two years in the shadow and in silence, in 
the expectation of one day or of one hour of suc- 
cess : this is important to note, this which appear- 
ed impossible to all before the war, and which 
to-day comes as a revelation. It used to be said, 
at one time, that Italy was made, but that there 
remained to form the Italians. And it was true. 
But do you not think that at the test of this war 
the Italians are beginning to be formed ? A little 
patience, and we, too, at the proper moment, 
will be able to ascend the Capitol to render our 
thanks to the ancient Deities of Rome. 

Destiny reserved the Alps to us for the great 
test. 

- 139 — 



When the history of this war will have gone so 
far back in remote centuries as to reach the at- 
mosphere of a legend, these small, dark Italians, 
climbing to-day, under the implacable fire of the 
Austrian artillery the naked rocks of the mount- 
ains in order to reach the summits and carry up 
there the blood of their wounds and their guns, 
will appear as the real masters, the real lords of 
those Alps which no human or divine force could 
ever succeed in vanquishing or subjugating. The 
wonder of contemporary poets and journalists in 
observing the cold courage, the tenacity, the ef- 
fort, of these small, dark Italians climbing mount- 
ains will become attenuated, perhaps, in the dist- 
ant future, when there will only remain a recol- 
lection and a fantastic outline of these men of 
flesh and blood ; but through this recollection and 
this fantastic outline Italy's right will reveal itself 
more natural and more certain; and also more 
elementary: because it will appear as the essen- 
tial blending of the human type with his land. 
And, under whatsoever incarnation, the German 
shall never again prevail over the conquerors of 
the Alps. He shall not prevail, and Europe will 
be more sure of her civilization and of her history. 
As in the case of England, we have seen the 
first war-shell explode at our feet without pos- 
sessing a real and proper artillery-park or an 
army in a fit condition to fight. And, as in En- 
gland's case, in consequence of this poverty of 
ours, and of this want of military preparation we 
have had to suffer the contempt of our Allies, 
which reached to the pitch of unchaining such an 
immense conflict of European races without even 
consulting us or giving us warning. « What would 
you do if an English army were to land in Bel- 
gium ? » — somebody once asked Bismarck. — 

— 140 — 



(( I would send the police to arrest it », — replied 
the great Lord of War, William II., who did not 
even deign to put his police in motion to stop 
that small army. And did he^or his Viennese Ally 
concern themselves with the Italian army > Ac- 
cording to Bismarck's expression, it was sufficient 
for both that the Italian Bersagliere, wih his feath- 
ers and his drum should be turned with his 
face towards France than towards Austria. That 
was the way of considering Italy's participation 
in the Triple Alliance. But after two years, things 
must have changed somewhat, if Austria has 
stopped laughing, and smiles no more at the 
thought of that Italian Bersagliere fit only for the 
parade ground. In fact, from two years ago, this 
military type, the representative of ancient wars, 
has laid aside his flowing feathers, does not run 
about uselessly and does not play his music to 
make the Allied bears dance. The Italian Bersa- 
gliere has turned miner, engineer, chemist, di- 
plomat, thinker and governor — governor, espe- 
cially of himself — he has become the true fight- 
ing man of new Italy and fights to win. And no 
one doubts of his victory. 

The two nations which up to yesterday had 
been considered as the least warlike and the least 
prepared of all the others for war, by the unex- 
pected weight of the sword which they have cast 
into the balance are now turning the fortunes of 
war in a different direction to that which had 
been imagined by its votaries, and are also chang- 
ing the destinies of Europe. 

These are facts, which it is well to note to-day, 
for to-morrow's guidance. 



— 141 — 



THE UNSQUAREABLE CIRCLE. 



In his interview with the representatives of the 
Russian Press, M. Tereschenko, new Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, has mildly refuted:, and, of 
course, by no means exhaustively (Russian men 
of Government are obliged, in these moments to 
employ a great mildness of language), the ques- 
tion put forward by the democratic Committees 
relative to the publication of Treaties concluded 
between the old Regime and the Allied Powers. 
This is a question which is connected with the old 
principles of democratic doctrine; principles 
which aim at universal suffrage applied to for- 
eign politics and, therefore, at the immediate 
publication of all acts and documents which are 
connected with foreign politics (all of which 
could be obtained with greater facility simply by 
the transformation of State Chancelleries into 
Circulating Libraries), with, of course, the inevit- 
able referendum on them. « The immediate pu- 
blication of Treaties », said the new Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, a would be equivalent to a ru- 
pture with the Allies, and would imply Russia's 
isolation ». — It would be equivalent — he might 
have said more aptly — to an act of treason : as 

- 142 - 



the disclosure and the revelation, to the enemy's 
profit, of secrets which do not belong to Russia 
only (even of the ancient regime), but to the 
Powers which have concluded agreements and 
treaties with Russia, would undoubtedly be. Un- 
fortunately, the innocence of democratic doctrine 
in questions of foreign politics is made up of si- 
milar failings of memory. 

This question of the publicity to be given to 
foreign politics, put forward to-day on their own 
account by the Russian Committees which have 
so recently appeared before history's footlights, 
and which suppose that Heaven knows what dia- 
bolical secrets detrimental to the pacifist demo- 
cracy of the Don are contained in diplomatic 
Treaties, has already been posed, sometimes 
even sarcastically, by the pacifist democracy of 
the Seine, to the Governments of the Third Re- 
public, the Ally of Russia. The Russian revolu- 
tionists are to-day showing themselves apprehen- 
sive and almost terror-struck by the snares against 
their philosophy which are lying hidden in the 
secrecy of Treaties. The French revolutionists, 
on the contrary, amused themselves in days gone 
by, in making fun of those Governments of the 
Third Republic which were deceiving themselves 
with the idea that they held the key to the CzaT*s 
heart in their hands. « Can you picture to your- 
self the Czar », wrote M. Sembat, « pouring forth 
the fulness of his heart into the heart of Felix Fau- 
re ? Can you imagine the Czar choosing our good 
M. Fallieres as the confident of his thoughts ? 
Six years after, he would have had the pleasant 
surprise of finding his secret served up cold in a 
fine volume entitled : « Memoirs of an Ex-Presi- 
dent )), or (( History of Seven Years ». The news- 
papers would have all published extracts from it. 



143 



But... you may be sure that in Berlin they would 
not have to wait for the volume to appear to be- 
informed of its contents in the most minute de- 
tails ». On this score, then, the Russian revolu- 
tionists can feel quite at ease, and need have no 
apprehension whatever about the secrets of their 
ancient diplomacy. 

M. Sembat, an anti -militarist Socialist, amongst 
the most eloquent and the most violent of his 
Party, on the eve of the war — and consequently 
of his appointment to the post of Minister of Na- 
tional Defence — wrote a book, one of the boldest 
and most spirited books of political literature 
vritten during the last few years, which is like 
an examination of conscience, and at the same 
time a review of all the errors and contradictions 
of democratic and Republican doctrines, entitled : 
« Faites un Roi si non jaites la Paix » , with 
Germany, of course. After an active propaganda 
in newspapers, in Associations, at meetings, in 
Parliament itself against militarism, that man of 
talent, and we must also add, of conscientious- 
ness, experienced a moment of doubt and sus- 
picion : (( Supposing that with all these ideas and 
all this propaganda I was contributing to lead 
my country towards disaster ? » — and then he 
stopped to think, and think again over his own 
ideas and those of his Party: and then to for- 
mulate the dilemma which is the title of his book : 
a dilemma which means this : democratic doctrine 
is not adapted to prepare a nation for war; and 
if you think that waT is not a chimera, but an 
hypothesis which might become a reality, then 
you must found your State upon a different doc- 
trine; because with this kind of Republic and 
this kind of doctrine you are going straight on 
your way towards defeat. — I do not propose to 

— 1 44 — 



discuss M. Sembat's fundamental thesis. But as 
the book contains a chapter dedicated to foreign 
politics and to the secrecy of Treaties not ad- 
mitted by democratic doctrine, I treasure up the 
contents of M. Sembat's pages before discussing 
the question on my own account and applying 
it to Italy. 

M. Sembat founds his argument on the follow- 
ing principle : « It is anti-Republican, or it is ri- 
diculous in a Republican regime to enter into 
Alliances of the essential clauses of which the 
people are ignorant ». And this may be so. But 
a question at once arises spontaneously: Be it 
Republican or anti-Republican, is it or is it not 
necessary for the purpose of foreign politics and 
in the interest of the country and of the people 
itself } This we do not learn. We only learn that 
it is un-Republiean not to publish Treaties for 
the people's behoof, and that is all. But M. Sem- 
bat, who writes and speaks and is a Deputy in 
a Republic, cannot help posing the question of 
Alliances to himself and cannot help attempting 
to solve it with the least possible damage to the 
principles of Republican doctrine. He. therefore 
asks himself : « How are principles to be saved 
in the midst of the necessities of Reality } By 
means of a Council of Ten ? Or a Committee of 
Public Safety } Of an irresponsible President 7 
Of a First Consul ? This is defying the impossi- 
ble ». (I should think so !). And then he recounts 
the attempt made by him, after the Agadir af- 
fair, to create something which should savour 
of Republicanism : une faihle ebauche d' organi- 
sation republicaine, for foreign politics ; for in- 
stance: a Council composed of all ex-Ministers 
for Foreign Affairs, to which, in time, might be 
added all the ex-Presidents of the Republic; a 



145 — 

10 



Consultative Council, a Council, in brief, which 
should have stood at the elbow of the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs to keep him up to date in 
the most particularly serious and difficult nego- 
tiations. J'y voyais — M. Sembat candidly ad- 
mits — une ebauche de tradition; — Tradition! 
Here we are, then ! The detested tradition which 
democratic doctrine would like to throw out of 
the door, coming back, with colours flying, 
through the window. And together with tradition, 
there also come back, or rather, should come 
back, Discreetness and Continuity. But M. Sem- 
bat is not successful in his intent, and does not 
succeed in creating the new organ of this Re- 
publican Tradition. Therefore he must needs give 
up his thirteenth labour. And what is still more 
conclusive is that he frankly admits « the diffi- 
culty of endowing our foreign politics with an 
organ of continuity .» Continuity in the instability 
of Universal Suffrage, perhaps "> 

It is painful, but it is so: the undertaking can 
never succeed, owing to that famous « contra- 
diction which does not consent » , and to that 
famous demonstration which cannot lead to a 
settlement by any known road, neither by that 
of quia, nor by that of propter quid. Foreign 
policy and popular publicity are two expressions 
which no strength of mind and will can suceed 
in reconciling or making agree. There is no 
middle course, therefore: one must either aban- 
don popular publicity or abandon the ambition 
of foreign policy. To attempt to introduce into 
foreign policy the principle of popular publicity 
is simply absurd. The fortunes of nations are not 
directed by absurdity. 

What, then, is to be done ? 

I know not: the matter concerns democratic 

— 146 — 



doctrine. I merely say this, that, as a preliminary 
to reaching a conclusion one should know whe- 
ther it is more useful to a State, to a nation, to 
proclaim and to maintain the democratic prin- 
ciple of popular publicity, or whether it is more 
useful to exercise foreign politics. 

Of course this must be considered as an ab- 
stract problem. Because, from an historical point 
of view, where and when can the foreign policy 
of a State ever be said to be exercised in con- 
tradiction and in contempt of its sentiments and 
interests } 

On another occasion, and without plunging into 
pragmatism, we may be able to discuss the pro- 
blem in its reality in the light of Italian foreign 
policy. 



- 147 — 



ALBANIA AND «L£ TEMPS*. 



I propose to discuss the question of the Italian 
Protectorate in Albania, on the lines of argument 
traced out by the recent article of Le Temps, 
which arrived yesterday. I have selected the lines 
traced by Le Temps for two reasons: first, becau- 
se we have to deal with an authoritative journal 
published in France, an Allied nation; and the 
remarks which I shall have the honour to submit 
and to oppose to those of that journal can also 
be adapted to those Italian democratic papers 
which show themselves extremely sensitive to the 
repercussion that our actions excite on public 
opinion in France ; secondly because to follow 
a given line of argument signifies confining one's 
ideas within a strictly limited field. (Readers of 
the Tribuna have been cognizant for a long time 
of my opinions on the programme which the 
Government ought to have followed in the Lower 
Adriatic after the defeat and dispersion of Ser- 
via; namely, the immediate occuption of Epirus 
and of all the islands situated at the mouth of 
the Otranto Channel, beginning, naturally, with 
Corfu). And to-day it is important to limit myself. 



148 



The article of Le Temps, then, considers the 
proclamation of Italy's protectorate over Albania 
from the strictly Italian point of view and like- 
wise from the wider Balkan and international 
point of view. 

From the Italian point of view, the highest 
praise is meted out. « We render homage » , says 
Le Temps, « to the perseverance and ability with 
which Italian diplomacy knows how to take ad- 
vantage, in the interest of the nation, of every 
phase of the war. It is a lesson for those inge- 
nuous speakers who consider the .diplomat's pro- 
fession a superfluous one; and, by a strange con- 
tradiction, have themselves the pretension of 
being improvised diplomats ». But is this lesson 
addressed to French orators only ? I have read a 
statement in some Italian democratic journal to 
the effect that the proclamation of the protector- 
ate over Albania is an ill-advised and inoppor- 
tune act, a rash deed, if not a surprise, on the 
part of Italian diplomacy. Once again, what is 
truth on this side of the Pyrenees is mendacity 
on the other side. And what of the Alps 7 How, 
then } An Italian democratic journal condemns 
as ill-advised and inopportune an action which 
is considered useful and wise and in conformity 
with national interest by another democratic jour- 
nal in France } How can the action be ill-advised 
and inopportune if it increases Italy's prestige, 
and if every Italian has welcomed it with appro- 
priate satisfaction ? Democracy should have the 
good grace not to put itself in disaccord with the 
national interest. 

I know full well and I do not attempt to dis- 
guise the fact from myself that there is a ques- 
tion of procedure underlying the unexpected po- 
lemics which are crackling here and there — the 

_ 149 - 



rents of these are seen daily in the white spaces 
censored in newspapers — concerning the ques- 
tion of the Albanian protectorate. But, if in their 
patriotic fervour, all Parties have laid down their 
banners — and their preconceived ideas — on 
the steps of the so-called Altar of national con- 
cord, can it be possible — for the action of Italian 
diplomacy is in consonance with national interest 
and opinion — can it be possible, I say, that some 
of these Parties can withdraw those banners 
merely on a question of procedure ? Men of tried 
faith, who were the promoters of national con- 
cord, must sacrifice their doctrinaire ideas before 
the accomplished fact, if only in order not to 
underrate it in the face of the enemy and in the 
face of the Allies. Does the event increase Italy's 
prestige ? If it does, any discussion upon it, be 
it ever so just and legitimate in the abstract, will 
appear an idle one and will not have the force 
to persuade and much less to stir the public. In 
war time all questions which it is not absolutely 
necessary to discuss appear idle ones. 

Let us return to he Temps. 

(( French public opinion » , states our authori- 
tative contemporary, « does not experience, in the 
face of this Italian action, any of those mean sen- 
timents which the German Press attributes so 
freely to the various Allied peoples in its vain 
hope of fomenting discord amongst them ». And 
I am glad — or rather, we are all glad — of this. 
But, after having called the attention of Italian 
democratic journals to the enemy's aims (if the 
enemy is pleased with the discord amongst the 
Allies, you can imagine how pleased he must 
feel at the disagreement between Italians !), I 
pose the question: Why on earth should our 
French friends make a show of mean sentiments 



150 



towards us in this question of Albanian Protect- 
orate ? France is to-day Italy's war Ally ; and it 
would be an insult to and an offence against La- 
tin probity to suppose that any member of the 
French Press would be capable of reawakening, 
now, the polemics which, at one time, were got 
up along and around the Otranto Channel as a 
reprisal against the Italy of the Triple Alliance. 
The war and the new system of war alliances 
must have deeply altered the spirit and the mind 
of our French cousins on the problem of both 
Lower and Upper Adriatic. Were it not so, of 
what use would be the change of ideas about 
« scraps of paper » ? 

I now come briefly to the other point of view 
on the Protectorate : the Balkan and international 
one, according to Le Temps. 

Says Le Temps, and I translate textually : « As 
General Ferrer o is in command at Argirocastro, 
a city in Northern Epirus, claimed as Greek by 
the Greeks, it is evident at once that the Italian 
initiative has been taken for the purpose of keep- 
ing the ambitions of Hellenism in check, in the 
event of Hellenism succeeding in reconstructing 
its national unity at some future time » . (I should 
really call it Imperial, not national unity). 

Now, what has turned up once more ? Hellen- 
ism ? Who ever thought of Hellenism any more, 
after so much of Constantine and Venizelos, after 
so much overturning and upsetting of alliances, 
after so much disarming and — as some say — 
so much treason ? Yet some one thinks and even 
speaks of it, as a thing alive. « The life of the 
dead in ourselves », says Ibsen in his « Ghosts », 
« is terrible ». In fact.... 

Le Temps is not only preoccupied by Hellen- 
ism, but also by Serbianism and Bulgarism, and 

_ 151 — 



by the struggle that the Italian flag will have to 
sustain in the Balkan melee : « a delicate task 
which evidently the Italian army is thoroughly 
decided to accomplish on its own account » , adds 
he Temps; and, according to usage, la politique 
suivra la marche des combattants ». Certainly. 
But it is strange that in all these small adventures 
Le Temps should not find out that Italy, the Ally 
of France, is struggling more particularly, at the 
present time, against Austria, Germany's Ally. 
Hellenism, Serbianism, Bulgarisrn, ay, these are 
all wretched things. What if we spoke of some- 
thing more wretched for us : of Austria, for ins- 
tance ? 

And, at this point, I take the liberty of correct- 
ing an historical error into which Le Temps has 
fallen. 

At the Berlin Congress, says Le Temps, had 
Bismarck consented, the Italians might have 
been allowed to occupy Albania, in the same 
manner as the Austrians occupied Bosnia-Her- 
zegovina. I beg to correct that statement. Bismarck 
has many faults to account for before men and 
gods, but of this fault before Italians he is not 
guilty. At the Berlin Congress, Bismarck used all 
his persuasion with the Italian representatives to 
induce them to turn their prow towards Tunis or 
towards Albania, seeing that it had been already 
decided that Austria should take Bosnia-Herze- 
govina under her care. And it was in consequen- 
ce of the supine — how shall we express it ? — 
unconsciousness of the Italian representatives at 
the Berlin Congress that he let the thing drop and 
suggested Tunis to France. 

But all this represents the past. 

Forty years later, in the furnace of the great 
war, in which she has cast so much of the flower 

- 752 - 



of her race and of her wealth, for her own sake 
and for the sake of European civilization, Italy 
is showing that in the defence of her interests and 
of her position in the Adriatic, she intends being 
— how shall we say ? — less unconscious than 
in 1878, and that the least she can ask her friends 
to do is to rid her of that Hellenism of the Cori- 
tza Republic. Is it too much to ask for ? 

I am sure that, with its high political sense, 
Le Temps is of the same opinion. 



153 



AUSTRIA IN GENEVA. 



It is said that Austria is in Buda-Pesth, in Ber- 
lin and also in Vienna. But now, more than 
anywhere else she is in Geneva. I do not know 
whether our Allies have yet found this out. 

It is perhaps owing to its position in the centre 
of Europe, ot probably owing to the habit brought 
on by the necessity of keeping its gaze fixed on the 
stormy horizon, that the Italian Observatory sees 
things more clearly and more surely than others 
do. It obtained a clearer and surer insight into 
the Bulgarian question as well as into the Greek 
one (to-day's epilogue is a proof of it), and also 
of the Albanian question; and, if the alarm sign- 
als were made in vain, it is sufficient for us, 
as far as our responsibility is concerned, that 
those signals should have been made long before 
the others saw the danger. Unfortunately, be- 
tween reality and the Allies* Observatories there 
is a veil of illusions and prejudices which only 
the enemies' successes — and the gods know 
with what delay — succeed in tearing to pieces. 
It was thus that, one by one, the various rounds 
in the Balkan game were lost; and that the En- 
tente's diplomacy issued forth from the ordeal 



154 



with but a little heap of ashes, the ashes of one 
man: Venizelos; truly too little for fouT nations 
lost and three Kings in exile. 

I do not wish to be a prophet of evil, but I 
really am afraid that bygone illusions and pre- 
judices will once more serve to blindfold us in 
the case of Austria-Hungary as they have in 
other cases. On our side we are displaying in an 
exuberant manner all the finest qualities imagin- 
able: fierceness in patriotism, coolness in sacri- 
fice, rapture in enthusiasm ; but, without offence 
to any one, we are also displaying foolishness 
in the sense of reality : whence the tendency of 
considering as substantial all dreams and desires 
even before they have begun to be incarnated in 
the enemy's mind. A most dangerous failing this, 
in war time, when the first elementary duty is 
that of keeping one's self in constant contact with 
reality, which is the enemy. To lose contact with 
this reality can be as fatal as it was to Don 
Quixote when he lost contact with the herds and 
kept it up only with the heroes of chivalry ro- 
mances. 

Amongst the extracts of the foreign Press, I 
read yesterday that the Observer has warned 
its readers that they will do well to let themselves 
be persuaded that there is a very real Austrian 
question to be settled, and a very real Austria 
to be overthrown for the sake of European peace. 
This warning is extremely timely; but will it 
produce any effect ? 

On the waves of English and French public 
opinion, Austria floats and survives merely by 
virtue of two well-filled air bladders: one, on 
the English side, the recollection of the common 
struggle against Napoleon; the other, on the 
French side, the aspiration towards a common 



155 



struggle against Germany. In a country of tena- 
cious memory like England, it is difficult to dis- 
sociate the name of Austria from that of Water- 
loo; whilst in a country where facile illusions are 
prevalent, as in France, it is still more difficult 
not to imagine that at some future time Austria 
will hanker to retaliate for the Sadowa defeat, 
just as France has done for that of Sedan. Retro- 
activity of the historic sense is not one of the 
least frequent errors of our Allies. And Austria, 
and, on her behalf, Germany, the realistic Power 
par excellence, and especially clever at exploiting 
the weaknesses of civilized minds, labours not 
a little to exploit such an error. 

It is well-known that for some time Austria — 
and it were ridiculous to imagine that in this mat- 
ter she is not in league with Germany — has 
instituted in Geneva a Bureau of Propaganda in 
favour of her own peace, for the purpose of 
inveigling the French and the English. She has 
sent one of her most able officials from Vienna, 
who has always been in charge of the Imperial 
Press Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and has appointed him to a Consulship for the 
occasion. She has placed at his elbow a real 
member of the consular corps and has surrounded 
him with a Jewish financier, a Catholic Prelate 
and an international Socialist (in the end the 
good Lord will recognize his own) for the work 
of penetration, by every possible means, into the 
minds of near and distant enemies; and, as the 
Metternich tradition has never declined in Aus- 
tria, and Metternich himself once taught the art 
of employing the services of women in diplom- 
acy, so Austria has authorized her official to enlist 
all the available cocottes of a certain age who are 
known to be more or less acquainted with ci- 



156 



devant Russian Grandukes, and to cause them 
to manoeuvre round the more or less anarchical 
ex-exiles of Holy Russia (the world, as you know, 
rotates), and to gyrate round the more or less 
accredited emissaries of the other Powers of Eu- 
rope more or less directly aimed at. Thus Aus- 
tria in Geneva performs her efficacious mission 
with no less zeal than the Austria of the Carso 
and of Galicia. If the Congress of Vienna of 1815 
was surnamed the Congress of pots-de-vin, you 
can imagine how much, after the experience of 
a whole century, the tribe of international go- 
betweens will have to do and to earn in view of 
a future Congress, which will have to sustain on 
its shoulders the weight of two new worlds ! 

Is it too much to ask that to-day out Allies* 
opinion be fixed on these two truths for ( which 
the evidence is absolutely convincing, firstly that 
Austria, in everything she does, has the same 
stamp of features as Germany, whatever mask 
she may assume, and secondly that it is impos- 
sible to think of maintaining Austria in her poli- 
tical and territorial efficiency without thinking of 
doubling at the same time and in the same 
measure Germany's political and territorial effi- 
ciency also ? To imagine that Austria can be sev- 
ered from Germany would be more than illusion, 
it would be ingenuousness ; and the Entente does 
not really want to slip into the one or fall into 
the other. A Bulgaria, a Greece and a Russia 
ought to be sufficient to make up the collection 
of such illusions. Why add Austria to it? 

The disappearance of Russia — let us call it 
a temporary one, so as not to trouble the minds 
of those who profess to be optimistic — from the 
field of the waT has substantially altered all the 
terms of the Eastern problem. Russia used to be 

— 157 — 



a barrier against the Central Empires. This bar- 
rier once fallen, and until it is rebuilt once more, 
the Central Empires and Turkey will have the 
road clear to all their ambitions. Austria consti- 
tutes the imperial bridge between Germany and 
Turkey. And, if the Entente possessed a suf- 
ficiently strong mental nerve to conceive and carry 
through to its termination a political and military 
plan in the grand style, without getting entangled 
and losing itself in the snares of old illusions of 
Parties and doctrines, it should, as a whole, act 
as a battering-ram against Austria, and as a whole 
should strike out with Italy, to destroy the Aus- 
trian bridge. Will it ever decide to make this ef- 
fort ? The unity of thought and action which, 
since the first day of the war revealed itself as 
formidable in Germany, is wanting in the En- 
tente, which, all through, has evolved and is 
evolving nothing better than a policy of inter- 
national parliamentarism. And this should be 
corrected. 

The British and French Governments, in their 
Messages addressed to the provisional Govern- 
ment of Russia have reminded it, almost in the 
same words, of its engagement to reconstitute 
the whole of the disjecta Poland into a free and 
independent State. But how is it possible to 
achieve such a result without a true and effective 
disruption of Austria's present organization ? 

In the present war of nations, the reconstitution 
of Poland is as necessary both from an ideal and 
a material point of view, as the organization of 
Austria is absurd from the same standpoint. And 
should the new Russian democracy persist in its 
renunciations and desist from the struggle which 
the Czars had entered into in favour of the prin- 
ciple of races and nationalities, so much more 

— 158 — 



imperative would the duty, and the interest of the 
Entente be, to make of Poland that bulwark 
against the Central Empires which Russia had 
refused to be any longer. But Poland's colours 
cannot be hoisted unless Austria's are struck 
down at the same time ; and the plan of Poland's 
unification and integration cannot be effected 
without effecting that of Austria's disintegration. 
The contradiction does not admit of giving cares- 
ses to Austria and sugar-plums to Poland at the 
same time. 

Geneva is, at the present moment, a good mar- 
ket for delicatessen. But one mustn't eat too many 
of them. 



159 — 



THE PACT OF SILENCE. 



It is by no means pleasant to enter into con- 
troversy with writers of Allied nations. But it 
would be still more unpleasant to allow their ar- 
guments to pass without discussion, or their er- 
rors without correction. An Alliance is truly a 
labour, by what it seems. So, then, to work! 

Le Correspondent, an old French Review dedi- 
cated principally to foreign politics, in its issue 
of June 10th., has published an article entitled: 
(( The Italian Programme » which, for instance, 
I cannot possibly feign not to have read, as I 
really should like to do. In fact, rather than an 
article, it may be said to be a Statement, or, to 
use a more Gallic expression, a bureaucratic 
Rapport, or Report, emanating from a public Of- 
fice, from the Quai d'Orsay, or from some other 
State Department specially charged with the mis- 
sion of cultivating and maintaining discord and 
misunderstanding with friendly peoples and Sta- 
tes; in which article are gathered all the sedi- 
ments of prejudices and rancours which, day by 
day, Old Time has deposited in his unremovable 
Archives; and, in which are none of those ideas 
and sentiments which mature in the sunshine of 

— 160 - 



a free life. This Article or Report — call it what 
you will — in what it states openly and in what 
it hints, and in the spirit it reveals, is by no means 
a gracious service rendered — I do not say to 
Italy, as Italy has something more important to- 
do at the present moment than to mind the un- 
pleasant things which are said of her — but to 
France herself and to the Entente which, at the 
present time are more than ever in need of keep- 
ing united and sound in all their elements, whilst 
the secular arm of Russia is falling inertly at the 
frontiers. 

The writer of the article in question proposes 
to combat as vain, dangerous and disturbing to 
the Alliance, not only the aspirations of those 
whom he calls the Italian imperialists — it is 
superfluous to note that, according to him, any 
Italian who should hint at a discussion on the 
most insignificant Colonial problem, is an impe- 
rialist — but even those of the most modest na- 
tionalists, whom, according to the necessity of 
his reasoning, he at times depicts as intervention- 
ists, at others as neutralists and pro-German. 
Italian aspirations } It was arranged — savs he 
with the assurance of a man who has made his 
nest in the deepest recesses of a diplomatic la- 
boratory — that Italian aspirations should not be 
spoken of until the end of the war. Afterwards, 
according to merit (honour to merit !), the gate 
of discussion would have been opened or closed. 
A pact of silence — he goes on, very kindly, to 
reveal to us — had been concluded between all 
the men les plus devoues a VEntente (the names 
of these illustrious conspirators, please !), for the 
purpose of leaving all the most serious and most 
compromising questions on one side, during the 
progress of the war; and it is strange that the 



161 



Italians should break such a pact now, and that 
they should speak of those most serious and com- 
promising questions as if the silence agreed upon 
yesterday were equivalent to and signified con- 
sent. Now, then, says the author of this article 
or Report, it is high time to speak clearly and to 
make Italians understand that they must not con- 
tinue to delude themselves with the hope of being 
able to obtain more than what we believe is 
rightly their due ; nor that they should pick quar- 
rels with the Allies if they do not suceed one day 
in obtaining what they imagine they can lay 
claim to. The tone of self-sufficiency assumed by 
the author of this not too -well inspired article, 
in judging our questions, and the air of protection 
which he makes a show of here and there in his 
advice and his admonitions, excites a feeling, I 
do not know whether of surprise or curiosity. But, 
dear innocent Sir, are you speaking on your own 
account, or on behalf of the French Government ? 
The article or the Report, whatever it may be, 
of Le Correspondant, examines the Italian aspi- 
rations with great excitability. The writer divides 
them into three groups: the African group; the 
Asiatic group (Asia Minor) and the European 
group. Of the European group, dealing with 
Trent and Trieste, with Istria and Dalmatia, as 
far as Cattaro and Ragusa, he says but a few and 
not too forcible words, adding the advice to be 
prudent in our future behaviour, in order to avoid 
the dangers which mieht arise in the future in 
consequence of too wide and not fully justified 
annexations. Let us pass on ! It is useless to speak 
of Yugoslavia at present. He does not mention 
but simplv hints at her. It is enough to catch a 
glimpse of the snail's little horn. Concerning the 
Asiatic group, he makes no particular refutations, 

— 162 — 



perhaps because it would be inopportune to give 
precise information on the Allies' arrangements; 
but he makes many observations on questions of 
principle, and speaks with ill-repressed irony 
about the exaggeration of Italy's pretensions in 
comparison to those of other nations. But where 
calmness, gravity and irony are altogether shiver- 
ed to atoms is on the discussion of the African 
group. How can we speak of Kisimayo Harbour 
to England } (The good Ally, as you see, is mind- 
ful even of England, though not entrusted with 
a power-of -attorney). How can we speak of 
Djibuti to, France? Such demands would mean 
a provocation in the full sense of the word, and 
would be advanced on purpose to elicit a negative 
reply; so that we could then say to the Italian 
public : « Do you see ? The Allies do not want to 
give you what is due to you ! » A nasty shot, then, 
from the pro-Germans and neutralists ; from those 
who did not want war, and who, now that war 
is declared are striving to play the well-known 
trick of the increase of price, which always suc- 
ceeds. To arms ! — I reply : « Calm yourself ! » 
Neutralism and pro-Germanism have nothing 
whatever to do with the question of Kisimayo 
and Djibuti ; and there is no need to call for the 
intervention of the Italian Censor against news- 
papers and reviews which have taken the name 
of those places in vain. Those who have discus- 
sed these subjects are not imperialists in good or 
bad faith, who attempt either to obtain an ille- 
gitimate conquest for Italy, or to excite unlawful 
trouble amongst the Allies. They are, on the con- 
trary, studious, peaceable and diligent men, be- 
sides being faithful and true votaries of the Al- 
liance, and, as men of study are even somewhat 
simple-minded, and consequently apt to foster il- 

- !63 - 



luaions. In their diligence, they are looking with 
their magnifying glasses all over the map, and 
burrowing in the remembrance of the past to seek 
for reasons and causes of probable future discord ; 
and, in their ingenuousness they believe they can 
speak to the Allies informally, en famille, as it 
were, and propose in a simple manner the means 
of averting and dissolving those reasons and 
causes. There is nothing to fear, then, from their 
prose. Nor is the Italian mind, which is made up 
of good sense and stability, capable of becoming 
excited or infatuated on every question in the 
same manner, or apt to put them all on the same 
level. It is quite useless, therefore, to awaken the 
echoes of the Capitol of Kisimayo or of Dijbuti 
for fear of a double scaling or descent on the part 
of the Italians. There is too much apprehension 
about Italian ambitions ! Be less apprehensive, 
and you will be more even-minded. 

For, after all, the great preoccupation demon- 
strated by the author of the article, is only one, 
namely that Italy should exaggerate the importan- 
ce to France and the Entente of her intervention 
in the war; and consequently should advance 
exaggerated claims at the moment when peace 
is being signed. Whence arises a constant and 
not easily dissimulated tendency to diminish and 
underrate the importance of our effort, and to 
reduce and circumscribe the function of our war. 
The Germans hate Italy, because they hold that 
Italian neutrality had the effect of upsetting the 
fortunes of the war; as otherwise our intervention 
on their side in August 1914 would have facilita- 
ted the annihilation of France and would have 
assured a prompt victory to the Triple Alliance. 
On this point, the writer of the article in Le Cor- 
respondent rushes in, doubtful and argumenta- 

— 164 - 



tive: ((Yes... certainly... Italian neutrality has 
been a fine thing: but... what of Belgium's hero- 
ism ? And France's heroism ? » I bow before 
these, and pass onwards. Because by means of 
discussions like these, one could arrive directly 
at the tittle-tattle of a Beauty Show. The same 
can be said of Italy's specific contribution to the 
war. (( Yes » and « But » are constantly recurring. 
(( On, jusquici, up to now, Italy's sacrifices, or 
more plainly (« sacrifices » is too tragic a figure 
of speech for him) Italy's contribution to the com- 
mon war has undoubtedly been considerable. 
But, certainly, by no means as considerable as 
that of France and England » . Therefore (this is 
the conclusion) why claim so many compensa- 
tions, not only in the Adriatic, but also in Africa 
and in Asia Minor ? 

We will not follow the author of the « Italian 
Programme » in he Correspondant along that 
road. 

In the European war Italy has done that which 
she should, politically and morally, have done 
as a great modern Power, as heir to the law of 
Rome, as creator of Mediterranean civilization. 
In order to fulfil her task, she sought no inspiration 
but her own, in the full liberty of her mind and 
in the serene consciousness of her mission amidst 
the old and new races of Europe. She did not 
set a price on her neutrality with the Entente in 
the first period, nor did she set a price on her 
neutrality with her old Allies in the second pe- 
riod. If the consequences of her neutrality and 
of her intervention were such as to procure the 
salvation of France and the possibility of develop- 
ing the military preparation of England, the 
thought never entered her mind of presenting her 
bill to the friendly Powers which she had so as- 

— 165 - 



sisted. Having once entered the field, she is fight- 
ing the fiercest of wars on her boundaries, alone 
and without the possibility of help from any side. 
Russia, which might have relieved her of the 
weight of a great portion of the Austrian armies, 
is now uselessly perorating on ideologies — her 
own and others' — without even having her 
weapons at hand. What more is required of us, 
then ? And wherefore the strange attitude of a 
certain section of the French Press towards Italy, 
and the still stranger discussions which are being 
carried on and are certainly not calculated to 
give Italians the comforting persuasion of the 
goodness of their Alliance ? 

And here let me break off the period; which 
my present bitterness might make too strong. 

It suffices me to have informed our French 
friends that, in Italy, those who are to understand 
have already understood. 



— 166 — 



THE PREJUDICES ABOUT AUSTRIA. 






One of the political animal* s greatest delusions 
is that of thinking or imagining that the idea 
(written with a capital I, or with a small i, ac- 
cording to the various degrees of imbecility of the 
person who so thinks) governs the world. The 
truth, on the contrary, is this : that the idea, like 
love, in order to become an active force must 
first of all pass through all the stages of corrupt- 
ion and putrefaction and become poisonous. The 
eel, whilst it is alive, slips away from your hand; 
but its serum, after its putrefaction, kills you, fixes 
you in death, without leaving or showing any 
trace of its work. If the idea is not past, if it does 
not become a prejudice and act solely in the sub- 
consciousness, it has no political or social value. 
The above can be applied to Austria. 

If ever there was a war in which the Idea (if 
you wish to adorn it with the capital letter, do not 
lose this opportunity), could and should beat San- 
terre*s drums to drown Austria's voice on the 
scaffold, it is this present war: the war of nations, 
or rather, to speak more ideally or abstractly, the 
war for the principle of nationality: the war of 
democracies; the war of democratic principle 



167 



against militarism and authoritarism combined. 
Yet, precisely in this war, and precisely in the 
most democratic countries which are fiercely 
fighting in it, Austria has found, up to recently, 
at any rate, the most constant defence and has 
excited the most persistent illusions, both deter- 
mined by two prejudices, which are the poisons 
of two ideas dead and buried in the last century : 
an historical prejudice and a political one. « Fe- 
lix Austria 1 » Once upon a time she wedded the 
living. Now she snatches the ring from the fingers 
of the dead. 

The historical prejudice. Because Vienna once 
held over the German races the place now oc- 
cupied by Berlin; because the Hapsburgs once 
wore the imperial crown now worn by the Hohen- 
zollerns ; because Sadowa was the precursor of 
Sedan; Germany's enemies now think, hope or 
illude themselves — at least they did so until re- 
cently — that Austria may issue forth from the 
circle which encloses her; that she may resume 
once more her position of rival and enemy of her 
present Ally, and claim once more her ancient 
supremacy ; and, from a « brilliant second » , be- 
come once more the « first » , the proud « first » 
of Olmiitz. It is, however, sufficient to consider 
the hypothesis (I cannot find a more appropriate 
word) even in the most superficial manner and 
out of the circle of our desires or of our passions 
to demonstrate its inconsistency and it fatuity. 
In the first place, historical situations are not re- 
newed at will, and empires are not created anew, 
as a Milanese geologist used to create volcanoes 
in his cauldron. To imagine, now, the possibility 
of an Austria taking Germany's place, and as 
she was before 1866, would be the same as to 
imagine Germany cut up into seventy small States 

— 168 — 



as in the treaty of Westphalia; and, at the same 
time, to picture oneself a German people disu- 
nited, unprogressive, not welded together by 
scientific labour and by military glory; but divid- 
ed, ignorant, poor and deprived of the natio- 
nal and imperial consciousness which it now 
possesses, and capable of being easily govern- 
ed by a new dynasty composed of madmen and 
degenerates. If Austria has descended to an 
inferior station it is not only because she was 
defeated by Prussia at Sadowa, but because she 
really is a State, or simply, a Government such 
as Gortchakoff wished her to be: mentally infe- 
rior, immeasurably inferior, to the State which 
emerged from the victories of 1866 and 1870, and 
from Bismarck's brain. To imagine an Austria 
as she was in 1815; an Austria of the Holy Al- 
liance, one should suppose the overturning of a 
whole century of European history, as well as 
the complete upsetting of the history of the pre- 
sent war. What would have happened to Austria 
if, after her first defeats in the Balkans, Germany 
had not run to her rescue and had not planted 
herself in the midst of her existence, and had not 
given her her conscience, her science, her will and 
the Generals of her Staff ? Without Germany, 
Austria would have now been food for dogs, as 
she would have been in 1848 but for Russia's 
prompt aid. If rebellious against Germany, she 
would have at once been reduced to reason, like 
the slave under the slave-driver's lash. And then, 
why should the new Sovereign undertake the 
task of claiming what was lost in the past — he 
who knew nothing of that past — just to please 
Germany's enemies ?* Perhaps old Francis Joseph 
might have felt — but did not feel — a thrill of 
desire and yearning; he who had seen all the 

- 169 - 



ensign® of his ancient empire escape from his 
hands, and wore the emblems of mourning for 
them. But his nephew has had no other experience 
than that of Germany's protection; knows of no 
other helping hand than that of his great pro- 
tector, the Kaiser: the Nephew was born to the 
imperial purple under the star of the Hohen- 
zollerns. He is Wilhelm II's ward rather than his 
vassal, and his kingdom will remain under Germ- 
any's care as long as Germany's force and autho- 
rity endure. And it would be a most sad illusion 
— let us hope that now, after the Versailles Con- 
gress, it no longer exists — on the part of France, 
or England or of Wilson that of making of Wil- 
helm 's ward or vassal a defender of the rights 
of nations or of the ex-principles of 1789, at the 
feet of Maria Theresa's statue at the gates of the 
Vienna Museums. Imagination in history should 
not be allowed to run unbridled. 

The political prejudice; a prejudice of order in 
the changeable, not to say revolutionary societies 
of Europe's democratic Powers. A prejudice 
which is widespread not only in neutral countries 
or countries which are not in actual war against 
Austria, but also in those which are in open and 
declared conflict with her, amongst the classes 
which, having nothing more to hope for in them- 
selves and not wanting or not being able to create 
for themselves another reason of existence, are 
satisfied with placing their hopes, no one knows 
why, on the Emperor of Austria. 

If those so-called orderly classes were not, for 
the most part composed of hypochondriacs, and, 
therefore, of people incapable otf making the 
slightest effort to think of, ,and to judge upon, 
this world's most simple matters, it might be 
expected that in the end they would arrive at the 

- 170 - 



jj persuasion that their hope of obtaining the seeu- 
;, rity of quiet dreams or the appeasing of their 
ii fears through Austria's Emperor was absolutely 
misplaced. What influence do you suppose the 
i Dual Monarchy can exercise on other States ? 
First of all, on account of its very formation, 
and 1 owing to the various races it embraces, and 
the various aspirations of these races, she is 
constrained to pursue a special policy of her own, 
which nations based upon unity of race and 
progressing in unity of aspirations must, from the 
very first, discard and could not possibly follow: 
a peculiar policy, that is, which does not possess 
the character and the elements which will cause 
it to become a general policy. And then, when or 
where did the reactionary policy of a State ever 
have force of expansion in, or contagious in- 
fluence on, other States ? Free principles which 
act on public opinion may have an influence and 
may determine movements and even crises 
through contagion between one country and 
another; but the reactionary policy of a State 
based on authority can by no means exercise an 
influence upon the conduct of other States which 
live under a regime based upon public opinion. 
To pine, therefore, for the love of Austria is the 
same as to pine for a figure projected on the 
screen of a cinematograph; that is to say, for a 
figure which, though it moves, cannot be seized 
in your embrace, and though it smiles, cannot 
abandon itself in your arms; it is the same, in 
short, as to lose time, the inclination and the 
opportunity for doing something more useful and 
more serious for oneself and others. Whilst you 
are standing spell-bound in admiration in front 
of the figure which is vainly moving on the screen, 
the river of life rushes noisily past you, dragging 

- 171 - 



in its waves and winding in its whirlpools the 
passions of men, and you remain on dry land 
on the desert island. Your love for Austria has 
served no other purpose than to make you lose 
contact with reality, to isolate you in your own 
country, to make you an exile in your own home, 
to make 3/ou enemy of your being and of your own 
life. Order for Austria, forsooth! In his first 
reactionary zeal, Bismarck for a moment thought 
of abjuring even that Germany which he carried 
in his great brain, for the love of that order which 
he believed Austria represented; and between 
1 849 and 1 850 he implored the Prussian Chamber 
not to accept the Imperial crown for the King of 
Prussia, which the Frankfort Parliament had 
offered him, and struggled for the subjection of 
Prussia to Austria, in order to combat together 
democracy which was arising th^sateningly. But 
he soon undeceived himself and hastened to 
inaugurate the policy of the « stroke to the heart » 
of Austria ; the policy of « iron and fire » , so as 
definitely to bring Austria under Prussia's subject- 
ion. Why should not the orderly men of all 
countries think of quietening their timorous 
consciences in Bismarck's name andi in his ex- 
ample 1 

I trust that Messrs Orlando and Sonnino have 
been doing good work in the Versailles Councils 
by destroying these two prejudices which, up to 
the eve of those meetings seemed to be erecting 
barriers in the minds of the Allies, sufficiently 
solid to prevent the formation of a clear and sure 
conviction of Austria's chances and functions in 
the present war. 

There is no question of proclaiming or claiming 
the wiping-out of Austria from the map of Eu- 
rope as undoubtedly has been done in the edicts 

— 172 — 



of doctrinaire polemics during the last three 
years; in war time, enemy countries must be 
wiped out on the battle field before they can be 
cancelled from the map. But it is a question of 
creating a special state of mind, and of prepar- 
ing such proper and opportune conditions and 
weapons as are fit to fight the definite battle 
against Austria; and not by Italy alone, but by 
all the Allies, by means of a precise plan, by a 
single and firm desire for victory, and what is 
still better, by a single aim. Those two prejudi- 
ces, and Austria's unimpeded manoeuvres tend- 
ing, with Germany's approval, to give them 
credit and life with the Governments and the 
nations of the Entente, have greatly delayed the 
work of creation and preparation. The Versailles 
communique shows that the danger has been 
averted at last; and that Austria is, for the Allies, 
as she is for Italy, the common enemy. 

No more time should be lost iin discussing, now. 
Let us fight for victory. 



173 ~ 



PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. 



If I were an elector, and a candidate to Parlia- 
ment came to solicit my vote, I should first of 
all require him to undergo a summary examina- 
tion on the history of the French Revolution, and 
then I should exact from him the sworn promise 
that he would never infringe the following Com- 
mandment : « Thou shalt never again, in the 
course of thy natural liifei, repeat the words and 
the formulas which thou hast learnt in that 
history.)). — I hasten to explain that I should do 
this not as an act of disrespect towards the French 
Revolution, but for the purpose of preventing the 
abuse of the words and the formulas which, at 
the time and in the surroundings in which they 
blossomed forth, may have had their reason to 
exist, but now no longer have it. And also in 
order to procure a slight amount of variety, if 
not originality, in our political literature which, 
through constant repetition is exhausting and 
humiliating itself and is becoming oppressive to 
us. The political animal is, in itself, a mournful 
animal; but fancy what a sad thing it would be 
if it were to present itself in the form of a parrot ; 
the most mournful animal in the whole zoological 

— 174 — 



emporium. Ninety -nine times out of a hundred, 
the words that are said and the things that are 
done in the supreme crises of European life are 
still merely the echoes and the projections of the 
deeds of the Great Revolution. There is no mid- 
dle way: either humanity has no longer any 
political imagination or it is not yet ripe for an- 
other Great Revolution. From the States -General 
to the Directoire, day by day, in the midst of fire 
and blood, the French created and invented a 
new political language, besides a new form of 
thought and action, which still contribute in no 
small measure to the political literature and to 
the Parliamentary oratory of modern times. When 
will a new Verb appear, which will announce the 
incarnation of a different Deity } The verb of 
1789 has already been conjugated too often. 

Have you ever read the Memoir on the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, presented to the Jacobins Club 
by Dumouriez, Field-Marshal of the 22nd. Divi- 
sion } Did you ever peruse « U Opinion de Lobjoy, 
Ancien Maire de Colligis, Depute de VAisne » 
on the necessity of organizing the Department of 
Foreign Affairs according to the spirit of the 
Constitution : a Report printed by order of the 
Assembly 7 Everything that is said or written to- 
day on public diplomacy, on people's diplomacy 
or, better still, on the necessity that diplomacy 
be public and that it be conducted by the people, 
is nothing more than a melancholy repetition of 
what was said and written by the obscure Lobjoy 
and by the more famous Dumouriez who, not- 
withstanding the pure principles he professed on 
the question of diplomacy, ended by betraying 
his native country. 

« There is no further need of diplomacy )), 
wrote Dumouriez, sententiously ; « a great people, 

- 175 - 



a free and just people is the natural Ally of all 
races, and should not contract special alliances 
which may bind it to the fortunes, the interests 
and the passions of this or that people » . — It 
would be useless, therefore, to take the trouble 
of organizing a Department of Forcing Affairs. 
« This Department of Foreign Affairs must be 
the most simple and least complicated of all 
Departments, because of them all it requires the 
least mystery. A Minister who should deceive a 
foreign Court would deserve a punishment pro- 
portionate to such a crime ». — Naturally, such 
a Minister of Foreign Affairs cannot claim to 
assume any responsibility. « He shall communi- 
cate all important despatches to the Diplomatic 
Committee (composed of members of the As- 
sembly) which, in its turn, shall communicate 
them to the Assembly ». « Thus », he concluded, 
(( we shall become the arbiters and pacifiers of 
that Europe, of which in the past (under the An- | 
cien Regime), we were the agitators and the 
scourge » . 

What of Lobjoy's opinion 7 It is not dissimilar 
to that of Dumouriez. Diplomatic secrecy ? We 
must do away with this « mysterious dogma » 
asserted by the Ministers of the Ancien Regime. 
« The diplomatic Committee (composed of mem- 
bers of the Assembly), must be the supervisor 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It must not 
be a passive or speculative power, but an active 
and practical one. It will spy upon les rouages et 
le jeu de la machine. Besides, the Secret of State 
will no longer exist. And our diplomacy will be 
a sincere diplomacy par excellence and open to 
all, friends and enemies)). (Happy man!). 

Open, above everything to the friends on the 
public street. Because, if it be true that the De- 

- 176 — 



partment of Foreign Affairs was rapidly organ- 
ized on the basis of these principles, it is no less 
true that its staff -roll was not at all simplified. 
From forty-one clerks who were employed there 
in 1789, the number was raised to, eighty-four in 
1793. And you can imagine what good luck 
befell all the friends of Dumouriez, who had been 
appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, and of 
Lobjoy. The new staff was composed of ex- 
Municipal employes, ex-port surveyors, ex-notar- 
ies* clers, ex-theatrical agents and even some ex- 
tailors were not wanting — all good patriots and 
upright citizens. But it is useless to insist upon 
this anecdotal part of history which has no im- 
portance in the present discussion. 

It is not, therefore, a new miracle this of public 
diplomacy, of people's diplomacy, of diplomacy 
bereft of diplomatic secrecy, of diplomacy with- 
out treaties, or with open ones, which comes to 
us from Russia, and which is welcomed even 
here with so much joy. It is, on the contrary, 
the old miracle of the Old Fairy, to whom minds 
with some critical sense should forbear to hold 
the train any longer. 

Napoleon's Law of January 27th. 1809, con- 
cerning the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, which had been re-integrated and restor- 
ed to their ancient honour, is preceded by a Re- 
port by M. d'Hauterive, in which, amongst other 
things, is stated: — ((The documents which are 
placed under the protection of this Law, contain 
the traditions, the will, the aspirations of our 
country. Are we to offer, gratuitously, to our 
enemies the secret of our aspirations ; are we to 
reveal the way by which we are striving to make 
our aspirations a reality 7 » 

The whole question lies here. 



177 — 

12 



Either the idea, the fact itself of the struggle 
for life in general, and for political life in parti- 
cular must be suppressed, or, in the face of 
individuals, in the face of parties, of the nation, 
an adversary, an enemy, or at least a competitor 
must always be assumed to exist. Is it indispen- 
sable to offer to the adversary, to the enemy, to 
the competitor the plans of our action ; to disclose 
the ends which we are endeavouring to reach by 
our action ? 

And, after all, what is the meaning of diplom- 
atic secrecy in modern political life ? Does it 
perhaps mean the same thing that was once 
meant by the formula of : « King's Secret », which 
has, by now, become so melodramatic? 

It is to be hoped that no one should desire or 
pretend that both things are one and the same. 

But, apart from the manner and the form in 
which it was effected, if the instinct of rebellion 
on the part of the men of the French Revolution 
against the King's secret was just and justified : 
a rebellion, that is, against a foreign policy con- 
ducted exclusively by the King and by men in 
his confidence, drawn from his Court and not 
from Parliament, that is to say, from the repre- 
sentatives of the nation; who can say that the 
distrust and the criticism of diplomatic secrecy 
are justified ? For the diplomatic secret is now 
nothing but the secret of the conditions contained 
in a treaty, the secret of articles of an agreement 
which, in its spirit and in its aims, is not and 
cannot be made public, because it is made by 
a Government which is the emanation of the 
representative body of the nation, and is ratified 
by the Chamber which, by the votes of the 
majority or unanimously affirms its confidence in 
the Government. 

- 178 - 



Bismarck, in 1850, wrote: « No one can ima- 
gine what stupidity and emptiness compose the 
diplomacy of my country » . The diplomacy of 
others, of course. For his own, when he was en- 
abled to evolve it, was certainly of another sort ; 
no longer stupid and empty like that which he 
had denounced and despised. 

In the modern world, therefore, the question of 
diplomacy must be transferred from the field of 
principles to that of efficiency. And, as it is by 
now a function of the State and not, as formerly, 
a privilege of the Chief of the State, it must be 
discussed only on the aims for which it is striv- 
ing and on the capacity and dignity of the men 
who exercise and direct it. 

There is no public diplomacy or secret diplom- 
acy; a Government diplomacy and a people's 
diplomacy — and in what measure and of what 
class should the people be in it } — but a State 
diplomacy which is — and cannot help being — 
public in its aims, and is, and cannot help being, 
secret in its means, in respect of enemies and 
competitors. 

The example of the Russian maximalists can 
offer no valid argument for any doctrine or party. 
The publication of treaties which they did not 
sign, does not mark the beginning of a novus ordo 
in diplomacy, but the end of the Russian State 
and the simultaneous abolition of the army and 
the diplomacy which were the defence and the 
guide of that State. 

From their point of view the maximalists are 
logical. Having dismissed the army, jhey could 
not do otherwise than dismiss their diplomacy. 
Having decided to discontinue the war, they had 
nothing more to do with treaties in which the 
terms of the war were determined and fixed, and 

— 179 - 



they could well cast them to the four winds as 
useless and embarrassing scraps of paper. But I 
ask : Would they have so acted, had they decided, 
instead, to continue the war and to attain the 
purpose for which those treaties had been con- 
cluded ? 

No one can reply in the affirmative without 
qualifying the maximalists as fools; a qualifica- 
tion which, in truth, they do not deserve. 

Then, with what political acumen, with what 
philosophic spirit, with what logical sense do 
those persons who do not pursue the same imme- 
diate ends as the maximalists, support their me- 
thods and their means ? 

The French Revolution, which tended to create 
ministerial responsibility on the ruins of the 
King's ancient absolutism, could speak at that 
time, and Russian maxim alism which tends to 
destroy all the forms of State organization, can 
speak now, of a public diplomacy, that is, of a 
public negotiation of general affairs, because both 
the first at an early stage, and the second at the 
present moment, have suppressed the struggle, 
that is, war, from their programme. But the same 
cannot be said by those who admit that there are 
foreign enemies to be fought, and that against 
these there is war; that is, the struggle for life 
or death. 

It seems to me, too, that logic should not be 
a mere opinion. 



180 — 



WANTED: A LITTLE DISTRUST. 



Distrust, I hasten to add, of ourselves more 
than of others : distrust of our ideas, of our sen- 
timents, of our fancies, of our prodigalities. From 
the attentive perusal of the controversy between 
Sonninians and Anti-Sonninians (which it has 
been agreed to call the controversy par excellence) 
on the subject of Yugoslavia, on the Pact of Ro- 
me, on the Pact of London and on arguments 
more or less kindred to these, I have arrived at 
the conclusion that we are too sure and too con- 
fident of ourselves, and that we are sadly in 
want of some of that salt which is necessary to 
the daily bread of golitics, and which imparts 
to it a certain flavour and certain nutritive quali- 
ties beneficial to the mind. Naturally we are 
plentifully supplied with many other kinds of 
drugs, for which, it is generally agreed, the world 
envies us. 

It is strange how, in our beautiful land, some 
questions are repeatedly coming to the fore, from 
one month of August to the other, with constant 
monotony, and without allowing the benefit of 
summer holidays even to their most innocent 
reasonings. This is really the Bel Paese, the 



181 



beatiful land of eternal intellectual immobility — 
or perhaps of eternal intellectual youth ? This 
time two years ago, we were gathered here to 
discuss, as we are discussing now, Austria's 
dismemberment, which has not yet taken place; 
and three years ago we were discussing, precisely 
as we are doing to-day, the cession on our part 
of Dalmatia, which we do not yet possess, to 
Yugoslavia which, on its part, is still non-exist- 
ent. After having read to-day's newspapers, turn 
over, for curiosity, the newspaper files of the 
months of August and September 1914, 1915 and 
1916, and you will receive the impression that 
Joshua has succeeded in stopping the sun of the 
dog-days, at any rate. I could easily furnish you 
with the proofs of my assertion by quoting 
extracts from my own articles of those months 
and years, in which I wrote about the principle 
of nationality as affecting the relations between 
Italy and Yugoslavia, about giving the Dalmatian 
Islands to the Yugo-Slavs and the /Egean Islands 
to Greece, and on Italy's supposed absolute and 
inevitable necessity of constantly offering to give 
away what she has and what she does not pos- 
sess, for her greater glory and for her greater sov- 
ereignty. 

From those days to this, has a step been taken, 
or has any progress been made on the question 
or questions at issue } And are we not yet labour- 
ing, with our present discussions, to create against 
Italy those currents of ideas and interests which 
two years ago were already noticeable as being 
stirred up and agitated } 

I am well aware that between then and now 
a new event has happened: the Pact of Rome, 
which concludes an understanding between Italy 
— shall we say the present great Power that is 



182 



Italy ? — and Yugoslavia that is to be : the Pact 
of Rome, which we all welcomed with sincere 
enthusiasm, notwithstanding the recollection of 
not long-past publications, illustrated with maps 
upon which the blots or the cross-lines of certain 
ethnical rights were spread even beyond the sea 
of Trieste and the walls of Udine; and we all 
felt happy to watch the disappearance of the 
distance between those who fight (we Italians) and 
those who yearn (the Yugo -Slavs) for a common 
aim : the overthrow of Austria ; between represen- 
tatives of races which, in any case, although parati 
ad helium one against the other until yesterday 
by Austria, felt the necessity of shaking hands 
and of sincerely declaring that they wished to 
proceed on the same road independently of Aus- 
tria, during and after the great world war. 

I now pose the question : Has this new event 
been created for the purpose of solving all the 
questions of our war; or a single question only 
— the smallest, I should hope - — that of our rela- 
tions with Yugo-Slav agitators ? Can this new 
event, which has arisen through the good offices 
of those agitators* Anglo-French friends, and 
through the good will and the action of many 
Italian idealists ; and also with the posthumous 
or anticipated approval of our Government; can 
it, I ask, influence, attenuate or lessen or destroy 
the Pact of London, which is the Charter of the 
Entente and of our war } Poor Italian diplomacy, 
poor Italian democracy, poor Italy altogether, if 
it were so ! But I have no need to wish that, from 
Sonnino to Bissolati, the spider of national in- 
genuity will not labour to weave the web of such 
a tendency. The mere wish would be an offence. 

The mistake of all these contrasts which, let 
us hope, may be more verbal and oratorical than 

— 183 — 



effective and substantial is, to my mind, a psycho- 
logical one; an error arising out of what French 
psychology calls the illusion of the deja vu. We 
submit ourselves in an excessive degree to the 
fascination of this illusion and find ourselves 
thoughtlessly led to consider as true and real what 
is merely an apparition on the stage of our inner 
world; and to remember as already seen that 
which has yet to happen. We, in fact, argue as 
if the war were already over; as if Austria were 
already vanquished and dismembered, as if the 
green baize were already laid out on the table 
where the peace treaty is to be signed, and the 
assignation to this or that Power of Austria's 
fragments were already decided upon. And we 
do not see that Austria is in Friuli, and has no 
less than seventy-two divisions in arms against 
us; we do not perceive that war is being fought 
on all fronts and that it iis impossible to foresee 
its end; and lastly, we take no notice of this terri- 
ble anachronism in our mind: that the war is 
alive and active and that it is multiplying the 
loaves and fishes of the miracle of peace. Is it 
so very difficult to awaken distrust even of this 
miracle } 

I am aware that many of our French and 
English friends would be willing for the sake 
of Yugoslavia, and, naturally, for the good of 
Italy also, to counsel the renunciation of the Pact 
of London in favour of the Pact of Rome. But, as 
Pascal says, I believe in witnesses who will 
rather die than forswear their evidence. And, 
on the contrary, I cannot perceive that these good 
French and English friends of ours are in any 
way disposed to sacrifice anything for the triumph 
of their argument. Prodigality jat other people's 
expense is certainly a virtue; but I think it is a 

— 184 — 



virtue of the person who bears the expense, not 
of him who advises and regulates it. 

Furthermore, on the faith of these good friends 
of ours, friends likewise of Yugoslavia, we are 
apt to lull ourselves excessively in the dream, 
the illusion or the programme of Austria's dis- 
memberment. But the problem of Austria's dis- 
memberment is one of recent formation in the 
public opinion of Allied nations, and I greatly 
doubt that it is a ripe fruit of their political con- 
science, when I see, for instance, that in France, 
the Socialists with M. Sembat at their head, and 
the traditionalists behind the Socialists are re- 
lentless towards M. Clemeiaceau for his fierce 
debate with Czernin, and blame him for having 
broken off with Sixtus' Brother-in-law. On the 
other hand, it is no mystery that in England 
traditions are as difficult to eradicate as belief 
itself is, and the tradition of Austria's friendship 
is far deeper and more rooted in the English mind 
than even the idea of the League of Nations. Does 
it seem wise and opportune to base our diplomatic 
action upon a conjecture or upon a desired event 
which has not happened (even though we are 
endeavouring to bring it about by force of arms 
and not by words) such as is the dismemberment 
of Austria ? And does it seem wise and opportu- 
ne to base our action upon an opinion about 
which we are not sure whether it will endure or 
not when put to the test, as is the opinion of many 
of our French and English friends on Austria's 
dismemberment. What, then, remains of the 
recent discussions, if we withdraw from them the 
foundation of that conjecture and opinion upon 
which they were based } 

I shoul like to remind writers and political men 
of my country that we are engaged in the great- 



185 



est conflict that the history of humanity has ever 
recorded; a struggle of interests which, notwith- 
standing that inspired words are attempting to 
surround it with lofty and noble idealism, has 
engrained in it the double aim of political and 
commercial dominion. Is it perhaps unlikely that, 
suddenly, from amidst the rose bushes and the 
laurel groves which hide its lair, the primitive 
wild beast may not spring forth to tear with his 
sharp fangs the veil of our nuptial amours with 
the stars, and drive those fangs straight into our 
living flesh } Beware ! Some reserve of distrust 
may, at least, serve to avoid sudden disillusion- 
ments, and to prevent the weakening of ultimate 
defences. 

There will be ample time, later on, to read 
« The Little Flowers » of St. Francis of Assisi. 



186 — 



VON BULOW'S AND RIZOV'S BULGARIA. 



Here, within the walls of Rome, we have wit- 
nessed the birth of the tragedy which, after so 
much bloodshed and so much ferocity, has found 
to-day its fatal epilogue in the Salonika armistice 
and the consequent disarmament of Bulgaria. 
Von Billow was Consul at that time; and Ger- 
many, victorious on both frdnts, was offering 
kingdoms and doctrines to those who were will- 
ing to join her and aid her to conquer, with all 
possible speed, the markets of the world. To 
Italy she offered Malta, Tripoli, Djibuti, Nice 
and Savoy; to Turkey, Egypt, rebellious Arabia 
and all the lost Empire of Mediterranean Africa ; 
to Greece, the Lower Adriatic and Albania on 
the one hand, and the /Egean Sea and Asia Mi- 
nor on the other; to Bulgaria, Macedonia, the 
Dobrudja and the Black Sea. They had only to 
order and they would be served ! Rizov, the Mace- 
donian, the good Rizov, in whose Tartarean eye 
and on whose lip still hovered the inexhaustible 
rancour of 1913, opened his hands and gave rein 
to his hopes at von Billow's offers, and was duly 
served ! Poor Rizov ! He died a few months ago 
in the Berlin Mecca, leaving to the world the 

— 187 ~- 



forty coloured maps of his Album of Greater 
Bulgaria, with a preface in twelve languages, but 
not the accomplishment of Bulgaria's destiny nor 
the rectification of her boundaries. Worse still, 
he left Bulgaria divided for ever from Germany, 
and Germany herself incapable of turning back 
and restoring the lost alliances of times gone by ! 
The bright, flowery dream of the Villa of the 
Roses had lasted at most the length of a morn- 
ing. And, what is worse, it was dispelled by the 
people who had created it, cultivated it and armed 
it with thorns. 

In Rome and, later on, in Berlin, the good 
Rizov was the representative of that political 
mania for annexation and supremacy which dur- 
ing recent years had so invaded the souls and 
the minds of political men in Sofia as to induce 
them to consider the other Balkan nations, Servia 
and Roumania as tributaries destined to co-ope- 
rate with their spoils to the formation of a Grea- 
ter Bulgaria. Germany blew into that individual 
and collective mania to inflate it as far as the 
extreme consequences, and exploit it for her own 
ends, just as usurers and demi-mondaines blow 
on the first restless passions of minors until they 
have sucked the last drop of blood and the last 
sesterces of their patrimony. It was thus that 
Bulgaria, a rebel by now against the Great Moth- 
er, the Old Russia of the Slav races, thrust her- 
self in the great circle of the imperial war to aid 
Austria in driving away Servia from her nest; 
and to assist Germany in driving away Roumania 
from her nest too, so as to allow her protectress 
to reach, undisturbed, the desired goal, Constan- 
tinople. But when, the brigand-like enterprise 
once enacted, came the hour of reckoning, and 
of the division and the assignation of the spoil, 



188 



and she, — the ambitious Prussia of the Balkans, 
as in the happy days she was nicknamed — 
demanded the portion she had bargained for, 
she was fated to discover, to her cost, of what 
stuff the other Prussia, the real one, the Prussia 
of incendiaries and devourers, was made of. And, 
from that time, she silently besran to prepare, in 
her mind, the plans of eventual escapes and 
eventual armistices. 

The Italian public, occupied with other and 
more important business of its own, was unable 
to follow, from a close point of vantage, the 
internal transformation of Bulgaria, both as a 
nation and as a government, which took place 
during the year of « German peaces » — the 
peaces with the Soviet of Brest Litovsk, with 
Ukraine and with Roumania. Had it possessed 
the means and the leisure to follow that transfor- 
mation, it would not have felt any surprise or 
wonder at these seemingly startling renunciations 
in favour of the Entente, which are nothing but 
slow and measured conclusions arrived at in 
consequence of a long series of miseries and 
disillusionments. King Ferdinand's illnesses, his 
disappearances from Sofia, and the rumours of 
his insanity; RadoslavofFs fall and Malinoff's 
succession were not then nor do they appear 
now, as signs and symptoms of internal crises, 
or crises of Court and Cabinet. But the supreme 
crisis, the crisis of the alliance with the Central 
Empires was already taking place. Bulgaria had 
not attained the aims for which she had entered 
the war. And the King and the Cabinet who had 
led her into the struggle were travelling about 
erratically, going around from their places of 
abode, like madmen, or considered as such, after 
having ruined the people which had 1 entrusted 

— 189 -<- 



its fate into their hands. The armistice is the 
consecration of that state of affairs. 

But what were the war .aims of Greater Bul- 
garia } 

They were: Annexation of Macedonia on one 
side and of the Dobrudja on the other; annexa- 
tion of the Morawa region in the centre, with 
Nisch, Vrania Pirat and Liskovet, and therefore 
the direct line of Mittel Europa, as well as the 
Timok basin, with Negotin and Jatchar; and on 
the part of her Moslem Ally; the Maritza region 
and the dominion of the Dedeagatch Railway. 
A very Empire to be cut out of the live flesh of 
Servia, of Roumania and of Turkey. But, at the 
moment of cutting, Germany, the colossal butch- ■ 
er, appeared on the scene with sharpened knife, 
to secure for herself the part nearest the bone. — 
(( Greater Bulgaria ? ^ Very good. But what of 
Greater Germany ? » . 

(( As to Macedonia, well, let it be so; there is 
nothing to gain from it; only worries and co- 
mitadji. But — says Germany — as to the Do- 
brudja, let us distinguish ,, The Dobrudja of 1913 
shall be restored without discussion. As to the 
other, the Dobrudja of 1878, that is another matt- 
er; because, notwithstanding the national Con- 
gress of Babadagh, and Rizov's maps, Bulgaria 
cannot claim any political or ethnographical right 
over it. Some other concessions can be made, to 
show an excessive generosity on my part, but 
Constanza and the Mouths of the Danube must 
remain in my absolute dominion » . — Whenever 
Germany stumbles on a sea, she says : « This is 
mine ! » She has thus stumbled on the Black Sea, 
on her way, and 'ware who touches it ! The Black 
Sea, however, threatens to swallow her alliances 
one by one; after the Bulgarian the Turkish. 

— 190 — 



Defeated in Syria and Palestine, Turkey hoped, 
and is still hoping to retrieve hex losses at least 
in the North, in the hinterland between the 
Caspian and the Black Seas, but even in those 
regions Germany will suffer no competitor on the 
two shores: a prohibition which will result in 
Turkey's detachment from her also; for the 
Maritza region and the Dedeagatch Railway will 
not be considered as sufficient compensation to 
Turkey for her loss of Palestine and other Holy 
Places. Meanwhile, to return to Bulgaria, Ger- 
many's presence at Constanza and at the Mouths 
of the Danube means the complete downfall of 
Bulgaria's dream and programme of supremacy 
in the Balkans. This dream, or programme was 
based upon, or rather had its cradle, on the 
Black Sea and the neighbourhood of small, not 
great Powers on its shores. a The equilibrium of 
the Black Sea » — wrote one of the theorists of 
Greater Bulgaria after the Peace of Brest Litovsk 
and Ukraine — « so long wished for, is beginning 
to become an historic reality with the advent of 
the Ukraine Republic. It is our interest that there 
be the greatest possible number of small Powers 
on the shores of the Black Sea » . But the shadow 
of mighty Germany arose and took the place of 
the other shadow — a protective one that ! — of 
whilom mighty Russia, now disappeared below 
the horizon. After the crime, complicity was to 
be shattered. 

Before leaving Rome, the good Rizov came to 
see me. He was sad and joyful at the same time. 
Sad to leave the beautiful land where an enjoy- 
able residence and ancient sympathies for Bulgaria 
had made him feel at home; joyful at the idea 
of soon attaining, arm-in-arm with von Billow, 
the ideal of Greater Bulgaria, and at the same 

— 19! - 



time vengeance against the supporters of the 
Treaty of Bucharest. « What a pity », he said on 
bidding me farewell, « that Italy has not entrusted 
herself into von Billow's hands ! » — These words 
come back to my mind to-day, after the proof of 
how Germany has treated her Allies, Bulgaria 
and Turkey, in the division of the booty. 

And I also think of the danger run by Italy on 
the threshold of the Villa of the Roses. 



— 192 — 



KANT'S HOUR 

AND THE ALLIES' HOUR. 



The history of the two Empires is falling head- 
long to its end. In the last days of September, in 
his well-known letter against those who wanted 
peace at any cost, Hindenburg urged upon the 
German people to be unyielding. In the early days 
of October, in his Message addressed to the Ger- 
man Fatherland Party, the Kaiser incited his peo- 
ple, in these extremely serious times, to gather 
resolutely round him and fight to the last breath, 
to the last drop of blood for the defence of Ger- 
many. — When the Bulgarian armistice was an- 
nounced, the German newspapers became violent 
and threatened that choice troops would be sent to 
oblige Bulgaria to rejoin the ranks of Mittel Euro- 
pa. What more } At the last meeting of the 
Christian Workmen's Syndicates, Herr Sterger- 
wald, the General Secretary, resuming Hinden- 
burg 's Note and the Kaiser's Message, exhorted 
and implored his associates to be firm and « to 
give the army time to perfect its system of de- 
fence, to multiply number of tan\s and to trans- 
form the country, during the corning winter, into 
an impregnable fortress ». But, a few days after 



193 — 

n 



these manifestations and forty-eight hours after 
the publication of the Kaiser's Message, Herr 
Herding, the Bavarian Chancellor, he who had 
shamelessly exalted the Peace of Brest Litovsk 
and that of Bucharest, and who, executing the 
orders of the Grand General Headquarters, had 
sacrificed Kuelmann to the intolerance of the Jun- 
kers, is obliged to resign and to give up his post 
to Maximilian of Baden who, as his first official 
act applies to Wilson to grant an armistice to 
Germany, precisely as Malinoff had done for 
Bulgaria. A flash of lightning is less sudden than 
this catastrophe. What, then, had happened in 
the stormy atmosphere ? 

Something had happened which can occur at a 
height of one metre and ninety centimetres, be- 
tween the ground and the branch of a tree, when 
hemp has become rope and the rope has wound 
itself in a slip-knot round the neck of a man who 
is hanging from that branch. After four years, 
the Entente's hemp has become the rope Tound 
the neck of Germany and Austria. During the 
past fortnight, all Hindenbufg's Lines have been 
demolished and passed; aM the phantasms of 
Wagner's Tetralogy, Wotan, Alberich, Siegfried, 
and the incestuous Brunnhilde are either fugitives 
or prisoners; the King of Belgium, the symbol of 
abjured and oppressed Right, re-entering the 
scene victoriously in the region between Dix- 
muyde and the Lys ; the Italians, victorious on 
the Chemin des Dames — that Chemin des Da- 
mes which like Caporetto reminds one of the ill- 
omened period of German propaganda, founded 
on corruption and treason, both in France and in 
Italy; in the East, the rapid and simultaneous 
march of General Esperey towards Sofia and of 
General Allenby on Damascus; the disarmament 



194 



of the Bulgarian army and the detachment of 
Bulgaria from the Central Empires; the disarma- 
ment of three Turkish armies, and the fall of 
Enver Pacha and his confederates; and the mi- 
litary and political surrender, preceded by the 
moral surrender of Turkey to the Entente. Mean- 
while, in the interior of Austria, the latent crisis 
of nationalities reaching its acme, to the point 
of loosening the Parties from their very last Par- 
liamentary compromise and leaving the Empire 
without a Government and at the discretion of 
its subjects ; and in the interior of Germany, the 
struggle of States in the Confederation reaching 
the point of insurrection against Prussia and the 
Kaiser, both equally dethroned before the whole 
civilized world by a Prince of Baden, become 
that of the Court Party, as a friend of Mr. Gerard, 
Chancellor by will of the Reichstag and not by 
the former United States Ambassador in Berlin 
and not as a friend of Wilhelm II. or of his son. 
And yet more ! — all the old mad theories, the 
old, aberrant theories destined to sharpen the 
brutish instinct of the race in war by the exalta- 
tion and the legitimation of the action of force 
over the idea of right, falling at one stroke, as 
by enchantment in the defeat; and, on all these 
horrors, reappearing as in the transformation 
scene of a ballet, and re -evoked in the new Chan- 
cellor's speech, who ? the old philosopher of 
Konigsberg, Emmanuel Kant, with his Pure 
Reason and his theory of human freedom. Do 
you remember } The citizens of Konigsberg used 
to set their watches by the time of Kant's daily 
walk. When Kant issued from his house it was 
mid-day. To-day Kant emerging from his house 
marks the hour to the Germans. The hour of 
defeat. 

- 195 - 



Nevertheless, so serious and so terrible has the 
experience of German bad faith been that, not- 
withstanding the first request for an armistice, 
notwithstanding the name of Kant, under whose 
aegis that request was presented, notwithstanding 
even to-day's reply to Wilson, an official reply, 
which declares that Germany does not wish to 
discuss but accepts the fourteen points of Wilson's 
speech, the Press of the Allied Nations, which 
reflects all shades of public opinion and the ideas 
of all Parliamentary Parties, shows itself neither 
at ease nor assured concerning the conduct of the 
new German Government: it suspects a supreme 
political and military snare in this sudden change 
of form ; too sudden to enable it to give credit to 
a substantial revulsion of ideas; and finds in the 
unexpected surrender rather a reason of distrust 
and fear than one of confidence and hope. Cer- 
tainly, the suggestion of the appointment of a 
mixed Commission for the purpose of negotiating 
the conditions of evacuation during the armistice 
is not a suggestion made by people who are will- 
ing to declare themselves beaten; and, on the 
contrary, may reveal a tendency to frustrate the 
plans and slacken the* tension of the armies of 
the nations of the Entente. In any case, Germany 
would indeed be too ingenuous if she were to 
suppose herself still capable of deceiving anybody 
by her masks and her disguises. And no less in- 
genuous would Austria be. 

Ever since the beginning of this war, and all 
through good and bad fortune, we have upheld the 
following argument, which was also an act of 
faith: It is not possible that three Powers, which 
disavow all the rights acquired by peoples during 
their long struggles for the vindication of their 
claims, and which are intent on annulling all the 

- 196 - 



conquests of liberty and civilization, can triumph 
over the three other Powers, France, England and 
Italy which, together, represent the glories of 
those conquests ; it is not possible that history can 
retrace its steps and that the Middle Ages, over- 
turning the stars, can suceed *o the Revolution. — 
And now that the war is nearly over, and that 
the quantity of blood which has been shed and 
the many sacrifices which have been made give 
the Allies the right to dispose of the enemy's fate 
and to impose their will upon him besides the 
weight of their sword, we are to-day even more 
convinced of the justice of our argument ; we are 
firm and assured in our faith. Therefore, with all 
the force of our soul we uphold that perilous com- 
promises are neither possible nor tolerable, whilst 
the soldiers of civilization are on their road to 
victory. It is necessary that peace should bear 
the signs of this victory and that the conditions 
of peace, in all their character and all their exten- 
sion should mean the absolute and uncontested 
triumph of civilization over barbarism. 

On one condition only can this be attained: 
that no truce be given to the enemy; that the 
means and the time be not allowed him to recu- 
perate his strength, and, as Stergerwald said, to 
reconstruct his fortress of defence. 

Does the enemy sue for peace ? Let it be given 
to him; but at once, whilst he is down. Not to- 
morrow, when he might arise again. 



- 197 — 



THE ORDER OF THE DAY STATES... 



If the Emperor — oh, lost title without a bearer ! 
— of the Dual Monarchy had had yet a little more 
patience, he would have spared himself the last 
humiliation of that Proclamation of his, addressed 
to his faithful but rebellious subjects, which will 
be handed down by history as a Proclamation of 
unavailing cowardice. What an exhibition of po- 
litical degradation ! Thus miserably ends the Aus- 
tria of the Hapsburgs : not in the midst of the 
bloodshed in which it was born, as Giosue Car- 
ducci did heir the honour to predict, but in the 
grime of an old-clothes shop, where she stores 
her gallows and her rope. Tout passe, tout casse, 
tout lasse: even the hangman's rope. Oh, ye old 
and new martyrs of Italy, Scenzi, Oberdan, Bat- 
tisti, Sauro, may your spirits be at last appeased ! 
It is the weight of your bodies, hanging for a 
century, for thirty years, for two years, that has 
snapped the rope. And you did not die in vain 
if your death has dragged Austria into the grave 
too. 

Who can deny that Austria is dead ? Dead, 
not gloriously on the battlefield, as a hero dies, 
enshrouded in her flag — be it even the black and 

- 198 - 



yellow flag of all the funerals she has imposed 
upon the Italian race — but dead, clothed in other 
peoples* rags, like a beggar in the streets. And, 
falling, she is even incapable of minding the 
decency of her attitude, of covering her head with 
the toga, Roman-like. Her existence was too base 
to allow her to try to imitate Rome's gesture. 

By this time, we are too accustomed to speak 
of Germany's iniquities in this waT, and are apt 
to forget Austria's ; thus rendering an unexpected 
service to the Vienna Ministers who, through our 
own fault, hide themselves behind the worse fame 
of those of Berlin, and continue^ unseen and unac- 
cused, in their secular work of oppression and 
suppression against those subjects of His Imperial 
Majesty who do not show their willingness to bow 
their necks under the yoke and to forget the sa- 
crifice of their brethren. Yet the disclosures made 
by the Deputies Stribrny and Ravnihar on the 
Slav and Italian concentration Camps — when 
there were still some Italians left — and on the 
Slavs in the. Austrian Army, converted into a 
very hell for them are but of 3'esterday. « Families 
spread all over the country and dispersed » — 
said Ravnihar — « children separated from their 
mothers; women scattered in exile; thousands 
and thousands of persons condemned without 
knowing why, to hunger, misery and the most 
horrible ruin... ». And, whilst all this was taking 
place, the Emperor was mumbling prayers and 
lies at the Pope's feet, in God's name ! But God 
did not believe him. 

And how could one believe him ? 

Ichthyologists have calculated that several thou- 
sand years are required to convert fresh water fish 
into salt water ones, and vice-versa. But that the 
soul of an individual or of an institution can be 

— 199 — 



changed in a single day, no one will admit or 
think possible. Marie Antoinette's hair turned 
white in a single hour. But has any one ever 
noticed that, from that hour, the pigment of the 
immovable family of the Queen who died on the 
scaffold, was also beginning to change? What 
they were at the commencement of their history, * 
such the Hapsburgs have always remained in 
governing the many races which had the misfor- 
tune of being subjected to them : covetous, ungra- 
teful, brutal, cruel; incapable of limiting or trans- 
forming or adapting themselves to the laws of 
human nature, and to the laws of social life. And 
who can seriously believe that the most inept of 
them all, Charles the Last, could limit or trans- 
form himself; he, who through no fault of his 
own was in vital and moral essence the poorest 
of a race which was in course of advanced dege- 
neration ? 

Austria sued Wilson for peace on the basis of 
the fourteen points of the historic Message. Before 
Wilson could reply, the Emperor, with the evi- 
dent aim of biassing the invoked decision, granted 
the Constitution of self-governments, calmly, in- 
nocently, as a boarder of a Young Ladies' Semi- 
nary might go to her first Communion. Was this 
serious, was this dignified on the part of those 
same individuals who, a few months before had 
forbidden the free publication of Wilson's Mes- 
sage, and had permitted it at last, expurgated of 
the passages referring to Austria and to her sub- 
jection to Prussia? Was it serious and dignified 
on the part of the same individuals who had cen- 
sored Wilson ? 

Constitution of autonomies ! Oh, caper flowers, 
budding unexpectedly, rootless and out of the 
soil ; in the crevices of a wall, shaken and totter- 



200 



ing through fear and terror ! But in Austrian earth 
are roots of real flowers of eloquence, those of 
the Ministers of the Empire. The Clam-Martiniz 
flower : « My programme is Austria ; and my 
system is that of dualism with Hungary ». — The 
Seidler flower : t< The supposition formulated in 
the question put by Herr Desinski, according to 
which the Imperial and Royal Government would 
recognize the right of peoples to dispose of them- 
selves in the peace negotiation, is simply an 
error». — The Burian flower: ((Austria's future 
lies in the fullest alliance with Germany)). This 
is a flower grown in the humus of the formula 
of the Austrian Germans : « Austria must be gov- 
erned by Germans or she will cease to exist ». — 
And with these flowers on her hat, Austria ap- 
proached Wilson smilingly, to dance the Tyro- 
lienne of her autonomies under the tree of her 
gallows, engarlanded with smiles and violets, and 
disguised for the occasion with flags and Chinese 
lanterns, as the Tree of Liberty. The least Wil- 
son could do was what he did by his Reply: to 
proceed with the Order of the Day. 

With this war, we are supposed to enter into 
the sphere of Great Democracy; and the puny 
artifices and intrigues and the little and great 
falsehoods of State and Government organizations 
of Old Europe should by now have become 
valueless and have no reason of being. To-day 
the brutish militarisms of the German race are 
falling. To-morrow the Parliamentary ambiguities 
of the Latin race should fall too. 

Also in Italy } 

Readers of the Tribuna are aware that for a 
long time I have considered Italian Parliamentary 
life as a thing lifeless and unreal). 



- 20! — 



IN THE FURROW OF VICTORY. 



Victory does not elate or exalt us. Having en- 
tered the war, Italy was fated either to win or 
disappear. To disappear under the heels of the 
Turks, the Bulgarians and the Bosnian® who had 
invaded her ? That was impossible ; therefore she 
could do nothing else hut win. To win not with- 
standing all, notwithstanding the internal plague 
of her parties invoking defeat; notwithstanding 
the external ferocity of her enemies in the field; 
to win by force of the ideals she represents, by 
the nobility of the destiny which moulded her an- 
cient history and will mould her new one ; by the 
inward virtue of her race, which no barbarian 
ignominy was ever able to corrupt or underrate; 
to win, in short, by reason of all the laws of ci- 
vilization which govern her being and which 
possess the same simplicity and the same divinity 
as Nature's indestructible laws. She won. What 
wonder ? All of us who exerted our power of per- 
suasion in favour of the war, and, despising the 
insults and the offences of the weak-minded and 
the feeble-hearted ; of the more or less deplumed 
musketeers of the two Empires still living amongst 
us and through the fierce Odyssey of three years 
of despair rather than of hope, calmly and tena- 
ciously insisted upon our first idea; all of us who 
saw with sorrow but without flinching the waver- 
ing of souls in Parliament long before the banners 

- 202 - 



wavered at Gaporetto; we were all sure of victory, 
more or less hard to attain, more or less bloody, 
more or less distant; but fated to come, like the 
alternation of the seasons ; normal, like the rythm 
of the blood in a sound human heart. 

Nothing to wonder at, therefore. After the 
Battle of the Piave, I saw our Supreme Com- 
mander, General Diaz, here in Rome, in the in- 
timacy of his home, as calm and unconcerned as 
if he had just descended from his horse after a 
morning Tide outside the Gates of Rome. — 
<( When will the offensive take place, General? » 
— I asked — « At the proper moment » , — he 
replied. — « To return on the Isonzo, or to pro- 
ceed further ? » — And he, speaking in measured 
tone, said : « Territory is the second part of my 
programme. The first is the destruction of the 
enemy's army. When we have destroyed the 
enemy's army, there will be no more limits to 
territorial conquest » . The battle which has just 
been fought is the execution of that programme. 
The Supreme Commander held the victory in his 
closed fist already, as he held his army in his 
heart when he enunciated his programme and 
was not doubtful of its success at the opportune 
moment. Austria was then binding herself in the 
most secure bonds of alliance or of vassailage 
with Germany, which defeat was to snap asunder 
so miserably and so prematurely. 

Behold, then: Italy has fulfilled the whole of 
her duty before herself and before history; and 
has accomplished all her task before her Allies 
and before humanity. Those who had hoped to 
see Italy issue from this war still humiliated, as 
in 1866, with the alms of some province ceded 
to her in a roundabout way, can put on mourning, 
or entrust their sorrow to a pastille of corrosive 



203 



sublimate. Italy emerges victoriously from this 
war by virtue of her arms; mistress of herself in 
her own home by the heroism of her trusty sons ; 
resplendent with all the lights of ideal which 
shone on the daybreak of her Revival, and shine 
to-day by reason of her war, illuminating the 
horizon of all the races living up to yesterday — 
as she herself had lived 1 in the past — in the dark 
shadow of the House of Hapsburg. By reason 
of her war. It is well to state this and to remind 
every one of it, especially to-day, when Memory 
must be the not vain and useless star which shall 
guide the Wise Men on the roads of the future. 
The war unchained by the Central Empires 
would have ended in twenty -eight days, as had 
been foreseen in the plans of the Berlin General 
Staff, if Italy had possessed a conception of the 
rights of nations different from that which her 
civilization based, as it was, on law, had 
moulded for her in centuries bygone ; or had had 
an historic sentitiveness less irritable than that 
which her political conscience could allow her to 
have. Italy's separation from the Central Empires 
was, morally, the true and great condemnation 
of their war before the civilized world; and, from 
a military point of view was the first real and 
great check for their armies, after which they 
became not so sure of victory as in their calcula- 
tions of the 4th. of August ; and much less in those 
of the future. All became unstable, all was uncert- 
ain and problematic in a war which had seemed 
to be so accurately studied, so terribly organized 
to give the greatest possible results in its sudden 
spring and in the least possible time — all, owing 
to the unexpected unknown quantity, the sudden 
x which was seen rising on the firing-line : Italy. 
That unknown quantity, that x, had in itself all 



204 



the ideal of the Allies* war, all the secret of their 
victories. What would have been the lot of the 
nations of Austria, which are now proclaiming 
their independence and their liberty, had Italy 
refrained from entering into the war and had she 
not — with her sacrifices and her noblest blood 
— macerated Austria during two long years on 
the double chain of mountains flanking the Ison- 
zo, and prevented the fusion of the German and 
Austro-Hungarian armies into a single army ; had 
she not given England time to create her army 
and her arms, and France the time to renew her 
forces and to train that sturdy group of Generals, 
which was, at last, to break and to strike down 
Prussian Militarism ? 

Now, after her victory, which integrates and 
completes that of the Allies, Italy, looking back- 
ward on the perilous sea whence she issued, can, 
with just reason, be proud of her action ; tranquil 
in her conscience for the part she has played in 
this great war of civilization, sure of the advan- 
tages that peace will bring her, in the peace she 
has worthily gained together with the Powers 
which have strenuously fought and struggled; 
high in the estimation of the peoples who have so 
nobly suffered and whose cause she espoused 
spontaneously in the hour of the greatest danger. 

Who remembers Austria any more? She is, 
by now, nought but a a nameless shame)). And 
who now thinks of Germany's dreams of supre- 
macy } Mittel Europa is nothing more than a « sad 
story )). Even the symbol of the mailed fist has 
become an implement fit to be hung up in the 
museums of ancient political rhetoric. 

In the future, an honest and loyal hand will 
suffice to lead this free Europe of ours on the open 
roads of wisdom and health. 

- 205 — 



SIGNIFER, STATUE SIGNUM. 



Battisti, Gberdan, Sauro. Last evening, whilst 
the throng was passing, acclaiming and singing, 
I saw, in the silence of my mind, and outside and 
above the vain noise, those three magnanimous 
shadows advancing through the air ait last grown 
still and bringing with them, to be enfolded in 
Rome's embrace, the symbolical forms of the 
three cities, Trent o, Trieste and Pol a, for which 
their lives were spent and for which they met a 
martyr's death. What sadness it was to think that 
among the crowd, and acclaiming and vocifera- 
ting more loudly than their neighbours, some of 
those impious and worthless individuals might 
have been found who, up to yesterday did noth- 
ing but corrupt, corrode and disunite and destroy 
the national union in the war; those individuals 
who up to yesterday did nothing but laugh at, 
deride, defame and threaten those who thought 
and struggled and suffered and died for the crea- 
tion of a Greater Italy! No: the shadows, the 
shadows only, must hover round us to-day ! The 
shadows: only they have the right to embody 
themselves in human form, and live again their 
second life in the triumph of their ideal. You, 

- 206 - 



Oberdan, Battisti, Sauro; you, precursors of the 
great deed ! And you all, soldiers of Italy, who 
have died on the bloody Calvary of the Carso, 
on the slopes of Oslavia or of the Sette Comuni ; 
on the peaks of the Kuk or of the Pasubio ; on the 
Mouths of the Timavo, or on the banks of the 
Piave ! And you too, who, wounded and mutilat- 
ed during three years of battling : sacred remnants 
of beauteous Youth, living trophies of the great- 
est honour of our history and of orur race ! You, 
you only are worthy to celebrate, under Rome's 
skies, the solemn rites of the ancient Fatherland, 
now reconstituted according to the law and the 
terms that Rome has marked out for her. 

For, whet has taken place yesterday is not only 
— think of it ! — a great political and military 
event of the European war, but is the greatest 
event that has been accomplished in European 
history for two thousand years; and it has been 
accomplished by the effort and the enterprise of 
those same Italic races which the barbarian in- 
vasions, breaking through the) boundary esta- 
blished by Julius Caesar on the Alps bearing his 
great name, seemed as if they would submerge 
and destroy; but which to-day, instead, have risen 
again in defence of themselves and of all hu- 
manity. 

The history of Rome, interrupted for two thou- 
sand years, resumes to-dav its grand regal course, 
after having subdued and dispersed the descen- 
dants of the barbarians who in this war made the 
last attempt to overthrow the ensigns of Rome 
in European civilization and plant on the ruins 
the ensigns of Arminius; of that Arminius of 
whom the Kaiser believed and declared he was 
the latest incarnation sent upon earth for the 
definitive glory and rule of the German races. 

— 207 _ 



Europe lost her stable equilibrium when Italy 
lost her Roman boundaries. But she has found 
to-dav, and will recover to-morrow, this stable 
equilibrium solely because Italy has, at last, at- 
tained and conquered her Roman boundaries, and 
will retain them in the future. 

Only the brutish minds of mean political hucks- 
ters were incapable, in this country, of listening 
to or understanding the great significance that the 
Italian war had in the European war, and could 
therefore brand and discredit as rhetorical echoes 
of the 1848 period, the agitations for the redemp- 
tion of Trent o and Trieste; and. worse still, 
brand as treasonable the rupture of the Alliance 
with the Central Empires, the nations which, 
like the first Huns descended on the plains to 
devastate the fields and the rights of their foes, 
to gather booty and to destroy everything that is 
sacred or useful to civilized communities :, all of 
which is there to demostrate that, among that 
political class of individuals, the historic sense 
was not more highly developed than the moral 
sense. Yet, all the Italian tradition, all the Italian 
history, all the tragedy of the Italian soul during 
long centuries was gravitating towards this war, 
which only those who had estranged themselves 
from, or had become refractory to the national 
tradition could strive to avert or deviate. Was it 
not an Italian of the true Italic race, a warrior and 
a political genius of the Caesarian stamp who 
said that the Julian Alps were more necessary to 
Italy's defence than Lombardy itself ? And were 
not all the political leaders and all the Captains 
of our Risorgimento, of our national Revival, 
unanimous in proclaiming this supreme necessity 
and in bequeathing to the future generations the 
task to be accomplished ? And what was that 

— 208 — 



ceaseless thirst, that fever, that ardour of the cities 
subjected to foreign yoke, and which although 
under no apprehension for material existence 
which was easy and secure, were constantly 
writhing under the pain of being separated from 
the Mother Country, but the physical torment of 
the vital organs of a great organism disposed in 
the function of defence by the very reason of their 
original constitution and diverted from this fun- 
ction by violence ? 

The unification of Italy once set going, it was 
sooner or later destined either to be definitely ac- 
complished in all its parts or definitely to break 
up into fragments once more. During periods of 
transition, whilst all the nations of Europe were 
displaced from their bases, diverted from their 
aims and consequently disconcerted in their ac- 
tion, Italy, maimed and imperfect, may have 
resisted, by leaning on enemies who themselves 
needed time to arm and prepare for their war — 
indeed, they were preparing and arming them- 
selves even against her — ; but this period of 
transition over, nothing remained to her but to 
take up her position and follow her road: the 
road which was to lead her to the form and set- 
tlement which Rome had given her. In the Con- 
stitution of Augustus, Italy was divided into 
twelve Regions, of which Venetia with Trieste 
and Istria constituted the Tenth; whilst Rome 
herself was the Twelfth. Yesterday, after a long 
and heavy storm, and by virtue of the new fight- 
ing armies of the Third Italy, the Constitution of 
Augustus was finally re-integrated. We have noth- 
ing further to do but to ascend the Capitol and 
render thanks to Rome's most ancient Deities. 

On the eve of the declaration of war, I had the 
honour to pen the following words : 

— 209 — 



(( Before the Government speaks, before the 
Army acts, we, free writers, who express the soul 
of our race in our words, and with our word dis- 
appear without even the glory that belongs to the 
soldier who is the first to set his foot on the con- 
tested territory, we wish to proclaim, in the face 
of the world that our war is a just and holy one. 
Just and holy: this is the proclamation that must 
call together all the sons of Italy for the achieve- 
ment of the great enterprise... ». 

Such as the proclamation was, so will the 
judgement of history be: a judgement which will 
exalt the glory of the accomplished enterprise. 



— j\ ■• — 



FOR ITALY, AFTER THE VICTORY. 



The story, then, is this: At the most critical 
moment of the European war, when, thanks to 
their exuberant military strength, there were nine- 
ty chances to a hundred' that the Central Empires 
would crush the Powers of the Entente, Italy, 
following the law of her civilization, which does 
not admit of criminal treaties, separated herself 
from the Central Empires to which she had been 
bound by a treaty which had lasted for thirty 
years; she proclaimed her neutrality; she armed 
herself rapidly, as best she could, and then enter- 
ed the war. She remained in the field for three 
years, fighting the fiercest of battles — battles 
against armed mountains — sacrificing in them 
the choicest flower of her race; spending — a 
thing which seems inevitable in war — from sixty 
to seventy thousand millions, out of the eighty 
thousand at which her wealth — or her poverty — 
has been calculated. After various vicissitudes, 
some sorrowful, others joyful, by the genius of 
her military leaders and the valour of her soldiers, 
she obtained, at last, one of the greatest victories 
which history records, totally destroying the 
enemy's army. Having brought the war to lan 

- 211 — 



end with such a victory, it would seem (would it 
not 7) that she should be entitled to gather the 
fruits accruing frorn it, as generally happens 
whenever one Power overthrows another in war; 
and that all, friends or indifferent spectators, 
should have been glad to Tecogmize this right of 
hers, which, after all, is a primitive, elementary 
right, undisputed and indisputable at all times 
and in every latitude. But, behold ! The Austrian 
army once beaten and Austria herself broken up, 
Italy sees arising before her some old banners, 
some old instruments of old Austria which are 
claiming neither more nor less than to divide with 
her the fruits of the victory which they, themsel- 
ves, up to the day before had disputed with her. 
Undoubtedly, all this is strange and ridiculous, as 
strange and ridiculous as it would be if, for ins- 
tance, the German Austrians were to claim from 
France a portion of Alsace-Lorraine in exchange 
for the service which they rendered her, by fight- 
ing with cannon and machine guns by the side 
of the German army, as the well-known telegram 
from ex -Charles I. to ex-Wilhelm II, said. It is 
thus that, on the epic poem of the last few days, 
is engrafted a comedy or a farce. But, what of to- 
morrow ? 

I know: there is Yugoslavia to be thought of; 
there is revolution in Austria, and the dislocation 
of the various races which were once united under 
the crown of the Hapsburgs; and there are also 
Wilson's principles and his Notes. Let us leave 
Yugoslavia and the Austrian revolution to their 
future destiny, but are those who speak so loudly 
about Wilson's principles and about his Notes 
quite sure of having read them and of remember- 
ing them now ? 

Let us read again some of these Notes. 

__ 212 - 



Those who have an interest in embroiling Wil- 
son's cards to the prejudice of Italy, are making 
a great confusion between the juridico-political 
standing of the Yugo-Slavs and that of the Czecho- 
slovaks during the war and in the revolution, or 
worse, are identifying them. But such a confusion 
is not permissible and identification is absolutely 
out of the question after merely reading Wilson's 
Reply to Austria, dated the 19th. of October, in 
which the difference of position between the Yugo- 
Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks is so clearly and pre- 
cisely laid down as to render any misrepresenta- 
tion or falsification absolutely impossible. A dif- 
ference, this, not uselessly or vainly stated, if it 
be true that every word and every idea of the 
President have a significance and an influence 
which no one will dare to divert from the straight 
path of justice and honesty. 

In that Reply, then, is said: 

« Since the sentence was written and uttered 
to the Congress of the United States, the Govern- 
ment of the United States has recognized that a 
state of belligerency exists between the Czecho- 
slovaks and the German- Austro-Hungarian Em- 
pires and that the Czecho-Slovak National Council 
is a de jacto belligerent Government clothed with 
proper authority to direct the military and poli- 
tical affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks. It has also 
recognized in the fullest manner the justice of 
the nationalistic aspirations of the Yugo-Slavs 
for freedom ». 

Thus, the Czecho-Slovaks who, during the war, 
and in Austria's very bosom have created an 
army, a policy, a Government in opposition to 
Austria and to Germany, are recognized as bel- 
ligerents. On the other hand, a simple recogni- 
tion of the justice of the national aspirations of the 

— 213 - 



YugoSlavs who, during the war, or better still, 
up to the end of the war have done nothing more 
than issue programmes and deliver speeches on 
Yugoslavia, and only a few of them have done 
that, whereas the rest continued fighting faith- 
fully and fiercely by Austria's side, and more 
especially against Italy. 

Now, it would be quite natural that, owing to 
their different position, the Czech o-Slovaks 
should be considered by the Powers of the En- 
tente, as they effectively are, as Allies, because 
their standing is that of belligerents; whilst the 
Yugo-Slavs should be considered as aspirants, 
and nothing more than aspirants to the protection 
of the Powers of the Entente, until such time as 
they have constituted their State and given it the 
direction which the Czecho -Slovaks have already 
given to theirs. But what is happening instead? 
That, whilst the Yugo-Slavs are aspiring to the 
Entente's protection, they are enjoying, on the 
contrary, the protection of Austria herself, and 
by the expiring Austria are considered as the 
heirs to her flag, to her fleet and to her position 
on the Adriatic ; they, who have never been, nor 
are now capable of becoming a maritime nation 
— strange prodigy of a people which is God's 
elect and the Devil's at one and the same time; 
equally dear to the Liberals of the Entente and 
to the Reactionaries of Austria, one cannot under- 
stand why; or, rather one can understand only 
too well, unless Italians, during the war, together 
with the blood of their sons have also lost the 
brains of their fathers. 

Meanwhile, these Croatians, in the name of 
Austria, are to prevent that like Trieste and Pola, 
Fiurne should be re-united to her Motherland, 
Italy, and with Fiume, Zara and all the remainder 

- 214 - 



which is Italian and lives and will ever live as 
Italian on the opposite shore of the Adriatic. But 
Wilson's Law speaks plainly. 

In Wilson's Law there is a Commandment 
which says: 

« The Nations must freely dispose of their fate, 
according to the principle of nationality » . — On 
the basis of this principle, who can say that Fiu- 
me and Zara are not Italian cities ? And who will 
prevent that, being Italian cities, they, according 
to their expressed will shall be re-united to Italy ? 
If one can discuss upon and doubt of the will of 
any people, one cannot discuss or cast the least 
doubt upon the will of the citizens of Fiume and 
Zara; so fully and so religiously expressed (their 
open plebiscite has assumed the form of a real 
national consecration) on the appearance of the 
Italian flag and Italian troops. It is not a question 
of mysteries, hypotheses or presumption now; 
any one who wishes, can see for himself. And I 
should like to address a special request to Mr. 
Nelson Page, the illustrious Ambassador of the 
United States in Rome, to go personally and 
collect evidence, and more than evidence, the 
plebiscites of those Italian cities, and afterwards 
truly and faithfully report to President Wilson. 
The ignoble Croatian agitation would thus be 
judged and definitely condemned at the same 
time. 

And here, for the present, I stop. 

No one can doubt the sincerity of Italy's equi- 
table intentions in regard to peace. No one can, 
without obvious bad faith, attribute to her any 
iniquitous intention of being overbearing towards 
others, as this is contrary to the spirit and the 
tendencies of her policy. And therefore no one 
should, now, attempt to create ambiguities which 

- 215 - 



may one day become the cause of trouble to Italy. 
President Wilson's pronouncement demands that 
no new elements of discord and antagonism, 
which may be capable of disturbing the peace in 
the future be created between nations. It is im- 
perative scrupulously to comply with that lofty 
pronouncement, which was. the ensign of victory, 
if the Peace Congress is to be approached with 
hands and souls purged of iniquity. Italy will 
certainly comply with it to the letter. Let others, 
great or small, comply with it likewise, and also 
with minds relieved of old and new ideas of more 
or less disguised European imperialism. 

To continue the game of mean pre-war politics 
which consisted of making small and weak States 
the instruments of great and strong ones, against 
near or distant neighbours, would be worse than 
an error: it would be a vulgarity unworthy of 
history. 



- 216 



THE END OF A TABOO. 



No one, either in Germany, in Austria or in 
Hungary wishes to assume, now, the slightest 
responsibility for the lost war. The new men 
whom defeat has carried to the government of 
those countries are cursing the old ones who are 
foundering together with the ambitions of the 
dethroned monarchs. The Press, which encour- 
aged the folly of the dethroned monarchs and of 
their Ministers, is now groaning and humbly im- 
ploring alms of bread and dishonour from the 
enemy which, in the hour of invasion, it pitilessly 
insulted. The last of the Hapsburgs, descending 
from his throne, is reminding those who were not 
his subjects, or the subjects of his ancestors, that 
he is not to blame for the war, which he found 
amongst the appendages of his succession. Max 
of Baden is announcing to the world that Ger- 
many emerges from the war, victorious at least 
over herself; for she has learnt, at last, that the 
principles which guided her moral and political 
existence during the forty years of the Hohen- 
zollerns' rule, are false; and that force cannot 
subjugate right, but right can subjugate force. 
Also: Erzberger and Schiedmann, the two offi- 

- 217 — 



ciants, one donning a black tie, the other a red 
one, are standing at the Emperor's side; in the 
name of Catholicism and in the name of Social- 
ism, and are bowing their head's over the error 
of the war which they encouraged for four 
long years with their speeches and with their 
propaganda, at home and abroad. What more? 
The author of « Solitary Souls »., Gerard Haupt- 
mann, and other writers and literary men, in a 
melancholy Manifesto are finally apprizing the 
German people that « with a clear and terrible 
logic, God's designs have triumphed over the 
designs of man », and are inciting the Germans 
towards the love and no more towards the hatred 
of human kind; thus annulling, simultaneously, 
the work of the Kaiser's Alter Gott and that of 
the literary men who wrote on the war and so 
gaily exerted themselves to encourage the des- 
truction of men and women and even of stones in 
conquered regions. When, then, will the mea 
culpa towards Italy and the Italians be uttered ? 
For the whole of the political and literary acti- 
vity of the Germans during the war has been, 
with equal intensity and in equal measure directed 
against England and against Italy. Against En- 
gland, which was pointed out and indicted as the 
instigator of the war; against Italy which by 
means of the most iniquitous falsifications of the 
Treaty of Alliance was reviled and slandered as 
the traitress par excellence, as sold for a price 
(the price can be seen, now, that attempts are 
being made to deprive her even of the fruits of 
victory !) to the Powers of the Entente. And yet, 
all that is now being said and written in the 
countries which up to yesterday constituted the 
Central Empires against the war and against the 
men who willed 1 it, completely demolishes the 



218 



accusation® against Italy. If the war was a crime ; 
if it was the adventure of a group of nefarious 
individuals bereft of mind and conscience; if it 
was the work of Statesmen who betrayed their 
mission and the interests of their peoples, should 
not Italy, which refused to associate herself to the 
crime and was, for that refusal, accused of trea- 
son by those who wanted her to be their accom- 
plice; should not Italy, I say, by means of public 
manifestations and public thanks be declared to 
have well merited of humanity, in those very 
countries and by those very peoples which are 
now accusing their ex-Emperors and their ex- 
Statemen as common criminals? 

Italy is awaiting this public apology if it be 
true that the German soul is changed and that 
defeat has rendered Germans reasonable and ca- 
pable of distinguishing truth from falsehood, 
reality from fantasy, justice from iniquity and, 
like Ibsen's characters on the verge of despair, 
capable of making a public confession and expia- 
tion of their sins. 

Such confession and expiation should serve to 
quieten the agitated souls of those who at home, 
here, were opposed to the Italian war for the 
same reasons, or rather, owing to the same accu- 
sations advanced by the German propaganda, 
that is, of Italy's treachery towards Germany and 
Austria and of the price of the treason agreed 
upon with the Entente. 

We made war whilst in full internal discord, 
by reason, precisely of those accusations which 
Germany was disseminating and which her faith- 
ful adherents were picking up, sad and grieved, 
or pretending to be, for the Fatherland's dishon- 
our, for her faithlessness to her treaties, and 
her disloyalty to loyal Allies. It can be truly said 



219 



that never was a war more laboriously carried on 
and more laboriously opposed in the interior than 
ours, which, considered by some as iniquitous 
and immoral, was destined in the end by contrast 
and by the defeated enemy's own qualification, 
to appear as the noblest and purest war recorded 
by the history of man. According to those who, 
during the German victories were not ashamed 
of calling themselves pro-German in hatred of 
their other countrymen who had wanted the rup- 
ture of the Alliance and then the war, this war 
of ours was a folly, a folly which reached the 
most extreme and unavowable consequences. The 
writer of these lines, on listening to and noting 
all the movements and the accents of Italian civil 
discord, pervaded by the German propaganda, 
was often fain to watch on the faces of many 
Italians, especially after Caporetto, the folly which 
Dante saw on the face of Sapia of Siena, in the 
Second Circle of Purgatory: 

That thou mayst own I now deceive thee not, 
Hear, if my folly were not as I speaj^ it. 
When now my years sloped waning down the 

arch, 
It so bechanced, my fellow-citizens 
Near Colle met their enemies in the field; 
And I prayed to God to grant what He had willed 
There were they vanquished, and betook them- 
selves 
Unto the bitter passages of flight, 
I marked the hunt; and waxing out of bonds 
In gladness, lifted up my shameless brow... (1) 



(I) E Perche tu non credi ch'io t'ingaani 
Odi 8e fui, com'io ti dico, folle, 
Gia discendendo i'arco dei miei anni. 
Eran li cittadini miei presso a Colle 
In campo giunti coi loro avversari, 



- 220 — 



Now, it is said, we are all brothers again (a 
state of affairs which for me has no great impor- 
tance as I have arranged to be relieved of a 
funeral procession at my death), and we are all 
convinced of not being sons of an adulterous 
Mother. Now that even the enemy has proclaimed 
to the world that the war he waged was an error 
of his mind, an aberration of his conscience and 
a crime in his history, it is to be hoped that 
these truths, upon which we have vainly striven 
to collect the unanimous consent of public opi- 
nion, be no longer arguments for discussion; so 
useless would it be to leave the corpse of war 
controversies without a burial. Now that, finally 
a taboo has been cast into the abyss, what is 
wanting to the inextinguishable superstition of a 
sceptical people like us } Are we, perchance, to 
create another: after the German taboo, the 
Yugoslavian taboo ? 

It would be the very last humiliation. 



Ed io pregava Dio di quel ch'ei voile. 
Rotti fur quivi, e volti negli amari 
Passi di fuga, e veggendo la caccia 
Letizia presi a tutte altre dispari... 

DANTE. Purgatorio, Canto XIII. 
English version by Henry Francis Cary. 



_ 221 — 



ON THE ROAD TO VERSAILLES. 



The Meeting of Ministers in London is now 
over, and the official Communique has announced 
to the three nations of the Entente the agreement 
arrived at between their respective representatives 
on the questions which have been discussed by 
them. Which questions? We are totally ignorant 
of the Order of the Day. What agreement has 
been arrived at, and according to which standards, 
or principles, or compromises ? We are still in the 
dark, and the doors of the room which had the 
honour to entertain History for forty-eight hours 
are as discreet as the lips of the Ministers them- 
selves. Complete silence, therefore. Diplomacy 
abhors newspaper reports; and for this reason, 
perhaps, it precipitates itself from time to time 
into the tragedy of War. 

In the mean time, we will continue to discuss 
on our own account and in the dust which we 
poor mortals are made of, the Italian questions 
which victory ought to have solved, but which, 
it is stated, victory has more than ever compli- 
cated. Was it really a victory, ours, which ended 
with the destruction of the Austrian army and 
with General Diaz's Bulletin which the Munici- 

— 222 — 



pality of Rome has hastened to engrave on mar- 
ble and consecrate in the annals of the Capitol ? 
I am beginning to doubt it. Oh, Italians have 
certainly found out, since the Battle of Vittorio 
Veneto, that they are encumbered with seven or 
eight hundred thousand more prisoners, between 
Hungarians and Croatians, who have to be fed 
— a misfortune which sometimes happens in the 
exercise of human compassion — but they have 
not yet found out that the ships belonging to the 
enemy's Fleet have been transferred from Pola 
to Venice, as always happens to a nation after 
victory, and as happened to our Allies who saw 
the ships of the German Fleet — much more 
numerous than the Austrian one — being trans- 
ferred from Kiel to Rosyth Bay. Evidently for 
Italy, and according to some inscrutable Book of 
Destiny, the effects of victory must be different 
to those which fall to the lot of other nations, 
friends or Allies, scattered all over this revolving 
Globe. Anyhow, the fact is this : the Italian Vic- 
tory was not born free, and not even independent ; 
in short, she was not born with wings on, as the 
fancy of man has ever created her and ornamented 
her with. She was born mutilated and with a rope 
round her ankles; with a tutor and a pedagogue 
at her elbow. She does not, and cannot move a 
step, by what it seems, without the permission 
and the advice of her venerable keepers ; she 
cannot even hold out her arms which, in the very 
midst of war, some of her Italians to whom con- 
siderate foreigners had lent the opportune weap- 
ons, have lopped off. And thus, with the rope 
round her ankles and her pedagogue at her side, 
she sets out on her journey towards the supreme 
Councils of Versailles. 

(( With what sentiments are you going to Ver- 

- 223 - 



sailles } » asked the speaker of the Socialist Party 
to Signor Orlando, during the last two ill-starred 
sittings of the Italian Parliament. And Signor Or- 
lando, amidst the applause of the Assembly, 
replied : « With perfectly Italian sentiments » . — 
Perfectly Italian? Ah, had the Premier said: 
« With the same sentiments as the English and 
the French »_, we might have been, and might 
have declared ourselves satisfied and re-assured. 
But that (( Italian sentiment » , said so crudely and 
simply, falls upon you like a chill from Siberia. 
Because, you see, that Italian sentiment is, alas, 
the sentiment of this or that passer-by; and it 
may happen that to-day, for instance, it is the 
sentiment of a democrat, to-morrow that of a 
humanitarian, that of a Yugo-Slav or of a Thessa- 
lonian, or, why not ? even that of a Mormon. We 
have never discovered that there exists an Italian 
sentiment, or that it has shown itself during the 
war, as a sentiment with precise characteristics of 
its own, differentiating it from others, as coal 
and diamond have their own characteristics which 
distinguish them from other minerals, whether in 
the bowels of the earth or in the open sunshine, 
and are convertible into ashes or into jewels ; no, 
we have never discovered it, except amongst our 
little soldiers, in the midst of the blood-stained 
rocks of the Carso and of the Grappa; on the 
banks of the Isonzo and of the Piave, and in the 
ships on the still bitter Adriatic. Politically, Ita- 
lian sentiment, notwithstanding Signor Orlando's 
eloquence, is yet « a butterfly which has failed 
to take on its perfect form » ; something poor and 
changeable, a thing which is vagula and blandula, 
which friends and enemies play with, alternately, 
as the cat does with a mouse, finally snapping 
it up suddenly by the tail and swallowing it. Do 

— 224 — 



you not see ? It does not even put out its claws 
after victory, and seems so happy and contented 
to remain what it is ! 

At one time, German propaganda, with the 
intent to discredit the Italian war in the Old and 
New Hemispheres propagated, by means of all 
its organs, this remarkable story: « The Italian 
war is an imperialistic war » . And owing to the 
easy success which propaganda always obtains 
when directed against Italians and Italian affairs, 
the remarkable story actually reached the mark 
to which it was directed, and from neutral count- 
ries it passed to Allied ones ,and from these to 
Italy, where, as a matter of course, it found open 
arms to receive it, not only amongst opponents 
of the war, but, worse still, at the proper moment, 
amongst the war's most inflamed advocates and 
supporters. For, not only amongst friendly stran- 
gers, but also amongst our own compatriots, the 
most common and practical way to show and 
express love for Italy is precisely that of placing 
one's self with one's sentiments, on the side of 
Italy's enemies. The reasons, the aspirations, the 
interests, even the most equivocal and knavish, 
of Italy's enemies are always justified, defended 
and protected by our friends, our Allies, and by 
many of our own countrymen — for the love of 
Italy ! Like those lovers who, in their fits of 
jealousy, kill their sweethearts, so these indivi- 
duals or aggregates of individuals cannot show 
their affection towards Italy otherwise than with 
a weapon pointed at her breast. I have not yet 
found a friend of Italy, or an Italian who loves his 
own country, with the whim, the fancy, the ori- 
ginality of considering as damaging to Italy any 
action committed or any event adopted or ac- 
complished by our enemies or our rivals. When 

- 225 - 



it is a question of Italy, all become — those who 
love her, of course — puritans, bashful, mysti- 
cal; and make use of the jeweller's balance to 
weigh their pure principles, and 1 of the flaming 
sword of the law to cut the knot of the most 
simple questions. Oh, it really cannot be said that 
Italy is corrupted by the love of her adorers and 
of her sons. And I do not despair of seeing, on 
some future day, emerging from the State Ar- 
chives of Old Austria, some document or other 
which will demonstrate howl Conrad and his 
Archduke plotted their* aggression at the time 
of the Calabrian earthquake, during the Alliance, 
merely to please Italy. Love's manifestations are 
indeed varied and surprising ! 

What is, at bottom, the reason why some En- 
glishmen and Frenchmen, and also several Ita- 
lians have espoused — as it is called — the cause 
of Yugoslavia, if not that- of Italy's tranquillity ? 
And what is the reason why they wish that Italy 
should, at the very least, share with Yugoslavia, 
in pectoris rather than in fieri, the fruits of her 
victory, if not that of ensuring her real security 
in the future ? Offering one's keys to burglars is 
certainly a splendid way of insuring one's house 
against theft ! And placing one's family in con- 
tact with madmen, is also a fine method of assur- 
ing its tranquillity ! 

It is therefore to be hoped that the Ministers 
of the Entente Powers who have met in London, 
have adopted, in the discussion of Italian quest- 
ions, different ideas from those which have been 
and still are adopted in Press controversies by 
Italy's friends. It is to be hoped that Italy's rights 
have been considered and respected not as those 
of a Power which is prepared to accept a peace 
of compromise or of bargaining; but as those of 

- 226 - 



a Power which has conquered peace by means 
of victory, and which will never, in any case and 
under any condition or form, consent that situat- 
ions similar to those which have brought on the 
war shall ever be again created. 

Italy has made her war for the Adriatic; and 
victory cannot but secure her the absolute and 
complete dominion of that sea. Whoever shall 
attempt, for any reason whatsoever, to lessen or 
curtail this dominion, is Italy's enemy. Nor let 
it be said that the Pact of London is sufficient to 
safeguard Italy's interests in the Adriatic: it 
would be making an erroneous statement, and, 
more than erroneous, it would be a factious one: 
firstly, because the Pact of London pre-supposes 
the defeat of Austria-Hungary, but not her dis- 
memberment and dissolution; and, secondly, be- 
cause at the time when the Pact of London was 
drawn up, Yugoslavia was non-existent in the 
negotiations between the Powers of the Entente. 
That Pact, therefore, cannot constitute a barrier 
and an obstacle to the complete claims of Italy's 
rights, which have been consecrated by her vic- 
tory ; it merely represents the minimum of Italy's 
claims in the conclusion of the conditions of war ! 
The victory has in itself created a new situation 
which it would be iniquitous in others not to 
recognize, and foolish on our part not to make 
the most of, in all its extension and all its law- 
fulness. 

Is it not enough to have lost the debtor in the 
war > Should we also abandon into other peoples' 
hands the inheritance which is waiting to be ta- 
ken up, and which, after all, is also our very 
own? 

In order to effect a similar ignominy, it would 
be necessary to create a new Code of International 
Law to the sole detriment of Italy. 

— 227 - 



ITALY AND HER ALLIES. 



Up to a certain point — and only up to a cert- 
ain point — our Allies are not in the wrong in 
treating us as they are doing, after victory. Si- 
gnor Martini, with a final phrase which summed 
up the whole situation, once determined the fall 
of a Cabinet — the Rudini-Nieotera Cabinet — 
which, after having resigned and having vainly 
sought to replace a Finance Minister in order to 
effect its own recomposition, presented itself 
before Parliament to ask for a Vote of confidence. 
Signor Martini said: « I cannot give a Vote of 
confidence to a Cabinet which, by resigning, has 
shown that it has no confidence in itself ». This 
is what our Allies, smiling in diverse ways, tell 
us; or, what is worse, look as if they would like 
to tell us, every time the so-called Adriatic quest- 
ion comes up for discussion. — a But we cannot 
be more Adriatic than you are ! » — And they 
remind us then, of all the toasts, the dinners, the 
treaties and the embraces — Oh, Folleville ! — 
of the Italian emissaries of the Yugoslav propa- 
ganda with the Yugoslav emissaries throughout 
the whole wide world. Who has ever heard of 
these emissaries 1 Only now we are learning a 

— 228 — 



few of their illustrious names. Who had ever 
imagined, or could ever imagine that the Italian 
Army List contained in its pages the name of 
that General who has been giving kingdoms 
away so freely on the banks of the Thames } And 
who knows how many there are of his stamp, 
of whose deeds and words in our ignorance, we 
know nothing. It would therefore be expedient 
that, at some future day, some one should enlight- 
en us, and should speak to us of these, our real 
heroes and exhibit in public the passports which 
have facilitated their journey beyond foreign 
Custom-houses and towards immortality. 

Undoubtedly, some serious events must have 
taken place during a certain period of time — 
the period immediately following Caporetto — 
serious events which we are unable to discover 
without the aid, perhaps, of the foreigners who 
witnessed them and assisted at them. Certainly, 
during that period, there happened a striking 
exodus of Italians who, despairing of saving Italy 
on the Piave, rushed in a furious hurry to save 
her in Paris and London, accompanied, of course, 
by Austria's best and most faithful servants. If 
they had not all become Balillas (1) to hurl the 
stone which was not always handy, Italy's sons 
had all become so many Macchiavellis. They 
were all going about undertaking legations and 
embassies; and they were all carrying with them 
some little thing under their arm: this one, a 
Curzolar Island; another, a piece of the Dalma- 
tian Coast; a third, a portion of the Istrian Coast, 
and so on, to offer to friends and enemies in 
order to propitiate some mercy in favour of the 



(1) Giovan Battista Perasso, afterwards surnamed Balilla, a street-boy 
of Genoa who, in 1746, by throwing a stone gave the first signal of the 
insurrection which ended with the expulsion of the Austrians from that city. 

— 229 — 



poor broen-down Country, which would never rise 
again. And the Allies, who do not always un- 
derstand our language, showed that they greatly 
relished the Yugoslav tongue spoken by our 
extraordinary legates and ambassadors of peace 
and anarchy. And even now, after so much 
victory, they still feign to ignore Greater Italy 
and 1 the Government which represents her, and 
appear as if they were always negotiating with 
those wandering ambassadors. But the misunder- 
standing is not without danger, for everyone. 

Certainly, our Allies show a very superficial 
proof of their philosophy if they think to see 
aright, far and near, by gazing on the world with 
eyes accustomed to look upon joyful events only. 
And they also show a still more superficial proof 
of their psychological experience if they think 
that they know Italy, or have gained a knowledge 
of her through that hundred or so of known or 
obscure commercial travellers of universal demo- 
cracy who, late and hurriedly, in disagreement 
with or despite the wish of the Minister of Fo- 
reign Affairs — himself guilty of not wanting to 
unbend before the exigencies of every-day reality 
— the various Bureaus of Propaganda have sent 
round Europe ; with what success and what results 
everyone now learns and understands. But Italy, 
it is well to state at once, Italy is another matter. 
Italy is a country of forty millions of inhabitants 
which neither that hundred or so of commercial 
travellers of universal democracy, nor the five 
hundred deputies of national democracy have the 
capacity of understanding and representing. Tho- 
se forty millions of inhabitants constitute a nation 
exercising a much more severe discipline and 
possesisng a much more tenacious and profound 1 
virtue than the thoughtlessness and the fatuity 

— 230 — 



of her Statesmen may cause to suspect : discipline 
and virtue of which, after so many centuries of 
expectation, our brethren of Trent and Trieste 
and of all the shores on the opposite side of the 
Adriatic, proud and staunch in their Italianhood, 
now, as they were in the times of Venice and 
Rome, are giving an admirable example: the 
golden material of our history upon which our 
race has impressed its divine and indelible mark 
to differentiate it from all the surrounding Bar- 
barians. And do our Allies of yesterday — and 
we should also like to add of to-morrow — think 
that they can so lightly jest with this nation of 
forty millions of ancient Latin souls and minds; 
and now that danger is over, pretend they can 
put her on one side and sacrifice her rights and 
hopes to the fancies of their pleasant ideologists 
as well as to the interests of our roughest and 
most dishonest enemies ? Let the French Govern- 
ment, of its own accord, if the Italian Govern- 
ment in its pastoral sentimentality has not thought 
fit to do so, inform itself why certain French tor- 
pedo-boats go from Corfu to Spalato and Zara 
on purpose to hob-nob with the Croatians; and 
then let it judge for itself whether it was truly 
for this, that from « Quarto's fatal Rock » Italy's 
war was proclaimed, by France's side, when 
France had been attacked and invaded ! In truth, 
more than offended, we are astonished and per- 
turbed by this sudden darkening of our Allies' 
mind, which we believed to be illuminated by so 
vivid a light of gentleness and love after such a 
terrible misfortune ! But, for all that, our soul is 
still sufficiently strong to bear the weight of these 
and other leaves which we expect to see falling 
plentifully from the tree of our illusions. 

— 231 - 



Certainly, the behaviour of the French Navy 
on the Adriatic has astounded all who thought 
they had the right to believe in France's changed 
sentiments towards Italy, after the common war, 
Perhaps they did not believe in an ultra-placid 
change, but they never thought of a storm ! And 
a real storm is that which the French sailors and 
their superior and inferior officers are exciting 
in the minds of our Dalmatian brethren, with 
wordb and actions which uphold and spur on all 
the crimes of Yugoslav scoundrelism. But we 
should like to prevent our Allies from committing 
another mistake: that of alienating from them- 
selves, without glory, the minds of forty millions 
of Italians. All they can see, at the present mo- 
ment of triumph, are three shattered Empires 
and, worse, three immense catastrophes of peo- 
ples without a State. But Anarchy is never, at all 
times, and in all countries, more than a passing 
phenomenon. Human life tends to unity. And, 
sooner or later, all this dust of nations, which is 
spread between the Ural Mountains and the 
Rhine and the Danube will resume form and 
figure once more and will also resume its inter- 
rupted journey along the path of history. Minds 
are now fleeter than years. And germs which, 
in other periods of human civilization, required 
a whole century, now require at most a decade 
to mature and fructify. If our Allies were to look 
into the future with piercing eyes, they would 
see that Italy, from the Brenner Pass to the last 
Dalmatian shore constitutes not only for herself, 
but for the whole of civilized Europe, a rampart 
which will repel the impetus of still inevitable 
irruptions. 

But what is the use of making conjectures, 
now ? Now there is singing and drinking in Vic- 



232 



tory's honour. And it is quite natural, after the 
long silence and the long agony of the trenches. 
But it would be well, in the midst of joy fulness, 
to avoid stepping on the edge of the Past. 



233 — 



OUR PRINCIPLES AND THE AIMS 
OF OTHERS. 



After three years and half of war, after the 
shedding of so much blood, and 1 the expenditure 
of so many thousand millions, and after the at- 
tainment of such a victory, we, good Italians are, 
morally, at the same point where we were before 
these serious and terrible things happened; and 
still the substance of our soul continues to move 
and dissolve itself in the vessel of our humanity 
every time it is shaken by a strange hand. Ah, 
our right ? Oh, we must first hear what the bro- 
ker of such and such a friendly nation thinks of 
it. It would seem, on the contrary, as if he had 
some good reasons to show that we are in the 
wrong. What of our boundary } Oh, we must not 
overlook the observations which the merchant of 
such another friendly country has to submit to 
our consideration, in order to save us from present 
worries and future dangers. — Thus the segments 
of our backbone, not properly bound in their 
ligaments, are dancing a furious St. Vitus* dance 
between the occiput and the coccyx at every bow 
that they deem it their duty to make each time a 
stranger passes by and has a fancy to offer an 

- 234 — 



advice or a warning, or to dictate a law or a 
programme for our history and our victory. Oh, 
yes, we are verily made up of a substance that 
is specially a graziosa e benigna » , gracious and 
benign. 

I frankly declare that I prefer the knotty and 
stubborn substance of which others are made. 

Victory has come to the three Allies at the 
same time. The French, in their enthusiasm, have 
immediately embraced her and have loosened 
her sandals in order to prevent her from flying 
away to other skies and other shores. The En- 
glish have at once bound her to the prows of their 
vessels, that the whole world may see her in the 
infinite extension of the seas. We, who are more 
cunning, have pulled out her eyes and stripped 
off her feathers, because it beseems not an au- 
thentic democratic people to substitute eagles for 
the geese of the Capitol. Which of us would dare 
to admonish an Englishman with reference to the 
German Colonies ? Or a Frenchman with regard 
to the Rhine or the Palatinate ? Both the English- 
man and the Frenchman would laugh in the face 
of any one who attempted such a doltish interfe- 
rence. But we, on the contrary, gravely discuss 
our questions of the Adriatic Sea or of the Bren- 
ner line with any instigator who comes in our 
way; and we exalt this discussion as a glory of 
our democratic spirit. I have never yet learnt, 
in studying History, that democratic spirit is the 
equivalent of political and moral poverty. 

Yesterday I was reading the Proclamation 
which the Commissioner of the French Republic, 
M. Mirman, has addressed to the Germans who 
have remained in Lorraine ; a Proclamation which 
contains periods like these : — « I am persuaded 
that you will love France as soon as you become 

— 235 — 



capable of knowing her and worthy of under- 
standing her, after a long and salutary exercise 
of freedom... If you succeed in discerning, now, 
the moral aberration into which you have fallen, 
through the fault of the directors of your conscien- 
ces, France will mercifully leave you to your 
remorse; otherwise she will disdainfully abandon 
you to your abjection ». « In any case » — M, 
Mirman ends by saying ■ — « whoever dare to of- 
fend France's name shall be punished in an 
exemplary manner » . 

Just think. What would have happened if an 
Italian Commissioner had addressed a similar 
Proclamation to the Croatians who, in their hatred 
of Italy have, up to yesterday, insulted, wounded, 
killed our fellow-countrymen of Zara, Sebenico, 
Spalato and Fiume ? And how many meetings of 
wise heads would not have been called for, in 
every part of Europe, to draw up a bill of in- 
dictment ? 

The fact is that, in consequence of the anguish 
and the horrors of the German war, France has 
at last acquired that profound sense of reality 
and necessity which the vague ideologies of the 
past had caused her to lose, and which made 
her also run the risk of being for ever ruined. 
And, now, she believes she cannot better avoid 
future wars than by securing for herself an iron- 
girt boundary line — it matters little whether it 
has been welded on the anvil of pure principles 
or not — and by attending to her internal recon- 
struction by means of a severe discipline of laws 
which will not admit, any more, of those peaceful 
enemy invasions of the last forty years, and 
which, on the eve of the war and whilst the con- 
flict lasted, caused her to discover that her sub- 
soil had been mined by treason and corruption. 

— 236 — 



Who can blame lacerated France, if after victory 
she strives to create for herself new moral and 
material conditions of security which will prevent 
future disasters, near or remote, to her territory 
and to her generation ? 

But I see, alas, with terror, that those vague 
ideologies which, during the past forty years had 
deprived France of her defences, of all her defen- 
ces, have migrated to Italy, where they are at- 
tempting new experiments and fresh woes. 

I see everyone in Italy, preoccupied with their 
own selves; I see them all intent in cutting out 
of Victory's robe a cockade for their vanity or a 
banner for their elections : I see them all running 
after butterflies, to show their well-shaped idle 
hands to the young English and American ladies 
sitting pensively under the Arch of Titus; but I 
see no one occupying himself about Italy, as she 
is, in the powerful construction of her mountains 
and plains, in the stirring agitation of her rivers 
and seas. Those who make a show of occupying 
themselves about her, do so merely as an expres- 
sion of their thought, an irradiation of the prin- 
ciples of their doctrines, which certainly count 
for a great deal, but are not exactly that same 
thing, that humble thing, which is Italy. Now, 
it is a question of securing during peace and for 
the longest possible time, Italy as a territory, 
Italy as a nation. And, in order to do this, there 
are not two methods to follow : there is only one, 
that which is now employed! by victorious Fran- 
ce. With our discussions, we are forty years 
behind the times. 

There are many fajtaiJisms in (physical and 
moral life; but I do not know of a more stupid 
and blind fatalism than that which I should call 
the fatalism of principles. 



237 



In Italy, we have many good souls who trem- 
ble at the idea of seeing a hundred thousand 
Germans included in our confines on the Bren- 
ner line, because such an inclusion would mean 
an infringement of the principle of nationality. 
But, would it not be more correct and humane 
to tremble, instead, at the thought of an invasion 
which, by an open door, or by one that is easily 
forced open, might imperil the labours and the 
peace of forty millions of Italians ? A certain 
proportion between different evils should always 
be made and a definite standard should be adopt- 
ed in choosing between any two of them. Now, 
I pose the question: Which is the worse evil, an 
invasion and a war, or a slight violation of the 
principle of nationality ? A violation which can 
never be of such a nature to rouse any of those 
future irredentisms which are spoken of with so 
much fear; either because the civilized status of 
our country does not admit of any kind of op- 
pression or of ill-treatment, or because of the 
small number of Germans who would be includ- 
ed in our boundary ; or even because of the non- 
importance to Germany's prosperity and defence 
which the strip of territory occupied by the Ger- 
mans on the Brenner line would ever represent. 
What then ? The apprehensions of ideologists 
for this, which cannot even be called a problem, 
arise solely from a mental defect : the defect of 
considering principles as being isolated in va- 
cuum; which principles, on the contrary, cannot 
reveal all their efficacy except in the complexity 
and the conflict of all the elements of existence. 

As for the Adriatic, the absurd, on that quest- 
ion, reaches its most grotesque manifestations 
and its most melodramatic catastrophes. 

— 238 — 



What reason can induce us or oblige us to give 
away a portion — and not a small one, either — 
of the Adriatic; say Dalmatia, for instance, to 
the Croatians and to those disguised as such ? 
Simply this: that such a portion was, up to 
yesterday, in the possession of Austria, of whom 
the Croatians were the staunchest supporters, 
and of whom they are to-day her most legitimate 
representatives. It is not a question, here, of 
Wilson any more (it is not only the Lord's name 
that is often taken in vain), or of any of his 
fourteen points : common sense and international 
legal sense are completely turned upside down, 
You emerge from the open field of all the prin- 
ciples and enter the closed field of insanity and 
criminality. Not for a single hour have the Croa- 
tians been Allies of ours in our war, so that it 
might be said that for or from that hour of com- 
mon danger should issue the metaphorical eter- 
nity of gratitude which should justify the most 
generous forms, if not of joint-ownership, at least 
of tenure, be it even that of trampling on our soil; 
but they have been, instead, our enemies until 
Austria breathed her last breath; and, after Aus- 
tria's death, her heirs, by virtue of a Will which 
can be called the true type of Pulcinella s Will (1). 
And we should sacrifice to them not only the 
principle of nationality (this time we are going 
to be chauvinists), but with that principle, the 
faith and the blood of so many Italians on the 
opposite shore, together with the fruits of our 
victory, for which our best men have fought and 



(1) Pulcinella, the popular Neapolitan Masque. It is said of him that 
the made a will in which he bequeathed, to a fabulous amount, property 
which did not belong to him. Hence « Testamento di Pulcinella », or « Pul- 
cinella's Will » is a by-word, in Italy, to signify a Will which is null 
and void. 



- 239 



have covered themselves with glory on the 
Adriatic ! 

And all this, why? 

To please xMr. Steed, and the Editor of the 
Times. 

Pshaw ! Italy is worth something more than 
an article in the Times. 



- 240 



THE HOUR OF CRISIS. 



It seems to me that too big words are being 
spoken with reference to Signor Bissolati's re- 
signation and with reference to the Cabinet crisis ; 
big words which, in the end, will have no other 
effect than that of distorting from their true sense 
and meaning the intentions and the aims of the 
men implicated in the discussion. I believe that 
a little more modesty of expression would do 
no harm to the seriousness of individual ideas 
or, in general, to the nation's political good- 
sense. 

In Italy, it is difficult to discuss the acts of the 
men who are at the head of affairs and their 
respective responsibilities with a sure knowledge, 
because it is difficult to discover the truth across 
the thick veil of ambiguity which, like a Homeric 
cloud, enshrouds the persons of Ministers. In 
all civilized countries, the men who hold the 
Government are almost always exposed to the 
test of public opinion, either through their public 
speeches or the statements made by them to the 
Press; unless, as it more often happens, their 
function as journalists and political writers does 
not act, in consequence of an uninterrupted and 



241 



public manifestation of ideas, as an anticipated 
guarantee of their actions. But in Italy, where 
Ministers are generally drawn from the various 
professional classes, in which it cannot be said 
that political culture is always the foundation of 
the science of statesmanship, mystery is the 
natural atmosphere of the Government. Who 
has ever found out, up to yesterday, that the dis- 
agreement within the Cabinet on the most serious 
problem of the war, which is, at the same time, 
the most serious problem of peace, was so pro- 
found ? Some invisible signs of distention were 
indeed suspected and were vaguely roaming in 
the air, through some ill-repressed newspaper 
controversies, through certain ill -concealed for- 
eign propaganda and through some ill-connected 
coalitions in the Cabinet itself; but that the 
discord was of such a nature as to render life 
in common incompatible and collaboration im- 
possible to the Members of the Cabinet in the 
decisive hour of realization, I believe the public 
has never, for a moment, imagined. How has it 
been possible properly to cultivate the same field 
together, or to cultivate a tree together in that 
same field if, at the last moment, the fruit that 
is hanging from the branches at the season of 
gathering, cannot be distinguished or will not 
be recognized } And by what grafting has the 
national tree been contaminated if, in the end, 
the cultivators themselves feel that their minds 
are further away from each other than they are 
from the minds of those in the neighbouring 
fields? Italy, of all the Entente Powers, is the 
only country of Europe where victory has brought 
on a Cabinet crisis ; the only country where vic- 
tory has been hailed by signs of political rather 
than Parliamentary discord; the only country 

— 242 — 



where victory does not pacify souls and minds; 
where it does not satisfy desires and ideals. Why 
and wherefore } Some reason must exist ; and it 
must be sought for and brought to light. I fear 
that the reason lies at the roots — too uncovered, 
on the bare ground — of our war. 

When England and France, attacked by Ger- 
many, pronounced the anathema against Prus- 
sian militarism, all the democrats who, up to 
then, had professed unlimited pacifism, hurried 
to join the colours, and justified their conversion 
by the new designation which had been given to 
the war: that of democratic war. War as war, 
no ! but democratic war, yes : it was another mat- 
ter ! Perhaps England and France were not in 
the wrong, on their part t when to the war of the 
Central Empires they opposed the war of two 
democratic and constitutional nations, based on 
Law and governed by responsible men. The 
wrong was on the side of the old democratic and 
pacifist Parties of Italy, for instance, when they 
considered the democratic war not as connected 
with the struggle of two democracies against the 
Central Empires, but, in the abstract, as the 
means to attain the old ideals of pacifism and 
to reach the sphere of the Kingdom of Utopia. 
When it became expedient to discuss the neces- 
sity of our war, we at once gave warning of the 
danger: the danger of reducing a national war 
to a war of Parties; the danger of reducing a 
war which had for* its essential and unalterable 
aims the boundaries of Italy, to a war of prin- 
ciples; the danger, in fine, of applying an ideo- 
logical and therefore by its own nature, an in- 
coercible and unreliable purpose to a war na- 
turally possessing a concrete and tangible object 
which alone would, and could, suffice to obtain 

- 243 - 



unanimity of consent and sacrifice. The announ- 
cement alone, of the democratic war was suffi- 
cient to create difficulties and encourage the re- 
luctance of the most torpid and stubborn elements 
in the country. And war was fought for the most 
part and in every sense, in the midst of national 
discord ; a discord which the political motives of 
the so-called democratic interventionism were 
bound on their part to foment, because over and 
above the patriotic and military ardour of its sup- 
porters, these motives represented a permanent 
contrast to the historical realities of war in ge- 
neral and of the Italian war in particular. And 
Reality is a terrible executioner, even of the 
noblest ideas and of the most generous illusions ; 
and, sometimes, she lets us find at the bottom* of 
her basket, cut off with our hands rather than 
with hers, our own heads which had conceived 
those ideas and illusions beyond the pale of good 
or evil. The symbol of Salome dancing round the 
severed lead of Jokahan is not without significan- 
ce. It is a little of what is happening to Signor 
Bissolati at the present moment. 

In any case, the country ought to have been 
spared the present crisis. 

It creates, in the face of foreigners, the most 
unthought-of difficulties to the solution of the 
territorial problem of the Italian peace ; and may 
create the most tortuous and dangerous agitations 
at home, by carrying back and deviating the pur- 
poses of the national war into the groove of the 
purposes of the democratic war, which existed 
only in the programme of one political Party and 
not in that of the whole nation. 

What then, is happening in Italy at this mo- 
ment ? Are the supporters of the democratic war 
detaching themselves from the Cabinet only, or 

- 244 - 



also, and in a greater measure, from the Enten- 
te ? Are they making the Entente suspicious of 
the democratic Parties of the Allied nations them- 
selves ? And even- of Wilson, at the very moment 
in which, at the Court of England, he is exalting 
the union of mind and ideal of the Anglo-Saxon 
race ? 

I do not think that impatience should be shown 
in replying reassuringly to the above questions. 



245 



AFTER SIGNOR BISSOLATI'S INTERVIEW. 



It would be giving offence to Signor Bissolati 
to allow his interview on his resignation from the 
Cabinet to pass without discussion. That (the 
report of the interview should have come back 
to us from England, is not to be wondered at. It 
is true that England is the classic land of consti- 
tutionalism ; a country, that is, which would 
hardly understand why a Minister should state to 
the foreign Press the reasons of his resignation 
without having previously stated them to Par- 
liament or to his constituents by some means or 
in some form, and still less would approve of 
his doing so. But, besides being the classic land 
of constitutionalism, England is also one of the 
two great Powers of the Entente (Italy, of course, 
does not count), and Signor Bissolati had already 
declared, in Paris, during one of the past sea- 
sons of the Alliance, that he was, Ido not exactly 
remember whether a soldier or a Minister of the 
Entente. It is useless, therefore, to raise the 
previous question of Parliamentary form. Let us 
pass, without further delay, to the subject-matter 
of the interview. 

Ever since he began to occupy himself with 
Italy's foreign policy, Signor Bissolati has infused 
into it the same ideas of party strife which un- 

- 246 - 



derlie his Socialistic doctrine and mentality. He 
has always considered Italy as being a great 
exploiting capitalist, and the other countries as 
being innumerable members of a proletariat which 
is being « sweated » by the ancient heir of Im- 
perial Rome. Whence it is that he has always 
called upon Italy to give back, give back, give 
back — pro bono pacts, and in order to avoid 
possible reverses and eventually, possible irre- 
dentisms — all the lands which in his mind's 
fancy he believes Italy to be unlawfully retaining. 
During the period of neutrality, when he main- 
tained that Italy should place herself at the 
head of the Balkan League — the League which 
would have been like a league of cats, for you 
well know how the Balkan States have agreed 
amongst themselves and 1 what deference they 
have at all times shown to us — he proposed that 
Italy should defray all the costs of that enter prize, 
which no one wanted or desired to undertake; 
and that she should generously make a donation 
of the /Egean Islands to Greece, from whom 
Italy had not wrested them; and of Dalmatia 
(which was then in the hands of Austria) to 
Servia, who had never expressed the desire to 
annex it. Sign or Bissolati is, assuredly, the purest 
of ideologists (Napoleon would certainly have 
never entrusted him with any kind of responsi- 
bility in State affairs), and is, more attached to 
his ideologies than to his native country or to 
himself. Thus, what he did not succeed in ob- 
taining in the name of the Balkan League, he 
is now striving to obtain in the name of the Lea- 
gue or Society of Nations; and, whether Balkan 
League or League or Society of Nations, his prin- 
cipal object is always one and the same: that 
of depriving Italy of the /Egean Islands and of 

— 247 - 



Dalmatia, with the addition this time, of the 
defensive line of the Brenner, which has been 
pronounced by our own generals to be indis- 
pensable to our defence. Evidently the /Egean 
Islands and Dalmatia must be a dreadful night- 
mare in Sign or Bissolati *s mind, if at all times 
and on every occasion he is restlessly striving to 
rid himself of them; and, putting himself in 
Italy's place, to rid Italy of them too. But, al- 
though Italians, not excluding those in Dalmatia 
would be most happy to see Signor Bissolati 
regain his peace of mind, I am afraid they would 
not be equally satisfied to see the Government 
of their country alienate or barter, without ade- 
quate compensations, the Islands of the /Egean 
which represent the pledge of the conditions 
which Turkey has never kept and the indemni- 
ties which she has never paid after the Lybian 
war ; they would certainly not be equally satisfied 
to see the Italian Government entrust to the ten- 
der mercies of Croatian xudgels the flesh and 
blood of the Dalmatian people which, after all, 
is the flesh and blood of Venice and Rome. Si- 
gnor Bissolati proposes to barter the /Egean 
Islands for the mines of Heraclaea. But Signor Tit- 
toni, in his most wise and masterly speech in the 
Senate spoke of those mines solely as a compen- 
sation due to Italy, on a line with the other Pow- 
ers, for the sacrifices she has made for all and 
with all the Allies in the European war. But, as 
a matter of fact, do any rights accrue to Italy in 
the East by reason of the European war ? To the 
other Powers of the Entente, yes, certainly. But 
to Italy, no ! for no reason whatever. It should 
be sufficient to Italy to have had the honour of 
fighting to make France greater, England more 
powerful and Yugoslavia more audacious. Ay, 



248 



let us inf orm our dead of this ; they who are pre- 
maturely sleeping their eternal sleep underground 
are probably unaware that it was for all these 
fine things, which were hidden from them to 
their last day, that they are now asleep for ever. 
Poor, poor dead of Italy ! 

But, nevertheless, the living are not less to be 
pitied than the dead. 

Whilst, abroad, the end of the war marks the 
end of Statesmen's errors, as well as the concord 
of public opinion and sentiment on peace pro- 
blems , for the sole aim of making the most of the 
sacrifices that have been undergone, and of 
creating the best possible conditions for the se- 
curity of our future existence, we, on the con- 
trary, just as if the blood spilt up to yesterday 
were nothing but water, and the wealth thrown 
into the consuming fire were nought but the pro- 
ceeds of a robbery, are more disunited than be- 
fore; we continue to fight amongst ourselves in 
the Cabinet, in the Press, and to-morrow perhaps 
we shall fight even in the streets, always to the 
detriment of the interests of Italy; always in the 
name and on behalf of her enemies whom in our 
minds we figure and represent as the latest pat- 
tern of ideal nations. Up to the eve of the war 
we were pro-French or pro-German; now that 
Germany has been defeated, we have finally 
become even pro-Yugoslav; and, in order better 
to justify this new mania of ours, not only do we 
disown our ancient national rights, not only in 
opposition to the pride and the faith of our 
heroes do we exalt the military prowess of the 
Croatians, which Signor Bissolati with terror re- 
minds Italians that they have witnessed during the 
war, but, with our actions and our speeches we 
lend asistance to our enemies, who are not a 

- 249 — 



few within and without the Entente's lines, in 
opposing our aspirations and' annulling or under- 
rating the aims of our war at the Peace Congress. 
Thus: with our pro-Yugoslavism, made up of 
panic and the fear of God, we are coming face 
to face with the pro-Yugoslavism of our Allies, 
which is made up, in complete disregard of Italy, 
of calculation and of maritime and commercial 
interests. Who cannot see the plan and the pur- 
port of French pro-Yugoslavism which, with the 
help of Greece, tends to no other object than 
that of gaining the supremacy over our Lower 
Adriatic and, across the Balkans, the supremacy 
over the Balkan highways to the East, in substi- 
tution of Austria which we helped to eliminate > 
Sic vos non vobis : our eternal fate ! And in order 
to attain this fate we have not only fought a great 
national and European war, but we are prepar- 
ing to face a civil war in our midst. Because, in 
fine, all the efforts of those who for one reason 
or another are endeavouring to disperse the aims 
and the results of victory and to prepare for Italy 
new conditions of territorial, political and com- 
mercial inferiority in the face of our Allies, and 
new conditions of weakness in the face of our 
enemies with the disillusionments which they 
sow, with the rancours which they arouse and 
the humiliations which they permit are directed to 
no other purpose than that of preparing the state 
of mind and the atmosphere of the most calami- 
tous of civil wars. Was it worth while waving 
so many flags and causing so much Italian sor- 
row, to arrive at such an abyss } 

I deeply regret having to write these things 
a propos of Sign or Bissolati who, during the war, 
has been an example of national discipline. I 
should have preferred to write them a propos of 

— 250 — 



others who have manifested the same ideas with- 
out having the same reasons to consideration 
which he has the right to inspire. But, alas, we 
have, now, no time to lose in minuet bows. We 
are hotly pursued by the sword of our enemies 
and by the asinine kicks of those upon whom we 
have conferred so many benefits. We must ra- 
pidly see to our offensive and to our defences. 

It is useless to illude ourselves or to illude 
others. We are now passing the gravest moment 
of our history ; a moment which should have been 
one of settlement and is, instead, one of danger 
and may result in one of definite disorder. As it 
was at one time with Germany and Austria, we 
are now, after this great war, regarded unfavour- 
ably and derided by England and France. 
Through our own fault ? Through the fault of 
others ? Certainly, there are, in England, vast 
centres of agitation against our aspirations which 
no one thinks of quelling and which are fomented 
by our Adriatic enemies and are not suppressed 
by our friends beyond the Channel. And France, 
as we all well know, is all one centre of agita- 
tion to our detriment. In the interior, do you not 
see? The old factious spirit is pervading even 
the Cabinet, which is in a perpetual crisis and 
in its innermost working is more troubled and 
upset than appears on the surface; and thus 
troubled and upset it is preparing to discuss the 
most serious problems of the future with asso- 
ciates who are sure of themselves, but diffident 
and heedless of us. I ask again: who is to blame 
for this unbearable situation ? If our own men 
are to blame, they must be changed without any 
regard, pitilessly, whatever their past merits may 
be. And if the blame is to be ascribed to our 
associates, we must unite, re-compose ourselves, 

— 251 — 



make a compact mass of all the nation and op- 
pose it to the ill-will or the selfishness of others, 
and not allow any decision or solution to be ar- 
rived at which may be prejudicial or compromi- 
sing to our interests. In any case, something 
must be done. To remain in a state of discord 
or inertia is not possible. To continue useless 
discussions of ideals amongst ourselves, to con- 
tinue the childish controversies on our intellect- 
ual fatuities, is contemptible and iniquitous; 
when we have round us, amidst such a pitiful 
devastation, half a million of men killed and one 
million of wounded, and all the secular patrimony 
of the nation on the ground. Therefore ? Let the 
Government first of all do its duty; that is to 
say, let it measure its own capabilities and its 
strength, and if it finds them up to the mark for 
the task assigned to them and if it receives the 
consent of the nation, let it trace out its line of 
conduct, and impose it upon the Paris Congress. 
Otherwise let it retire and leave to other stronger 
men, whoever they may be and whichever side 
they may come from, the care of our interests 
and of our future. On her part let the nation, in 
the forms which it will not be difficult to find 
and which may be spontaneous and efficient, 
proclaim loudly and clearly her irreducible and 
unsuppressible will to issue victorious and not 
defeated from the war, and not to allow those 
who are near or afar, friends or enemies, to de- 
viate from or betray her wishes, her aims and 
her interests, present and future. 

To sleep is no longer permissible. We must 
act and act at once. And act solely on Italy's 
behalf; not on behalf of your miserable passions 
or your miserable political and party ambitions. 

And have, sometimes, pity for this humble 
Italy, too. 

- 252 - 



THE PACT OF ROME 
AND THE POLA SWINDLE. 



A popular morning paper raised an outcry 
yesterday against the Yugoslav propaganda which 
is being widely spread abroad and is becoming 
more perfidious and more audacious, during this 
first period of the Paris Congress to the detriment 
of Italy and of her aspirations; and it called for 
(( first aid » in the f otiti of counter propaganda 
on the part of the Government and the national 
Press, Oh, the national Press ! Oh, the chaste 
national conscience ! Whilst the Croatians are 
amusing themselves at our expense abroad, we 
are tearing one another to pieces at home for the 
sake of their handsome faces, and in the name of 
Fiume and the name of Spalato, which should 
be names of national concord, we are making a 
show of the most senseless erudition in newspa- 
pers and of still more senseless violence at public 
meetings, to demonstrate to the world that we 
want, undoubtedly, the League of Nations, but 
not before having provoked and succeeded in 
obtaining the dissolution and the destruction of 
the Italian nation. It is evidently a question of a 
new and more horrid form of madness which is 
manifesting itself amongst mental diseases of our 
race in the after war period. 

— 253 — 



From what poisonous exhalation has this new 
form of madness, which assumes the specific ap- 
pellation of pro-Yugoslavisrn, been created? 
Madness it undoubtedly is, judging by the ways 
in which it becomes manifest, by the agitations 
and the perturbations which it provokes all round, 
by the catastrophes which will inevitably follow 
in its wake, by the direct and irreducible contra- 
diction to the vital law of preservation — pre- 
servation of individual and collective personality, 
of State, country and nation — and by the rest- 
less craving for dissolution which stirs it, besides 
the incapacity of understanding the evil it works, 
and of realizing the damage it does, both far 
and near. 

If I am not mistaken, the poison which pro- 
duced it was the defeat of Caporetto. 

Our Allies, too, underwent days equally sad 
if not sadder than ours of October 1917: the 
French on the Chernin des Dames, and the 
English on the Somme. But they did not raise 
the hubbub round their disaster that we did, nor 
did they bury under it all the heroic effort which 
their armies had accomplished during the long 
and toilsome travail of the war : they closed 
ranks, they ascertained and punished the persons 
who were responsible, they reformed the com- 
mands and continued the war-effort, both behind 
the lines and on the battlefield, without attaching 
to the reverse they had suffered any more im- 
portance than to an episode to be marked with 
the nigro lapillo, the black pebble of unlucky 
days, and from which to draw more useful 
teachings for the future. We, on the contrary, 
lost our confidence, and what was worse, con- 
fidence was lost by the politicians and writers 
who, being most in view during the struggle, 



254 



felt with greater keeness the biting criticisms of 
their adversaries, who now that the expected 
hopes of victory had not been realized, did not 
hesitate to hurl back at them the insults and ac- 
cusations launched against them at the beginning 
of the war. What was to be done } Whilst furna- 
ces were seething in order to prepare new artil- 
lery and General Diaz was training new men 
for the counter-attack on the Piave and the final 
glory of Vittorio Veneto, they became diplomats, 
with the intent of beating Austria at least in a 
closed field if the armies should not succeed in 
beating her in the open one. (In order to combat 
the errors of adversaries, it is not necessary to 
misrepresent the motives of their actions). But, 
whilst they were engaged in their diplomacy, 
they happened to meet M. Trumbic in the 
streets of London and Paris, just as our soldiers, 
whilst fighting, were meeting his brethren in the 
service of Austria. And M. Trumbic allowed 
himself the luxury of playing, for once, the part 
of Metternich with the tardy grand-children of 
Nicolo Maechiavelli, and to « take them in » as 
at one time his ancestors would have taken them 
into prison or hanged 1 them on the gibbet. 

Certainly, if by negotiating the Pact of Rome 
without the cognizance of the constituted autho- 
rities, our candid parliamentary men and publicists 
intended foiling or checkmating the old State 
diplomacy and giving a decisive example of the 
new popular diplomacy, without secrets, without 
protocols and without ambassadors, it is my 
belief that for the triumph of their principles and 
their methods they will have to try agrain. They 
showed themselves at least wanting in the first 
and most essential element of any negotiation : 
the psychological element, which implies a 

— 255 - 



knowledge of the contracting party, whether 
friend or enemy, and an understanding of his 
aims and of his means of carrying on a struggle. 
They who, from an historical point of view, if 
from no other, should have known what a Croat 
is, negotiated with M. Trumbic as they would 
have negotiated in Parliament with one of their 
own countrymen belonging to one of the various 
Parties there, for the formation of a colourless 
Cabinet. M. Trumbic, instead, had his colour: a 
colour which does not fade, his cudgel which 
does not bend, and, in his waistcoat pocket, all the 
hatred of his race against the Italians, which is 
not spent in vain nor spent in every market. Here 
in Rome, in London and in Paris, he saw a group 
of individuals upset by disaster, distrustful of the 
future, prepared to do anything and everything 
in order to save their war in some way or another. 
And, in the guise of a protector he concluded the 
Pact of Rome with them, in the name of the most 
sacred principles of 1789, of course. Of what is 
his own or of what belonged to the Croatian race 
he staked nothing in the game, not a drop of 
blood, not a drop of tallow, nor even an ounce 
of good will: he staked simply nothing. He was 
and remained a Croat and an Austrian. And, 
after the decisive day of Vittorio Veneto, when 
the Italian army had destroyed both the Austrian 
army and the empire of the Hapsburgs, there 
was M. Trumbic at his post — (when I say M. 
Trumbic, I mean either himself or any other 
representative of the Croats) — there was M. 
Trumbic, on the side of beaten Austria, organiz- 
ing the swindle of the Pol a Fleet to the detriment 
of Italy, the victor ! Behold the Croat ; always 
the same, always the sworn enemy of Italy and 
the Italians ! He had previously been led up the 

- 256 - 



steps of the Capitol and solemnly feasted there ! 
And the geese of the Capitol had been silent: 
they, which in the fibres of their throats must 
still feel the thrill of the screech they emitted at 
the assault of the Gauls ! 

The Pola swindle ought to have caused even 
the blindest and those who had fostered the 
greatest illusions to open their eyes. It was not 
only the proof or the revelation of the unchan- 
geable mind of the Croats, but what is worse, it 
was both the revelation and the overwhelming 
proof of the duplicity which had surrounded and 
infused the whole of the famous Pact of Rome, 
and which tended — for the audacity of the 
Croats in crime has no limits — to destroy and 
annul the Pact of London. What was, in fact, 
the Pact of Rome if not a lever wherewith to 
unhinge the Pact of London ? And when one 
thinks of the accomplices which the Pola swindle 
has immediately found on all sides, and of the 
snares to which even after our victory the Pact 
of London is exposed, one can well ask the pro- 
Yugoslavs whether they have ever realized or 
had any conception of the danger to which they 
have exposed their country, first by their diplo- 
macy and afterwards by their efforts to discredit 
and cause the fall of the Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs who did not want to open his hands to al- 
low the Pact of London to fall into the Croatian 
trap. For, in the same way as with the Pola 
Fleet, so would our rights, already recognized by 
the Pact of London, have been contested later 
on; and we would have presented ourselves at 
the Peace Congress with all the scath and the 
scorn of our tragic imbecility. We would have 
had in exchange, it is true, M. Trumbic's gra- 
cious friendship, in the same manner as we have 



- 257 
17 



been the recipients of M. Pasic*s gratitude after 
we had twice denied Austria our assistance for 
the destruction of Servia, and after having saved 
and led safely to our shores the remnants of the 
Servian army, ragged and disbanded by defeat, 
along the rear ways of Macedonia. 

Yet, in the interior of the country the contro- 
versy on Yugoslavia is still raging, and there are 
people who are tiring out their brains in newspa- 
pers and their vocal chords in theatres and in 
the streets (I cannot understand why the Socialists 
who have always kept aloof from these contro- 
versies, should now take part in them with the 
rest), to uphold and defend, in the name of 
Heaven knows what degenerated liberty and hu- 
manity, the crimes of the Pola swindlers against 
the clear and evident rights of the Italians of 
Fiume, Zara, Sebenico and Spalato, and against 
the rights of the whole of Italy and of the Italian 
victory. Graecia capta, conquered and held in 
bondage her proud conqueror, in her turn. So 
Austria after her defeat now vanquishes and 
holds Italy. But Greece held Rome in bondage 
by the Fine Arts: Austria, instead, holds Italy 
— - pardon, oh, goddess Rome! — with her 
Croats. It is her posthumous revenge. Besides, 
each employs the arts which he possesses. Aus- 
tria's Fine Arts are the Croats. 

It will, therefore, be not inopportune that, 
whilst the Croatian propaganda is pursuing its 
turbid and defamatory work against Italy abroad, 
we should exercise our patience in collecting 
and studying all the texts of the pro-Yugoslav 
propaganda at home, to show to the public and 
possibly to its authors, all its political iniquity 
and all its intellectual monstrosity. 



258 - 



SOME QUOTATIONS FROM CAVOUR. 



It is needless to pay any attention to what the 
Agram newspapers say concerning the Italian- 
hood of Dalmatia, nor to excite oneself about 
their boasts of the deeds accomplished by the 
Croats on the Isonzo and on the Piave, in the 
service of Austria and against Italy. Boasting is 
superfluous. The Croats have done their duty in 
the service of Austria on the Isonzo and on the 
Piave recently, as they served her during last 
century at Brescia and Milan. And their historical 
science unfolded for the purpose of convincing 
their Italian and foreign associates of their rights 
over our peoples are equally superfluous. The 
only thing that, perhaps, is not superfluous is 
this: to state that once, after 1860, some Croa- 
tian generals were roughly handled in London 
and threatened to be thrown into the Thames by 
the exasperated mob at the recollection of their 
cruelties and their iniquities committed on their 
victims in Brescia and Milan. Now, instead, the 
Croatian propagandists against Italy have esta- 
blished their general headquarters in the offices 
of the principal London and Paris newpapers. It 
is true that they have also established these head- 

— 259 - 



quarters in the minds and the hearts of many 
gracious Italians. 

Let us not, therefore, follow the, let us say, 
literature of the Croatian Press and of that other 
which is its accomplice in the other countries 
of Europe. Let us occupy ourselves, simply, with 
the Press of our own country. 

I have here, before me, the files of many in- 
terventionist newspapers and the volumes of 
many interventionist writers published during the 
period of Italian neutrality. It is painful to ac- 
knowledge the fact but, in order to arouse the 
public spirit and give it the right direction to- 
wards the war, these newspapers and writers had 
no other thought in mind but to demonstrate 
that it was Italy's absolute, unrestricted neces- 
sity to reconquer the whole, complete inheritance 
of the Most Serene Republic of Venice, com- 
mencing from Dalmatia and Istria as far as Trie- 
ste and Trento: a demonstration which must 
have been extraordinarily efficacious if, notwith- 
standing the reluctance of the parliamentary 
bourgeoisie in power, which was proceeding in 
a different direction, it succeeded, in the end, in 
convincing and in dragging the country into the 
war. But, now that war is at an end, behold those 
same newspapers and writers disavow the pro- 
gramme which had served to induce the nation 
to enter the war and uphold another, revised and 
corrected, or rather, mutilated; another program- 
me in which the inheritance of Venice appears 
diminished and contested; and a portion of it, 
Dalmatia, considered as res furtiva and declined 
with a gesture of supreme disdain, and thrown, 
to the dogs. « Dalmatia ? » — they ask the gods 
and the Croats — « what is Dalmatia ? Who has 
ever heard of Dalmatia as Italian ? There must 



260 



evidently be a misunderstanding. Neither Dante 
nor Cavour, either in Italic speech or in Frank- 
ish idiom have ever pronounced or written so 
strange a word. Dalmatia ? Why, this strange 
word is not even found in Tommaseo's Dictiona- 
ry » . What then 7 

Then, one of two things: either the public was 
drawn into eTror before the war, or it is being 
drawn into error now. Either the public was 
drawn into error when, in order to arouse it in 
favour of the war it was made to believe that 
Dalmatia was absolutely necessary and indispen- 
sable for the integrity of the fatherland and for 
the security of the Adriatic; or it is being drawn 
into error now, that it is informed not only that 
Dalmatia is no longer necessary for the security 
of the Adriatic, but that it cannot be considered 
as an integral portion of the fatherland, as it is 
not, nor ever was, Italian. The dilemma has 
horns which it is impossible to hide under the red 
ribbon of any international haberdashery. 

The serious part of the controversy on Dalma- 
tia is, unfortunately, this: that the old upholders 
of the integral national claims, in changing their 
programme and in throwing Dalmatia to the dogs 
do not confine themselves to the employment of 
political arguments (that is, to arguments which 
are opportunistic and transitory in their own es- 
sence), but also attempt to use historical, statisti- 
cal and ethnographical ones; that is to say, fun- 
damental and substantial arguments which are 
by their own nature permanent and unchangea- 
ble; the same arguments, in fact, which the 
Croats — that is to say, the enemies — are in 
the habit of employing, with evident offence to 
science as well as to the moral and legal sense 
of all cultured and civilized people, for the pur- 



261 



pose of disputing the pure character of our na- 
tional struggle and therefore of denying to Ita- 
lians the right of aspiring to Dalmatia; and to 
the Dalmatians the right of aspiring to Italy: a 
surprising and truly unexpected phenomenon this, 
of moral transubstantiation between the Italian 
flour and the Croatian bran, which will hardly 
find any Apostles at the Supper to celebrate its 
marvels. 

Even Cavour has been quoted in support of the 
arguments employed by the Croats, Such a name 
ought to have been spared from being used for 
such an argument and such a people. 

To quote Cavour for the purpose of attenuating 
or disputing the Italianhood of Dalmatia is a 
useless profanation, which can lead! to no practi- 
cal result ; because it is sufficient to turn the page 
of a certain book in order to restore to its proper 
position the name of the great realizer of the na- 
tional idea and to reconsecrate his word. 

It is untrue that Cavour did not — as it is at- 
tempted to intimate — recognize that Dalmatia 
formed part of the programme of Italian unity. 
In the same manner as the interventionist news- 
papers and writers of 1914 and 1915, Cavour, in 
his famous letter of December 18th. 1860, ad- 
dressed to Valerio, showed that he was perfectly 
cognizant of Dalmatia and regarded it in the 
same light as I stria, Trieste and Trento; only he, 
who was discussing the question at a time when 
Rome and Venice did not yet form part of 
united Italy, was in duty bound not to compro- 
mise or allow to be compromised by inconside- 
rate actions or propositions the immediate or mo- 
re remote aims of reality. Rome and Venice were 
yet to be attained; and he, a cautions and' pro- 
vident realizer, contented himself with the mo- 

— 262 - 



dest defence of Ancona. (( I must likewise request 
you», he therefore wrote to Valerio, who was 
then Royal Commissioner of the Marches, « to 
avoid any expression from which it might be 
inferred that the New Kingdom of Italy is aspir- 
ing to the conquest not only of Venetia, but also 
of Trieste, together with Istria and Dalmatian. 

(Note well the expression, which constitutes the 
whole programme: Trieste together with Istria 
and Dalmatia). 

And after having made a summary mention of 
the complexity of the Adriatic problem, he con- 
cluded : « Every inconsiderate phrase which may 
be uttered in this sense constitutes a terrible 
weapon in the hand of our enemies, who will 
take advantage of it in order to attempt to render 
even England hostile to us, as she would look 
unfavourably on the Adriatic becoming what it 
was during the time of the Venetian Republic, 
namely, an Italian lake. These few hints will 
suffice, I trust, to render you circumspect in this 
matter. For the present it is necessary to confine 
your efforts to well defending Ancona: this will 
become the ladder for a splendid progress in a 
future which our grandchildren will not find too 
remote » . 

(Note the means and the end : Trieste together 
with Istria and Dalmatia were not to constitute a 
weapon in the hands of our enemies to serve 
against the immediate problem of the liberation 
of Venetia). 

This happened in 1860, previous to the libera- 
tion of Venetia and Rome. And, on the basis of 
such a letter must one conclude that Cavour had 
from that moment renounced all claims to Trento 
and Trieste, besides Istria and Dalmatia } 

The great Italians of the Risorgimento were not 

->- 263 — 



the puny Italians of to-day and ideas and argu- 
ments irrelevant to the national essence were 
excluded from their lofty historical and political 
conception of Italian unity. Prudence and, at the 
same time, the condition of Italy, which was then 
weak, in the process of revival, and unarmed in 
the midst of strong and well-armed States, com- 
pelled them to pose and to solve questions one 
at a time. But postponing questions did not si- 
gnify relinquishing or disowning them. Thus, 
even in the fiercest moment of irredentist agita- 
tions, Francesco Crispi who, by reason of his offi- 
ce had been constrained to effect a repression of 
them, from his seat on the Government bench 
proclaimed as haughtily as ever Italy's right to 
her full territorial reintegration. In fact, in 1889, 
replying to the interpellation addressed to the 
Government by Signori Cavallotti and Imbriani, 
he ended a speech, which was not, or was not 
intended to be favourable to the agitations of the 
agitations of the moment, with the following 
words : 

(( The illustrious Marco Minghetti, whilst in of- 
fice and during a debate into which he had been 
drawn and during which he replied with that 
shining eloquence and clearness of thought which 
were habitual to him, said that with regard to the 
question of nationality, it was necessary to choose 
the opportune time and even the opportune mo- 
ment; but that if ever such a question were to 
arise, and that wars were to bring about a modi- 
fication of the geographical map of Europe, Italy 
would have nothing to fear, for she had nothing 
to give, but a great deal to recover. But, if there 
are any principles which should animate all pa- 
triots, whether they be seated on those benches 
(pointing to the Deputies* benches), or on these 

— 264 - 



(pointing to the Government benches), the prin- 
cipal virtue of States and of political men is 
prudence » . 

Prudence: a word in Cavour's doctrine of 
realization. 

But I pose the question : Can there be more op- 
portune times and moments than these, following 
the war and victory, to recover, after so much 
prudence and so much expectation, all which 
has been taken from us in centuries gone by } 

Prudence and expectation even after war and 
victory ? 

The programme of the war was the integral 
programme for the attainment of our national 
claims. It was for that programme that Italy 
fought and won. 

To support a different programme is to com- 
mit a crime against public faith. 



265 - 



ITALY AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. 



It cannot be a mystery to those whose thoughts 
are fixed on realitxy, that no country in Europe is 
more naturally disposed to support Wilson's 
projects than Italy is ; because no country in Eu- 
rope is more intolerant than Italy of any doctrine 
or action which may lead towards war nor more 
inclined by tendency and taste towards the gentle 
arts and the gentle customs of peace. But, unhap- 
pily, our internal Party controversies, not always 
starting from the humble and chaste observation 
of reality, but always inspired either by the Idea 
— which is the moral fermentation of passion 
and emits manifestations at once tragic and ridi- 
culous — or, what is worse, by interest, which 
is the immoral fermentation of all the errors and 
all the stupidities of those, great and small, who 
are for the moment in authority — our internal 
Party controversies, I say, concurrently with those 
of our most insolent and most petulant enemies, 
have succeeded, abroad, in representing Italy as 
the militarist and imperialistic nation par excel- 
lence : the nation which is the most agitated by 
a perpetual war fever, and the most distorted and 
distracted of all by the mania and the fury of 

— 266 — 



conquest. And whilst debating and negotiating 
in the midst of a Europe which, from the great- 
est to the smallest Powers, is, under more or less 
well -hidden forms, pervaded by the lust of ag- 
grandizement ; those persons amongst us who dis- 
sent from the integral national programme, and 
those who, abroad, show themselves to be the 
most stubborn opposers of our every right and our 
every just claim and do not hesitate in changing 
even the name of things and the contents of de- 
finitions, have alternately given the names of 
militarism and of imperialism to every rectifica- 
tion of boundary which we have suggested and 
claimed for the defence of our borders, and to 
every effort made by us to group around the 
ancient paternal stock all the peoples of the Adria- 
tic which are Italian by blood, mind, conscience 
and will. So much have they said and done, espe- 
cially in recent times, that they have suceeded in 
giving the fable the consistency of truth. Where- 
fore Italy is still to-day condemned to the double 
labour of struggling against and destroying not 
only the snares and the hostility — hidden or vi- 
sible — of the many enemies who surround her 
even more closely than her own mountains and 
seas, but also of dispersing and dispelling the 
whims of her own citizens. It is true, however, 
that she is by no means unaccustomed to this 
double labour, which constitutes the pathos of 
her sorrowful history through centuries gone by. 
The action accomplished by Signor Orlando 
with his speech on the League of Nation is not, 
therefore, an act of formal homage to the Presi- 
dent of the United States, but is the authentic 
expression of the Italian spirit which moves in 
law and through law strives to attain the equili- 
brium of human and social forces. In the same 



267 



manner as, four years ago, in consequence of 
Germany's declaration of war against France, the 
Italian spirit, which felt the offence which had 
been perpetrated against law, drew back and de- 
tached itself from the old alliance, so now that 
war is at an end, the Italian spirit, in order to 
prevent new and no less serious offences against 
law in the present and in the future, resolutely 
takes up its stand, and not as a vain parade, on 
Wilson's side. 

But will the League of Nations prove a success ? 

This is a problem which does not depend on 
the will of men, and especially does not depend 
on the will of its author and of his collaborators ; 
but depends, above all, on the political and ter- 
ritorial settlement which the Congress will have 
given to the various European nations indepen- 
dently of the ideal picture which the League of 
Nations may have supplied. 

For my part, I do not believe, for instance, 
that the division of half Europe and, let us say, 
of Mittel Europa as it had been conceived by the 
Germans, into so many small States, on the basis 
of more or less easily recognizable or generally 
accepted nationalities can, in course of time, lead 
to a sure and definite system of universal peace. 
Nationalities are from their very nature excitable, 
and in the varied daily struggle are more apt to 
become still more irritated than to neutralize 
themselves and cool down. There is no treaty that 
will have the effect of modifying or attenuating 
natural differences, just as there is no marriage 
contract which has the effect of eliminating the 
incompatibility of character between husband 
and wife. And, in order to keep so many scat- 
tered peoples in check, what new principle will 
possess the energy and the capability of replacing 

— 268 - 



the authority and the imperial bond of the three 
great States defeated in war? The admonition 
addressed by Wilson and by the Delegates of the 
other great Powers of the Congress to the small 
Powers in course of formation, which are showing 
so much eagerness and so great a hurry to employ 
violence instead of reason in the initial questions 
of meum and tuum, is the first indication of the 
contrasts between the ideal authority of the Exe- 
cutive Council of the League of Nations and the 
behaviour of its future members. Will this admo- 
nition suffice, to cool the appetites and to cut the 
nails growing with so much audacity from very 
infancy } 

Again: will the Powers victorious over Ger- 
many be themselves satisfied with conditions of 
peace representing the expression of strict law, 
- of pure law, whilst Germany still possesses, fal- 
len but not shattered, a hardy and tenacious peo- 
ple which, by reason of its strength and its auda- 
city, is well capable of a prompt rehabilitation 
and of a new struggle ? 

For, the difference between the two defeats, 
that of Austria and that of Germany is this : that 
the one, by destroving the State has also destroy- 
ed the bond which held together those peoples 
which now tend to a different constitution and or- 
ganization of their own, in accordance with the 
different impulse of the race; whilst the other, 
though destroying the State, has left not only the 
unity of the people intact, but its very efficiency 
also: unity and efficiency which are anything 
but decadent, but quite the contrary, if we are 
to judge by the effort accomplished before and 
during the course of the war; of a people, in 
fact, possessing the full vigour of all its faculties 
and qualities, a people which the errors of its 

- 269 - 



old leaders may have thrown into ruin but which, 
from the depths of its ruin will undoubtedly re- 
vive by reason of its own impetus, better taught 
by bitter experience and re-moulded by misfor- 
tune. Is it possible that France and England do 
not understand this, and that they do not attempt 
to prepare stronger defences for themselves than 
in the past ? The opposition which France is al- 
ready raising against the union of Austrian Ger- 
mans with those of Germany proper, opposition 
which is in conflict with the principle of the self- 
decision of peoples, which, in its turn, it is endea- 
voured to overthrow at the, outset in virtue of the 
other principle, that of the incapacity of vanquish- 
ed peoples to annex others — (really, this prin- 
ciple may be sound for territories, not for men of 
the same race and of the same will) — show that 
the needs of the great victorious Powers are al- 
ready loudly clashing with the bases upon which 
Wilson's Ideal City, the safe refuge of the League 
of Nations, should be erected. 

On the road bordered by these hedges, only 
Italy can proceed firmly and without swerving 
towards the Ideal City. Her conflicts with the 
Croats are not of such a nature as to make her 
apprehensive for the future. Besides, the Croats 
will also have to settle matters with the Magyars 
at their back, who are a strong and war-like peo- 
ple with whom Italy has no reason to be eternally 
in emnity, and with whom she has no reason for 
not resuming the old relations which, at the time 
of the common struggle against Austria, resulted 
in so amicable an accord of arms and ideas. Al- 
so, given her situation in Europe and her position 
of equilibrium between the various nations com- 
peting and struggling against each other, peace 
and the constitution of peace are essential condi- 

- 270 - 



tfons for Italy's material as well as for her poli- 
tical and moral development. In the constitution 
of peace she is safe from friends and from ene- 
mies. But would she be under a different consti- 
tution 7 She knows from long experience that if 
she has to be on her guard against enemies at 
fixed dates, she has to be on her guard against 
friends at all hours and on every occasion. Be- 
cause our friends are always so made that they 
never believe they show sympathy on our behalf 
except by defendig and assximing as their own the 
ideas and the interests of our enemies. And it 
is useless to go any further in search of evidence 
and proofs. 

For all which reasons, both of the present and 
the future, it is expedient that Italy, apart from 
friends and enemies, should constitute for her- 
self a state of right — even though represented 
in that which is now called the League of Nations 
— which should secure for her, morally and ma- 
terially, the conditions of development to which 
she is entitled after the war she has fought and 
won. 

And our Delegates at the Peace Conference 
will serve their country so much the better if they 
will strive their utmost to create and co-operate 
in creating a European and world condition in 
which the good will of our friends and the ill 
will of our enemies will never have the opportu- 
nity to meet and unite to our wrong and our de- 
triment. 



271 - 



THE ATTITUDES. 



Without being unduly pessimistic (sometimes 
it is sufficient to be merely logical in order to 
draw conclusions from premises), it can be fore- 
seen or concluded, even from this moment, that 
the Paris Congress will hardly arrive at a defi- 
nite and permanent solution of the questions 
which are successively coming up for discussion. 
There is such a difference in minds and, worse, 
such a diversity of conception and judgement on 
the nature and the importance of political factors 
and of material interests in competition, that no 
effort of science or will can succeed, it seems to 
me, in discovering formulas and in excogitating 
measures which will have other characteristics 
than those of haste and temporariness. The 
world, in fine, is not to be reformed or transfor- 
med! by means of a constitutional or diplomatic 
Charter resulting from a discussion between ju- 
rists and Statesmen of different ideas and of dif- 
ferent countries, constrained to submit to a law 
dictated by one of their number, and to which 
they would willingly show themselves contrary 
and rebellious, if they could but act freely or 
could declare themselves and decide spontaneous- 

*- 272 — 



ly. Intuitively one perceives an atmospheric pres- 
sure and' compression in the Paris Conference 
which the mercury in the veins of human baro- 
meters vainly try to avoid measuring, and which 
the Press communiques vainly endeavour to avoid 
revealing. Uneasiness is prevalent in minds and 
purposes. A perfect agreement will not be arrived 
at, therefore, in the forthcoming decisions. 

No one will deny that the conflicts are nu- 
merous. 

There is a conflict between Wilson's ideologies 
and the various historical and political realities 
of the Powers of Europe. 

There is a conflict between the aims of the 
war totally attained by England, and the aims of 
the war incompletely, attained by other coun- 
tries allied to England. 

There is a conflict between the rights of the 
victors and the pretensions advanced by those 
who have intruded themselves amongst the vic- 
tors, and are suported here and there, according 
to cases and interests, by this or that Allied Go- 
vernment. 

There is a conflict between the method of inter- 
preting the principles of nationality, and the me- 
thod of grouping the scattered fragments of Aus- 
tria and of Mittel Europa in general, with respect 
to the safety and the territorial and commercial 
defence of the Western Powers. 

There is a conflict between the international 
programme of one or more of the victorious Po- 
wers and Wilson's American programme. 

Lastly, there is the conflict, or more properly 
speaking the aversion, or still more precisely, 
the hatred between the small nationalities which 
have issued from the ancient Empire of the Haps- 
burgs, and the struggle of the ambitions, the 

— 273 - 



vanities and the cravings of these nationalities 
amongst themselves or in respect of other nation- 
alities, neighbouring or distant or greater : ambi- 
tions, vanities and cravings which all together 
should contribute, with racial and historical ha- 
treds and aversions, to create that harmony, that 
concord, that blending of minds and hearts ne- 
cessary for the constitution and the government 
of the League of Nations, promoted and willed 
by the President of the United States, who is but 
a passing President — and in eighteen months' 
time may have as a successor an opponent of his 
ideas and an enemy of his League. 

Meanwhile, the varying conditions and the 
varying interests of the States represented can be 
seen by the conduct of the most authoritative men 
of the Congress. 

President Wilson, who has no enemies on his 
flank like France and Italy, and has only the 
Ideal City of his mind to build, is wandering to ! 
and fro, like Orpheus with his lyre, from Asia- 
tic to African shores, building walls to contain i 
the aspirations of nations or dykes to dam them, \ 
and temples upon the sole altar of which the re- i 1 
ligions of the future and the reasons of the finan- j 1 
ces of the United States may find a welcome. He I' 
is in a hurry, and it does not matter if the walls J 
are not sufficiently solid, the dykes are not of 
sufficient strength and the temples are not suffi- 
ciently crowded by the faithful. Provided the City 
be erected and the bank secure in the pomerium ! 

Lloyd George appears as if he were unconcern- 
ed in and indifferent to the discussions of the 
Congress. As a matter of fact, why should he 
excite himself ? England had but one aim in the 
war: to strike down Germany's naval power ^ 
which was threatening her on all sides and which, 

- 274 — 



with a little more patience, might have succeeded 
in prostrating her. Germany's naval power has 
been overthrown. The enemy's great fleet is all 
in her ports. The seas and the sub-seas are clear- 
ed of vessels and the horizon free from the Ger- 
man flag. England fears no one any more. She 
is, by now, mistress of herself and of her destiny. 
Why and wherefore should her Ministers tire 
themselves out in discussing at the Congress } For 
a piece of German Colony more or less; a man- 
date more or less in her spacious domains; for 
the glory of her old Colonial Empire ? She can 
even afford to free herself from European quest- 
ions, in which she only became involved, for the 
attainment of her sole aim, the overthrow of Ger- 
many. As to recovering the costs of war, she will 
see to that, presently, in the wide world. 

Clemenceau, on the contrary, is champing the 
bit. At the present moment, he finds himself be- 
tween Wilson — to whose aid and to whose ar- 
mies France owes a great part of the recovery 
after defeat and the final victory over Ludendorf 's 
armies — and Germany, which is undauntedly 
raising her head from Weimar and is speaking 
through Erbert, as yesterday she was speaking 
through the Kaiser. He cannot oppose Wilson; 
he must not not suffer Germany's challenge. His 
racial instinct would prompt him to fix a French 
stamp on Victory; but diplomatic propriety 
obliges him, instead, not to forget Wilson's ut- 
terances and actions, which were gratefully ac- 
cepted at the time of the greatest danger. A 
taciturn man up to yesterday, he has spoken at 
last, in support of Foch's military argument, and 
in opposition to Wilson's civil proposition. Both 
tlie one and the other (or the others) — Wilson, 
Clemenceau and Foch — are right, from their 



275 



particular points of view. If the League of Nations 
is to serve for the peace and the pacification of 
the European peoples, how can Germany, which 
constitutes the greatest nucleus of these peoples, 
be excluded; and, on the other hand, how can 
she be included, enslaved and in fetters } But, on 
the contrary, how is it possible to leave a nation 
which has been vanquished but is neither broken 
up nor in dissolution, alone in the midst of other 
nations which are disarming? 

In the midst of so many conflicting interests 
and opinions, Sign or Orlando by his judicial at- 
titude enables Italy to play the part of peace- 
maker. But we should like others to recollect that 
a sound and sure peace will not be attained in 
Europe until Italv has been rendered completely 
secure and well defended in respect of her ter- 
ritory and her peoples ; we should like to remind 
those who know and to inform those who do not 
know, that European peace has been shattered 
during centuries and centuries, ever since the 
time when, through our broken boundaries the 
Italian lands were invaded and the Italian peoples 
oppressed by barbarians of every caste and of 
every degree of bestiality; we should like, finally, 
those who possess sense, science and conscious- 
ness of nationality to be on our side to affirm and 
defend the Italian nationality of the lands situated 
on the Adriatic and along the whole of the Dal- 
matian coast, from Trieste to Fiume, Zara, Se- 
benico, Spalato, Trau and Ragusa; and that they 
would set on our Victory the same value which 
we have set upon theirs, namely, the value of a 
noble, pure and lasting triumph of Latin civili- 
zation over barbarian bestiality. 

If not, what would be the use of a vain effort 'f 
for peace ? 

_ 276 --- 



THE KAISER'S SUCCESSORS. 



No one who has followed attentively the trend 
of the internal movements in Germany during 
these last four years of war, can be astonished at 
the rise to power in the new German State of the 
so-called ((Kaiser's Socialists)). David, President 
of the Constituent Assembly; Erbert, President 
of the Empire; Scheidemann, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, these are the names of three men who 
signify and represent not a breaking up, but the 
continuation of the Imperial policy which they 
have accepted and supported during the war, and 
of which they now assume the charge, if not the 
responsibility, after the defeat. « Le Roi est mort; 
Vive le Roi! » is the formula of hereditary mo- 
narchies. (( With or without the Emperor ; Long 
live the Empire ! » is the new formula of German 
imperialism. In fact, according to the Weimar 
Constituent Assembly, there is not, in Germany, 
a Republic and a President of the Republic, but 
an Empire and a President of the Empire. After 
the disappearance of the Hohenzollerns, the struct- 
ure of the State remains the same as Bismarck's 
powerful hand had forged and welded it in the 
furnace of the wars of 1866 and of 1870. 

— 277 — 



At all events, these Socialists who are now at 
the helm of the German Empire are by no means 
the improvised knights of a political adventure. 
Men of industrious mind and of experience, train- 
ed in the struggle for the political and social re- 
vendications of the great labouring class, they are 
ripe for all the responsibilities of government and 
of State; and in their office and functions, and in 
a greater measure than their predecessors, who, in 
the end, were the representatives of nothing but 
a feudal caste historically fallen, they bring with 
them that authority, or rather that legitimacy 
which derives from the inexhaustible sources of 
popular conscience and will. Erbert's speech at 
the opening of the Constituent Assembly is the 
speech of a Statesman — (we shall see, later on, 
if acts will correspond to words) — the speech 
not of an individual only, but of an entire people 
which, whatever its faults, its aberrations and 
its errors may have been in the past, declares its 
firm purpose to live; and, in affirming this will, 
shows likewise that it takes into account the new 
difficulties which surround its existence and the 
unsuppressible exigencies of that sad reality: de- 
feat. Hence the announcement which has been 
made of the future programme, in the shape of 
a concise formula: Order and Labour, which is 
a formula of reality and also a formula of parsi- 
mony and intimacy: the usual formula of all 
wealthy families fallen into ill-fortune, of all com- 
mercial Companies hurled into the abyss of in- 
solvency. We are now a long way off from dreams 
and follies. Far away from Bethmann-Hollweg's 
brutal language and from the Kaiser's mystical 
rhetoric. We are floating along the sluggish cur- 
rents of modest humanity. 

The German maximalist Socialists themsel- 

— 278 - 



ves did not pass from dreamland to reality after 
the defeat, but during the course of the war it- 
self, when they demanded not only internal State 
reforms, but also the reform of their own Party, 
in order to enable them to attain, well prepared 
and well accoutred, to the Government of the 
country. 

Scheidemann's speech at the Wurtzburg Con- 
gress, at the end of 1917 can be said to have been 
the humus from which Erbert's speech at the 
Weimar Constituent Assembly sprang and blos- 
somed. 

There were sentences in that speech which it 
is not superfluous to remember to-day, after the 
assumption by Socialism of the Government of 
the State. 

— (( Without showing ourselves optimistic, we 
can foresee that at the next elections we shall 
obtain such an important influence as will allow 
us to assume all the responsibilities ourselves 
and not to entrust them to others... » 

— « But we must show prudence in making 
promises, and not give the people to understand 
that we are preparing for it a paradise on earth...)) 

— (( We must not, everlastingly, play the part 
of theoricians and agitators as in the past; but 
we must evolve a positive and practical policy...)) 

— (( Socialism is nought in itself : we cannot 
examine each measure to know whether it is a 
Socialist measure or not; we must find out whe- 
ther it leads to a practical issue. . . » 

— (( On every occasion we are being taunted, 
as if it were an insult, with being Government 
Socialists. Well, we must feel honoured by these 
taunts. We have gone beyond the time of mere 
criticism. We cannot continue to pass our lives 
in breaking windows. Let us abandon our ancient 

— 279 — 



dogmatism, and let us enter into the realm of 
reality... » 

Sense of reality is sense of Government; and 
when the German Socialist Party uttered the 
above sentences through the medium of the pre- 
sent Minister of Foreign Affairs, it showed itself 
ripe for governing. If they do not lose this sense 
of reality on the road, the Kaiser's successors in 
office will be able to ensure to the Empire a safer 
future than the Kaiser himself has done. 

Should the Allies be glad at this speedy re- 
construction of the German State ? 

If the Allies, at an early stage, thought that 
Germany, owing to her defeat, would have been 
incapable of finding in herself the necessary ener- 
gies for a prompt or a tardy resurrection, they 
cannot, certainly, be glad of the results of the 
Weimar Constituent Assembly. 

That they had so thought, and had mentally 
eliminated Germany from their immediate cal- 
culations and from their remote anticipations is 
shown by their strange conduct immediately fol- 
lowing the conditions agreed upon for the armi- 
stice. 

As long as Germany was in arms and repre- 
sented an implacable menace, the Allies remained 
united. But no sooner did the menace seem to 
have been dispelled and Germany appear to be 
overthrown and incapable of arising, the Allies 
became disunited: each of them stood aside, as 
if victory had not been the result of a common 
and combined effort ; each showed itself indif- 
ferent to the fate of the others; each wended its 
own solitary way, in which it almost hoped it 
would not meet its neighbour of the previous day 
face to face; each selected its own friends, heed- 
less whether they were friends or enemies of its 

- 280 — 



former brother-in-arms. And, amongst them all, 
Italy was and still is not a little surprised; Italy 
who, in her infinite good -faith was compelled to 
learn as new some old political and moral truths 
which it is now useless to discuss and to illustrate. 

But the Germans who, feudalists or Socialists, 
militarists or pacifists though they be, are always 
men of keen discernment, were not slow to find 
out the withdrawal — let us so name it — of the 
Allies from their primitive point of concentration, 
which was the German name; and when they 
had fully seen and felt that their old enemies were 
beginning to become indifferent to each other, 
they commenced to dare and to threaten on their 
own account. Erbert, as well as David and Schie- 
demann had always maintained Germany's right 
over Alsace-Lorraine, and the legitimacy of the 
annexation of those provinces after the war of 
1870. Erbert, as well as David and Schiedemann 
had always defended the policy of the Kaiser 
and of the Imperial Chancellery in the question 
of the absolute integrity of the Empire within all 
its boundaries. To re-affirm this right and to pro- 
claim this integrity was only therefore, to be con- 
sistent. Naturally, this demonstration of consi- 
stency would have been postponed to more fitting 
times had not German audacity thought to find 
resistance weaker and solidarity looser. The Ger- 
man sword showed its point through the inter- 
stices. 

In any way, I do not consider it an evil if the 
danger appears tangibly from time to time, and 
shows itself visibly now and then. It may thus 
serve to prevent the heedless from falling into 
new errors, and the foolish from agitating them- 
selves in new follies. 

Though it may be an easy art of pride to des- 



281 



pise the good that has been received, it is not 
useful political art to despise the recollection of 
the evil that has been suffered. Germany is the 
remembrance of that evil. Let it serve, at least, 
to recall every one together at the point of depart- 
ure, and at the concentration point of the war. 

The speedy reconstitution of the German State 
under the government of the Imperial Socialists 
must be considered from a twofold point of view ; 
that of Germany's internal policy, and that of the 
mutual policy of the Powers which were at one 
time allied against Germany. 

If these Powers continue to slacken the bonds 
of their Alliance they may be sure that, some fine 
day, sooner than they believe or imagine, Ger- 
many will be once more in their midst, stronger 
than before, more corrosive than before, more 
domineering and more revengeful. 

And this time, it would be for ever. 



282 — 



A LESSER AND WORSE AUSTRIA. 



Under a Yugoslave cloak, the Croats have 
drawn up, and sooner or later will end by reading 
and commenting before the Paris Congress, the 
Memorial of their pretensions, or, if the definition 
is more suited to their audacity, the Manifesto 
of their Imperialism. Was it not they who venti- 
lated even the idea of proclaiming Emperor the 
successor of the Obrenovic ? 

There is no limit to the Croats' aspirations. 

Do you remember the scene, in Manzoni's The 
Betrothed, of the Innominate' s return to his castle 
after his conversion ? The proud lord assembled 
all his bravoes in the great hall and, with extended 
arm, in the midst of a deep silence announced in 
a loud voice : « I release each one of you from 
the heinous orders which you have received from 
me». The bravoes, at that announcement re- 
mained thunder-struck; uncertain of one another, 
and each one uncertain of himself; some were 
chafing, some were making projects as to where 
to go to find an asylum and an employment ; some 
— says the author also — were making an exa- 
mination of their conscience to see whether it 
might be possible to turn honest men. 



283 



Amongst the bravoes in the service of Austria, 
you may rest assured, it was certainly not the 
Croats who considered the possibility of turning 
honest men. On the day following her defeat they 
still persisted in wearing the curl of hair on their 
forehead as they had always worn it (1). 

The domestics who stand for hours in the court- 
yards of the wealthy, end by learning many more 
things and knowing many more people than those 
who remain in the private apartments. They watch 
visitors and clients ascending and descending the 
staircase, and gather from the expresison of their 
countenance, all their thoughts and sentiments, 
and even their obscure and subdued words : they 
thus succeed in knowing precisely who are the 
friends or the enemies of their masters, and what 
are the springs which move their friendship or 
their enmity; and in the event of their master's 
ruin they are in a position immediately to decide 
upon the line of conduct which is convenient to 
them, and how to make use of acquaintances ma- 
de by them during their experience in time of 
service. After the downfall of Austria, the Croats, 
who had duly learnt who were the friends of Aus- 
tria and who were the enemies of Italy, did not 
have much trouble in tracing back the familiar 
faces they had seen at the foot of their former 
Lord's stairs. 

Owing to historical necessity, the Allies at war 
against the Central Empires, had not all to face 
the same direct enemy. Italy had to face Austria; 
England and France had to face Germany which, 



(1) The curl of hair (in Italian: ciuffo), on the forehead was a peculiar 
sign by which the bravoes, or hired assassins of the 16 th. and 17 th. 
centuries were known. The curl was, properly speaking, a long and 
thick tuft of hair which, during an attack or a fight was pulled over the 
eyes to hide the features of the assailant. 



284 



moreover, absorbed within herself Austria, Tur- 
key and Bulgaria ; and for various reasons of equi- 
librium, our direct enemy was not definitely eli- 
minated from the chessboard of negotiations by 
those narrow-minded Parties in France and En- 
gland which reckoned on all the elements of pro- 
bability in order to succeed in weakening Ger- 
many. 

The Austrian question always remained, at bot- 
tom, the tragic knot of the war and if Clemen - 
ceau's gesture — the gesture of a polemist — bare- 
ly succeeded in cutting it materially, it did not 
succeed in untying it, morally, in the disconcerted 
minds of those Parties which, after Austria had 
been defeated and beaten by our armies, did not 
give up the illusion or the hope of repairing her 
under the guise of Yugoslavia, and thus erecting 
that famous Eastern barrier against Germany 
which, during the war, they had never succeeded 
in erecting; without reflecting that, this time, they 
would end by erecting it exclusively against Italy. 
As a matter of course, the Croats immediately 
followed the road traced out by those dismal nar- 
row-minded Parties in order to co-operate in the 
plan, and became their instruments: one could 
more appropriately say their hired assassins, as 
befits the tradition of their trade. 

There is, in France and in England, a com- 
plete stock of old literature on the function of 
Austria and on the necessity of securing the per- 
formance of this function on behalf of European 
equilibrium ; a literature which had its greatest 
development during the period of formation of the 
doctrine of pan-Germanism, the movement which 
more particularly aimed at the overthrow of the 
political and commercial influence of England and 
France in Europe and in all the other parts of the 

- 285 - 



globe. If you open one of the books which form 
part of that literature, you will immediately 
discern, on reading the first pages, nay, the very 
first lines of the Preface, the nature of the senti- 
ments which inspire the fearful authors of those 
books, and the political aims to which they are 
directed. Read for instance the last of these books 
published by Mr. Steed. He attempts to demon- 
strate not only the essential unity of the territories 
of the Hapsburgs, but also that all the internal 
crises of the Danubian Monarchy are crises of 
growth, not of decadence; whence the necessity 
of co-operating with the House of Hapsburg in 
order to find and to effect the remedies which will 
best suit the prosperity of the Dynasty and of the 
Monarchy. — Read, likewise M. Weil's book. 
The whole Preface to the work, written by M. 
Leroy-Beaulieu, one of the most authoritative na- 
mes of the present French school, is one cry of 
alarm, a If ever Austria were to disappear from 
the map of Europe, the end of our old historic 
Europe would come » . Austria must be taken as 
she is : a she is the wor\ of Nature, besides being 
that of politics ». And not without reason, there- 
fore, he concludes with these words, which I 
should wish to bring to the recollection of many 
politicians and writers in France and in England : 
« Anything which may be put into the place of 
this ethnographical Babel will always be a more 
artificial construction than the existing one, wi- 
thout being more propitious to the liberty of peo- 
ples)). 

Now, this old literature is yet operating to Italy's 
detriment by means of its most poisonous and 
most dangerous venom. Because all those persons 
who, in good or bad faith cannot picture to them- 
selves a Europe bereft of Austria, believe that, let 

_ 286 — 



this State once disappear, they can be themselves 
reassured and secure the tranquillity of their de- 
scendants by the creation of another Austria, 
formed on a Croatian basis, more unreal and 
worse than the former one; and they thus show- 
how difficult to the human mind it is to conceive 
things and situations different from those which 
through unvarying custom it has been agreed to 
consider as necessary and permanent. How is it 
possible, for instance, to convince the writer or 
writers of the newspapers of the Northcliffe Trust, 
from the Times to the Daily Mail, that he is, or 
they are, not ten or twenty years behind the times, 
with their propaganda, but a whole century ; and 
that he, or they, are discussing, in Paris, in the 
year 1919, with the same mind and with the same 
fears with which their ancestors discussed in Vien- 
na in 1815 ? They perpetually see the shadow of 
Germany hovering round them, as their ancest- 
ors were continually haunted in like manner by 
the shadow of the great Napoleon; and with the 
exception of the few inevitable changes that have 
to be made, they think and act now precisely as 
those ancestors thought and acted in 1815. How 
miserably poor the human mind is, especially 
when it has the pretention of making the world 
anew ! The world, instead, remakes itself on its 
own account, slowly, deeply, internally, without 
the aid of the more or less pretentious pedagogues 
who, from time to time, seat themselves round a 
table, to reconstruct it at their will and pleasure 
— on paper. To attempt to rebuild a new Austria 
with the worst elements of the old one, under the 
cloak of Wilson's principles, is a vain and ridi- 
culous enterprize, which may even succeed to- 
day, when all hypocrisies, more or lesse veiled and 
masked appear to be successful, but which will 



287 



not and cannot succeed to-morrow when, freed 
from temporary forms and disguises, life will re- 
sume its normal rythm, and reality will impose 
itself upon mankind and make itself felt by 
means of its organic and natural forces. Do you 
really think that this is the first time that Kings 
and kingdoms which had no right to exist, have 
been defended and have have had men to defend 
them before a Congress ? At the Congress of 
Vienna, the pretenders actually paid the men 
who defended them. To-day it is possible that the 
defenders pay the pretenders. Idealism is so ca- 
pricious ! You remember where Giosue Carducci, 
in his moments of spleen, wished he could drown 
Idealism ! 

It is therefore needless seriously to discuss the 
Croats* Memorial. 

Why disturb the tragic silence of history and 
ethnography, and the less tragic ones of statistics 
and geography merely to establish and to know 
what is and where is Italy and where is Croatia ? 
Let us leave these illustrious academic exercises 
to the sportsmen of the new European idealism. 
The Croats, on their part, are quite right in inten- 
sifying their action and pursuing their trade vi- 
gorously in the hurly-burly of this idealism. They 
would be wrong if they were not audacious, now 
that audacity is the indisputable sign of the vile- 
ness of the race. 

They have found in the European Press many 
honest Jagoes who have placed them on a par 
with Italians, who discuss their desiderata on the 
same plane as Italy's desiderata; who treat them 
as combatants and victors in the war against Aus- 
tria and Germany on the same line of fire as 
Italy, and who invoke — oh, gracious bounty ! — 
Wilson's blessings upon their heads and upon 

- 288 - 



the heads of the Italians at the same time. They 
who, up to yesterday, were nought but the exe- 
cutioners of a sanguinary regime, see themselves, 
all of a sudden, robed in the toga and considered 
as judges in the same tribunals where the creators 
and the propagators of the world's Law are sit- 
ting. Why should they not aspire to an Empire ? 
Ay, they are perfectly right in aspiring to an Em- 
pire, and thus showing a supreme contempt of 
human kind and civilization, when they see that, 
after so many crimes committed on behalf of 
Austria, their old mistress, and after so much vio- 
lence against all laws divine and human, they, 
without a vigil of expiation, without even a bapt- 
ism of purification, can be considered as an in- 
tegral part of this humanity and of this civiliza- 
tion. Oh, I should like to see the Paris Congress, 
after the reading of the Yugoslave Memorial and 
on the uniform plea of the Daly Mail y assign to 
the Croats, forthwith, the half of Dalmatia, the 
half of Istria, the half of Trieste, the half of Go- 
rizia, the half of Udine — and, likevise, the half 
of the corpses of our dead, buried or unburied on 
all the sides of the Carso, and on the banks of the 
Isonzo and of the Piave. 

In the name of civilization and humanity, then, 
up, up, and be doing ! 



- 289 - 



THE SAME OLD STORY. 



A war, a revolution, a reaction: a short period 
of truce; then, again a war, a revolution ,a react- 
ion: another short period of truce; and then the 
same thing over again. Frequently the three events 
take place contemporaneously, on the same plan 
and on the same level, in the various countries 
of Europe: thus it happened at the time of the 
French Revolution; thus it happened at the time 
of the civil-religious wars, which were interwoven 
with the wars of conquest and of supremacy be- 
tween France, Spain and the German States : thus 
it happens now, during the sweet hours through 
which we are passing. And, in the midst of alii 
these storms, even Wilson's mission and Wilson- 
ism are by no means new or original. At the end 
of every war and every revolution, some indivi- 
dbals of good-faith and goodwill have always 
turned up to affirm, to predict and to propose so 
to arrange the world's affairs, that the war and 
the revolution just finished should be the very 
last. The whole political literature of all times is 
full of Wilsonism. Afterwards, things went on 
worse than before. Humanity possesses an inher- 
ent faculty which renders it always new to itself, 

— 290 — 



whilst keeping it always equal to itself: the fa- 
culty of oblivion. From one generation to the 
other, it forgets the ideas it has thought out, the 
words it has uttered, the actions it has accomplish- 
ed, and recommences, all over again, to think out 
the same ideas, repeat the same words and mimic 
the same actions; spurred on, as it were, by the 
inexhaustible energy of an hereditary law which, 
by means of various forms and figures, ever main- 
tains intact an equal physical and moral persona- 
lity which, from father to son, recommences al- 
ways the same existence under the illusion that 
an ever different life has been recommenced. 
What is to be done } Escape from this galley we 
cannot, and to back-water is inopportune whilst 
the boat's crew are exerting every nerve in the 
hope of gaining the illusive mirage of the harbour, 
But, meanwhile, how monotonous life is ! 

One day, a King of France decided upon rid- 
ding himself of one of his Ministers, the Marechal 
d'Ancre. The courtiers presented to his Majesty 
the Sieur Nicolas de THospital, Marquis de Vitry. 
— « And, Sire, were he to defend himself, what 
should I do ? — The King, who was the taciturn 
Louis XIII., remained silent. But one of the court- 
iers spoke in his stead. — « His Majesty intends 
that he be killed ». — And so it was done. — 
Another time, another King of France, Henri III., 
wished to get rid of another Minister, the Duke 
de Guise. Monsieur de Monfery was the executor 
of his Sovereign's command. — Once again, the 
same thing happened, in the case of Coligny. Why 
wonder, then, if the Wittelsbach have found 
Count Arco Walley, an ex-Captain of the Guards, 
to kill Kurt Eisner, the President of the Bavarian 
Diet ? In the vicissitudes of history, this is merely 
an episode of ordinary administration. Besides, 



291 



political crime is not a prerogative or an inven- 
tion of revolutionary Parties; it is also a means 
adopted by reactionary Parties for the purpose 
of revenging themselves for the power they have 
lost, or to strengthen a power which is tottering. 
Neither is it only revolutionary ideas which act 
— as Lenin's and Trotzky's act now — beyond 
territorial boundaries, amongst analogous Parties 
in other nations. Religious or, humanitarian ideas 
always act above and outside, and very often 
against, the conscience and the interests of na- 
tions. During the wars of religion, the French 
Catholics fought against the Protestant Govern- 
ments of France side by side with the Spanish 
Catholic armies ; just as the French protestants, in 
their turn, fought the Catholic Governments by 
the side of the Genevese armies. And were not 
Protestants surnamed « Huguenots » , from eid- 
genossen, that is, confederates, — of the Berne 
and Freiburg Cantons — as Socialists are to-day 
called genossen by their Nationalist adversaries, 
in order to confound them with their German 
comrades from whom they derive their doctrine 
and their means of action and organization ? As 
you see, not even the coining of words, through- 
out the course of centuries, bears the stamp of an 
excessive originality. 

To-day — and this, at least, might appear to 
be an originality — there happens in Germany, 
the contrary of what happened in France during 
last century. In the last century, the French Re- 
volution came to an end with the Empire ; to-day, 
the German Empire ends with a revolution. But 
these are merely formal syntheses and antitheses. 
The following might seem more substantial ar- 
guments, namely, that in order to change the 
feudal regime into a liberal regime, and to destroy 

— 292 - 



the royal power in order to create ministerial pow- 
er in France, a revolution was sufficient; whilst 
in order to obtain the same results in Germany, 
a European or rather a world war has been found 
necessary. For, after all, what is the true and pro- 
per historical result of the European war, if not 
that of the internal transformation, the transform- 
ation of the regime of the German Empire ? I am 
well aware that together with the Hohenzollern 
Dynasty, the dynasties of the Hapsburgs and of 
the Romanoff have fallen too; and with them the 
political structure of three Empires; but the dy- 
namic importance which the internal transform- 
ation of the German regime can exercise in Europe 
cannot be compared with that of the liquidation 
of the Austrian Empire and with that of the dis- 
integration of the Empire of Russia. When the 
tumultuous Bolshevic tyranny has exhausted , all 
its resources, and a new unitary or federal State 
has been formed by the peoples of Great and 
Little Russia on the ruins of Lenin's and Trotzky's 
dual Czarism, it can, from now, be predicted that 
this State will not exercise any decisive influence 
upon European civilization, as no decisive in- 
fluence will be exercised by the other States deriv- 
ing from the old structure of the Austrian Empire, 
unless they succeed in organizing themselves and 
in entering in the ways of peaceful relations be- 
tween themselves. But the same cannot be said 
of Germany, whatever may be her future adjust- 
ment and her future structure. Under the form 
of a Republic or of an Empire, the German nation 
will always remain one of the strongest and most 
resisting of European nations: a nation which 
defeat can, for a moment, overturn and prostrate, 
but of which it will never succeed in changing the 
nature, which is essentially active and efficient 



293 



and will ever find in science and in labour the 
methods and the means of renewing and re-as- 
serting itself. It is in this sense that I say that the 
political transformation of the German regime is 
the real and true result of the war; and that it 
may become as important, if not more important, 
to European civilization, politically and socially, 
as was the political transformation of the French 
regime in the Great Revolution. Because, after all, 
the Great Revolution, by destroying feudalism, 
acted socially as well as politically on European 
life, and created the possibility of a new endow- 
ment in favour of the middle classes which, up to 
that time, had been destitute of landed property 
as well as of social power. At present , other so- 
cial classes are alternately appearing before the 
ancient footlights of history, and endeavouring to 
don the helmet and the sword which, at one time 
and even now, they have been holding for the 
behoof of personages standing in the first row and 
belonging to the first category of the social scale. 
These reactionary movements in Germany, be 
they monarfTiical or Spartachian against the new 
Government may, therefore, succeed in perturb- 
ing the Chronicle of events, if this modest servant 
of history is a victim to neurasthenia, but will not 
succeed in offending or discrediting the disorder 
of things, which will always remain the same, 
throughout all forms of wars and revolutions, 
which are the political forms of the life and 
vitality of the human substance. Who can say 
what will be the function of the German nation 
in a regime of liberty ? Who can say what new 
labours of salvation or of death it will prepare for 
an unsuspecting world ? This will be the surprise 
reserved to future generations ; to whom I , on my 
account, bequeath the legacy of this interrogation, 

— 294 — 



in the hope that some newly-born reader with eyes 
still damp with dew, will send me a reply when 
his eyes will be wet with tears as those of his 
parents or relations are now, to the world beyond, 
to the asphodel meadow where I shall wander, a 
restless shadow, longing for news of future wars. 

For, if the Kingdom of the Lord was not re- 
established on earth by Jesus Christ, two thousand 
years ago, it will not, by any means be re-esta- 
blished within six months or a year from now, 
by the Council of Ten at the Paris Congress. 

And new wars will happen again to-morrow, 
as they happened yesterday and the day before 
yesterday, instigated as of yore by the High Lord 
of War who, if he is not, personally the Kaiser 
any more, will again be collectively, as he was 
since remotest times : the People of Germany. 



— 295 



THE NEGLECTED FACTOR 
OF THE PARIS CONGRESS. 



History, or legend, has taught us that Plato, 
before passing from active life to a contemplative 
one, gave a banquet to which he invited his 
friends. The handsomest courtesans and the most 
dissolute Athenians were his guests at the glo- 
rious feast, which was intended to represent the 
last temptation of worldly pleasures to the great 
pupil of Socrates, who was on the point of loosen- 
ing the hydroplane of his genius from Pleasure's 
shores to proceed on the journey towards the sea 
and sky of the Ideal. The experiment was succes- 
ful. Plato, penetrated on open wings in the in- 
visible atmosphere of his Republic, where he still 
abides, in serene beatitude. Following his traces, 
many other pure minds, in the course of D3'gone 
centuries have unsuccessfully attempted Plato's 
pleasing adventure. With the aid of the most 
fantastic motors of modern aviation, our illustri- 
ous diplomats at the Congress of Paris are cer- 
tain, or pretend to be certain, of finally discover- 
ing the particular star in which Plato has planted 
the ensigns of his Republic, and of hanging on 
the rays of that luminous halo the augural wreath 
of the nations of this very old Europe, of whose 



296 



destiny they have assumed the care. It is not 
without emotion, therefore, that we read the glad 
tidings which the greatest Plato of the United 
States has brought to his countrymen on setting 
foot on the soil of his Republic; namely, that 
(( European peoples feel, by now, lightened of 
the great burden of distrust, and feel moreover, 
that they are on the eve of the day in which the 
nations will understand each other and will asso- 
ciate to obtain the prevalence of Right ». In fact, 
as aviators tell us, whilst flying one feels the sen- 
sation of this moral and physical « lightness » . 

Plato started from life and from the banquet 
which was to leave him a vague recollection of 
life, on his journey in search of the ideal Repu- 
blic. Contrariwise, the Delegates at the Congress 
of Paris have started from the Ideal Republic to 
descend to this lowly world and regulate the af- 
fairs of its existence. They, in fact, independently 
of any earthly care, independently of any paltry 
contingent consideration, as philosophers say, and 
of any still more paltry estimate of near and tan- 
gible elements of reality, have created, of their 
own accord, the Society of Nations, in the ab- 
stract, just as they have imagined that it ought 
to be and to work; they have duly supplied it 
with an outfit of laws and regulations; they have 
even inaugurated it — still empty, of course — 
with appropriate speeches; and* their task ac- 
complished, they are now making a tour in search 
of the dispersed nations which are to inhabit it, 
as at one time emigration agents used to send 
their emissaries on tour in the countries of Eu- 
rope to enrol labourers desirous of leaving their 
firesides and of abandoning their native soil to 
emigrate to far-off America, to till the ground 
and construct railways. A rather perilous enrol- 

- 297 — 



ment, I should think, with the present cravings 
and the relative conditions of the human market, 
judging by the pretensions which the various com- 
petitors are advancing against one another: the 
King of the Hedjaz and Venizelos ; Venizelos and 
Turkan Pacha — Turkan Pacha and Trumbic and 
Korosec; without taking into account the other 
rivals who remain m the shadow, or on one side, 
or behind, awaiting the opportune moment to 
issue forth into the daylight to demand their com- 
pensation or to dictate their conditions. An extre- 
mely difficult problem, this, of emigration from 
the real world to the world of ideal; which, wi- 
thout doubt, will eventually give the Delegates at | 
the Paris Congress more serious trouble than the 
priests and the poets, the undesirables of the 
Ideal Republic, ever gave to Plato. And I do not 
think that the admonitions and the « solemn 
warnings » imparted, from the very first meetings, 
to the lesser nations will have any resolutive effi- 
ciency. Besides, are differences of quality and 
quantity conceivable only in the category of the 
Ideal? It would be the same as authorizing dis- 
cussion in the sphere of divinity, that is to say 
the sphere of the absolute. 

The illustrious Academicians at the Congress 
of Paris have forgotten, in the vestibules of the 
great Salle de I'Horologe, a little thing which 
might perhaps have had some importance in their 
negotiations and their discussions : a little thing, 
a small trifle which may even excite derision at 
the recollection of it : the War. 

They have arrived in Paris placidly, serenely, 
candidly; as if each had started from his village, 
from his home full of rosy-cheeked and prat- 
tling children; from his School-house full of 
abaci, maps and geographical globes; from his 

- 298 — 



library full of books and catalogues — and not 
from the blood-stained fields, and not from the 
destroyed cities, not from the countries convulsed 
by death and terrorized by the fury of the strug- 
gle which has been fought on land, on sea and 
in the air by the noblest and most fiery genera- 
tions of the nations of Europe. And they have 
seated themselves round a table to discuss, with- 
out delay, the ideas, great or little of their minds, 
the conceptions, great or little of their schools, 
the systems, great or little of their philosophies; 
but, of the sacrifices undergone by the peoples 
which they have the honour to represent, of the 
blood spilt by the nations which they are in duty 
bound to defend and to protect — blood and 
sacrifices which are, and must remain, the sacred 
sources of Right after the war — not a word ! 
And it is this silence on the event, this indiffer- 
ence towards the concrete and positive fact of 
the war, that have rendered possible these ridi- 
culous and repugnant disputes on merely verbal 
points, in the name of this or that principle, en- 
gaged in between all the intriguers, all the agi- 
tators, all the jobbers of all the backslums of 
Europe, and tending to establish the reign of their 
ignominies and of their nationalities on the blood 
and on the sacrifices of others. 

It is impossible to read the list of the dead, 
wounded and missing during our war, published 
yesterday by the Ministry of Marine, and at the 
same time read the report of the logomachies of 
the Paris Congress without itching to slap the 
face — oh, jokingly, to be sure ! — of Humanity, 
for the forgetfulness which, from one day to 
another, it shows of its fiercest tragedies and of 
the sense of responsibility which these tragedies 
ought to create and nourish for the behoof of 

- 299 - 



morality in public and private life — if it be true 
that the problem of morality in public and 1 pri- 
vate life is to be, in the future as well as in the 
present, a problem of responsibility. 

What ? Italy has lost (and what I say about 
Italy must be applied to France and to Belgium, 
the nations which have suffered the most from 
the war), Italy has lost some three millions of 
men, between killed, wounded, sick and missing, 
and together with these men she has lost so im- 
mense a portion of her labour accumulated in 
wealth; and the discussion of her questions is 
to take place on the same plan as that of the 
poltroons and scoundrels who have waited until 
the storm was over to expose to the sun of ideals 
their bellies filled, up to yesterday, with the leav- 
ings of the kitchens of the House of Austria ; and 
the resolution of those questions are to depend 
upon their good pleasure, and be subject to agree- 
ment between themselves ? 

This political and moral iniquity is only pos- 
sible because the Academicians of the Paris Con- 
gress have mentally suppressed the war from 
their negotiations and discussions, and have based 
the foundations of that, which they illude them- 
selves will be the future peace of the world, upon 
an ideal Charta, and not upon the reasons of the 
war which has been fought, and on the sacrifices 
which the nations that have taken part have con- 
tributed to it. Following the old lines of contro- 
versy against Germany, they have continued in 
the Salle de VHorologe, in firing their verbal ar- 
tillery against militarism and Prussianism, which 
were the targets of that controversy, without con- 
sidering that over and above apparent causes, a 
war has always a raison d'etre of its own in the 
condition, requiring mutation, of the nations 

— 300 - 



which, more or less willingly, are obliged to un- 
chain it or to accept it. Italy's raison d'etre for 
the war resided in Austria's overwhelming pres- 
sure at her shoulders on the Alps, and at her left 
side on the Adriatic which rendered her material 
development and her political and moral indepen- 
dence in Europe impossible — so that the result 
of the victorious war and the destruction of Aus- 
tria could not be any other than the creation of 
a new condition and a new order of things which 
should prevent the formation of a new Austria, 
capable of producing and apt to produce the same 
constraint and the same dangers which victory 
has succeeded in eliminating. 

But properly to understand this and, conse- 
quently, to create this new condition of things, 
it is necessary to remain standing in the field of 
historical reality and discuss of peace keeping 
one's foot firmly planted on the ground-work of 
the war, and with one's mind always turned 
towards the reasons for which Italy has entered 
the war and lost, in the struggle, three millions 
of men and three fourths of her wealth. 

If, for Italy, the Treaty of Peace is not of such 
a nature as will put an end to, and satisfy these 
reasons, it is a morbid illusion to think that peace 
will be obtained for the ancient land of Europe. 

A peace of ideas is a peace without a past or a 
future. Ideas have always served to divide men, 
not to unite them — or to unite them, if at all, 
in Parties and factions. 

And nations are not artificial and transient crea- 
tions, as factions and Parties are. 



— 301 



A LITTLE MORE DISCRETION, PLEASE! 



Prince Alexander of Serbia does not possess 
the virtue of silence. Whilst on his travels, he 
speaks too much and, what is worse, does not 
reflect before speaking. Apparently, he is a man 
to whom conquest is easy : he pricks pins on the 
map and in the holes left by the points he places 
the pillars of his throne. The ancient barbarians, 
instead, used to mark the boundaries of their con- 
quests with their sword. Do you remember the 
bold warrior who said : a The kingdom of the 
Goths will extend to this point » and planted his 
sword in the sea, off Reggio ? The sea which, in 
those parts is rather capricious, amused itself by 
swallowing his sword and the remainder of his 
armour. 

Prince Alexander of Serbia, then, before return- 
ing to his Balkan konak deigned to state to the 
Marseilles correspondent of Le Matin, that he has 
an urgent needof Zara, Spalato and Antivari, 
in order to create a State, all in one piece and, 
naturally, all of one faith and one tongue; and 
assured the aforesaid correspondent that the bu- 
siness would be greatly to the advantage of the 
Congress and, as a matter of course, to humanity; 

— 302 — 



"because, as you are aware, in these times, Hu- 
manity is printed in big type on all the posters of 
the war and of peace, as at one time were the 
popular dramas Charles the Sapper and Dora, 
or the Spies. Now it cannot be denied that Zara, 
Spalato and Antivari are fine seaside cities, and 
as such are likely to excite the most immoderate 
desires of an ambitious conqueror. But that they 
should be pre-destined to serve as troughs for 
those illustrious animals which abound in Ser- 
bia, and which it is agreed not to call by their 
proper name, although under all kinds of deno- 
minations they serve to the botulism of mankind, 
I really do not believe; and, at least, as far as 
Zara and Spalato are concerned, which, of the 
three, are dearest to the hearts of Italians, I hope 
not. Could not, therefore, Prince Alexander find 
other outlets from which to forward his herds ? 
At one time, Salonika seemed a godsend. Why, 
therefore, attempt to make the water of the Adria- 
tic muddy 1 

I have not the slightests desire to write disagree- 
able things against the Prince of Serbia, or against 
Serbia, which was so sorely tried by the war; 
although as an Italian I would have every reason 
to do so. Every reason: for it rarely happens to 
meet with, in history, a greater, how shall I say ? 
indifference or nonchalance, on the part of one 
country towards another country which has been 
its benefactor. It is well-known that Italy twice 
refused to follow Austria in her designs of aggres- 
sion against Serbia; it is likewise notorious that, 
after the dispersion of Serbia, Italy hastened to 
her aid, and by the effort and the valour of her 
Navy, the King, the army and the Government 
of Serbia were safely rescued; and this notwith- 
standing the fact that, after Italy's entry into the 



303 



war Serbia had done her utmost to render Italy's 
situation in the face of Austria most difficult, and 
had refused, under futile pretexts, to attack Aus- 
tria on her side in order to relieve the task of the 
Italian Army on its side. But this is ancient his- 
tory; and we are now thinking of the history of 
to-morrow. This does not signify, however, that 
between ancient history and that of the future 
there should not be found sufficient links to justify 
and render possible, discussions and negotiations 
appertaining to the actual fleeting moment, which, 
by the way, is not a pleasant one. 

Now, in this fleeting moment, and with regard 
to Serbia, the following fact must be noted: a 
fact which does not redound to the honour of 
the Paris Congress and of its Academicians who 
have allowed it, and continue to allow it, namely, 
that Serbia has extended her domain of her own 
accord, arbitrarily and surreptitiously, by the an- 
nexation, effected before the adjudgment to her 
had been pronounced, of two nations belonging 
to the defeated Austrian Empire; two nations 
which were most fiercely hostile to Italy, one of 
the Allied Powers, and which had been fighting 
against her up to the very hour of the Battle of 
Vittorio Veneto. And whilst Belgium, which, for 
her Spartan -like sacrifice to honour deserves every 
regard and assurance for the future, is denied the 
slightest increase of territory, Serbia is allowed 
to effect the greatest possible aggrandizement, ac- 
complished not with the forms of the Society of 
Nations, but with those peculiar to that other So- 
ciety which, in criminal life and to signify the 
greatest insult to honour, is called the Onorata 
Spcieta, or « Honoured Society » : — the Camor- 
ra. How and wherefore, and by means of what 
iniquitous complicity has such a phenomenon 

— 304 — 



been possible and, worse still, been accepted ? 
How and wherefore in consequence of this phe- 
nomenon which is entirely new in the annals of 
diplomacy, can the representatives of Belgium, 
France, England and America be gathered to-day 
in the same hall, together with the representatives 
of Slavonia and Croatia, one of whom had even 
been a Minister in the last Royal and Imperial 
Cabinet of Vienna, the Seidler Ministry } In any 
case, and whatever the complicity may have 
been, the chief responsibility rests with Serbia 
which, by disguising Slovenes and Croats as 
Serbs — whilst they, by what it seems are not 
anxious to have anything in common with her, 
and are showing a preference for a federal Re- 
public of their own, instead of wishing to subject 
themselves to the rule of Prince Alexander — 
not only has purloined from Italy a not indifferent 
portion of what Italy justly claimed in the war 
but has also given a juridical personality or legal 
standing as Allies to those who were Italy's most 
ferocious enemies during the war. How can our 
Delegates at the Congress have accepted, on 
their part, this situation of affairs; and why, not- 
withstanding the too ingenous and too hasty 
acquiescence on the part of the other Delegates, 
they should not have contested the credentials — 
evidently false and inadmissible — of the Slovene 
and Croatian Delegates, blended with those of 
the Servian Delegates, is not easy to understand; 
and, in any case, if any error was committed, it 
was not a justifiable one. Neither from a diplo- 
matic nor from a moral point of view is the pre- 
sence of Slovenes and Croats at the Conference 
tolerable. Not from a diplomatic point of view, 
because they are enemies of the Entente; not 
from a moral point of view, because they are 



— 305 — 

20 



inferior to the other Powers in the scale of civi- 
lization, and, consequently, incapable of exercising 
any rights. In one of the Articles of the League 
of Nations, a precise distinction is made, in the 
question of mandates, between nations capable 
and incapable of free choice ; and this distinction 
is specially applied to the peoples of the Ottoman 
Empire. 

Now, is not the different treatment used towards 
the Slovenes and Croats of the Austrian Empire 
a glaring injustice and a still more glaring cruelty 
towards those peoples ? 

It is, therefore, natural that those who have so 
successfully plotted this deceit to Italy's detriment 
should believe they can still dare all things and 
advance unlimited pretensions, in the hope that 
their audacity may find, in some dead angle of 
European interests, and in some unexplored region 
of American finance, a suitable ground to culti- 
vate. But when audacity reaches the point of dig- 
ging its claws into the pure Italian flesh of Zara 
and Spalato, it stops being an attempt against 
International Law and against property, and as- 
sumes the form of a criminal assault. 

And, in that case, nothing remains but to apply 
the branding-iron. 



— 306 — 



AN EXPONENT. 



M. Trumbic's Memorandum cannot be thrust 
back to the small gaol whence it issued, without 
some kind of verification and some consequent 
observation. 

These, I hasten to declare, not in reference to 
M. Trurnbic's action. 

Owing to an instinctive repugnance towards 
anything that is false or vulgar, we have always 
refused to occupy ourselves with this noxious in- 
dividual, even when he was being led through 
the streets of Rome as a living miracle — the 
miracle of Croatian devotion towards Italy — 
and we shall not occupy ourselves with him to- 
day, when the Memorandum unveils and reveals 
to the most blind, of eyesight and of mind, what 
big pearl was hidden in the Yugoslavian rosy 
shell. But the phenomenon cannot be denied. And 
we will discuss the phenomenon, and not the in- 
dividual, who is and must be kept at a distance, 
absolutely, from any discussion of a political or 
moral order. 

All the minor Powers, or the newly formed 
Powers, such as Bohemia, Poland and Greece, 
which possess a particular raison d'etre' of their 

— 307 — 



own, and a special right of their own to attain 
the highest grade in autonomous life in European 
civilization, have, at the Paris Congress, repre- 
sentatives of their function and their mission; 
men of enlightened mind and conscience, who 
may not perhaps succeed in being convincing 
in all their arguments, but who cannot fail in 
inspiring the profoundest respect and the deepest 
sympathy for the labours they are engaged in, 
which is, after all, the continuation of their long 
apostolate and the expression of the ideals or of 
the dreams of their nations during centuries 
gone by. 

But Yugoslavia is represented by a man who, 
owing to his mind, his character and the work 
he is engaged in doing, cannot be included 
amongst or confused with the representatives of 
the other small States which are aspiring to pea- 
ce: a man who is neither a politician, nor a wri- 
ter, nor a jurist, nor a diplomat as Benes, Zarnor- 
ski and Venizelos are — and who is not even a 
refugee, a martyr, a rebel, a soldier, a propagan- 
dist of any species or weight, who has in him, in 
his soul, in his conscience or ori his body the signs 
of the heroism of the sacrifices and of the suffering 
of the nation in whose name he speaks and acts ; 
but who is simply a cheat, a swindler, who was 
yesterday in the service of Austria, and who is 
to-day serving interests of a more unavowable 
nature than those he served in Austria's behalf; 
a low-born swindler, a mixture of Cagliostro and 
Scapin, without intelligence, without eloquence, 
without literary knowledge; furnished only with 
the puny art of mendacity, the puny industry of 
braggadocio, the puny resources of sleight-of- 
hand; a swindler, in fine, whom you would not 
care to receive in your house — (and Signor Son- 

— 308 — 



nino was truly well -inspired in not wanting to meet 
him, either at the Foreign Office or elsewhere) — 
and in whose company one could not be seen in 
public without feeling humiliated. And it was 
only in a turbid and tumultuous period of war, 
such as we have just passed, during which, un- 
fortunately, one has been obliged to use any kind 
of wood to make fire with, that he has been able 
to thrust himself forward as the counsellor and 
leader of a people ; and of such a people ! The 
representative is worthy of the nation he repre- 
sents. The exponent is worthy of his employer. 
Talis Trumbic, talis Croatia. One and other are 
outside the pale of law and civilization. 

It wanted a swindler of his stamp, unscrupu- 
lous, indiscreet, bereft of discernment, unaccust- 
omed to public business and without any idea of 
civilized life, to create a Memorandum like the 
one he has created, or to divulge it as he has 
done, in the hope that it might, perhaps, be ac- 
cepted or, at least taken into consideration, I do 
not say by the Powers, but by the persons who 
are most obstinately hostile to the Italian cause. 
That Memorandum is not only the sign and the 
proof of its author's inferiority, but is also the 
sign and the proof of the inferiority of the Balkan 
race which goes under the name of Croatian and 
Slovene; and of its utter incapacity to rise to a 
higher grade of political probity. To imagine that 
a handful of mere incoherent monsense can take 
the place of incontrovertible facts unfolded in the 
open sunlight, on the field of battle and on the 
sea; to imagine that a statement, a denunciation, 
an anonymous letter (and what other value can 
be set by the Entente Powers on that Memoran- 
dum if not the value of those contemptible means 
used by police confidants to initiate or legitimize 



an action against persons against whom they have 
a grudge ?), can destroy a pact, a treaty, an Al- 
liance, welded in blood and for the sake of his- 
tory ; to imagine that a suggestion and the advice 
offered by the first comer, the promises and of- 
fers made on paper by an irresponsible person, 
the conjectures and hypotheses put forward by 
an incompetent man possessing neither function 
nor authority, can avail to lead others into tempt- 
ation or into error; to imagine all these things 
together means declaring one's own qualities. 
And, as a matter of fact, the author of the Me- 
morandum qualifies himself for what he really 
is : a tool of the Austrian police ; of that Austrian 
police which, as at one time it hatched up reports 
and built up prosecutions against Italian citizens, 
so now it hatches up reports and builds up pro- 
secutions against the Italian State and against the 
Italian Army and Navy in the lump. Whether a 
servant of Austria or not, the, Croat is ever the 
same. 

But, can it be said that, notwithstanding the 
meanness and the vulgarity of his action, M. 
Trumbic has not done us any harm } 

He certainly has done us a great and a most 
serious harm. 

In the first place, by deceiving Italian writers 
and political men who were more easily influen- 
ced by insinuations and illusions than by analysis 
of men and ideas, he has created a real and ef- 
fective secession in the field of public opinion 
which, although of limited proportions, has ne- 
vertheless seemed of sufficient importance abroad 
owing to the names of the individuals and to 
their participation in the national war policy. 
Availing himself of this secession and with the j 
complicity of our open and masked enemies, he ' 

— 310 — 



has been able to create the legend of our impe- 
rialism and obtain credence for it, abroad; and 
by means of this legend he succeeded in under- 
rating the importance of our national aspirations, 
the legitimacy of our conquests and the results of 
our victory. By instilling a prejudice into the 
minds of the Delegates of the Entente at the Con- 
ference with the legend of our imperialism, and 
with that of the discord prevailing in Italy on the 
initial problem of boundaries and claims, he has 
rendered the work of our own Delegates more 
laborious and more painful, diverting it into a 
controversy which was purposely designed to 
cause time to be lost as in reality it suceeded in 
doing, during the Delegates' work of persuasion 
and refutation ; thus obstructing its speedy action 
and its still speedier execution. During this con- 
flict he has finally rendered possible the orienta- 
tion and the polarization of purposes and errors, 
of interests or even suspicions hostile to Italy and 
the Italians. 

Unfortunately, Trumbic won his first battle in 
Italy, not abroad. And the point of departure of 
his success abroad was not his propaganda, but 
the discord he left behind him in Italy, and the 
skilful utilization of this discord, the evident 
marks of which can clearly be seen in the Me- 
morandum. 

The importance of this Memorandum can be 
attributed more to the coincidence which it re- 
veals between the political reasoning of its author 
and the initial arguments of controversy of the 
Italian supporters of the Pact of Rome, than to 
the nonsense about the Italian Army and Navy 
which it contains. 

Trumbic *s Memorandum is in perfect unison 
with the campaign of his supporters in Italy in 

- 311 - 



the questions of the struggle against Sonnino, the 
struggle against the Pact of London and the strug- 
gle against Italian imperialism (alas !) ; it is in 
unison with that campaign in the minor details: 
in the ethnical, political and geographical consi- 
derations put forward; in basing the political ar- 
gument on Slav democracy as against the small 
groups of the Italian bourgeoisie which aspire to 
imperialism. And, what is worse, it is in unison 
with it in the effect to obtain from Wilson (who 
is not bound by the Pact of London), the reco- 
gnition of the ideals of Slav democracy, in oppo- 
sition to the small groups of the Italian bourgeoi- 
sie. The following sentence in Trumbic's Memo- 
randum ought to send a cold shiver down the 
backs of Trumbic's Italian friends : « Public opi- 
nion in Italy is prepared to accept the decision of 
America on the Yugoslav conflict)). And this 
explains the reason why the proposal in favour 
of Wilson's arbitration was made to the Congress. 
Italian public opinion prepared — over and abo- 
ve the decimation with which Italy is threatened 
— to accept an arbitration ? It is an offence and 
a lie. Because Italian public opinion is prepared 
for something quite different. But I should not 
like, oh, pro- Yugoslavs of Italy, I should not like, 
in the presence of the shadows of our dead, to 
have on my conscience the attempt to prepare 
it to such and end. 

I believe that, after reading the Memorandum, 
many of Trumbic's old supporters must feel the 
necessity of making an act of profound contrition. 
But that is their own affair. 

Meanwhile, let the Italian Delegation do its 
duty. 

Signor Orlando! On resuming your journey to 



312 



Paris remember that you will return to Italy, on 
this, or it is safer to stay away. 

On this; namely, on the shield which bears 
the revendications of Italian right intact, and the 
satisfaction — all the satisfactions / — of the 
Italian blood shed during the War. 

A happy return I 



- 313 — 



ON THE EVE OF DECISIONS. 



We will discuss the « great principles » and 
the (( great universal constructions » after the Con- 
gress has given its decision on the questions refer- 
ring to the insignificant realities of our war, and 
to the negligible constructions of our land and 
sea borders, for which so much sorrow has been I 
expended and so much blood spilt. If the « great j 
principles » and the « great constructions » enter j 
within the boundaries of our realities, we should j 
have no reason to advance any protest against j 
them, nor to exercise our irony upon them; if, | 
on the contrary, they are of such a nature as to I 
offend those realities, or show themselves unable ; 
to recognize or to understand them, we shall then i 
advise our Delegates to do without them ; I mean ! 
to say / shall, for the infinitesimal part which 
appertains to me. As to other people, they can, I 
of course, if they wish, amply take advantage of i 
the liberty of being, or seeming to be, idiots, and ! 
of allowing the young squadrons of humanity ! 
which will cross the earthly or celestial spaces in j 
motor cars and aereoplanes in the after war pe- j 
riod, to laugh at them behind their backs or over 
their heads. 



3,4- 



All the arguments explaining our demands have 
been, by now, fully stated and illustrated. A long 
war of three and half years* duration has not 
been sufficient; and a longer history of three 
thousand years and more — (how many yeaTS 
have gone by in vain, since the day, in which 
the She-Wolf first offered her milk for the nutri- 
tion of the human beast, in order to render it 
fit for civilization !) — are not sufcient, it seems, 
to convince the Judges of Peace of our rights and 
of the rights belonging to the Italian peoples scat- 
tered along the ultimate shores of European bar- 
barism : even if a Memorial has been found neces- 
sary; a Memorial of the same type of that (oh, 
shame !) presented by the quondam servants of 
Austria; a kind of conclusive plea, in fact, like 
those addressed to the Court in cases of litigation 
over a right of thoroughfare or over a trespass. 
And, oh, supreme sorrow, this conclusive plea 
has had to be presented, besides having been 
drawn up by the citizen of Trieste who for thirty 
years has represented Rome in the Italian Par- 
liament. Rome, which acted, through him, as the 
representative of all the unredeemed cities ; as if 
his name were not sufficiently eloquent to signify 
the aims and the ideals of our war ! But it is to be 
hoped that, after so many words, facts will be 
initiated; and that these facts will correspond to 
rights : true rights v , authentic rights, historical 
rights — reconsecrated by sacrifices and illumi- 
nated by the light of all ideals. Because, believe 
me, all the rest is nothing but bestiality. 

M. Pasic, who gathers in his flowing beard all 
the errors and all the faults of his enemies and 
ours; enemies of yesterday and of to-morrow, 
has had the not-too bright idea of allowing some 
of those faults and errors to fall out of his beard, 



315 



whilst combing it in the offices of the Paris Jour- 
nal, thinking, perhaps, to bury under such a plenti- 
ful fall, all the arguments and all the methodical 
reasoning of the Italian Memorial. « The Pact of 
London », he said, passing his hand like a comb 
through his beard, which is anything but Cato- 
nian: «« but we are not acquainted with it; and 
we do not recognize it, because we were not pre- 
sent when it was signed, and, besides, Wilson's 
docrine is opposed to secret treaties ». Holy 
chastity of Balkania ! But, in whose name and of 
what does M. Pasic speak ? In the name of Yu- 
goslavia } It is quite evident that Yugoslavia 
could not be present when the Pact of Lon- 
don was signed, for the very simple reason 
that the two so-called nationalities which, together 
with Serbia, would now like to form her, were, 
at that time, on the other side; on the enemy's 
side, and were fighting against Italy and against 
the Entente; and were, moreover, receiving their 
pay and their orders from Vienna, and not from 
London. Or, does he speak in the name of Serbia 
only ? But the Pact of London was precisely the 
pact concluded by the great Powers in the great 
war, to save, amongst other things, Serbia her- 
self, which had been devastated and destroyed 
by the soldiers of the Central Empires amongst 
whom the most ruthless and the most ferocious 
were precisely the Croats and the Slovenes. To 
protest against the Pact of London, not to recogn- 
ize the Pact of London because it does not bear 
the signature of the ex-Minister of the Seidler 
Cabinet who, together with Trumbic, is now 
buzzing round the Paris Congress as a represent- 
ative of Yugoslavia, is an act of insolence towards 
the Powers of the Entente, which may put for- 
ward ignorance as an excuse if, as a thousand 



316 



signs indicate, it were not aggravated by bad- 
faith, and, without offence to anyone, especially 
Balkan bad-faith. We would therefore advise M. 
Pasic to let the Pact of London alone, which is 
something which does not concern him and can- 
not concern him, neither as the representative of 
Serbia, nor, much less, as a representative of Yu- 
goslavia, the soulless tricorpor in this war. Let 
him also leave Wilson alone. There are no theo- 
ries, as there are no laws, which can be applied 
retroactively, except in the case of criminal com- 
pacts which have no place in any Code of Law, 
national or international. The Pact of London 
merely contains conditions subscribed to by Pow- 
ers allied for the war, in view of an enemy to 
overthrow; and this enemy once fallen, to deprive 
him of all that he has acquired by force and has 
kept by force during long centuries. The posthum- 
ous opposition to secret treaties has nothing what- 
ever to do with the Pact of London; because it 
principally refers to treaties concluded between 
States in time of peace without the knowledge 
and the consent of peoples and of their respective 
political representatives; and, in reality, it is extra- 
neous to the Pact of London, considering that the 
knowledge and the consent of the allied peoples 
are implied by the very act of war. Were the 
revendications contained in the Pact of London 
and for which it fought, unknown, perhaps, to 
the Italian people } Some renunciation, determin- 
ed by special conditions and oppositions on the 
part of one of the Powers may not have been 
known ; but that renunciation has been withdrawn 
and healed to-day by the unanimous will of the 
nation which, with one voice, demands that Fiu- 
me be included amongst her revendications; and 
even before it had been withdrawn and healed 

— 317 — 



by the will of the nation, it had 1 become null and 
void in consequence of Russia's withdrawal from 
the Alliance; it having been Russia who had 
demanded it. Finally, neither did Wilson, on 
entering the circle of war, ask for the abolition or 
the annulment of old treaties concluded by other 
countries ; a thing he could not do — and, if any- 
thing, he himself would have proposed, or the 
Powers of which he became the last Associate 
would have proposed, new ones — because 
whether new or old, whether public or secret, 
treaties are necessary to give assurance to the 
peoples that are fighting, and to serve as guides 
for the sacrifices which have to be undergone and 
the aims that have to be attained. Peoples which 
fight inconsiderately, adventurously, without pre- 
cisely knowing why, are outside the pale of 
history. It is only in the Woods that killing is 
done for the sake of killing, or to snatch away 
the piece or raw meat from the mouth of a feroci- 
ous rival. 

Therefore, let these Balkanians, who, it may 
be said, are not yet born to existence within the 
Law refrain from exercising their minds in juridi- 
cal previous questions, of the kind which M. Pa- 
sic is hawking around from Corfu to London, and 
from London to Paris, as if they were stupendous 
problems before which the sun ought to stop 
rotating, and the wind to stop blowing. These are 
nugae, as our forefathers called them in Latin — 
silly things, as we would say — which should 
not even obtain the honour of discussion amongst 
persons of juridical common sense ; if, unhappily, 
this juridical common sense had not all fallen, 
together with the blood of combatants, in the 
pits of the war; and there had not remained at 
the surface but the vanity of some old idea or of 



318 



some old saying which feeds upon corpses in 
order to revive the colour of its old feathers a 
little, and make them appear as new. It behoves 
Italians — who should, at least, do penance for 
the too many errors they have committed to their 
own detriment in this war — to array themselves 
in such feathers no more, but to abandon tran- 
sient patterns and go back to the cloth of the great 
Italian tailors. I would suggest to our publicists 
and political men a course of Guicciardini. 

Meanwhile, let our Delegates in Paris follow 
Guicciardini *s dictates. Let them not lose them- 
selves in running after the flies and drones of 
other peoples' ideals. For Italians there can be 
only one ideal, now: that of obtaining that Italy 
may issue from the war unified and without any 
break of continuity. 

Unified and fortified. 

Because Force is a personage who has not vet 
spoken her last word in the history of mankind. 
And it would be ridiculous for Italians to think 
that she is dead and buried together with the for- 
tunes of the Hohenzollerns and of the Hapsburgs. 

But I have not yet lost all hope in the elasticity 
of the valves of the old Italian political heart. 



— 319 



GERMANS AND YUGOSLAVS. 



During the last few days, the French Press has j 
resolutely taken up its stand by the side of the I 
Italian reasons and we cannot help being glad i 
that the brotherhood in arms which yesterday j 
allowed us to beat the enemy on the field of battle ' 
should be perpetuated in a brotherhood of ideas ! 
and purposes, which will to-morrow render it ' 
possible for the two nations to draw from their 
victory the greatest possible benefits, which should j 
be finally summed up in mutual security and in j 
the security^ of European civilization of which 
they are the most trusty exponents and the most [ 
faithful guarantors. 

A struggle between France and Italy on the 
ground of diplomatic conflicts would have been 
a very moral and political monstrosity of discord, 
and even worse, after the common war; that is, 
after the noble and strenous effort accomplished 
by the two nations with the object of returning 
to the point wheje Bismarck had divided them 
and had kept them disunited for thirty years; a 
monstrosity aggravated by the fact that the Bis- 
marck of the new separation would not have been 
a great victorious diplomat, but a mere Trumbic, 
issuing forth from the tortuous back-alleys of Aus- 
tro-German corruption ; a mere tool of Balkan bad- 
faith, operating amidst the free peoples of Europe 
in the name of principles which he and his peers 
have always disowned and fought against, at so 

— 320 — 



much per day, in the service of the Ministers and 
of the Archdukes of the Vienna of old times. 
France and Italy could not repeat their former 
error, in such vastly different conditions, without 
dishonouring themselves and making known even 
to the barbarians of all species and of all hordes 
that the « gentle Latin blood » is incapable, even 
in war, of holding in a bond of unity the peoples 
which boast of having their veins full of it. Fran- 
ce and Italy could not re-open the old book of 
mutual distrust, of mutual suspicions, and of by- 
gone conflicts which resulted in their common 
damage and favoured their common enemies and 
aggressors. To make an experiment of brother- 
hood during peace: here is a new and original 
problem which should excite the intellectual cu- 
riosity and the aesthetic virtuosity of the two 
countries on both sides of the Alps. But can such 
an experiment be possible ? 

In Europe are by now clear and evident — 
even, it is to be hoped, to the most monomania- 
cal levellers of ethnography — only two ferment- 
ations resulting from the war: the German fer- 
mentation and the Yugoslavian fermentation; the 
Rhenish fermentation and the Balkan one. In 
whatever way you wished to reform the geogra- 
phical map ; on whichever idea and principle you 
wished to reconstruct the States, you will infal- 
libly find at the bottom of the European vessel 
those two fermentations ever ready to act by their 
own natural impulse, and ever ready to befoul 
the waters and to corrupt the atmosphere, and to 
leave neither rest nor peace to the peoples which 
are so fortunate as to live within their radius of 
infection. Which is Serbia's greatest vanity ? 
That of giving herself the airs of a Balkan Prus- 
sia. Prussia: so as to subdue, to absorb, to annul 

— 321 — 



the neighbouring peoples, and leave no rest to 
the more distant ones. With the excuse — also a 
Prussian one — that she is suffocating within the 
circle of her native forests and mountains, and 
that she is in need of somebody else's sea, in 
order to enable her to evolve and progress. So- 
meone else's sea — the infinite. 

If the Editor of the Times, who appears to have 
the ambition of cutting out for himself in Yugo- 
slavia the Empire which an ex-Lebaudy (the bro- 
ther of le Petit Sucrier) once intended to cut out 
for himself in the Sahara, were to turn his me- 
mory a little more on the causes and origins of 
the European war, he would probably see that 
by his oblique and iniquitous campaign against 
Italy he is only encouraging precisely the same 
controversy and the same struggle which Germany 
once sustained against England. What was the 
argument which Germany used against England 7 
It was the following: ((Empire, for England, re- 
presents the past: for Germany, the future. Why 
should Germany trouble herself for England's 
reasons ? Owing to robbery or cunning, England 
is in possession of a fifth of the habitable globe ; 
she must yield up to the labours of a younger 
Germany that which she possesses owing to rob- 
bery or craftiness. It is in vain that England pro- 
tests that she has no aggressive designs against 
Germany. The mere existence of the British Em- 
pire is, in itself, a continual aggression against 
Germany's own existence. Whilst the robber 
State lives and prospers on the life of others, Ger- 
many claims the right of laying snares for it to 
fall in, and of arming herself in order to overthrow 
it. And wh«y does Germany claim such a right ? 
Because, enclosed as she is, between the North 
Sea and the Danube, between the Rhine and the 

— 322 — 



plains of Poland, she will suffocate if she does 
not expand ; and her expansion can have no other 
limits but those of the British Empire. If Napo- 
leon did not succeed in ridding the earth of that, 
which Heine calls the most obtuse, the most vul- 
gar, the most bourgeois and the most unbearable 
of all the Empires, will Germany, by means of 
her thought, her labour, her weapons and her 
kultur, succeed in ridding the world of it ? » — 
And it cannot be said that, impelled to the exe- 
cution of the great enterprize, Germany, with all 
her enormous preparation, was not within an ace 
of felling the colossus which Napoleon had barely 
succeeded in scratching. But the danger once over, 
there are some Englishmen of the Steed type (I 
do not venture to generalize as far as the point 
of offending the susceptibilities of the numerous 
supporters we have and wish to keep in the no- 
ble nation of our ancient friendship), a type, in 
fact, made up more of presumptious German in- 
tolerance than of fine British structure, who are 
endeavouring to renew on behalf of Yugoslavia 
and against Italy the controversies which Germany 
sustained against England. « Why should Yugo- 
slavia trouble herself about Italy's rights (national 
rights, let it be noted, not imperial ones) ? Those 
rights represent the past. And Yugoslavia repre- 
sents the future. Why should Yugoslavia trouble 
herself about Italian civilization in the Adriatic 7 
That civilization signifies Rome and Venice — 
that is, two Empires which have no longer any 
reason to exist — whilst Yugoslavia signifies the 
youth, sturdy though barbarous, of a people which 
will have to make its own way on the sea even 
if it has never shown any seaman-like tendencies 
(Germany, before aspiring to substitute herself for 
the British sea force and power had, at least, 

- 323 - 



constituted a great sea force of her own!), and 
does not even know how to handle the rudder of 
a small fishing boat. Lastly, can Yugoslavia re- 
main stifled between the Balkan mountain gorges 
and the affluents and confluents of the Danube ? » . 

— And to think that she has remained so well, 
there, for so many centuries ! 

But the truth is only one, and it is the following : 

— Both Germany and Yugoslavia possess a sub- 
stratum of barbarism which can only rise to the 
surface by means of explosions of war, and which 
can be compared to water which boils in a pot and 
causes the pot lid to fly into the air. The German 
lid, which all the sciences and all the arts have 
contributed in forming, is of a greater weight, but 
it is not sufficiently resisting, however, to with- 
stand the pressure of boiling Nature. The Yugo- 
slav lid hardly exists, as no science or art has yet 
succeeded in modelling or ornamenting it. Each 
of them represent a permanent danger to France 
and to Italy, unless the Paris Congress succeeds in , 
erecting strong dykes to contain both one and the | 
other in the future, near or remote. How is it pos- j 
sible to imagine that Germans will give up the j 
idea of making war, when they have lived upon | 
nothing else but this idea during centuries and I 
centuries; and when, with this idea they have j 
crossed their own history and other peoples* ? I 
And how is it possible to imagine that the Yugo- ' 
slavs will depose their war weapons when, in the 
service of the House of Austria, they have known 
nothing else but those weapons in the countries 
of the old Empire ? Of these soldiers of fortune 
they would now make a free people, a civilized 
people, a people, forsooth, which may even dis- 
pute the rights of the Italian nation in European 
civilization ! But, although we have no reason 

- 324 - 



whatever not to promote the improvement of ra- 
ces — there are, in fact, so many Societies for the 
improvement of the canine and equine races — 
we have no reason whatever to lower our own race 
to the level of that of the Yugoslavs which, besid- 
es, still remains to be formed. We have only one 
task to perform, a task which yesterday was 
Rome's and Venice's, namely, to sweep clean 
all the Islands of the Adriatic, all the lairs and all 
the centres on the Adriatic shores, of the barbar- 
ous and factious elements which might disturb 
our peace and the peace of Europe by their dis- 
orderly violence and their traditional raids. It is 
the same task which France has to perform on 
the banks of the Rhine. 

All the rest is, truly, nothing but bad literature 
and worse philosophy. 



- 325 - 



BUSINESS IS BUSINESS. 



It is generally admitted that the Year of Grace 
during which the Congress of Paris is sitting and 
is attending to the felicity of human kind is 1919, 
and not 1815. It is likewise generally admitted 
that the Congress of Paris of 1919 is all vibrating, 
like a sounding-board, with the pure principles 
which are most calculated to ensure human kind 
from war, pestilence and famine and from other 
similar calamities ; unlike the Congress of Vienna 
of 1815, which possessed neither human bowels 
nor ideal guitars with which to serenade the moon, 
but which busied itself solely with the ambitions 
of shifty tyrants. Finally, it is generally admitted 
that all those persons who are attending to the 
felicity of human kind round the table of the Con- 
gress of Paris, would rather have their feet cut off 
than to set them down in the field of interests, 
removing them slightly from the field of princi- 
ples, and, it is superfluous to add, from that of 
Wilson's Fourteen Points. The Bourbon of Na- 
ples, the King of Saxony and other Monarchs 
whose thrones were tottering ominously are not 
there to open their purses as in 1815, to author- 
ized diplomats so that these might zealously de- 



326 



fend their hopes and their crowns at the Con- 
gress. Who. would dare to do likewise, now, 
with such a penury of Kings and crowns ? To- 
day, it is known, secret diplomacy is scarcely a 
faint recollection, and everything is done in the 
light of day and in that of electric lamps. Even 
business. Read the leading articles in newspapers 
published in the great capital cities. 

Have you ever doubted that there could be any- 
thing else, in the English market, but a stroke 
of business behind the Press campaign in favour 
of Yugoslavia? I hope not. When we expressed 
our doubts, the idealists belonging to the beatiful 
Italic kingdom (Italy, as you know, is an inex- 
haustible mine of imbecility), always replied, 
whilst they patted us on the shoulder in sign of 
compassion : — « Certainly not ; you are not 
acquainted with the mechanism of the English 
soul: it is an entirely Garibaldian mechanism (in 
fact where did Garibaldi receive a more hearty 
welcome than in England?), a mechanism which 
moves in Law, emits Justice and is irradiated by 
the Ideal. The eagerness to protect and support 
small nations is inborn in the English soul. And 
our dear Steeds possess a mechanism of their 
own, which is their soul, but which is English, 
every bit of it ». — And it is well. But as I am a 
total abstainer and a vegetarian, and detest roast 
beef and red wine which idealists are so fond of ; 
fonder perhaps than they are of Croats and Yu- 
goslavs, I have never entertained any doubts on 
the political and moral motives of the Press cam- 
paign promoted by diminutive Talleyrands (oh, 
very diminutive, and particularly lacking in the 
grace and the spirit of playing the simpleton pos- 
sessed by the Duke of Dino) against Italy and in 
favour of Yugoslavia. « Excavate in Rome and 

— 327 — 



you will find bones of Christians » — said the Ca- 
tholic orator. « Excavate deeper » , replied the 
humanist writer, « and you will find the bones of 
Pagans ». Whilst excavating, we have found, at 
last, hidden behind the rights of the Yugoslavs 
over Fiume and the Adriatic, the interests of the 
shareholders of the Cunard Company. 

Previous to the publication of the news by the 
newspapers, we had received some warnings ori 
the subject from friends in London. One of the 
letters said, amongst other things : — « It appears 
that behind the pro-Yugoslav campaign are the 
interests of a great English Navigation Company, 
If this be true, our cause is as good as lost; as 
when interest is concerned, the English ne demor- 
dent pas, they do not loosen their hold'; and the 
British Government does not think it has suf- 
ficient liberty of action to be able to oppose the 
interests of British Shipping and the Press which 
supports and represents it » . We handed the let- 
ter to those who might find some use for it; and, 
owing to that cool sense of responsibility which, 
in the case of total abstainers and vegetarians is 
often sounder than in the case of those whose 
blood is too heated by red wine and red meat, we 
refrained from speaking of the subject in public, 
so as not to kindle unpleasant controversies with 
the Press of a nation with which we wish to re- 
main, and must wish to remain friends. But now 
that the information is widely diffused and from 
Paris it has been published in all the Italian 
newspapers without being contradicted or cor- 
rected; now we cannot help saying that no worst 
act of brigandage was ever attempted against a 
friendly nation than this, which a certain English 
Press and a certain ring of English capitalists are 
attempting, to the detriment of Italy; that no 



328 



knavish trick was ever so iniquitous and so de- 
testable as this, which, under the excuse of prin~* 
ciples of race, if not of nationality; under the 
excuse of the protection of small nations and small 
States, these individuals are attempting to com- 
mit against a nation which is just issuing, covered 
with blood, from a fierce war of three years' du- 
ration. Ah, the handsome knight -errants roving 
about, for the love of their Ladies and for the 
glory of the great Lord of Heaven ! Ah, the hand- 
some Crusaders, undertaking expeditions for the 
liberation of the holy sepulchres of oppressed 
peoples ! Let us be candid : the Germans, at least, 
were more sincere; or rather, and without com- 
parison, they were truly sincere. They had their 
philosophy, their politics, their diplomacy, which 
they proclaimed, asserted and imposed upon 
others, without any disguise, without any hypo- 
crisy, without any mental restrictions ; crudely, 
cruelly even, but also fairly and uprightly. They 
openly said, from the tribune of the Press, from 
their Professors* chairs, from the Throne, that 
they wanted to conquer the markets of the world 
for their own glory and their own salvation; not 
for the glory of God and the salvation of man- 
kind ; they said that they wanted to suppress 
small and great States, friendly kingdoms and 
hostile Empires, in order to plant on their ruins 
their greater power and their still greater Kultur. 
They were playing an open game. But someone 
is cheating here, Gentlemen ! In the name of prin- 
ciples, Italian cities are being staked to-day on 
the gaming table of diplomacy, by means of cards 
which are not precisely those which Wilson has 
brought with him from the White House. Here 
punting is effected on the « auto-decision of peo- 
ples » and one wins, instead, « Cunard Company's 

- 329 - 



Shares » . Ah, pardon me ! Police intervention is 
absolutely necessary here ! 

I trust the English Government will look well 
into the game of a certain Press and of certain 
Companies in the City. A Government based upon 
public opinion must search for the sources of 
that opinion and must learn from what subter- 
ranean currents such sources spring and resound 
gurglingly on the foot-path. We are well aware 
that in Parliamentary systems, Ministers are cons- 
trained to follow the foot-path and the various 
classes which encumber it. But there is, and 
there must be, a limit; the limit represented by 
the rights and the interests of other countries, 
especially if they are friendly and Allied coun- 
tries, and above all, Allies of war. In no country 
is it permissible — and much less in a country 
which wishes to be considered as the leader and 
standard-bearer of all the liberties — to engraft 
the interests of this or of that private Company 
on the tree of the great international questions, 
in order to deform them or suffocate them. And 
the Congress of Paris, which aims at the consti- 
tution of the Company of Nations, cannot be 
reduced to the proportions of a Stock Exchange 
wherein take place speculations on shares of other 
Companies which are taken care of by the Com- 
mercial Code of Laws, and which are not pre- 
cisely the Nations of the world. 

If possible, an eye should be kept on the foot- 
path, or on the pier! 



330 



TO ACT BY EXPERIENCE. 



Although discussion is useless whilst the Jury 
are considering their verdict, let us go on discuss- 
ing, or better, let us continue to philosophize, so 
as not to lose the habit, on the uselessness of good 
and evil; that is to say, on the vanity of human 
affairs. 

Wilson, then, has recovered his wonted health, 
and is about to busy himself with Italian affairs, 
We have also learnt, from newspaper rumours, 
that before solving the question posed by Iapan 
on the equality of coloured races he intends plac- 
ing the Ocean between his person and the Salle 
de VHorologe, but not before having decided on 
the fate of Fiume. It is to be hoped that, with 
regard to Fiume, he will find 1 in himself a good 
inspiration for a just decision. 

In himself — for one must never be diffident 
of the good inspirations of honest and upright 
persons; and Wilson's friends say that he is a 
model of uprightness and honesty. 

Does the error into which he has fallen in res- 
pect of Italian affairs arise more from other peo- 
ple's action than from his own will > You will 
Temember that, in one of his speeches which he 

_ 331 — 



delivered here, in Rome, he stated with much 
ingenousness, and with no less sincerity, that he 
regretted not having known our country before, 
and not having done enough for it, during the 
war. Our friends are always requiring to discover 
us twice, before they are able to appreciate us. 
The worst is, that they always discover us too 
late, and when they can do nothing more than 
express their sorrow for having \nown us too 
late: just as it happens in a famous melodrama. 
Thus we who, unlike our French and English 
Allies, did not receive the aid of the armies and 
of the Navy of the United States, have now only 
the pleasure of enjoying the graces of the Presi- 
dent's idealism. Men and arms, none; but many 
ideas. And to think that with ideas, in so many 
centuries during which the Italian brain has 
thought for itself and for others, we are so richly 
endowed ! But it is our fate to revel in super- 
fluities. 

To tell the truth, it is not all other men's seed 
that which now fructifies to our detriment in 
Wilson's mind. When the President was in Ame- 
rica, it was the task of the Allies, directly, or 
indirectly by means of their Yugoslavian bravoes , 
to promote a propaganda campaign against Italy. 
But when he had set his foot on Italian soil, it 
became the task of Italians themselves to com- 
plete the propaganda of the Allies arid of their 
l>ravoes. Here, amongst us, he found everything 
that was necessary definitely to fix his ideas and 
his conceptions. Here, in our midst, he found 
civil war on the question of the Adriatic; here, 
in our midst, he found the orators and the theo- 
rists of our wrong rather than of our right. What 
could the good judge do, if not add the evidence 
gathered on the spot to that with which our ene- 

— 332 — 



mies (or, if you prefer, our Allies) had supplied 
him , on the other side of the Ocean > It is true 
that, according to the Military Penal Code (we 
are in a regime of war) the evidence given by the 
parents and relatives of the accused is of no value 
and is not admitted. But in politics every-thing 
is of some use; even parricide; for everything 
becomes public opinion. And in democracies, as 
you know, public opinion is the foundation of 
all power and the basis of every bestiality. Oh, 
for Lycurgus' knife ! Perhaps you have forgotten 
why and wherefore Guicciardini used to call for 
the knife of Lycurgus in Italian life. And it is 
useless that I should remind you of it. In the mean 
time, I invite you to read Whitney Warren's ar- 
ticle in he Temps. Many Italians ought to feel 
ashamed on reading that article, which is so rich 
in historical and political truths, so vibrating with 
justice and humanity, and which they never 
would have dared to write, nor to think. 

Let us pass on. 

Let us speak of English friendship. 

We were scarcely born to life, when our fath- 
ers used to whisper into our ears the words of the 
Grand Old Man against the Bourbons : « Nega- 
tion of God ». And we, who had not known the 
Bourbons, but only the fear of God, grew up in 
admiration of England for the love of Gladstone, 
even after we had commenced reading history 
by ourselves and learning, for instance, that 
Queen Victoria had been one of the bitterest op- 
ponents of Italian unity and that in 1 860 and 1 866 
the supporters of Austria in the English Parlia- 
ment were not less industrious and efficacious 
than the present supporters of Yugoslavia; with 
this attenuating circumstance in their favour, 
which cannot be advanced by the Steeds and 



333 



Northcliffes, that in I860 and 1866 England was 
not a war Ally of ours, as she has been up to 
yesterday and still is now — not without some 
profit in the moment of extreme peril, to herself 
more than to us. In any case, I repeat, the recol- 
lection of Gladstone's phrase (for we live more 
on memories than on anything else), was the 
kernel of the tradition of our friendship with 
England; a kernel which grew and developed 
to the point of effecting the overturn of our policy 
of thirty years' duration when our ex- Allies of 
the Triple Alliance pointed their guns against the 
British Empire. But it is not worth while reviving 
the beard of the war with a dye of youth. 

It may perhaps be more useful to remember, 
now that a summary of events can be drawn up, 
that notwithstanding tradition, brotherhood of 
ideas, common principles of freedom and other 
like matters, our dissention with England has al- 
ways been unsurmountable whenever it was the 
case of definite action and definite resolution in 
which our direct or indirect advantage was im- 
plied. 

There was a moment in which the problem of 
our front imposed itself upon the Allies, not 
unaccompanied by danger signals — a problem 
which, had it been solved according to the ideas 
of our General Staff, would have resulted in the 
breaking up of Austria two years before the Bat- 
tle of Vittorio Veneto, and, consequently, accord- 
ing to deductions arrived at by Ludendorf and 
by Boroevic, the breaking up of Germany would 
have taken place two years sooner. But the po- 
licy of England, which did not want to point her- 
guns against Austria, opposed the project of our 
General Staff; and our front was abandoned to 
our own defences, which although it represented 

- 334 - 



an heroic effort, was at that time insufficient to 
beat and destroy the strong and experienced army 
of the Hapsburgs. Thus hundreds of thousands 
of dead continued to make of the Carso our Cal- 
vary and the bulwark of the Entente. 

Again : during the period of secret negotiations 
between Austria and the Entente, who can say 
that English policy did not strive its utmost to 
induce us to renounce or to tear up the Pact of 
London ? 

Lastly: during the war, and more especially 
after victory, did not London become the centre 
of agitations against Italian aspirations and was 
•not the most influential English journalism the 
inspirer and the protector of those agitations } And 
did not the ^English Delegates at the Conference 
raise, from time to time, the various proposals 
of Messieurs Trumbic, Pasic and Vesnic, which 
had been formulated by the last named person- 
ages and agreed upon in accordance with the 
writers and inspirers of the most influential Press 
of England? Frankly, a closer coherence than 
this, between the supporters of the English policy 
detrimental to Italy, and its executors cannot be 
found. 

Nor do I render these facts and actions of our 
Allies evident for the purpose of diverting the 
Italian mind from war Alliances; I bring them to 
view simply to fortify that mind and to accustom 
it to consider both Alliances and Allies in the 
light of reality, and not in that of memories and 
of fancy. International life is an e very-day expe- 
rience; and if it be a grave error (an error, the 
consequences of which we can now estimate) to 
act in that experience with the ideas and the pas- 
sions of previous days, it is a no less grave error 
to alter our course or change our direction every 

— 335 — 



time a wrong is inflicted upon us, or at every 
delusion which we come across on our way. We 
are, and must remain England's friends, and 
friends of our Allies because, during the war, we 
have woven a web of interests which can and 
must be extended in the future ; and it would be 
mere folly to widen its meshes instead of tighten- 
ing and unifying them. But this does not mean 
that we should give up discussing openly, freely 
and thoroughly the terms of our friendship and 
refrain from summing up the acts of our solida- 
rity. A great people proves its efficiency by the 
elimination of its superfluous or aberrant factors 
and by its system of making use of its own factors 
which are necessary to its action. Up to now, we 
have not succeeded in doing the first of these two 
things, and we have shown our incapacity in or- 
ganizing the second. We have thus obtained the 
minimum of results with the maximum of effort, 
whilst for instance, our competitors in the Adria- 
tic question have succeeded in obtaining without 
any effort, the greatest result, which, if nought 
else, would be this : to checkmate our very vict- 
ory, which was the Entente's decisive victory. 

At all events, it is sufficient for the present to 
confirm that for some reason or another, we find, 
arrayed against our most simple and elementary 
reasons and against our most logical and natural 
aspirations, the idealism of some, the egotism 
of others and. the materialism of yet others; and 
we find, moreover, questions which for their very 
essence should be undiscussible or, better, inad- 
missible, elevated to the dignity of discussion. 

There must be a reason why everybody should 
find the way to act against us, whilst we show 
no other tendency but that of wishing to agree 
with all; there must be a reason which at present 

- 336 — 



escapes our perception, but which to-morrow will 
appear plain and evident to our less remote de- 
scendants. Nevertheless, this reason must be 
found ; for we must needs understand and, having 
understood, act, with sure experience. 

To understand, especially, whether the damage 
exists in our machinery or in the machinery of 
others. 



— 337 — 
22 



AND IF NOT, NO ! 



The Congress of Paris is every day falling 
deeper into incoherence and futility, It was to have 
given back to the world peace and security for 
centuries and the centuries of centuries to come, 
and has not succeeded in finding an agreement 
even for a transient truce. It was to have applied 
the most pure principles of justice and humanity, 
and no sooner has it succeeded in enunciating 
one of these principles than it feels the imme- 
diate necessity of destroying it by means of an- 
other contradictory principle, or of eliminating 
it by means of a previous question. It was to have 
created the constitutional Charter of the political 
and "moral unity of the peoples of the Universe, 
and has not succeeded in drawing up and for- 
mulating even the most simple agreements re- 
quired for the relations of good neighbourhood, 
which, up to yesterday, mere custom was suffi- 
cient to define and regulate. It was to have pro- 
claimed the absolute dominion of ideas in inter- 
national life, and has only succeded in the end, 
when it has succeeded, in sanctioning the most 
subtle compromises between the strong to the 
detriment of the weak and between people of the 



338 



same race to the detriment of those of a different 
one. It was to have inaugurated new methods of 
negotiation and discussion, and has ended, by a 
process of elimination, in becoming a narrow 
Sanhedrim of four priests, in perpetual fear of 
one of their number who wishes to assume the 
character of Moses, and who has not yet found 
the rod wherewith to divide the waters of the 
Red Sea and lead the peoples which are not his, 
to the opposite shore. What more ? It was to have 
rendered impossible the intrigue, the corruption, 
the bribery, the jobbery and the obscure dealings 
of all kinds which engraft or superpose themsel- 
ves on the great interests of Nations and States; 
and has, instead, rendered possible iall these 
ignoble and criminal aids to diplomacy to an ex- 
tent they never reached in the past ; whence may 
be seen, for^ instance, in the Adriatic questions, 
groups of English agents, journalists and inter- 
mediaries successfully operating to keep in check 
the rights of a great victorious Power like Italy, 
and creating new situations in the Entente, which 
were unsuspected and unsuspectable at the mo- 
ment of the Alliance and of the war. Metternich 
and Bismarck^ from the halls of their Valhalla 
must indeed smile at all these glories of the new 
democratic diplomacy. 

But will this diplomacy finally succeed 1 in con- 
cluding a Treaty ? 

Certainly, from the very beginning, it has 
shown itself capable of doing anything — com- 
posing a book of verses or verselets, creating a 
Bible, a liturgical chant, a heroic poem, a pasto- 
ral symphony — but a Treaty, that is to say, an 
agreement, a public act which will determine con- 
ditions, define obligations, formulate pacts and 
laws, not in the infinite and for eternity, but in 



339 



restricted limits of time and space, with the in- 
tent of solving precise questions, for known per- 
sons (persons juridical and persons dramatical); 
a contract which is not Rousseau's, and which 
will not aim at establishing a theory about man- 
kind that a subsequent theory will cover with 
ridicule or hurl into nothingness; a contract, in 
short, such as private citizens and constituted 
authorities have always stipulated in order to 
conclude a transaction or conclude a war : no, by 
no means ! To demonstrate this it would be suf- 
ficient to mention the fact that the illustrious Con- 
suls of the Two Hemispheres have started by 
discussing a question which could, and should, 
have been the last: the question of the League 
of Nations (they knew not which, and how many 
of these Nations would be dignae intrari), thus 
consuming in one day all the fuel of the discus- 
sion, which they will now have to rekindle in or- 
der to include the amendments on the Monroe I 
Doctrine, or to exclude the proposals of the Ja- 
panese Delegation on the equality of races — 
whilst, after five months, the essential questions, 
the territorial questions are still standing on the 
threshold awaiting to be introduced and to be 
solved : the questions for which the Congress wae 
called together, the very questions of the war for 
which the armies have fought and the contending j 
Nations have impoverished themselves and have j 
been thrown into mourning and into the gloom j 
of death. These things unfortunately, are taking 
place in the Congress: philosophy is stifling his- i 
tory; phantasy is stifling reality and rhetoric is | 
stifling the science of government. And the des- 
tinies of Nations are depending not from their 
rights and from the sacrifices they have undergone j 
to assert them and render them triumphant; but | 

- 340 — 



from the consent, the condescension or the diges- 
tion of this or that of the four members of the 
Congress, who may be more or less well disposed 
or badly informed. Given this situation, the hy- 
pothesis may be put forward that our reasons will 
be crushed down and our aspirations will be 
ignored. And in such hypothesis what is to be 
done ? 

We have not waited until this hour to give a 
reply: we replied ever since the danger became 
apparent; ever since we discovered that error 
and ill-will had taken possession of the minds 
and the souls of our Allies. There are not two 
replies, as there are not two solutions of the ques- 
tions; there is only one. We have not attended 
at the Congress of Paris to hear our Allies tell us 
where Italy begins and where she ends, or to per- 
mit her ancient structure and her supreme defen- 
ces to be modified. Italy is what she is, what Na- 
ture, History, wars and sufferings, during centu- 
ries have made her. We do not present ourselves 
before the Congress to have her formation cor- 
rected, but simply to call attention to the fact that 
after four years of war we have reintegrated her 
in all her parts and freed her from every conta- 
mination and every oppression of the enemy. And 
the Congress, cannot, in decency, do other than 
take note of this state of fact. To discuss the Ita- 
lianhood of the Italian territories of the Adriatic ; 
to discuss the adjudgment of these territories after 
their manifestation, which corresponds to their 
essence, towards Italy, would be the same as to 
annul the labour of the war and to annul the rea- 
sons of the war as well as those of Nature. By 
so doing, the Congress would take the place of 
Austria, would continue the personality of Aus- 
tria and the work of denationalization vainly at- 



341 



tempted by her at the acme of her struggle and 
of her oppression. That Wilson should aspire to 
become the Metternich of this Congress, and 
Lloyd George its Tisza, we cannot believe. But 
if it were so, we ought to prevent, for the sake 
of their reputation, and the reputation of the coun- 
tries they represent, that they should carry their 
aberration too far. Can it be that they want to 
put themselves in Austria's place, become the 
lords and masters of the Adriatic, and 1 internatio- 
nalize that sea > 

No treaty of peace can obtain Italy's consent, 
or can be signed by the Italian Delegates, if it 
contains a renunciation of Italian lands and peo- 
ples; or if it contains an abdication of the abso- 
lute and legitimate influence of Italy over her sea, 
that sea which has been too long contested and 
wronged. 

It is no longer the style of political literature of 
our times, but Mr. Wilson can read the following 
words in Mazzini's works, with which Genoa 
the Proud has presented him as a gift of welcome ; 
words which, in the biblical style of the great 
Prophet of nationalities reveal the whole religion 
of Italian aspirations : « The curse of Cain awaits 
whoever shall forget that, whilst one only of his 
brethren is moaning in the abjection of servitude, 
and cannot repose calmly and lovingly under the 
shadow of the three coloured flag ; he cannot own 
a fatherland nor is he worthy of possessing it ». 
And Mazzini does not speak of possible snares 
by other Adriatic peoples, of which Cavour 
speaks. Can it be that Italy should leave a single 
Italian to the mercy of the Croats } And all her 
sea to the mercy of foreign Navigation Com- 
panies ? 

Conclusion : 

- 342 



A Treaty of peace in Europe is not possible 
without the adherence of Italian civilization. 

And the Italian Delegates cannot sign a Treaty 
of peace which may be in contrast with the aims 
and the interests of Italian civilization. 

And it is well that this should be known. 



343 



OLD STUFF. 



Men who are truly free-minded, men whose 
intellect is truly unprejudiced, whose soul is truly 
anxious cannot but feel humiliated and mortified 
at the exhibition of the pedagogical and scholastic 
destitution which is offered by the Paris Congress 
in the midst of the ruins of such a war, and of 
the suspension of so much of the world's life. 
Whatever may be the forthcoming resolutions, 
whatever majr be the paragraphs of the piece of 
paper which will issue from those resolutions, we 
all feel that the creative genius is wanting; the 
original and spontaneous genius which can pe- 
netrate and understand all the convulsed elements 
and all the energies dispersed in the horror of the 
present chaos; and which has the capacity and 
the might to endow this hoary humanity with a 
new adjustment, a new form, a new breath or a 
new ensign. We all feel that, after the hundred 
years which have gone by since the French Re- 
volution, the same reasoning and scribbling de- 
mocratic fanaticism which stirred the childish 
brain of the Incorruptible Robespierre is now 
shaking the brain of the Congress and will lead 
it, in the end, to produce the usual, self -same 

- 344 — 



abortion which bookish ideas have always pro- 
duced, and will ever produce, in the social sphere. 
Humanity was born from two beings of different 
sex, bound together by a serpent; from two sen- 
tences and from two theorems bound together 
by the more or less factious dialectics of a Reli- 
gious Science Professor. And now, besides hav- 
ing the Professor, we have also the experts at 
our elbow ! 

Who invented the theory of the right of peo- 
ples to dispose of themselves } 

Who invented the formula of the League of 
Nations } 

In five months* time, the Congress has done 
nothing but writhe uncomfortably between the 
theory and the formula without having found a 
fierce and mighty giant,, a Danton without eye- 
glasses and without a flower in his button-hole to 
teach it that the policy of the Nations is not creat- 
ed by means of statistics and of compasses. It is 
simply absurd that the Congress of 1919 should 
be remasticating the pastilles of 1870, and fancy 
they are the products of the chemistry of modern 
thought. 

The right of peoples. Do you remember the 
Address sent by Bohemia to vanquished France 
in 1 870 } « The German Nation has the indispu- 
table right to repel by the force of arms the at- 
tacks against her States and 1 her liberty ; but were 
she to premeditate the imposition of a certain 
form of Government on the French Nation, or to 
wrest from her a portion of her territory the po- 
pulations of which have the sentiment of being 
French, she would violate, in respect to these 
populations, their right of freely disposing of 
their own selves, and would thus subordinate 
right to force ». — Was there any necessity, the- 

— 345 — 



refore, for President Wilson to leave the White 
House and to come to teach us this old phrase 
which, here in Europe, is wearing a somewhat 
long beard, considering that it had grown, since 
1870, on the chin of the peoples subjected to the 
House of Hapsburg? But neither was there any 
necessity to assert this old phrase in theory, and 
disavow it in practice in respect of Italy which is 
proclaiming it for Fiume; and in respect of Fiu- | 
me which is proclaiming it for its annexation to 
Italy; because as to denying and disavowing it, 
more logically in practice, besides denying and 
disavowing it in principle, Austria had seen to it 
long before. And, verily, to cross so much Ocean 
in order to come and tell us what Austria has 
told us for such a number of years, is an act of 
courtesy for which we are, and our descendants 
can be grateful to the illustrious President, but 
from performing which we would have willingly 
dispensed him; as we have dispensed him from 
supplying us with men and arms wherewith to 
fight Austria, whilst we have used all our efforts, 
as best we could, to procure victory by ourselves 
without anybody's assistance or anybody's per- 
mission. It is certainly very gracious on Mr. Wil- 
son's part to show such a preference for Italy for 
his interesting ideal experiments in anima vili. 
But there surely must be a great deal of unculti- 
vated land in America, whereon to make his 
experiments ! 

The League of Nations. 

In its issue of September 10th. -25th., 1915, the 
Paix par le Droit, formulated its minimum pro- 
gramme and called upon the Peace Society, from 
that time, to defend before the competent authori- 
ties, at the termination of hostilities, the two fol- 
lowing principles: the recognition and the ap- 



346 



plication of the principle of nationality; and the 
constitution of a free Society of the Nations which 
were determined to submit all their questions, 
without any exception, to arbitration, and to place 
their combined forces at the service of general 
peace. 

There is nothing new under the sun. 

The programme of those dreamy idlers of the 
Paix par le Droit, became, after some years, the 
programme of Mr. Wilson, and the Paris Con- 
gress sees itself obliged to become, in its turn, 
the organ of that programme, to which Mr. Wil- 
son appears to want to hold on, as firmly as a 
statue to its pedestal; whilst the questions of 
the sorrowing nations of Europe have been releg- 
ated to the second or third row, and are put to 
an ornamental use, under the form of festoons, 
Cupids and bas-reliefs, for the decoration of the 
pedestal of the President's statue — with how 
much dignity and utility for the sorrowing nations 
of Europe there is no need to belong to posterity 
(as late as possible !) to ascertain and to judge. 

Now, it is useless to form any illusions : nothing 
durable, nothing true or just, can emerge from a 
Congress which is dominated and directed by the 
thought and the will of a single individual: of a 
man, too, who, by habit of mind and soul, abides 
in the field of abstractions and of the most senile 
abstractions which, in times gone by, have worn 
out the printing machines of politics ; such as that 
of the liberty and the equality of men excepting, 
of course, men of colour, who disturb America's 
policy in the Pacific; of a man of indisputable 
good- will, but too simple, and too off-handed for 
a world as complicated as the Old World; of a 
man, in short, who possesses such an incomplete 
notion of European affairs as to be obliged to 

— 347 - 



obtain cognizance of them, one after another, by 
means of inquiries and 1 experts, as, for instance 
(laugh not, oh ye Seas of Italy, with your eternal 
Aeschylean laughter !) for the Adriatic question 
which directly concerns us ; a man who is but a 
transient authority, and who is already past, in 
fact, whilst he has been disposing of the destinies 
of Europe, and who has not, in himself, the vir- 
tual power which will ensure to- morrow, the de- 
fence of his ideas and of his acts of to-day, not 
only in the State, but in his own Party also. And 
I am horrified in thinking that the history of my 
country is likely to be diverted from its lofty ways ; 
that the blood of so much fervid Italian youth 
will have been spilt in vain — owing to the false 
information possessed by Mr. Wilson on Italian 
affairs, or owing to the errors which Mr. Wilson's 
experts insert in their tardy Reports, or even owing 
to the interests of the American finance which 
has its starting point in Mr. Wilson's idealism. In 
the course of human events, this is the first time 
that supreme political and territorial questions, 
which concern the life of historic peoples, and 
which spring from the dim, mysterious depths of 
so remote an existence, are expected to be solved 
by the expert opinion of four Professors, and of 
as many — if not more — American bankers. 

And this, unfortunately, is happening to us, 
through the mental error of a man, who, notwith- 
standing, declares himself a friend of truth, if 
not a friend of ours ! 

Evidently, we are not more fortunate in our 
friendships than we are in our Alliances. 



- 348 



AT THE LAST MOMENT. 



After four months of vague nonsensical twaddle 
about the freedom of men on earth, and of well- 
meditated and bargained-for silence as to the 
freedom of Great Britain on the seas, Mr. Wilson 
has finally descended to discuss the Italian ques- 
tions, and has discovered the existence of a Pact 
of London for Dalmatia, a Pact which he has not 
signed, and which he does not feel in duty bound 
to recognize. At the same time, the signatories of 
the Pact of London have suddenly become aware, 
in their turn, that there are certain principles 
enunciated by Mr. Wilson, which they have not 
asserted and which they do not feel in duty bound 
to apply to the city of Fiume ; nor have they the 
intention of so doing. When the Czar Alexan- 
der I. and Napoleon met at Tilsitt, they threw 
themselves in each other's arms and: — - « Sire, » 
said the Russian, « I hate the English as much as 
you do ». — (( If that is so, » replied the Corsican, 
(( we will not have much to discuss between us, 
and peace is made ». — In the same manner, now, 
Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau are threat- 
ening to build their peace on the body of the Ita- 
lians. But, for all that, we are not going to lose 

_ 349 - 



our heads and our souls, which are by now tried 
and put to a severe test since no inconsiderable 
time by the graces of our Allies. Nor shall we 
stake our future, in a moment of sadness and des- 
pair, on their marked cards. In this supreme crisis 
of the war and of the Alliance, we will show 
ourselves calm and strong; and, above all, united. 
For, to-day as it was yesterday, the union of all 
Italians is, alone, the most strenuous and the 
most sure defence of Italy. The only availing res- 
istance against the concourse of aggressions is 
that of a compact mass. To disband, or to divide 
into fragments would be the same as to lose 
ourselves, and lose, at the same time the reasons 
of war and of peace. 

In so frightful a turmoil of deceit and delusion, 
one force only must support our resistance; it is 
the force which we derive from the consciousness 
of our right, and, what is consoling, from the sin- 
cerity and the nobility of our action during the 
dangers run by those who were not yet our Allies 
when we resolved to enter the field to avert from 
them their first defeat, that is, their extreme ruin. 
The knee of Germany was pressing on their 
breast and would have caused them to lose their 
breath for ever, when we appeared on the horizon 
of their misfortune. And at our appearance they 
held out their arms, and, in their commotion they 
wept with all the tears of which their eyes were 
capable, in the presence of our banners, the co- 
lours of which they now hardly recognize; and 
they promised. and swore by their dead, which 
were falling, by the thousand under the strokes 
of the fierce invader, that they would never forget 
the service rendered by Italy to civilization — 
their civilization — the civilization which they 
are now bartering on the market of that Yugo- 



350 



slavia which they are striving to create for their 
bankers and their jobbers to the detriment of the 
Italian races. But what matters it ? We then did 
what we thought it was our duty to do, and we 
shall not repent having done it. But, at the mo- 
ment when we see that the representatives of En- 
gland and France at the Congress of Paris, now 
so serene and so forgetful, cannot find, in them- 
selves, in their remembrances and in the sorrow 
of their war anything to oppose to Mr. Wilson's 
cold, doctrinaire sport against Italy; that they can 
find none of those feelings of revulsion which all 
Italy found to oppose to that other sport — so 
differently ferocious and sanguinary — of the 
Kaiser and of his armies at Charleroi and on the 
shores of the North Sea, we claim, at least, the 
right of remembering all these things for them 
and for the glory of their dead. Oh, certainly, 
they are perfectly right in being grateful to Mr. 
Wilson for the assistance he has lent them to ac- 
complish their last achievements against Ger- 
many. But, for the sake of chronology, it would 
be expedient that they should not forget that 
they would not have had the pleasure of expres- 
sing their gratitude to Mr. Wilson to-day, had 
Italy not run, at the outset, to place herself at their 
torn sides. And Mr. Wilson, too, by this time, 
instead of trying conclusions with us, would have 
had to try conclusions with the victorious Ger- 
mans who, from Mexico to far Japan, would have 
prepared for him a specimen of the Caudine 
Forks, immensely more imposing than the trium- 
phal Arches which the ingenuousness of the La- 
tin races has erected in his honour and for the 
purpose of allowing the flag of humanitarian 
idealism — covering the merchandise of Ameri- 
can jobbery (for a long time eager to conquer the 

- 351 - 



markets of the Old World) — to pass under them. 
But who remembers last year's fire ? 

At the last moment Mr. Wilson — evidently 
following the latest advice of the Yugoslav pre- 
ceptor who is completing the family's education 
during the visit to Paris — has declared that he 
does not acknowledge the Pact of London because 
it does not bear his signature; the Pact which 
contains the Italian revendications over Dalmatia. 
Not recognize the Pact of London now, after two 
years of epistolary literature between the White 
House and the various Foregn Offices of Eu- 
rope, in which literature no mention has ever 
been made of any refusal to acknowledge that 
Pact ? After four months that the Congress is in 
full sway, and during which his Fourteen Points 
have been considered doubtfully, even by him- 
self and by his adepts whilst no doubt whatsoever 
has been cast on the Allies* Treaties } Not re- 
cognize the Pact of London at the point where it 
is a question of Italian revendications; and not 
recognize the rights of Fiume at the point where 
these rights meet with one of the Points of his 
Gospel, of that Gospel which, owing to the va- 
riations it has to undergo day by day, seems li- 
kely to end by being set aside amongst the apo- 
cryphal ones ? There is positively no political 
sense, nor a sense of justice and equity in the 
manner of proceeding and of negotiating of this 
strange simulacrum of a peaceful transatlantic 
Robespierre looming ominously over European 
peace. Neither is there any sense of juridical mo- 
deration and of commercial probity. Whatever 
may be the principles that it is intended to adopt 
to regulate the world's affairs, the Old or the 
New World, it is impossible not to take into ac- 
count a fundamental Law which constitutes a 



352 



previous question not only in business transactions 
but also in trie application of principles : the law 
of do ut des. Now, we should never lose sight of 
the fact that Mr. Wilson has not given anything 
to us Italians ; he has given nothing of that which 
he has given to the other Allies and which can 
determine an obligation on our part towards him. 
To the other Allies he has given two million and 
half of men for their war against Germany; and 
by reason of these two million and half of men, 
besides all the rest which he has given them, he 
can feel justified in demanding the equivalent, 
be it in markets, influence, principles or ideas. 
What has he given to us ? To us, over and above 
the loans, which are business transactions and the 
Red Cross aid which can eventually be gaid for, 
he has not given any forces wherewith to win the 
war : forces, that is to say, real and proper elem- 
ents of obligation for peace. And, contrariwise, 
— these things would seem absurd and incon- 
ceivable, were they not happening under our very 
eyes — and, contrariwise, he comes forward to 
claim from us the settlement of the bill of his 
principles represented by the sacrifice of our ter- 
ritorial revendications ! He does not claim from 
England the settlement of the bill for the freedom 
of the seas; he does not claim from France the 
settlement of the bill for Alsace-Lorraine or for 
the Rhine, or for the armies which he has supplied 
and the weapons he has given them : no, he has 
recourse to us, he wants everything from us and 
claims everything from us, for his Yugoslavs who, 
up to the last day of the war were the supporters 
of Austria, their sovereign lady. And we are also 
to be placed under suspicion, before the sorrowing 
populations of Europe, of delaying, of opposing, 
of hindering the conclusion of peace (Wilson's 



— 353 

23 



peace), because we persist in not placing our 
shores and our peoples of DaLmatia at the feet of 
these former servants of Austria. Pshaw! Italy 
has undergone many invasions; she has suffered 
many wrongs and lived under many yokes in the 
course of centuries, ever since the power of Rome 
was overthrown. But that she should now, after 
her victory, be submitted to the supreme wrong 
and to the supreme yoke inflicted upon her by 
half-a-dozen Yugoslav marauders abetted by a 
larger number of English, French and American 
jobbers, under the shadow of Mr. Wilson's star- 
spangled banner, no ! this is not compatible with 
right and morality, and much less can it constitute 
a subject for discussion and negotiation with the 
Allies. Undoubtedly the German Delegates on 
the way from Weimar to Versailles will laugh 
gleefully — for once — at the thought of these 
rough days which the Italian Delegates are passing 
in Paris; and, raising the blinds of their railway 
carriage windows, they will probably cast a scru- 
tinizing glance afar, to see whether there appears 
a trembling streak of blue in the dim distance of 
their horizon. But the gods wisely reserve the con- 
solation of hope to mortals, even in the depths of 
an abyss. 

For our part, our state of mind will undergo no 
change during these adversities, which are to be 
registered amongst the most severe which have 
resulted from our tragic Alliances. 

They are painful experiences, which a great 
people has to undergo in order to acquire a full 
independence of spirit, a complete consciousness 
of its being — and also a complete consciousness 
of its life in relation with the world. 

Italy was not born yesterday, nor will she end 
to-morrow, in the midst of the intrigues of the 



354 



Paris Congress. The historic sense of her perpe- 
tuity must come to her aid in these days , and must 
help her to surmount, wisely and calmly, the dan- 
gers which press upon her on all sides and which 
might otherwise cause her to fall, humiliated and 
disorganised, into the void of a fruitless victory. 

The gravity of danger must clear up , not darken 
the conception of our responsibility, and must 
also string even more tightly the bow of our will. 

A moment of weakness and of surrender would 
annul our victory and leave us irreparably defeated 
in the war. 



355 - 



THEIR PROFITS AT OUR EXPENSE. 



There is no longer need 1 to discuss the formal 
portion of Mr. Wilson's Proclamation to the Ital- 
ians when Signor Orlando's counter-Proclamation 
and the unanimous comments of the Press have 
exhaustively demonstrated its diplomatic impro- 
priety and its political and moral iniquity. By the 
contorsions of its sophistries and of its errors of 
Law and fact; by the incoherences between its 
premises and its deductions, by all the falsehood 
of its intonation, that Proclamation at last reveals 
the cloven hoof of the Devil who had come in our 
midst enveloped in the diaphanous azure light of 
a celestial Messenger. Imprudence and haste have 
lost him. His abuse of the old edict — the edict 
addressed to peoples — which, at the outset, had 
accredited him to public opinion, has exposed 
the game hidden behind the title of the Ideal. 
Italy has at last understood the game. 

At the point which matters have reached, hy- 
pocrisy would be a useless crime. It is imperative 
therefore to speak loudly and clearly to our friends 
of yesterday and, let us hope, of to-morrow, and 
tell them the reasons of our distrust and of our 
grievances. Our common Alliance may emerge 

- 356 — 



better strengthened in dignity and honesty from 
the demonstration of truth. 

All the labour of the Congress of Paris has been, 
for the most part, directed to this end, namely: 
that of removing, holding at a distance, of elimi- 
nating Italy from the concert of the war Allies; 
that of placing the Italian questions and interests 
not on the same plane as that of the others, but 
on a different and inferior plane ; that of consider- 
ing, in fact, and keeping Italy in appearance 
amongst the great Powers, because, owing to the 
existing Treaties, it could not be otherwise, but 
really and effectively, amongst the minor Powers ; 
if not on a par with Serbia, and with Montenegro, 
then something between Japan, not acceptable 
to Wilson and the Hedjaz, somewhat acceptable 
to England : in a situation, in fine, of which there 
was no reason to be proud and in which Mr. 
Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau might now 
and then make a show of protecting us against 
Wilson, and Mr. Wilson might now and then 
appear to be benevolent to us against the pride of 
Messrs. Lloyd George and Clemenceau. Truly, 
a most touching situation ! 

What have been the consequences of this si- 
tuation ? Mr. Wilson having effected his entrance 
in the Conference in the character of High Priest, 
of dispenser of favours, mandates and blessings, 
our two Allies of the previous day who, undoubt- 
edly, had serious and difficult tasks to undertake 
in the interest of their respective countries, con- 
centrated all their efforts upon their own quest- 
ions, which they had placed in the fore -front, but 
indifferently left ours a long way behind, with 
the intent (every one adapts his means to his 
ends) of making up again with the bread belong- 
ing to us, the board laid out for the High Priest, 



357 



from which they had, bit by bit, abstracted the 
(( Freedom of the Seas » , the « Sarre Basin » and 
the (( Left Bank of the Rhine » ; and had done so, 
being well aware that there were many hungry 
mouths eagerly awaiting to bite our loaf; and 
knowing also that the High Priest would have 
been only too glad to see that loaf intact within 
view and under his hand. 

Thus, after having solved the questions ap- 
pertaining to England and France, with our loyal 
co-operation and our full and cordial assent, they 
passed on to us. But how laborious was that pas- 
sage ! And with how many stoppages, from one 
half day to another ! And after how many secret 
meetings and plottings, now between two, now 
between three, during the short crossing ! The 
discussion of the Italian questions seemed to be 
a bitter pill to swallow for ail; and every one 
would have willingly done away with it, by hand- 
ing it over — one never knows — to the forthcom- 
ing League of Nations. The League of Nations! 
What an appropriate Court, wherein to bring up 
Italy and the Italian aspirations for trial ! Italy, 
under the indictment of Imperialism; the Italian 
aspirations as the proofs of the crime. In any 
case, in order to reach the goal, no means has 
been neglected, no expedient has been left un- 
tried, no moral coercion has been spared, from 
the date of the German Delegates* arrival at Ver- 
seilles, to the date of the arrival of the Washing- 
ton, which was to take back the indignant Achil- 
les to the White House. Oh, the Washington! 
We have seen it appear and disappear on the 
horizon of the Conference, like the black-sailed 
Phantom Ship, in the distant seas of humanity. 
But afterwards we have learnt that the famous 
vessel turned back, without Caesar, but with bare- 



358 



ly a cargo of tardy American troops. And instead 
of leaving, after he had found out that the 
Italian Delegates insisted upon having their quest- 
ions solved before the arrival of the German 
Delegates at Versailles; and the charm and the 
delays, once dispelled, and the negotiations bro- 
ken off; Mr. Wilson sent forth his Proclamation, 
as the head of a Syndicate sends out false news 
with the intention of causing the shares of a com- 
mercial enterprize to fall in the Stock Exchange, 
with a view of obtaining possession of the con- 
cern and holding it in his power. The coup was 
made. 

That the glory of his Fourteen Points and with 
it the fortunes of the States to be resuscitated from 
the ashes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were 
the precise aim of Mr. Wilson's coup, no one 
in Italy is, by this time, inclined to believe any 
longer, and no one in Europe can any longer af- 
firm and maintain. And that it is only for the 
sake of the Croats* fair faces that Wilson, Lloyd 
George and Clemenceau are denying to Fiume 
the right of re-uniting herself to Italy in virtue of 
the principle of auto-decision; and denying to 
Italy the duty of accepting the plebiscite of that 
city, none of the five hundred thousand Italian 
dead who are lying buried from the Piave to the 
Isonzo; and none of the four hundred thousand 
cripples and mutilated men who are wandering 
over the land of Italy will ever be led to believe or 
to understand. Were it a question between our 
dead and wounded in the war and the Croats, 
there is no doubt that it would have been already 
solved in favour of the first named without even 
the shadow of a discussion or a dispute. But, un- 
fortunately, it is a question wherein something 
quite different is at stake. 



359 



And it is this: that the bankers, the sharehold- 
ers of the great Navigation Companies, and the 
business men of our three great Allied Powers 
want the dominion of the Adriatic for themselves, 
for the Eastern traffic ; they want Fiume for them- 
selves, as a mid-way port between Dantzig and 
Constantinople, to complete the line of maritime 
and commercial power over which, ever since the 
eve of the war and during the course of the war, 
an outcry has been raised because it was thought 
that the capitalists, the bankers and the business 
men of Germany and Austria-Hungary wanted 
to obtain it for their own exclusive profit ; they 
want to substitute themselves, as a real and proper 
State, a State of a novel species and of new for- 
mation, in the place of States which have their 
historical and political basis in their natural si- 
tuation itself. The Yugoslavs are merely the men 
of straw ; and Yugoslavia is nought but the politi- 
cal disguise of this immense maritime and indus- 
trial concern which those people are desirous of 
erecting on the ruins of two Empires, and for the 
promotion of which, after all, the noblest and 
the fairest youth of Italy has shed its blood during 
four years of war ! But all the Italians are now 
asserting that the Adriatic will dry up before this 
enterprize obtains the success which its promo- 
ters and supporters hoped for it. The Americans 
and the English shall not transact their business 
over the skin of the Italians. 

In order to understand the opposition which is 
being made to prevent Fiume from becoming Ita- 
lian, it is necessary to consider, at the same time 
Wilson's proposal to confer Dantzig upon Poland; 
and to think also of the Constantinople mandate 
which Wilson is aspiring to obtain for America. 
We have no objections to raise against the attri- 



360 



bution of Dantzig to Poland; on the contrary, 
we are very glad' of it; we only wisK to remark 
that American capital cannot possibly be exclud- 
ed from an outlet on the sea which Wilson has 
offered to Poland. And we should only be too 
glad if American or other capital would expend 
all its power upon Dantzig and upon Constanti- 
nople and would not wrong Fiume and Italy. We 
do not ask to be protected. We only ask not to 
be wronged and suppressed. 

We have entered the war for a two-fold reason : 
a reason of a general and ideal order; for the 
rights and the liberty of peoples, against Germa- 
ny, which had attacked these rights and this li- 
berty ; and likewise a proper and particular reason 
of our own : the security of our land and sea boun- 
dary, and the liberation of the Adriatic and of 
the oppressed Italian peoples on the Dalmatian 
shore. Our intervention brought with it all the 
benefits it was intended to bring to the ideal part ; 
that is to say, it brought about the overthrow of 
Germany's power; of that Germany — let it be 
well remembered by our English and French 
friends — against which we had no special reason 
for rancour or dispute; and the Allies derived 
from the overthrow of Germany all the benefits, 
all the legitimate advantages which we have nev- 
er, for a single moment, thought of lessening or 
frustrating; and which during the discussions of 
the Congress we have, instead, done our utmost 
to propitiate and to favour. 

But, what of our own particular part ? 

Is our intervention, in so far as it concerns our 
own particular part, to be rendered useless ? And 
are the effects of our intervention, of our war, of 
our victory to be rendered null and void in respect 
to our ends, which consist of the liberation of our 

- 361 — 



Adriatic brethren and the liberation of the Adria- 
tic itself ? And are we to have fought such a 
tremendous war to allow its fruits to be enjoyed 
by American and English capitalists ? 

This is the problem. 

Because, when all is told, the possession of 
Trieste is useless without Fiume. By leaving Fiu- 
me to others we would have fought such a tre- 
mendous war to lose both Fiume and Trieste, 
and to cause Trieste to perish and to allow our 
enemies and their new masters to live and thrive 
upon Fiume. 

Is all this possible ? 

We ought to emerge from this war with all our 
aims attained. 

After all the sacrifices we have undergone, we 
ought to obtain all the advantages of victory. 

We ought not to have sacrificed our former 
alliances, and our people, and our hard-earned 
savings of two generations, merely to prepare a 
banquet for English and American capitalists. 



— 362 



THE SPIRIT AND THE LETTER 
OF THE TREATY OF LONDON, 



Italy has delivered her solemn verdict upon the 
conflict which has arisen at the Paris Congress on 
the question of the Adriatic. We would lessen 
the importance of the plebiscite voted by the peo- 
ple on both shores of that sea and the correspond- 
ing Vote of the Italian Parliament, were we to 
add any words to the sovereign expressions of the 
national will. If these expressions constitute the 
Law — unless (everything is possible) the Paris 
Congress and Mr. Wilson deny, in Italy's case, 
even the most elementary principles which con- 
stitute the juridical and political basis of modern 
democracies — no one can question or set at 
nought our Law. But is it permissible to eliminate 
surprises from the calculation of our probabil- 
ities ? 

Meanwhile, it is opportune to elucidate all the 
points of the conflict and to leave none of them 
in the shadow, or in partial shadow, in order to 
demonstrate to the world, even before demons- 
trating it to our Allies and to the Associate, the 
absolute justice of our thesis, so that no doubt 
of any kind be raised about the absolute honesty 
of our intentions. I mean « honesty » in a political 

— 363 - 



sense ; that is in the sense of consistency between 
our ideal premises of the war and our territorial 
demands after victory; which are not demands 
of an imperialistic nature, though Mr. Wilson has 
audaciously thought fit to denounce them as such, 
but of a strictly and sincerely national character, 
as all those persons who are judging in good-faith 
are in duty bound to admit. 

The culminating point of the conflict is the 
Pact of London and the exclusion of Fiume from 
that Pact. 

Up to the eve of the rupture, Mr. Wilson as- 
sumed he could not recognize the Pact of London 
because — oh, the stab in the back ! — it was a 
secret treaty, and because the first of his Four- 
teen Points excluded secret international agree- 
ments from the diplomacy of the future. An inad- 
missible and above all, a specious argument this, 
and for many reasons : firstly, because theoretic- 
ally, when one speaks of the illegitimacy of secret 
international agreements, one wishes to signify 
agreements concluded without the approval of 
the peoples and of their Parliamentary represen- 
tative bodies; secondly, because the conditions 
agreed to for the participation of one or more 
peoples in a war cannot be classified amongst the 
occult and insidious international agreements 
which tend to produce war, because they are 
themselves a produce of the war ; thirdly, because 
the new causes owing to which a new Power 
enters into a war do not destroy the primary 
causes nor the agreements entered into by the 
other Powers, which are closely bound to the 
primary causes; fourthly, because without a for- 
mal intimation, the agreements entered into be- 
tween Allies cannot be considered as null and 
void in consequence of the intervention of the 



364 



latest arrival, nor can the former agreements be 
considered void of force because other more re- 
cent agreements in addition have supervened. But 
all these are arguments on questions of mere 
form, or arguments of mere historical or, better, 
pre-historical value now that Mr. Wilson no lon- 
ger makes of the recognition of the Pact of Lon- 
don a question of theory but, as is written in his 
Memorandum, a question of opinion — of his 
personal opinion on the adjustment of our Eastern 
frontier. « Personally » he says, in fact, in his Me- 
morandum, (( I am entirely disposed to admit that 
Italy should obtain, all along the extension of her 
Northern frontiers and wherever she comes into 
contact with Austrian territory, all that has been 
granted to her by the so-called Pact of London, 
but I have a clear opinion that the Pact of London 
can no longer be applied for the adjustment of her 
Eastern frontiers. . . » And here follow all the well- 
known reasonings concerning the disappearance 
of Austria and the formation of new States, and 
the necessity of endowing these new States with 
a sea outlet at Fiume; reasonings which, by now, 
need no longer be contested, as none of them 
has ever proved to be capable of resisting the 
most elementary historical and political criticism, 
and which it would useless, therefore, to examine 
and to consider. 

The only argument left, then, is this one: In 
the Pact of London, Fiume is not attributed to 
Italy, but to Croatia. 

But — and here really arises the question 
which the Paris Congress did not see, or did not 
want to see and examine — to Croatia in what 
capacity ? As part of Serbia, or, even, of Yugo- 
slavia, or as part of Austria-Hungary } 

At the Paris Congress they have argued round 



365 



the question but they have never penetrated into 
the heart of it. And it is most strange that men 
in authority, who are, at the same time, polit- 
icians and jurists and possess, or ought to possess, 
a special tecnique of their own for the interpre- 
tation of treaties, should have halted, as if they 
had turned to stone, before the Medusa head of 
Croatia, and should not have felt the courage or 
the inclination to scrutinize it closely. Yet, the 
meaning of the attribution, made in 1915, of Fiu- 
me to Croatia is so clear and limpid, so simple 
and open, that it is sufficient to state it, to destroy 
all the sophistications and all the falsifications 
for which, up to now, the letter of the Treaty has 
given opportunity. 

When that Treaty was signed, in 1915, not 
only was there no intention, and still less was 
there any proposal on the part of the Allies to 
destroy Austria _or to make her disappear from 
the map (on the contrary, in the minds of the 
English and the French there was a design and 
an aim to detaching Austria from Germany during 
the war and of holding Austria as a good card 
in the game of the Entente against Germany, to 
be played in the event of victory), but neither 
was there the most remote suspicion of the advent 
of Yugoslavia, nor of any part to be given to 
Yugoslavia in the future adjustment of Europe. 
Therefore the Allies on formulating the condi- 
tions of victory, and in assigning to Italy the 
boundaries and the lands bestowed upon her by 
her national rights, also took the life of Austria 
under their care and, as Trieste, which was con- 
sidered as the principal lung of her commercial 
respiration, had been assigned to Italy, the Al- 
lies left Fiume to Austria, as that city of the Dual 
Monarchy had been Hungary's lung of commer- 

— 366 — 



cial respiration. Naturally no mention could be 
made in a Treaty made by the Entente of the 
future of Austria or the future of Hungary, but, 
considering that the Entente had taken in hand 
the conditions of existence of Austria-Hungary, 
Croatia was selected on Russia's suggestion and 
for the motives which determined Russia to make 
that suggestion, as representing Hungary, of 
which country she formed a part; she was se- 
lected, in short, as representing the State to 
which, more than to any other country, she was 
and appeared to be bound for life and for death. 

Mr. Wilson, by means of a fantastic deduction 
which is surprising not only on account of its 
arbitrary indifference to any logical pre-supposi- 
tion and to any historical and political precedent, 
but also on account of its more than arbitrary — 
its outright iniquitous — contempt of the intent- 
ions of the contracting parties in a Pact, which 
is nothing else but an Agreement, Mr. Wilson, 
I say, starting from the destruction and the disap- 
pearance of the power of Austria-Hungary, ar- 
rives at conclusions and donations which con- 
siderably outrun the functions and the powers 
with which he is invested in the Conference ; and 
of which it is strange that he should not feel and 
understand the juridical and moral as well as the 
political limitation. 

((Austria has disappeared)), says Mr. Wilson, 
(( therefore I can re-arrange the geographical map 
of the Balkans according to my conception and 
my powerw. — Oh, no! You cannot do that, 
Mr. Wilson. You can suppress any of your 
Fourteen Points or add one or more points to 
them, but you cannot suppress any of the four 
Cardinal Points nor add a point to them. Neither 



367 



can you transform Nature. Nor can you trans- 
form the spirit of a Pact or of an Agreement. 

Austria once fallen, the sole consequence which, 
politically and juridically, Fiume can derive from 
Austria's fall is this, and only this : that the cause 
for which the contracting parties of the Pact of 
London had thought it expedient to assign Fiu- 
me to Croatia having disappeared, Fiume should 
follow the fate marked out by her national right 
and by her sovereign will. But to assign Fiume 
to Croatia, never! To assign Fiume to Croatia 
after Austria's fall, in virtue of the Pact of Lon- 
don, would be committing a true and gross fraud, 
to which it is not possible that the representatives 
of civilized Governments would lend themselves. 

Fiume had been assigned to Croatia as forming 
part of Austria-Hungary, not of Serbia or of Yu- 
goslavia. And it is not possible that, the terms 
and the factors being changed, and the perso- 
nality being altered, the conditions of the Pact 
should remain intact. 

In a moment of absent-mindedness (l et us 
hope), Messrs. Lloyd George and Clemenceau 
thought fit to interpret the Pact of London in the 
Croatian sense. But on being recalled to reality 
they cannot do otherwise than interpret it, in good 
sense and' good-faith according to the spirit with 
which it was framed. Any decision contrary to 
that spirit would be a wrong inflicted not only 
on the rights of Fiume and on Italy, but also on 
the juridical civilization of their countries. 

We are waiting. Sure of our Right in peace, 
as we were faithful to our pacts in the war. 



368 



((NOBLESSE OBLIGE)) 



A year had scarcely gone by since Italy had 
renewed a thirty years* Treaty with Germany 
when, in 1914, this last mentioned Nation decided 
to assail France .The object of the aggression had 
been stated and illustrated by General von Bern- 
hardi in 1912, two years before, in his book on 
the forthcoming war : « In one way or another, 
we must settle our accounts with France in order 
to have our hands free for our Weltpoliti\. The 
first indispensable condition of a sound German 
policy is the overthrow of France. And this time 
we must strike hard and in such a manner as to 
prevent our enemy from rising once more and 
crossing our path ». And, in fact, everything had 
been scientifically prepared for the execution of 
this design; the weapons and the minds— and, 
above all, the opponent's moral and political dis- 
integration. In twenty day's time, in forty, if cal- 
culations were correct, the Emperor, mounted on 
Attila's horse, would have made his entry into 
Paris. (The commemorative medals of the great 
event had already been struck). In the calcula- 
tions was also the presence of the Italian drum- 
mer, with his face turned towards the Maritime 
Alps. But the Italian drummer did not appear on 
the scene. And Attila did not pass. 

Italy had been united to Germany for thirty 



— 369 

24 



years and she had likewise been divided from 
France for thirty years. What mattered it ? At the 
decisive moment, notwithstanding the recent 
controversies on the question of the S.S. Manouba 
and on the question of the Otranto Channel; not- 
withstanding the Marseilles demonstrations in fa- 
vour of the Turks, and the demonstrations in 
Tunis against the Italians, Italy, no sooner had 
the aggression been perpetrated, did what she 
was in duty bound to do. She detached herself 
from Germany. And placed herself on the side 
of France. Had she done otherwise, she would 
have dishonoured her name, in her juridical tra- 
dition and in her political history. And she held 
fast to the honour of her history and of her tra- 
dition. 

Immediately after the declaration of Italian 
neutrality, messengers from Berlin came running 
down in all haste. « What do you require ? » said 
they, « Gold ? Incense ? Myrrh ? » Everything they 
threw down at our feet, to prevent us from pas- 
sing from neutrality to war ; everything, especially 
the spoils of France in the Mediterranean. And, 
finally, von Biilow came, bringing with him all 
the ideas which von Bernhardi had upheld in 
his book, for the purpose of keeping Italy bound 
to Germany in case of war. « We must think of 
strengthening, in every possible manner, the po- 
litical power of our Allies. We have strengthened 
Austria in the Balkans, we must now strengthen 
Italy in the Mediterranean, especially in the case 
of a war with France ». And von Biilow arrived 
in Rome with this resolute programme. The first 
portion of his mission was precisely devoted to 
persuade Italy, by means of a Press propaganda 
and of negotiations with the Cabinet, not to think 
of the Adriatic but to think, instead, of the Me- 

- 370 - 



diterranean, and to join Germany in fighting the 
maritime and Colonial power of France in the 
Mediterranean. As a prize, we would obtain Nice, 
with Savoy, Corsica and Tunis. Had not von 
Bernhardi sustained that it was worth Germany's 
while even jto make war to conquer Tunis on 
Italy's behaff } 

But Italy, once more, during the second period, 
declined the German Wise Men's gold, their in- 
cense and their myrrh. And she entered the war 
by the side of France. She did, that is to say, 
once more, what she was in duty bound to do. 
And she would have dishonoured herself had she 
done otherwise. 

But would not France dishonour herself even 
more, perhaps, now; and would she not cancel 
her name from the list of the civilized Powers 
of Europe if, for the sake of the Yugoslavs and 
for the sake of Wilson she were to detach herself 
from Italy, and were to proceed to Versailles 
without her } She certainly would dishonour her- 
self — and she would' not even be mindful of her 
future. And, in a single hour, besides victory 
itself, she would lose the reasons of victory and 
the reasons of her life. 

We abandoned the Germans for the sake of 
France. France can well abandon the Yugoslavs 
— as no one knows who and what they are — 
for the sake of Italy and of the Italians of all the 
shores. 

We staked the whole of our future in the game 
against Germany — which, at that time was the 
stronger of the two, and, in consequence of the 
victories she had gained appeared to be invinci- 
ble — and against the Emperor of Germany who 
was and had been our friend and the friend of 
our Sovereigns for thirty years. France can well 



371 



put a little good-will into the game which is being 
played between Italy and Wilson; especially as 
all the cause of freedom, all the cause of demo- 
cracy in the old countries of Europe are at stake. 

Can such a thing happen as France going to 
Versailles without Italy, to discuss the terms of 
peace with those very Germans from whom Italy 
detached herself in order to place herself at her 
side in the war ? Is such a thing possible ? Very 
likely. But the day in which France were to find 
herself at Versailles on the side of the Nortchliffe- 
Steed gang and on the side of the Yugoslavs — 
whose powers, the Germans, and with reason, 
do not intend recognizing — and not on Italy's 
side, would be a day of deep mourning for the 
civilization of Europe. The men of Old France 
would refuse so to act, and would' exclaim : « No- 
blesse oblige! ». Will Mr. Clemenceau yield, 
instead ? He would be rendering a bad service to 
his country. 

I am well aware that some time ago, to an Ita- 
lian Member of Parliament who called his atten- 
tion to the fact that the consequences of a dis- 
sention between France and Italy might be disa- 
strous to France, in ten years' time, M. Clemen- 
ceau replied : a In ten years* time, I will be no 
more ». But M. Clemenceau who possesses more 
esprit than Louis XV. , and has also a greater 
sense of responsibility should understand that 
flashes of wit must not be carried to extreme con- 
sequences — neither should the heresy of such 
premises. 

The representatives of the Allied Governments 
are men of powerful temperament, and therefore 
they are less apt to dissociate their personal sym- 
pathies or antipathies from the real and proper 
interests of the countries they represent. Who can 

~ 372 - 



say that M. Clemenceau, in the conception and 
the animus which determine his judgments, does 
not insert a little too much of the personality of 
one who, for thirty years fought against Italy and 
the Triple Alliance; and cannot conceive, now, 
an Italy different from that against, which he 
fought } And who can say that Lloyd George, 
even after his attacks against the Times and the 
Northcliffe-Steed gang, is not the same man who 
studied and schemed, in the past, in the com- 
pany of that gang the erection of the Yugoslav 
counter-altar to oppose to Italy's aspirations in the 
Adriatic ? Cavour was more mistrustful of Eng- 
land in the Adriatic than in the Mediterranean. 
And the distrust of our great Statesman is stri- 
kingly proved at the present moment. But Lloyd 
George does not reflect that England has the need 
of more numerous friends now, after the war, than 
she had need of before; and is probably illuding 
himself excessively that the disappearance of the 
maritime power of Germany, signifies the absolute 
security of England on the seas and throughout 
the ages to come. But Germany, before she disap- 
peared as a naval power, gaye a practical demon- 
stration of the value of a weapon which represents 
the depreciation of all Fleets : the submarine. And 
Wilson, by himself, means more, against the 
British Empire than even the maritime power of 
Germany, and even more than the submarine. 
Let Mr. Lloyd George strut round Mr. Wilson as 
long as he pleases. But the theory of mandates, 
which Wilson has not invented and has barely 
had the merit of putting into practice for the li- 
quidation of the German colonial Empire, can 
also be applied for the liquidation of the British 
Empire. We will speak of it when thistles are in 
bloom. 

— 373 - 



In any case, and whatever may happen, the 
resolutions which are to be taken in these days 
are resolutions which will determine the fate of 
the European Powers. 

Will peace be concluded, if it be concluded at 
all, without Italy 7 Well, Italy will recover her 
freedom for the future, and will find, outside the 
circle of the Powers with which she has been al- 
lied in the war, new roads to follow. A great 
country of forty millions of inhabitants, in the 
midst of a worn-out and defeated Europe can well 
be useful to friends and dangerous to enemies or 
to indifferent parties, with her work, her intelli- 
gence and her moral and physical vigour. We 
have lived amidst storms. And amidst storms we 
will continue to live and to teach to others the 
science of life. 

Peace will not be concluded 7 Well, it is not 
Italy's fault, but the fault of those who by means 
of their artificial structures, by means of their 
cosmopolitan banking and industrial Companies, 
have endeavoured to substitute their artificial 
structures to the natural structures of States, and 
to crush down or eliminate the natural elements 
of the life of the nations. 

But can you imagine a Treaty of Peace without 
Italy, without the victorious nation ? 

Can you picture to yourselves a Mr. Wilson, 
flanked by Lloyd George and Clemenceau, of- 
ficiating on the altar of the League of Nations, 
without Italy which to-day more than ever re- 
presents in her soul and in her loftiest forms the 
sovereign principle of nationalities ? 

Yes? 

But then, what a burst of laughter would re- 
sound throughout the two Hemispheres ! 



— 374 



THE DEMOCRATIC WAR ! 



During the period of Italian neutrality, seven 
months previous to our entry into the war, whilst 
opposing the foolish and, — by what appears now 
clear — the ruinous ideologies, so detrimental to 
us, of the promoters and stage-managers of the 
((democratic war », I wrote (it is useless to renew 
the usual protest on the odiousness of the letter 
(( I » , considering that it is impossible to burden 
Mr. Lloyd George or M. Clemenceau with the 
responsibility of my ideas), I then wrote in the 
columns of this same newspaper the following 
words : — « Before placing ourselves at their head, 
why should we strive to obtain an understanding 
between the two Powers which claim to possess 
in themselves the strength to accomplish two 
great historical missions; that is, Serbia which 
is aiming at the re-constitution of Greater Serbia 
with the southern Slavs; and Greece which, in 
her turn, is tending towards the re-constitution, 
by land and sea, of the anciant Byzantine Em- 
pire: the two Powers, in short, which have always 
arrayed themselves against Italy, rather than in 
her defence; the first, Serbia, with the Croats* 
propaganda in the Adriatic; the second, Greece, 



375 



with her disturbing action in all the questions 
arising between the Otranto Channel and the 
/Egean Sea? 

And I concluded thus : 

(( I am unable to understand this tendency (a 
moral and idealistic tendency) and am unable to 
understand its golden language. I cannot under- 
stand the disinterestedness of my country dis- 
played for the profit of the interests of other peo- 
ple. I do not understand the principle of nationality 
in the abstract or as sole agent of the life of peo- 
ples in history. / only understand the principles, 
the ideas and the actions which, at a given histo- 
rical moment, are useful to my country. Besides 
there are no principles which have or can have 
an absolute value or are capable of an absolute 
application. The men of real efficiency in politi- 
cal life are the realists, not the dreamers... And 
I hasten to express my ardent wish that some 
strong realist may shape himself and may build 
up a doctrine for us which will be more useful 
and more conducive to the health of our country » . 
It is superfluous to say that Italy has not yet found 
this realist. 

The war, which is a fierce and terrible struggle 
of interests, which is the supreme tragic expres- 
sion of the peoples* struggle for life, was con- 
ducted and managed by the Italian politicians as 
a pure Crusade in favour of democratic ideas the 
triumph of which at the points of the bayonets 
of the victorious armies had been promised by the 
leader of the English Radicals, Lloyd George, and 
by various leaders of the Radical Governments, 
of France, Viviani, Briand, Ribot and Clemen- 
ceau. During the course of the war, no question 
was ever raised, — seriously and with positive 
ideas and intentions — of what practical results 



376 



Italy would expect to realize in the event of an 
Italian victory. The neutrality was not negotiated, 
nor were the war and peace negotiated. Every- 
thing was deferred to the loyalty and the generosity 
of the Allies, who were naturally prompted and 
inspired by the purest sentiments of Europeanism 
and of interplanetary humanitarianism. Yet, dur- 
ing the course of the war, there were not want- 
ing some premonitory signs of the loyalty and 
generosity of the Allies in the humble but still 
not negligible questions of material existence ; for 
instance, in the questions of coal, grain, freights, 
and, lastly, also in the distribution of the war 
means, of arms and men. But who had the time, 
then, to think of such small matters ? They stinted 
us in everything : from bread to fuel and to barbed- 
wire; they sent us, when they did send after 
unheard-of difficulties and humiliations, the leav- 
ings of the grand banquet, for which they made 
us pay at the double rate of gold and blood ; and 
from these premises there was nobody to draw 
the probable inferences for the future ! Nobody 
who, from the annoyances to which we were put 
and the difficulties which were placed in our way 
at the most critical moments of the war, did not 
foresee the annoyances to which we would be 
put, and the difficulties which would be placed 
in our way in the glad or sorrowful moments of 
peace. The rigidity, the aridity, the immobility 
of the Italian political brain, in comparison with 
the agility, the fertility and the ability of the brain 
of the Allies in the exploitation of situations, will 
appear phenomenal to the historians of the future, 
especially when it is contrasted with the heart 
and soul of the country, so rich and fertile in 
resource, so fierce and powerful in all their react- 
ions, so vigilant and ready in all their manifesta- 

— 377 — 



tions ! The ancient Greeks represented Victory 
without wings. We, instead, possess a Victory 
without a head. And all the glory rests with the 
great and noble heart of this eternal people of 
Italy, which is not an « indolent giant », oh, Poet ! 
and neither it is old, of, so abandoned by its lead- 
ers, it has been able to find for itself a sure lead 
in the just and straight road of its action. 

During our war, our political men did nothing 
else but mount guard at the sepulchre of the de- 
mocratic Ideal, an occupation to which the Allies 
had destined them, whilst they themselves were 
settling amongst themselves and on their own ac- 
count the division of the spoils of Christ. What 
an honour such a mission was ! And this honour 
grew immeasurably when the Associate, from 
across the Ocean came to join the Allies. To be 
European democrats was already something; but 
to be world democrats, what joy! The French 
Revolution, the Marseillaise, Lafayette, Wilson; 
what music ! And what a melodrama ! The Italian 
democrat lost touch with the earth and flew 
through the translucent blue of the star-spangled 
banner. But artless man that he was, he did not 
see what was hidden in the folds of the star-span- 
gled banner! If the radicalism of Lloyd George 
and of Clemenceau barely covered the old impe- 
rialism of Europe, Wilson's humanitarianism 
covered the world-imperialism of American ca- 
pital which from its industrial phase was aspiring 
to the commercial phase of dominion. And he, the 
artless man, began to strut round Wilson and to 
fan with his peacock tail all unfolded, the Ideal 
which he thought was shining, like Moses* light, 
on his forehead, and which was, instead, the other 
light (not to be despised either, nor incompatible 
with civilization) of American gold, which our 

- 378 — 



Statesmen were wrong in not knowing how to 
introduce (as it was their duty to have done) and 
to make flow into our national policy. 

For I do not say that political men, whether 
friendly or not — Lloyd George, Clemenceau or 
Wilson — were wrong in looking after the in- 
terests of their countries, by means of their ideas; 
I simply say that the Italian political men were 
wrong in the concrete case, not to have known 
how to negotiate, in a financial sense, with En- 
glish business men and with American or French 
bankers the solution of our Adriatic problem, as 
the Yugoslavs have more ably and more wisely 
been able to do. It is the mentality, the faith and 
the good-faith in pure principles and in pure 
ideals of Italian political men which frighten and 
terrify me ; because they show me that with those 
principles and ideals, and owing to them my 
country is becoming unarmed and deprived of the 
possibility of offence or defence in the great 
struggle of modern life — which is now, more 
than ever, the struggle for wealth. Wilson is the 
chief exponent of this struggles because he 
represents the richest country on earth. And his 
authority is not derived from ideas, but from the 
reserves of metallic currency which are at the 
back of his ideas and in their paper circulation 
endow them with an absolute value and, in any 
case, with a value greatly superior to that which 
the pages of Plato or of Mazzini ever possessed. 

The fundamental error of Italian policy in the 
war and in peace has been not to have wanted or 
known how to search for, and to find, the inter- 
ests struggling under the architrave of ideas ; worse 
still, not to have put into evidence, not to have 
proclaimed and defended our own particular in- 
terests, coherent and connected with our territo- 



379 



rial aspirations; not to have gathered together 
and co-ordinated round our special interests the 
interests of the stronger; not to have given, in 
fine, a unique, certain and realistic character to 
our war, and apart from the ideological character 
which it assumed and which was continually va- 
cillating and fluttering between the vanities of 
individuals and the fatuous hopes of factions. 
Thus have our political leaders closed the war 
in open discord, and have given the two Hemi- 
spheres an insane exhibition of struggle and di- 
vision, on the very eve of the Congress, on the, 
alas ! democratic problem of the Italian territorial 
boundary in relation to Wilson's American prin- 
ciples; making the world believe in a division 
of the country, which has never existed ; and ac- 
crediting a legend of the imperialism of our na- 
tional policy, which was fated to facilitate all the 
coalitions of interests and tendencies against our 
victory and our future ! 

Thus ended the « democratic war » — wasting 
and dissipating in all its efforts the true, the great, 
the glorious war fought by our people, not for 
the triumph of this or that variable idea, of this 
or that changeable Party, but for the triumph of 
its spirit, which is of divine essence and is eternal, 
and for the triumph of the laws of its existence 
and its civilization which are worth something 
more than the fortune of the electors at political 
meetings or of the elected in Parliament. 

Five hundred thousand killed and as many 
mutilated and wounded, are too many, in truth, 
for the glory of the vague ideas of our democrats 
and for the by no means vague interests of our 
Allies of France and England. 



380 — 



AS IN THE CASE OF GERMANY. 



That which many of us had foreseen has taken 
place. Immediately after the war, the Allies have 
revealed themselves what they were and always 
will be: enemies. All the stage effects of « Latin 
Brotherhood » and of « Liberal and Democratic 
Brootherhood », have fallen at one stroke no 
sooner had the Germans retreated from the fields 
of Northern France and from the threatened lit- 
torals facing England. Those stage effects served 
only whilst on the theatre of the war there still 
remained, as a grisly phantom, the fear of Luden- 
dorFs armies. The fear once dispelled, Italy's 
services could be dispensed with. And Lloyd 
George and Clemenceau pretended not to recogni- 
ze her, and were astonished, rather, to see her 
by their side at the Congress of Paris. 

Italy, in fact, when she did not appear as an 
intruder, was considered as being brought up for 
trial, at the Paris Congress. And her trial is not 
yet over. As swallows returning from the South 
sharpen their eyes to discover on the horizon the 
colour of their nests, so the correspondents of 
Italian newspapers, sharpen their eyes on the 
horizon of the Conference to discover whether 



381 



Fiume and Dalmatia are still in existence ; whilst 
our most important newpapers print as titles and 
in big type the small news of Le Matin or of Le 
Temps or even of U Homme Libre, announcing 
that perhaps to-morrow or next day will happen 
the pleasant surprise, the delivery of the sentence 
of acquittal or of conviction in the case against 
Italy. And to think that those who are now acting 
as Judges have been on the point of being drag- 
ged along to the Kaiser's feet with the rope round 
their necks! And that we inserted our hand be- 
tween the rope and their necks in order to prevent 
the noose from giving the last pull and then letting 
them fall, throttled, into extreme slavery ! But, let 
us forget these miseries ; and let us only think of 
the future. 

At the Congress, then, the Allies have placed 
Italy in a position of indictment. There has not 
been a single question referring to Italy which 
has been discussed by a criterion, I do not say 
of justice or equity, but even of honesty; of that 
elementary honesty which consists, for instance, 
in not stealing the cigarette-case or the pocket- 
book from the travelling companion who offers 
you a cigarette or shows you his passport. There 
has not been a single question of difficulties or 
conflict between her and her rivals, which has 
been considered, I do not say with sympathy, or 
in a friendly manner, but even with that common 
sentiment of reserve and decency which prompts 
persons even of elementary manners not to treat 
in the same way the unfortunate of the pavement 
and the lady who is in mourning for her sons 
killed in war. On the contrary, all the questions 
which were vexatious and offensive to us and 
damaging to our interests and to our security, have 
been reared, cultivated, pruned and grafted on 



382 



to theiTS in order to yield 1 a greater result to our 
detriment in the present and in the future. Think 
of the twice-repeated trick — fortunately avoided 
the second time in consequence of Sonnino's sharp 
refusal — of proposing to submit the question of 
Fiume and Dalmatia to Wilson as sole arbitrator : 
the just Wilson whom we know not only as our 
enemy and the protector of our enemies, but li- 
kewise as the enemy of the Pact of London. 
Think: after six months had elapsed since our 
victory was attained, they were not even disposed 
to guarantee the Pact of London, that is, our War 
Pact, with the excuse that Wilson — who entered 
into the war two years later — was not disposed 
to recognize it. Think, finally, of the concomitant 
missions of M. Allize on behalf of France and of 
General Smuts, on behalf of England, to Vienna 
with the object of creating situations and arousing 
agitations on our borders which would directly 
tend to depreciate and to annul our victory and 
to raise new threats and new wrongs against our 
territorial security and against our economic and 
commercial life. And then draw your own con- 
clusions with reference to the new diplomacy 
inaugurated by the illustrious representatives of 
the Democracy of France, England and the Unit- 
ed States at the Paris Congress — in comparison 
of the old diplomacy of the Central Empires at 
the Congress of Brest -Litowsky. Is there any dif- 
ference between the two? Certainly; but all in 
favour of the Central Empires which declared their 
intention of imposing^ their conditions upon a 
vanquished country, by right of force, and making 
the scale turn with the weight of Htndenburg's 
sword and not by means of the gold bags of inter- 
national banks. I cannot say whether to-morrow 
the world will declare its satisfaction for having 

— 383 — 



caused the fall of two Empires and having instead 
placed three round its neck: the three empires of 
finance; no longer those of Arms and Kultur. 
Ah, it was not for this ! It was not for this, indeed, 
that so many tears have been shed, and so much 
blood has been spilt in the profound abyss of the 
war! 

The Allies do not treat Italy as an enemy in a 
rhetorical sense; but in a real sense; effectively 
and with premeditation. 

In fact, they have adopted for Italy the same 
threat they have adopted for Germany : starvation. 

What do they say to Germany } « If you do not 
sign the Treaty, we will not send you any food ». 

And what are they saying, or causing their 
authorized organs to say to Italy } « If you do not 
bow to our will, we will not send you any more 
grain, nor coal ». The are even saying something 
worse than to Germany : because if they threaten 
Germany to deprive her of food, they threaten to 
deprive us of both food and coal. 

Behold Italy, therefore, victorious Italy at the 
Paris Conference, reduced to the same conditions 
as defeated Germany at Versailles: reduced to 
submit to imposition on the part of her former 
War Allies; that is, on the part of those whom 
she saved from dire ruin; reduced to submit to 
the same imposition which offends Germany: 
either the Treaty as we have made it, or starva- 
tion. I do not know whether Messrs. Lloyd Geor- 
ge and Clemenceau have formed a precise idea 
of the situation they are creating for Italy, and 
whether they intend making history by means of 
these tragic jests. We are very sorry for them 
and for their countries, besides being sorry for 
ourselves and for our country. And without prob- 
ing any further, we restrict ourselves to denounc- 

- 384 - 



ing, to that part of the civilized world which they 
have not yet succeeded in reducing to slavery, 
the barbarous threat which they have dared to 
make against Italy after war and victory. 

Do they delude themselves with the idea that 
Italy is all contained in Signor Orlando's suavity ? 
Or that they can trifle, now, with that suavity as 
Bismarck in 1870 trifled with Thiers* tears which 
were, after all, the tears of defeat ? 

They would fall into the same error as Germany 
on the eve of the war ; and would show how little 
they know of the Italy of the Piave and of Vit- 
torio Veneto. 

No ! Orlando's suavity does not correspond to 
the sentiment of Italy. 

To-day, in the depth of her heart, Italy has the 
bitterness of her Farinata — and of her Crispis. 



385 — 



THE GERMAN THEORY 

AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH ONE. 



In the year 1915 Italy, together with France 
and England, had signed a Treaty — the Treaty 
of London — in which were contained the condi- 
tions of peace after the war. 

In the year 1917 Italy, together with the same 
Powers, France and England, had also signed 
another Treaty, after the Meeting of Saint-jean 
de Maurienne, in which Treaty were contained 
other conditions, concerning the eastern part of 
the Mediterranean, to be put into execution after 
victory. 

Now, what has happened ? 

At the Paris Congress, during a long period of 
five months' duration, France and England re- 
fused to guarantee to Italy the execution of the 
Treaty of London — this refusal being made in 
the name of the American Associate, who had 
signified his intention not to bind himself to terms 
not signed by him — and it was only after the 
secession and the departure of the Italian Dele- 
gates that they declared their decision to meet 
their engagements. And, as to the Treaty of Saint- 
Jean de Maurienne, they thought fit to ignore it 
altogether — in the name of Kerensky who, hav- 

— 386 — 



ing fallen from power, had been unable to adhere 
to it. So that, once in Wilson's name and another 
time in the name of Kerensky, our Allies strove 
to escape — which, in part they actually succeed- 
ed in doing — from the Treaties signed in their 
own names in time of war, and which had been 
concluded for the explicit aims of the war and 
were to represent, after victory, the aims of peace 
itself. 

Well, in the face of this manner in which the 
Powers of the Entente interpret and execute 
Treaties which they have signed, I do not think 
it excessive on my part to state that the Germans, 
since the month of August 1914 and up to the 
present moment, have been most foully slandered 
for their theory on « Scraps of Paper » . 

The theory of the Germans was, at bottom, a 
theory of strategic opportunity, and refejrred, 
besides, to a Treaty of neutrality, dated 1839, 
which the Kingdom of Prussia, and not the Em- 
pire of Germany had originally signed. — « Be- 
lieve me » , said the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, von Jagow, to the Belgian Minister, <( be- 
lieve me, it is with death in her soul that Ger- 
many has resolved upon violating the neutrality 
of your country; and I, personally, feel an im- 
mense sorrow f or_ it. But what is to be done ? It 
is a question of life and death for the Empire. If 
the German armies are not to be placed between 
the anvil and the hammer, they must strike a 
violent blow on the French side, in order to en- 
able them, if need be, to turn against Russia ». 
And in the Reichstag, von Bethmann-Hollweg 
declared in the same sense, and although he con- 
fessed that the was placing himself in contradict- 
ion with the rules of the Law of Nations, that: 
(( Necessity \new no law » . 



387 



But what necessity could our English and 
French Allies have pleaded yesterday, or can 
they plead to-day, for having refused once to 
guarantee the Treaty of London, and for having 
thrown the Treaty of Saint-Jean de Maurienne 
into the waste-paper basket without even looking 
if it were a scrap of paper or a piece of bandage 
torn from a wound? What necessity can they o 
plead which compels them to violate the rules of 
the Law of Nations, as the fear of Russia compel- 
led Germany > Were, perhaps, the armies of 
Venizelos threatening the frontiers of Syria, or 
Mesopotamia or of Egypt, so that France and 
England were justified — in order to save their 
colonial Empires — in tearing up the treaty con- 
cluded with Italy at Saint- Jean de Maurienne, 
and in giving the city of Smyrna (which they had 
agreed to give to Italy) to Venizelos instead, so 
as to induce him to remove his annies from the 
aforesaid frontiers ? And all this whilst Greece 
was hob-nobbing with the German Emperor, and 
Italy was casting her blood and her fortunes into 
the furnace of the war ? 

They have been slandered, the Germans ! 

(( We were compelled » , said von Bethmann- 
Hollweg on August 5th. 1914, in his speech to 
the Reichstag, « we were compelled to override 
the just protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian 
Governments. The wrong — I speak openly — 
the wrong that we are committing we will en- 
deavour to make good as soon as our military 
goal has been reached. Anybody who is threaten- 
ed as we are threatened, and is fighting for his 
highest possessions, can only have one thought 
— how he is to hack his way through... » 

Von Bethmann -Hollweg, therefore, loudly 
proclaimed the wrong he was operating against 
Belgium. 

— 388 — 



Could Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau 
repeat to-day, with words coming equally straight 
from the heart what was said by von Bethmann- 
Hollweg; now that they are tearing away the 
Treaty of Saint-Jean de Maurienne from the 
hands of Signor Sonnino and Signor Orlando, 
and giving it to M. Venizelos ? 

Macchiavelli said — (let not the Italian Dele- 
gates fear that I am awakening the great thought- 
ful Shadow for the purpose of placing them in 
an awkward position) — « that although fraud 
is, by nature, always detestable, yet to employ 
it may sometimes be necessary and even pro- 
ductive of glory: as, for instance, in war » (and 
this can be applied to von Bethmann-Hollweg's 
justification). «But)), he goes on to say, « I do 
not mean that fraud is productive of glory when 
it impels you to break your given word and the 
pacts you have concluded, because although it 
may happen that the State or the Kingdom might 
benefit by it, it will never gain any glory by 
using it » . (Let the Allies see whether these words 
can be applied to their actions). And, lastly, here 
is the rule, a political rule par excellence : « I 
mean the fraud which is employed against an 
enemy who has no confidence in himself: the 
fraud which is essential to the conduct of the 
war ». On the strength of which argument, I ask : 
In the opinion of Messrs. Lloyd George and Cle- 
menceau, is Italy to be considered as an enemy ? 
Or was the Treaty of Saint-Jean de Maurienne 
concluded against enemies ? And if it was con- 
cluded between friends, and was essential to the 
conduct of the war, and not made against the 
signatories of the Treaty, why should the « given 
word and the pacts which have been concluded » 
be now broken ? 



389 



From one moment to another, between one 
shooting-trip and another, Smyrna disappears 
from the Italo-French-English Treaty at the Pa- 
ris Congress, as a roe disappears in a trap. Who 
will ever see it again ? Who will ever pay any 
more attention to it ? Who will ever again speak 
of it, or discuss it? Yet, if you utter the words: 
a Scrap of Paper!)), everybody will reply: 
(( Germany ! » , and everyone will unanimously 
pour imprecations upon the bad-faith of von 
Bethmann-Hollweg and von Jagow. 

They have been slandered, the Germans, most 
foully slandered 1 

A propos of the Paris Congress, when one is 
discussing treaties and stipulations, it means that 
political matters are being discussed, not doct- 
rinaire or sentimental matters. It is !the/refore 
useless to introduce amongst treaties and stipula- 
tions the sentiments of those English and French 
private citizens who are taking their afternoon 
nap, or playing at lawn -tennis and at bridge 
whilst the Delegates of their respective countries 
are building up the stronghold of future European 
discord. Ill -posed questions and ill-defined res- 
ponsibilities are fated to generate, together with 
the greatest misunderstandings, the most grie- 
vous errors and the most heinous crimes in the 
future. Let us therefore put on one side the ideas 
and sentiments of private citizens of France, En- 
gland and even of America, and, instead let us 
consider the action of responsible persons only. 
How is this action evolved ? To what end does 
it aim ? To whose benefit or detriment is it being 
carried out and developed } Up to now — and 
apart from the attitudes and the efficiency of our 
Delegates, which will be judged at the proper 
time — no one can assert that this action has 

— 390 — 



ever been evolved and carried out in favour of 
Italy. The peoples of France, England and Ame- 
rica can become the victims of their own Delega- 
tes, and declare themselves as such, to-morrow; 
as we ourselves are, and assert from this very 
moment that we are ; but without supinely ming- 
ling and confounding names and responsibilities, 
the real fact is this: — that the political lines 
traced out and followed by the Delegates of the 
Allied Powers have never had the time nor the 
opportunity to meet with the Italian lines. And 
what is worse, that at the very point where they 
had' previously been marked and agreed upon, 
they parted company, they separated unexpect- 
edly and knew and recognized each other no 
more: as for instance, in the matter of treaties. 
Therefore, how can Italian public opinion have 
confidence and faith in the friendly spirit of the 
Allies in the solution of questions which form the 
subject of discussion at the Congress, or are 
brought to the discussion of the Congress as new 
and not previously considered, whilst the existen- 
ce and the reasons of those questions which have 
already been solved and donned by existing 
Treaties are doubted; and whilst their execution 
has been submitted to conditions and wills and 
interests absolutely extraneous and irrelevant to 
the original pacts and to the very aims for which 
these pacts were established during the war? 

I pose the problem. To which, perhaps, it is 
no longer worth while to seek a reply. 



391 



THE DIARY OF THE ADRIATIC. 



During the past fortnight, the Adriatic question 
seemed to have been caught in the net of the so- 
called Tardieu compromise. We now learn, in- 
stead, that it is on the point of emerging from 
the meshes of that compromise only to be caught 
in the meshes of another compromise, which the 
President of the United States is elaborating. All 
these nets which the illustrious debaters of the 
Paris Congress are weaving laboriously with the 
intent of catching therein our rights and our fu- 
ture, will pjqbably have no better luck than 
those which would attempt to catch within their 
meshes the vibration of a human brain, or the 
respiration of a human heart. The vital functions 
are not matters for compromises or adjustments. 
One must have the necessary courage, if possible, 
to kill the enemy, or if it is more profitable, to 
kill the friend, by striking him in the chest or in 
the back. Tying him to a corpse is merely a 
torture which seemed to be reserved to the 
gruesome phantasy of those whom the glorious 
descendants of 1 789 are in the habit of calling by 
the infamous names of tyrants or of petty tyrants, 
according to the greater or lesser extension of the 
State while it is under their dominion. 

— 392 - 



One question which I have always posed to 
myself is the following, which I have now the 
honour of submitting to the consideration of polit- 
ical writers and of the Delagates at the Paris 
Congress, if my article happens to have the for- 
tune of falling within their range of vision : — By 
means of what instantaneous or premeditated in- 
spiration have Italy's Allies and the Associate 
found themselves unanimous, at the termination 
of the war, in placing themselves in conflict with 
the Italians of both shores of the Adriatic, and 
on the side of the Croats, in defence of the not 
yet recognized Yugoslavia ? — For, the action of 
the Allies against us was instantaneous and has 
been continuous and uninterrupted, as will be 
demonstrated by the following Diary which I have 
had the patience to compile on the basis of cor- 
respondence which I received during these ex- 
ceedingly long seven months from our colleagues 
on the opposite shore. Can it be possible that the 
news contained in that correspondence was un- 
known to the Government ? And, if known, what 
impression did it produce on its lofty mind ? And 
in the event of its having produced an impression 
of some kind, what action has the Government 
taken in order to avert the resulting perils and 
damage ? These are interrogations which will all 
have to be replied to at some future time. Mean- 
while, after having read the Diary we shall be 
able to draw from them the most sure and the 
most irrefutable inferences. Here is the Diary: 

9th November 1918. — French warships arrive 
at Spalato and furnish a pretext for Yugoslav de- 
monstrations. Those who have taken part in these 
demonstrations tear down the Italian flags, under 
the eyes of the Allies, who look on impassively. 

— 393 — 



November, 1918. — Notwithstanding the con- 
trary advice of the Italian Naval Authorities, the 
French Admiral entrusts the maintenance of pub- 
lic order in Cattaro to the Servian troops. 

November, 1918. — American officers on board 
motor boats encourage, by their conduct, the 
hostility of the Yugoslavs against the Italians. An 
American midshipman passing in front of Spa- 
lato in a motor boat waves a flag with the Yugo- 
slav colours, in sign of salute. 

November, 1918. — The Italian Commander 
of the S.S. Magyaroszag, the Commander of the 
M.A.S. 109, and the Captain of the S.S. Doltin, 
having to lie alongside the Spalato quay, the 
first in order to land some soldiers and sailors 
of the ex- Austrian army and navy, receive an 
intimation from the Harbour Master, Stipanovich, 
to lower the Italian flag^and to hoist a white flag 
at the poop and either the French of Yugoslav 
flag on the foremast, such being the orders of the 
Corfu Government. 

December, 1918. — The French warship Al- 
tair arrives at Zara to inquire into the demon- 
strations on the arrival of the Japanese destroyers. 
The French officers land and hold secret confa- 
bulations with the Yugoslavs : thdy also take 
charge of the latters* letters of protest against the 
Italians. 

November, 1918. — On Nov. 30th., on the oc- 
casion of a vibrating manifestation of Italianhood, 
serious conflicts take place between our compa- 
triots and a group of Croatian roughs. On the 
following Wednesday, the French cruiser Courbet 
presents itself before Zara casting anchor in front 

— 394 — 



of the Yugoslav Casino. The Commander of the 
cruiser requests the Italian representative to sup- 
ply him with information regarding the aforesaid 
incidents, thus assuming the function of an of- 
ficial inquirer. He leaves nothing undone to show 
the Yugoslav population the legitimacy of his 
presence and the efficiency of the military strength 
under his command. 

January, 1919. — At Spalato, the Servian and 
French Headquarters, endeavour in every pos- 
sible manner to hinder the communications be- 
tween the Italians residing in the city and those 
on board the guard ships. The search -light on 
board the French guard-ship is continually turn- 
ed during the night on the stretch of water be- 
tween the quay and the Italian vessel. 

February, 1919. — A French major from Spa- 
lato presents himself at Pygomet and states that 
he has been sent by the Commander-in-chief of 
the French troops in the Seast, to verify if we have 
gone beyond the armistice line. 

February, 1919. — Officers and men of the 
British warship Veronica land at Lissa, where 
they take part in a ball at the Croatian Club. 
They are heard to shout : « Long live Yugosla- 
via ! » , and also : « In a few days you will obtain 
your freedom ! » They promise to return to Lissa. 

Spalato, 9th. March, 1919. — Some agitators 
compel the crew of a sailing ship to lower the 
Italian flag, and persecute the Italian residents 
and Delegates. The Allied Delegates having 
equivocated as to whether an intervention of des- 
troyers was necesary to quell the disorder, ar- 
rangements are made with the American Dele- 

— 395 - 



gate who thought he might induce the Delegates 
to act in unison; but no steps are taken by the 
American. 

March, 1919. — The ex-Austrian S.S. Godello, 
requisitioned by the French authorities, starts a 
passenger and goods service, with evident da- 
mage to our interests and our prestige. The steam - 
eT ought to have been de-requisitioned by the 
French. A steamer belonging to the Spalato- 
Fiume Line is running under the auspices of the 
French Navy for the purpose of winning the 
Croats* favour. 

March, 1919. — Branches of the MusSe du Com- 
merce et de V Industrie, the chief Office of which 
is situated in Paris, 20, Quai de la Megisserie, 
have been opened in A gram and Belgrade. Other 
Agencies will be opened in Spalato, Scadro and 
Serajevo. 

Spalato. — At Spalato, a Croatian instigator 
spits upon an Italian officer, He is arrested and 
brought up for trial on an American warship. 
The Croat is sentenced to one day's imprison- 
ment and a fine of 10 Kroners, that is, 4 Italian 
Lire, amidst general laughter! 

March, 1919. — The proposal of the Italian 
Admiral to occupy Spalato with international 
forces in view of a revolutionary movement is 
rejected by the Delegates, who declare their enti- 
re confidence in the Servian troops and consider 
thefm sufficient, together with detachments of 
international troops to maintain order. 

Spalato, March, 1919. — The French Delegate 
makes an application for a regular requisition of 



396 



steamers at Scutari and Skedra, which have al- 
ready been requisitioned by us. 

The American and English Delegates in the 
name of their Governments express an opinion 
contrary to that of our Government, and assert 
the right of the Committee to decide upon and 
to sanction all requisitions effected after Decem- 
ber 21st. 

March. — The French Delegate in the name 
of his Government makes an inquiry on the state 
of the warships which were being built in the 
various ship-building yards on the ex-Austrian 
coast occupied by us. 

March, 1919. — Extracts from an inquiry made 
by an Italian Admiral, and his impressions on the 
political and military situation at Spalato, and 
on the conditions of the armistice: « M. Kestli 
« declares that he is Governor of the whole of 
(( Dalmatia by order of the Belgrade Government. 
(( The other Members are considered as mere 
(( employes. 

(( The Provisional Government instituted ac- 
(( cording to Article 6 of the conditions of Armi- 
(( stice is considered as non-existing. The Servian 
(( Government has literally taken possession of 
(( the place, and its action has been sanctioned 
« by the Americans and the French. The Ser- 
« vian Government considers the territory which 
<( has been entrusted to the Americans by the Al- 
« lies, as if it were definitely annexed to Serbia. 
« General Vasich has been appointed military 
(( Delegate for Serbia to the local Government. 

« The action taken by the Superior Naval 
(( Command of the United States up to the end 
« of February can be resumed as follows : 



397 



a) No control whatever over the Provisional 
Government, nor over the Press. A tacit tolera- 
tion of the most vulgar insults inflicted upon one 
of the Allies : Italy. 

b) No measures taken against the insults to 
the Italian flag. 

c) Proposals for the removal of Italian war- 
ships. 

d) No notice taken of the nationalities of the 
fallen Austro-Hungarian Empire. 

e) No decisions taken nor any energy shown 
on several occasions when the prestige of the 
Italian flag and the good name of the Italians 
and of the Allies themselves have been seriously 
damaged. 

Admiral Niblach, the Delegate of the Adriatic 
Interallied Commission, since the month of Fe- 
bruary and immediately after his arrival at Spa- 
lato, has taken up the Superior Naval Command 
also. He does not consider himself as the man- 
datory of the Allied Powers for the application 
of the conditions of the Armistice, because, in 
his opinion, these conditions have nothing to do 
with this zone; as the zone is contested; and, be- 
sides, he has openly declared that this part of 
Dalmatia has been recognized as belonging to 
Serbia. 

March, 1919. — The Italian Delegate ascertains 
that the terms of the Armistice are not being 
complied with. His views are not upheld by the 
other Delegates. He presents a Minute noting 
the non-compliance. The other Delegates do not 
accept a proposal, advanced hy him, of an in- 
terallied occupation to prevent possible riots. 



398 



March, 1919. — An inquiry is made with re- 
ference to the incidents which took place on 
March 9th., between Italian sailors and an insti- 
gator, by a Commission composed of the Com- 
manders of the Allied warships. A Minute of 
the inquiry is drawn up, but it is not accepted by 
the Italian Delegate, the conclusions being un- 
favourable to the Italians. 

April, 1919. — The French Delegate issues a 
Communique stating that his Government has 
ordered that the ex- Austro -Hungarian steamer 
Godollo, which had been requisitioned by the 
French Government, should be assigned to mi- 
litary traffic, and also to the transportation of 
goods and passengers. This measure practically 
tends to the re-establishment of the Hungaro- 
Croatian Setamship Company, under the protec- 
tion of the French flag. 

March, 1919. — The S.S. Lusley, which is 
under requisition by the British Government, 
surreptitiously attempts to land correspondence 
and newspapers, which, however, are seized. 

April, 1919. — The American authorities at 
Spalato make a census of the Italian population. 
They consider as Italian only those persons born 
in the kingdom of Italy, and take no notice of 
those born in Dalmatia and of those who, from 
choice, are Italian. The result of the census will 
not represent the real situation. 

May, 1919. — A naphta-vessel having on board 
a French naval commander and crew hoists the 
French flag only, whereas by a decision of the 
Committee of Admirals it has been established 



399 



that that vessel also should hoist the interallied 
flag, together with the French flag. 

May, 1919. — The arrival of the Servian Band 
at Spalato affords the opportunity for demon- 
strations of a serious nature against Italy, accom- 
panied by insults against Italian officers and non- 
commissioned officers who are passing in the 
streets. « Long live Wilson ! » and « Down with 
Italy ! » was shouted. From the balcony of the 
Municipal Palace, Servian and Allied officers 
look on at these manifestations. The American 
Commander offers apologies, and promises to 
ask for the recall of the French Commander. 

May, 1919. — The officers of the British war- 
ship Ceres are continually present at meetings 
held in the Yugoslav Club at Zara, although the 
presence of the vessel is not justified. The Yu- 
goslavs had been previously informed of the 
forthcoming arrival of the vessel. 

I have suppressed from this Diary many odious 
episodes of a personal character, and have only 
left those of a political nature, in order not to go 
beyond the line which I have traced for my de- 
monstration, and within which I intend rigidly to 
contain my discussion. 

It is clear by the afore mentioned facts, that 
there is a method in all the action of our Allies ; 
a method corresponding to a well determined 
aim, to a well-arranged and harmonized pro- 
gramme. There are no doubts, no uncertainties, 
no misunderstandings and, much less, dissen- 
sions between our Allies of France and England 
and the Associate, Wilson, on the Adriatic pro- 
blem : there is something more than concordance 

- 400 — 



between them; there is uniformity of views, unity 
of assertion and unity in the means and the end ; 
which is to prevent Italy from becoming mistress 
of the Adriatic; and to impede her from finding, 
by herself and by the expansive force of her 
liberty and her trade, the way to come into 
agreement with the Balkan peoples commencing 
from her closest neighbours, the Yugoslavs. 
Whence the design of creating at her side the 
perpetual anxiety and preoccupation about Yugo- 
slavia, which is rendered still more acute, still 
more poisonous, still more engrossing and resist- 
ing owing to the Allies* political strength and 
financial power. But who can seriously imagine 
that at the very hour in which they are cutting 
up in quarters the fat ox of Asia and of Africa 
to prepare them for their Homeric banquet ; and 
that, whilst in the ports, on the rivers and on the 
mountains of continents they are gaily strutting 
it as conquerors, three great Powers like France, 
England and the United States by means of its 
President, are likewise sitting for months and 
months with their heads bent over the microscope 
endeavouring^ to discern the Croatian bacilli in 
the blood of Istria and Dalmatia; if, under this 
toilsome work there were not hidden an idea and 
an interest far superior to the reasons of life of 
those bacilli ? 

The unpardonable fault of the Italian Govern- 
ment was that of not having seen or even looked- 
for for what was in the soul and in the mind of 
the Allies during four years of daily contact and 
daily transactions with them; of not having felt 
or understood from the many signs which blurred 
the atmosphere the scarcely concealed drama of 
the Alliance ; and of having appeared at the Con- 
ference with its soul in a state of candour and 

— 401 — 



with a flower in its button -hole, without even 
suspecting the storm which was brewing and 
which would' soon upset that candour and brush 
away that flower. 

The Italian Government remained for seven 
months seated at the green table without under- 
standing anything of the game which was being 
played, or of the style of the players. And per- 
haps even now it is illuding itself that its part- 
ners are showing it their cards. But those cards 
are merely the geographical maps drawn by 
Mr. Wilson's experts. 

To-day, after seven months, there emerge, one 
following the other, none but compromises which 
only serve to tangle the threads of the question 
and to mingle them in a way which will render 
the finding of the knot impossible. And you will 
see in the end — if there will be an end — that 
no solution can be acceptable because no com- 
promise can ever be possible in regard to the 
absolute. And the right of Fiume of deciding 
of her own fate is the absolute — against which 
the formal logic and the formal diplomacy of the 
Allies will inevitably break their horns. 

Furthermore, as it is happening in our quest- 
ion, so will it happen in all the other questions 
which are lying waiting to be solved before the 
Congress of Paris, which, as one can plainly see, 
is not arriving and cannot arrive at any decisive 
result, because it is acting and enacting outside 
the pale of the laws of history and the teachings 
of reality. 



402 



CONTENTS 











Pag. 


To the Heroes of the Adriatic . . 5 


La dame aux camelias 








15 


Antwerp mount Lowcen 








19 


Some truths .... 








24 


Upper and lower Adriatic . 








28 


The Germans and the Adriatic . 








32 


Still to substract : Turkey and Greece 








38 


The journey to Paris . 








42 


Beyond democracy 










46 


Respectable diplomacy 


. 








51 


A year after 










55 


Seeking new frontiers . 


m 








60 


Beyond the names of men and the vanity of parties 64 


The captains of anabasis and the ministers of the entente 69 


The march to victory ....... 74 


The disturbing bluff . 










78 


Facts noted . 










84 


Old words and old ideas 










89 


The truth, the whole truth 










95 


Dedicated to count Liitzow 










102 


Things transatlantic 










109 


A reply to Liitzow 


t , 








116 


Peace or preparedness? 










. 125 


Italy ad the Allies 










131 


The war of the alps . 


, 








138 


The unsquareable circle 










142 


Albania and « Le Temps » 










. 148 


Austria in Geneva 










154 


The pact of silence 


. 








160 



-403 



The prejudices about Austria 

Public diplomacy . 

Wanted: a little distrust 

Von Biilow's and Rizov's Bulgaria 

Kant's hour and the Allies' hour 

The order of the day states... 

In the furrow of victory 

Signifer, statue signum 

For Italy, after the victory . 

The end of a taboo .... 

On the road to Versailles . 

Italy and her Allies .... 

Our principles and the aims of others 

The hour of crisis 

After signor Bissolati's interview 

The Pact of Rome and the Pola swindle 

Some quotations from Cavour 

Italy and the League of Nations 

The attitudes ..... 

The Kaiser's successors 

A lesser and worse Austria 

The same old story .... 

The neglected factor of the Paris Congress 

A little more discretion, please! 

An exponent 

On the eve of decisions 

Germans and Yugoslavs 

Business is business 

To act by experience 

And if not, no! . 

Old stuff . 

At the last moment 

Their profits at our expense 

The spirts and the letter of the Treaty of London 

« Noblesse oblige » 

The democratic war! . 

As in the case of Germany 

The german theory and the anglo-french one 

The diary of the Adriatic .... 



\ V 
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404 



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